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ABSTRACT 
DIASPORIC BELONGING:  
THE LIFE-WORLDS AND LANGUAGE PRACTICES  
OF MUSLIM YOUTH FROM MARSEILLE 
Cécile Anne Marguerite Evers 
Asif Agha 
Stanton Wortham 
 Since the 1980s, when it became clear that immigrants from France’s ex-
colonies were likely to settle with their families in France, the French have 
repeatedly questioned the cultural compatibility of Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants with French Republican values. Recent security concerns about 
Islamic terrorism in Western countries have reinflamed this debate about French 
Muslims’ “assimilability,” albeit with a novel focus on the cultural aﬃliations of 
French Muslim youth, in particular. The French State and politicians are 
concerned about survey data showing that, even as such youth have acceded to 
legal citizenship, they nevertheless exhibit a greater adherence to Islamic norms 
and more numerous transnational links than their parents’ or grandparents’ 
generations, and may, for these reasons, pose a threat to French sovereignty. 
This dissertation investigates these top-down claims of French Muslim youth’s 
unprecedented religiosity and transnationalism, seeking to ethnographically test 
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the veracity of such hypotheses and to oﬀer a more nuanced, historically 
emplaced account of youth’s cultural identifications and practices.  
 Based on long-term research with youth ages 13 to 30 who grew up in 
North, West, and East African Muslim households in Marseille’s northern 
housing projects, I demonstrate that such youth embody various emic forms of 
belonging to France, many of which stretch mainstream definitions of what 
constitutes Frenchness. Through ethnographic observation of these youth while 
they partook in Arabic classes, spent time with their peers and family, and 
navigated public space, this work reveals that youth more often perform local 
cultural belonging than are accorded French cultural citizenship, or the right to 
be seen and heard as French within the public sphere. I document the forms of 
alienation from Marseille that youth experience as a result, quite notable among 
them a gendered reverse migration phenomenon whereby orthodox-identified 
Muslim young women are planning to leave Marseille for their parents’ home 
countries and the Gulf States. Two further foci of the dissertation are the role of 
Arabic language education, both publicly provided and denominational, in 
shaping youth’s cultural trajectories, and also the analysis of youth’s language 
practices. I contend that, as diasporic youth draw upon—and play with—
standard and non-standard varieties of French and Arabic, they aﬀord the 
!vii
listener unique insight into where they are coming from and where they are 
headed, or their life-worlds and aspirations.  
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NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
 Throughout this manuscript, I rely on the MSA transcription standards of 
the American Library Association-Library of Congress (c.f., reference list) when 
transliterating Arabic. A left-facing apostrophe is used to indicate the letter ’ayn 
(ع) and a right-facing one is used for the letter hamzah (ء). Personal names with 
Arabic sources are spelled according to the owner’s preference if known, and 
according to MSA conventions if unknown. Terms in MSA are italicized within 
the body of the text. The sole exception is words familiar to general readership 
(e.g., Sunni, Koran, Muslim, Mecca, Medinah, Wahhabi, Salafi, Sharia), for 
which I use English conventions. 
 Other conventions of note are that I italicize languages other than English 
(e.g., French, MSA, etc.) throughout the body of the text, and that for my 
transcripts I make selective use of Schegloﬀ ’s (2007) discourse analytic 
conventions. Within the transcripts, International Phonetic Alphabet 
transcriptions are indicated by phonetic [brackets], while overlapping speech 
across speaker turns is shown with {curly brackets}. I provide the French 
original versions of my participants’ quotes, and their dates of occurrence, in 
footnotes in most chapters except Chapter Two, given its introductory nature.  
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I. Citizenship, Belonging, and Language 
among Marseille’s Diasporic Youth 
I. Introduction 
 They spoke French perfectly.  This is how Coco, one of the cartoonists at 
Charlie Hebdo, described the Kouachi brothers who terrorized the newspapers’ 
headquarters on January 7th, 2015 (L’Internaute, 1-7-2015). One of the people 
taken hostage on November 7th, 2016, during the attacks on the Bataclan 
concert hall, in turn aﬃrmed that his assailants “spoke entirely in French, with 
barely a dash of a North African accent, nothing more” (L’Humanité, 
11-17-2016).  Language surfaces early on in these witnesses’ accounts because 1
how we speak is believed to be a window onto where we call home and who we 
are. As Belgian poet-singer Julos Beaucarne sings (1980), “An accent is good. It’s 
a whole country unfurling from one’s mouth, with its houses, its forests, its 
paths, its factories. And in a voice, all one’s anxieties. Where are you coming 
from? Where are you going?”  Investigations would later reveal that the men 2
 “Le tout en français, avec à peine une pointe d’accent nord-africain, mais sans 1
plus” (L’Humanité, 11-17-2016). 
 “C’est bon l’accent. C’est tout un pays qui sort d’une bouche, avec ses maisons, ses forêts, ses 2
sentiers, ses usines. Et puis dans les voix toutes les angoisses. D’où viens-tu? Où vas-
tu?” (Beaucarne, 1980). 
!1
responsible for both strings of Parisian attacks were French-born individuals. 
The Frenchness of their speech, as judged by the witnesses above, ultimately 
proved a reliable indicator of their nationalities, though not of their cultural and 
political visions. Indeed, their cultural identifications assumed a trajectory 
leading away from their nationalities and legal citizenships; they were going 
somewhere other than where they were coming from, in the words of 
Beaucarne.  
 Events like these in France, along with the July 7th, 2005 bombing of the 
London Underground train system, likewise perpetrated by locally born men, 
have alerted Europeans to the potential for European nationals to wish—and act
—to disrupt the sovereign integrity of their birth countries. My study did not 
center on such individuals, who in fact represent a microscopic slice of the 
demographic describable as French Muslim youth. I begin by addressing them, 
however, because the disjuncture they embody, between being French citizens 
and yet feeling animosity rather than belonging towards France, introduces  
terminology key to understanding the French Muslim youth around whom my 
study did revolve, all of whom, like the lion’s share of Muslims in France, 
cultivated perfectly benign dreams for the future. To capture the experiences of 
the youth appearing in these pages, I elaborate a three-way terminological 
distinction. When I speak about youth’s French nationality and legal citizenship, 
!2
I refer to their de jure, passport-holding relationship to the French nation and 
the kinds of rights it bestows: freedom of movement across borders, political 
involvement, state protection, etc. Beside this more objective measure is a more 
subjective measure of Frenchness. This is the Frenchness that is personally 
claimed or decided upon, which I term cultural belonging. An individual’s claims 
to Frenchness can be subtracted from, however, by others failing to publicly 
recognize them as culturally French. The practice of measuring the cultural 
Frenchness of others was illustrated, for instance, by Coco when she oﬀered that 
the Kouachi brothers spoke French perfectly, or by the man taken hostage when 
he remarked that his takers spoke entirely in French, with barely a touch of a North 
African accent, nothing more. Thus, a third dimension of Frenchness is cultural 
citizenship, which I define as the right to be seen and heard as French in one’s 
public interactions with others.  
 In what follows, I examine the histories and political dimensions of each 
of these three relationships to France—nationality and legal citizenship, cultural 
belonging, and cultural citizenship—as they apply today to French Muslim 
youth, in particular. In Section II below, I recount how French Republican 
citizenship has been formulated as a privileging of the body politic’s needs over 
individual cultural diﬀerences: first, during the French revolutionary era; second, 
during the Third Republic; and thirdly, during the citizenship and national 
!3
identity debates that have lasted from the 1980s to present. Towards the latter 
part of this discussion, I dote especially on contemporary political 
representations of French Muslim youth as, either, occupiers of French space or, 
alternatively, a demographic experiencing cultural upheaval of various sorts. 
Subsequently, in Section III, I detail my research participants, sites, ethnographic 
methods, and analytical tools. Section IV concludes with an overview of the 
dissertation’s chapters. Each of them assumes a diﬀerent vantage on a central 
problematique: why were these diasporic youth, who were by and large legal 
French citizens and also experienced themselves as locals to Marseille or else 
French in a more cosmopolitan sense, nevertheless frequently denied cultural 
citizenship by Marseille’s ethnically French (de souche) inhabitants, as well as 
actors and programs working on behalf of the French State?  
II. French Republican Citizenship: What Kind of Collectivity? 
 The particular mark of French Republican citizenship, since its initial 
formulation in 1789, has been a tension between a tendency towards the liberal 
autonomy of the individual, on the one hand, and a focus on the social and 
political collectivity, on the other (Laborde, 2004; Young, 1989). The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, for instance, outlined a model 
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of French citizenship structured around an unconditional right to private 
property, but also  around the right (and duty) to participate politically in the 
State’s deliberations alongside fellow citizens. The first three articles of the 
Declaration set up this initial tension between individual and collectivity in the 
definition of the citizen:  
“(1) All men are born and remain free, and have equal rights. Social distinctions are 
unjustifiable except insofar as they may serve the common good. (2) The purpose of 
political association is to preserve the natural and inalienable rights of man, i.e., liberty, 
private property, the inviolability of the person, and the right to resist oppression. (3) 
Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation as a whole; no group or individual can 
exercise any authority not expressly delegated to it or him.” (Osmańczyk & Mango, 
2003, p. 1937) 
Whereas the freedom to be a proprietor was individually assured, political 
liberty—of the sort sought by the subjects of the feudal, ecclesiastical, and 
monarchical Old Regime, with its unequal privileges—depended upon concerted 
political participation. Political rights had to be claimed equally by each individual 
in order to eﬀectively combat despotism. The citizen was, in a word, “a subject 
who rises up (qui se relève)” at the side of other citizens (Balibar, 1991[1984], p. 
40). Linguistic propaganda during the First Republic (1792-1804) evinced a 
similar emphasis on fighting oppression by finding a unified political voice. A 
document from June 4th, 1794 entitled “An invitation from the National 
Convention to the French people, to speak only French,” identified French as the 
language of citizens’ accession to the Republic:  
!5
Citizens, you detest political federalism, swear oﬀ linguistic federalism. Language should 
be like the Republic: from North to South, throughout French territory, the ways of 
speaking, like the hearts, must be in unison. These diverse dialects have gushed from 
the impure spring of feudalism. This fact alone should make them odious to you. They 
are the last ring in the chain with which tyranny bound you. Hurry to break it. Free men, 
put aside the language of slaves, to adopt the language of liberty. (Kibbee [Trans.], 
n.d.).    3
In summary, this early formulation of French citizenship, though it placed 
certain rights, like the right to private property, fully in the hands of the 
individual, likewise demonstrated a keenness for individual, mainly political, 
rights that were meant to be exercised en masse.  
 This emphasis on freedom from tyranny through joint political 
participation was meaningfully influenced by the mid-18th century writings of 
Jean Jacques Rousseau on the general will. I briefly touch on Rousseau’s 
influential position here in order to prefigure the later triumph, at two key 
moments in the history of thinking about French citizenship, of the collective 
over the individualistic understanding of the citizen. In The Social Contract, 
Rousseau (1993[1762]) leads with an argument about human nature. Man, 
according to him, is a ratiocinative being who resolves that his self-preservation 
is of utmost importance: “…as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the 
sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes 
his own master” (p. 181). Rousseau then proposes an analogy, between the 
 My thanks go to Robert Moore for sharing Douglas Kibbee’s translation of this archival 3
document with me. 
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family as the model of the first political unit and the French Republic. He 
deduces that, much as children find it in their self-interest to surrender their 
independence to their father in exchange for protection, adults, too, recognize 
the advantages of “a form of association which will defend and protect with the 
whole common force the person and goods of each associate” (p. 191). Thus, 
man trades away his “primitive independence” (p. 187), alienating his liberty, in 
Rousseau’s idiom, for the sake of self-preservation. By Rousseau’s theory of the 
social contract, as such, people abstain from their individual personalities and 
predilections in order to partake in, and yoke themselves to, a self-governing 
“Republic or body politic” that looks out for the common good (p. 192). For a 
variety of reasons discussed below, this theoretical bequest from Rousseau 
would later resurface at two decisive junctures in French Republican history: 
first, during the Third Republic (1870-1940), and second, in the 1980s. Each of 
these two periods was characterized by a deepening of France’s relationship with 
foreigners, first abroad, then at home, circumstances that prompted France to 
reexamine the modalities of French citizenship. 
Citizenship in the Third Republic 
 The Third Republic, which lasted from 1870 to 1940, witnessed vigorous 
French imperialism, in Africa, the Caribbean and South America, Southeast 
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Asia, and Oceania, progressive changes in road and rail infrastructure (c.f., 
Weber, 1976), the First World War, and Fawzive labor immigration to France. 
Casualties from the Franco-Prussian War (1870) and World War I, coupled with 
a demographic stagnation in France more generally, had led to a dire need for 
men to work in France’s industries and the army (Camiscioli, 2009).  4
Legislation enabling immigration followed suit, and by 1931 the population of 
foreigners, mainly from Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Spain, residing in France 
numbered 2,715,000, 6.6% of France’s total population, over the 381,000 in 
1851, totaling 1.1% (Schain, 2008, p. 40). It was in fact to strengthen France’s 
military ranks that one of the first pieces of legislation on naturalization, the 
Law of June 26th, 1889, was drafted (McGovney, 1911). With this law, French 
legislators repealed naturalization based on descent, or jus sanguinis, and 
instituted jus soli naturalization, allowing those born to foreign parents on 
French soil to acquire French nationality at legal maturity. During World War I, a 
further 662,000 immigrant workers were recruited to man France’s war-time 
industries, half of whom were from Western Europe and another half of whom 
came from France’s colonies (i.e., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,  Indochina) and 
China (Nogaro & Weil, 1933). The individuals from France’s colonies, many of 
 Childers (2003) registers France as having the lowest birth rate in the world at the end of the 4
19th century. 
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whom fought the Great War in France’s name (c.f., Fogarty, 2008), were 
excluded from full citizenship rights, as were their “French” brethren back 
home, totaling an estimated sixty million across France’s colonial holdings 
(Lewis, 1962).  It was within this three-fold context, of private and public 5
industry recruiting hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers to work in France, 
the strategic naturalization of these workers’ French-born children, and the 
exclusion of “native” Frenchmen overseas from citizenship status, that the 
Rousseauean core of French citizenship, that of the collective cemented by the 
will of individuals to participate in politics, was reiterated, only with culturally 
particular overtones.   
 In a lecture given by the rationalist Ernest Renan in 1882, he 
distinguishes between the French form of nationalism, which he claims is 
grounded in people’s “daily plebiscite” (1990, p. 19), and the German form of 
nationalism, in which the “ethnographic principle” of the Volk, or German race, 
“is substituted for a national one” (p. 13). He deplores the latter and lauds the 
French nation’s basis in “a spiritual principle,” namely, “the will to perpetuate 
the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (p. 19). 
 The French treatment of the people in their colonies varied by case. Senegal, for instance, was 5
unusual in the extension of rights like the vote and education to inhabitants of its four 
Communes. Even so, Commune inhabitants had to meet certain requirements in order to access 
such rights (c.f., Diouf, 1998). Because colonial Algeria was a French département, Algerians had 
the option to become French nationals, starting in 1880, and citizens, in 1958, but always 
pending requirements (P. Silverstein, 2008; Weil, 2008).
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This heritage, he specifies, is neither linguistic, nor ethnoracial, nor religious. 
Rather, it lies in the French people’s common memory of the “great deeds”of the 
past and “the wish to perform still more” (p. 19). At the very time Renan was 
speaking, however, was the individual’s simple wish to participate politically or 
perpetuate great deeds enough to assure him or her citizenship in the French 
nation? Certainly, for the foreigners, French women, and colonial subjects who 
lived during the Third Republic, a profession of faith in Republican civic 
principles was not suﬃcient to guarantee them membership in the sacred 
collectivity described by Renan.  Cultural and ethnic heritage, rather, 6
represented “the anthropological minimum” (Mehta, 1999, p. 63) mediating 
individuals’ access to French citizenship. 
 In sum, thus far I have described how, during the Third Republic, French 
thinkers and politicos were challenged by the country’s intensifying ties with 
foreigners and newly French people overseas to account for the less-than-
universal scope of their citizenship. I used Renan’s thesis as a case study of how, 
in response, the French appealed again to Rousseau’s concept of a general will 
that rises above ethnographic particularities and personal interests. In addition 
to further belaboring the political nature of ties between the individual and the 
Republic, Renan’s writing underscores the quasi-religious, moral terms in which 
 Suﬀrage for women was not granted in France until 1944. 6
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such political arguments were couched. The subtext of such appeals to the 
general will was that “groups judged not capable of adopting that general point 
of view” (Young, 1989, p. 251), or individuals deemed likely to fail the test of 
civic faith in the French union (Citron, 1987), could be excluded in practice 
from French citizenship and yet not impair its ideals.  Now, prior to moving into 
the citizenship debates of the 1980s, I discuss two brief historical examples of 
how individuals who were in fact denied French citizenship viewed their 
exclusion from the Third Republic. These examples will aid in fleshing out the 
distinction between legal citizenship, cultural belonging, and cultural 
citizenship.  
 A first example shows how the residents of France’s overseas départements, 
who were French nationals but not legal citizens, desired citizen status because 
of the cultural belonging they felt to France. At the International Colonial 
Congress of Paris in 1889, on the centennial of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen, a man named Alexandre Isaac, who was a French-educated 
native of the Antilles and a Senator in the French département of Guadeloupe, 
took the floor to denounce contradictions in the document’s application. He 
stated:  
“I cannot understand how (…) between a colonizing people and the inhabitants of the 
colonial country there should be only a relationship of domination; that the customs, the 
language, the knowledge of the European nations are a reserved patrimony which the 
natives should not be permitted to touch; that, finally, in the external territories of 
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which these nations have taken possession, there should be only subjects, never 
citizens.” (Lewis, 1962, p. 139). 
Senator Isaac sought to convince those attending the congress that, at least for 
the case with which he was most familiar, that of the West Indies, the cultural 
and linguistic assimilation of islanders had proceeded to such a point that it 
would be nothing short of logical to continue their assimilation in constitutional 
terms (Lewis, 1962). The incorporation of colonial residents into the French 
“community of interests” stood to benefit the metropolis, thought Isaac, not 
least because such individuals bore the spirit of the French nation aloft: 
Should not a colony be considered, even after a conquest, once the traces of violence 
have been eﬀaced, as a fraction of the national individuality, which is linked to the 
original country by bonds of aﬀection as well as by a community of interests?” (Lewis, 
1962, p. 142). 
A second example illustrates how, for such non-citizen individuals linked to 
France, their feeling of cultural belonging stood in stark contrast to how they 
were regarded by the native French people they encountered, who denied them 
not only legal but also cultural citizenship.  
 Upon his visit to Marseille in 1929, Ludovic Naudeau, a traveling 
journalist working for a Parisian weekly, waxed nostalgic about a city whose 
revolutionary commitment to progress and civilization heaved under the weight 
of a foreign worker population. Naudeau’s reflections and encounters with 
members of the worker population, which in the early inter-war years exceeded 
a quarter of the city’s inhabitants (López & Témime, 1989), reveal that whereas 
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the workers considered themselves locals, the French were likely to consider 
them foreigners. Naudeau reports, for instance, on a stirring story told him by 
an old-timing Marseillais. The Marseillais, who was trying to locate a particular 
foreigner, visited a building where foreigners were rumored to live. Much to his 
surprise, when he queried the building's residents about the whereabouts of the 
foreign man he sought, they replied, “there aren’t any foreigners in this place; 
we are all Italian” (p. 201). Having likely been in Marseille for many years, the 
residents considered themselves locals, if of the Italian persuasion. Naudeau 
himself is in turns impressed by the French fluency and mannerisms exhibited 
by the local population of non-white people, and then bewildered by their sheer 
numbers. Mostly, his piece reads as a distressed account of the city’s ethnic 
diversification: would not Marseille’s autochthonous population be genetically 
swept away by "all those sidis, all those gingerbread-faced people (à figure de pain 
d’épice), all those brothers from the coasts, all those blackies (noirauds)… that 
enormous allogeneic mass that only continues to densify" (1929, p. 200)? His 
closing sentence blends admonishment of what the future could hold with a 
reminder of France’s past agreements on the constitutive marks of the French 
soul: “I dare not try to envisage with any clarity by which signs will manifest, 
here, a hundred years from now, what we have agreed to call the French soul. 
No! I dare not!” (p. 202).  
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 Naudeau’s travel bulletin, together with Senator Isaac’s hints at the 
limited scope of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, are worth 
examining insofar as they expose the thick web of cultural and ethnic pre-
conditions that undergirded French Republican citizenship as it was understood 
during the Third Republic. These anecdotes reveal that access to French 
citizenship, in either of the dimensions I have delineated, legal or cultural, 
depended on more than simply a “daily plebiscite” (Renan, 1990, p. 19), despite 
much oratory to the contrary. “Foreigners” with ties to France, whether they 
lived in a French département abroad or labored in the Hexagon, performed and 
claimed Frenchness, and still they were not acknowledged as potential fellow 
citizens. An examination of Renan and Naudeau’s writing demonstrates how 
they draw on Rousseauean ideas to sanctify the political collectivity, which they 
refer to as France’s “spiritual principle” or “soul,” and also to selectively 
establish certain individual cultural diﬀerences as detracting from this union’s 
moral integrity. By couching their rejection of cultural and ethnic diﬀerence in 
terms of people’s supposed inability to contribute civically, such writers were 
eﬀectively able to sustain the French citizenship construct’s veneer of 
universality. In practice, meanwhile, the distribution of French citizenship 
privileged a French ethnic and cultural order. Nowhere was the reality of ethnic 
barriers to French citizenship clearer, additionally, than in the stories here 
!14
presented of foreigners (and, in some cases, French nationals) who, despite 
identifying culturally or politically with France, were deprived of public 
recognition as legal or cultural citizens of France.  
The Citizenship and National Identity Debates, 1980s - Present 
 The previous section demonstrated how, between 1870 and 1940, French 
nationality, citizenship, and cultural belonging often proved not to be 
overlapping, congruent processes. This section dwells on another formative 
moment in the history of French citizenship, beginning in the 1980s and 
continuing to present. Marking the end of economic immigration to France, this 
period ushered in a debate about the settled immigrant population, their 
children, and more specifically, these populations’ right not only to French 
nationality but also to legal as well as cultural “citizenship in France” (Balibar, 
1984, p. 1752).  Weil (2008) identifies this period as the third iteration of the 7
relationship between citizenship and nationality. In the first period, under the 
French Revolution, citizenship was primary, and nationality was derivative of 
being a citizen. The second period, lasting from the beginning of the 19th 
century to the 1980s, decoupled nationality from citizenship, and focused more 
squarely on how foreigners’ personal circumstances interacted with policy 
 Balibar (1984) compares this to the “right to French citizenship” per se, as debated during the 7
French colonial period, for instance (p. 1752). 
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frameworks for nationality (e.g., jus sanguinis until 1889, jus soli afterwards). 
Nationality during this period, moreover, did not necessarily pave the way to 
citizenship, as illustrated by the case of French indigenous residents of certain 
colonial départements and French women (until 1944) who, though French 
nationals, lacked equal access to certain civic rights, like the vote or education. 
The third period, beginning in the 1980s and continuing to present, reinstated 
the reciprocal relationship between nationality and citizenship, only now 
assuring that legal citizenship was derivative of nationality. In what follows, I 
chronicle the dynamics leading up to the creation of a new consensus about 
citizenship during this most recent period and explain in what sense the 
contemporary citizenship construct is classically Republican. Through a 
discussion of the terms in which both the political left and right couch their 
discourses on integration, and specifically that of French Muslim youth, I set the 
stage for my own study and research question, which are described in the 
following section.  
 If the French need for man-power after World War II resembled that of 
World War I and the inter-war years, the circumstances under which foreigners 
arrived and lived in France during the second half of the 20th century 
nevertheless diﬀered considerably from the earlier period of immigration. For 
one, worker populations increasingly became settled communities. Ordinances 
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from 1945 made it possible for laborers to remain in France past the duration of 
their work contracts, and the family reunification (regroupement familiale) Decree 
of April 29th, 1976 would increase the relative proportion of women and 
children to men, as compared with the previous decades (Schain, 2008). 
Secondly, decolonization and the end of the War in Algeria in 1962 eﬀected a 
shift in the demographic balance of immigrants: by 1982, immigrants from 
Africa and Asia outnumbered those from Europe (ibid.).  Thirdly, to address the 8
housing shortage created by relatively fluid decades of immigration and family 
reunification, large-scale construction of government-subsidized worker housing 
began in the 1960s and 1970s, under the aegis of the National Society for the 
Construction of Worker Housing (SONACOTRA). These public housing 
projects, known as Habitations à Loyer Modéré, came to replace most of the hostel 
accommodations in which male workers had been living since the start of 
immigration (Hargreaves, 2007).     9
 Economic and political dynamics converged in the 1970s to reverse the 
flexible immigration policy of the years since World War II. On the one hand, 
 Schain (2008, p. 49) reports that, in 1982, foreigners from the European Community resident 8
in France numbered 1,580,000, whereas 2,100,000 foreigners from outside the European 
Community were registered. This demographic shift frustrated the National Immigration 
Oﬃce’s (ONI) eﬀorts to favor people arriving from European countries over those arriving from 
Africa and Asia.  
 Hargreaves (2007) notes that, according to a census by INSEE, in 1990 there were 100,000 9
individuals, 85% of whom were Africans and most of whom were men, still living in hostel 
accommodations. 
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the world economy’s Fawzive contraction in the early 1970s put an end to the 
economically prosperous years (Les Trente Glorieuses) France had enjoyed since 
World War II, drying France’s thirst for foreign labor. On the other, 1974 saw the 
election of a centrist-conservative president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.  
Giscard d’Estaing’s administration exerted a conservative influence on 
immigration policy, proposing for instance to forcibly return 100,000 foreigners 
per year, many of whom were Algerians, to their countries of origin (Weil, 
1991). He was denied a second term, however, defeated by French social-
democrat François Mitterand in 1981, who remained in the presidency until 
1995.  The socialist party’s tenure in oﬃce would nevertheless be marked by 10
significant power sharing with the political right. A right-wing coalition achieved 
victory in the 1983 municipal elections, and again in 1986 during elections for 
the National Assembly, prompting President Mitterand to appoint right-leaning 
Jacques Chirac to Prime Minister in 1986. Despite these political hands-oﬀs, 
both parties perceived the necessity of hammering out an across-the-political-
spectrum consensus on immigration policy.  
 Consensus was to emerge on the legislative front first. In May of 1984, 
the National Assembly unanimously voted in a law that had the following three 
 Mitterand is France’s longest-serving president and remained in the presidency for two full 10
seven-year year terms. In 2000, a referendum reduced the presidential term to five years. 
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eﬀects. First, it dismantled previous plans by which foreigners would have been 
forced to leave France. Second, it limited all further immigration only to the 
families of those presently installed in France, refugees, and students. Third, the 
law granted ten-year residency permits to adults already in France, regardless of 
employment status or national origin (Taguieﬀ & Weil, 1990; Weil, 2008). The 
post-immigration context of the mid-1980s also gave way to another, more 
subtle kind of consensus; namely; the emergence of a dominant idiom, among 
French political elites as well as academics, for discussing cultural diversity 
within France. On television and in oﬃcial documents, politicians from across 
the aisle urged France’s ethnic minorities to harness their cultural diversity, 
confining it to the private sphere, for the sake of a more socially and morally 
cohesive union. Gesturing to this idiom’s resuscitation of a classically 
Republican focus on national unison, Weil (1991) characterizes this unusual 
merger between politicians as “the new Republican synthesis” (p. 187).  
 This discourse of Republican citizenship and cultural integration was 
surprising in the agreement shown by its proponents as well as its timing. The 
neo-Republican turn in political discourse followed hard upon the heels of the 
anti-colonial identity struggles of the 1960s and the multiculturalist “right to 
diﬀerence” movement of the 1970s and early 1980s (c.f., Giordan, 1982), not to 
mention its consolidation during a democratic-socialist presidency. Favell (1998) 
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oﬀers convincing reasons, however, as to why it was at this time in particular 
that the integration of immigrants, and especially Muslim immigrants, became 
“the epicenter of party political debate and positioning, and the key test-site for 
the continued validity of Republican ideals” (p. 48). If the question of 
immigrants’ compatibility with the French national identity was much 
politicized during these years, Favell estimates this was not because France 
eﬀectively “discovered” the Islamic cultural traditions of its immigrant 
population at this time, or because of competition over scarce jobs.  Rather, in 11
the mid-1980s France was in the throes of questioning its political sovereignty 
as a nation-state. Following the general trend taking hold of Europe at the time, 
France was liberalizing its financial markets, deregulating business, and 
pursuing transnational policy frameworks for security and the economy, like 
those proposed by the European Community. France’s political sovereignty and 
national unity were, thus, already facing challenges when the far-right National 
Front party hit its political stride in the 1983 municipal elections. This 
unprecedented political success gave a platform to the National Front’s concerns 
about the divisive influence of immigrants, and specifically Muslims, on France’s 
cultural, ethnic, and political cohesion.  
 In 1989, three girls entered their middle school wearing headscarves. Although the State 11
Council eventually ruled in favor of the girls’ right to wear the headscarf, this event, known as 
the “scarf aﬀair,” fueled a Fawzive debate in favor and against the girls’ decision, one which 
reignited whenever Islam became politicized, like after 9/11 (Bowen, 2009).  
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 Although the National Front never achieved preponderance in the 
electorate, with electoral successes falling between 10-25% over the past thirty 
years, the binary they helped to erect, between a national unity based in 
Republican principles and a dangerous cultural pluralism, gained remarkable 
traction across the political spectrum in the mid-1980s and continues to 
reverberate throughout French political discourse today. The Republican concept 
of French citizenship that crystallized in the 1980s, which required citizens to 
restrict mores perceived as culturally diﬀerent to the private sphere, was, again, 
articulated in the Rousseauean idiom of a need to defend the body politic from 
partition and corruption. This logic of citizens needing to defend the French 
national identity was not an altogether new one though, and Taguieﬀ and Weil 
(1990) trace it—along with some of its stereotypical roles: foreigner, invader, 
patriot, collaborator—to the “political mythology” (p. 101) of the Vichy Regime 
(1940-1944). Only the threats have drastically changed; with indulgence in 
individualism and cultural singularities representing the contemporary 
“disturbances of the collective order” (Durkheim, 1951[1897], p. 246). Below, I 
compare how recent political discourse from the right and the left has portrayed 
the nature of “the threat.” I contend that political representations of French 
youth from Muslim families, as, alternately, "occupiers" of French space 
(according to the right), or a "lost generation” (according to the left), share in a 
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deep-seated fear of social “anomy” (Durkheim, 1951[1897], p. 254) and are, 
hence, inhibited from attending to the ways in which youth display cultural 
rootedness.   
The Political Right and the Left Speak to Diversity within France: “Homesick at Home” 
versus “The Lost Generation” 
   Each year since 2007, on French television, tele-journalist and anti-
racism activist Rokhaya Diallo awards (or rather, projects) “golden bananas” to 
politicians who contribute to racist stereotypy through their public speech. The 
satirical Y'a Bon ceremony confers awards with names like “the Super Patriot 
Award,” “the Barely Veiled Racism Award,” and “In the Good Ole Times of the 
Colony Award” upon unsuspecting politicians and public figures. In 2013, then-
President of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement Party (UMP) Jean-
François Copé eked out a victory over several competitors for “the Lost 
Territories of the Republic Award.”  Copé delivered the comments warranting 12
his selection on October 5th, 2012, while on the campaign trail for presidency of 
UMP. He revealed his despair at certain swaths of France:   
“...those neighborhoods where certain of our compatriots, mothers and fathers 
whose exasperation I can understand, upon returning home from work in the 
evening, learn that their son had his pain au chocolat torn from him by thugs (voyous) 
as he was leaving school, who explain to him that ‘we don't eat during Ramadan.’ 
There are some French families that live their suﬀering in silence, and to whom no 
 The original award titles are Prix Super-Patriote, Prix Racisme à Peine Voilé, Prix Au Bon Vieux Temps 12
des Colonies, and Prix Territoires Perdus de la République. 
!22
one speaks, except to stigmatize them and insult them with every name in the book, 
to the point that today they are obliged to hang their heads and to leave, if they can, 
as far as possible, despite the fact that they are citizens of the Republic.” (Le 
Parisien, 10.6.12) 
Above and beyond equating those who keep Ramadan with thugs, in these now 
famous remarks Copé hints that such petty thieves have come to speak for the 
French Republic. They presuppose a Republic within which their Islamic norms 
are customary, as indicated by their speech in the first-person plural (on, "we"). 
Forms of punishment for infringing such norms, we learn, include the 
expropriation of old staples of French baking, like the pain au chocolat, from the 
clutches of wide-eyed schoolboys. Copé’s depiction, in which diasporic Muslim 
youth occupy French space and cause French “natives” (français de souche) to lose 
their bearings and evacuate, pervades right-leaning political discourse. The left 
also speaks in terms of a disorientation, interestingly, only the roles of victim 
and perpetrator are reversed in their discourse. In the eyes of the French left, it 
is diasporic Muslim youth who undergo a destabilization process, whether 
because of cultural disjunctures with their parents’ generation, or due to French 
institutions’ failure to deliver socioeconomic equality. Below, I touch on each of 
these two circulating portrayals of French society in turn and discuss how both 
are haunted by the specter of a Durkheimian anomic disintegration.  
 Copé’s political candy-gram from Ms. Diallo was named after an edited 
volume entitled Les Territoires Perdus de la République (Brenner, 2002). Indeed, the 
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threat Copé introduces, of authentic French cultural values shrinking in 
jurisdiction, is also the thematic kernel of Brenner’s book. The volume 
assembles the accounts of a dozen schoolteachers and principals who attest to a 
climate of anti-semitism, racism, sexism, and violence unfurling in the heartland 
of the French Republic, the French public school system. This “new 
doxa” (Brenner, 2002, p. 54) is spearheaded by France's new “nous, the children 
of the Arabo-African immigration” (p. 69). Thus, one author reports that a gang 
of Franco-Maghrebi girls thrashed two thirteen-year old girls on the steps of a 
Jewish private school in Aubervilliers. Several express disbelief at how, on 
September 12th, 2001, some students extolled Al-Qaeda for its role in weakening 
the U.S.-Israeli axis against Palestine. Yet another teacher recounts his 
disturbance when, during a history lesson on World War II, a handful of pupils 
praised Hitler. The book’s contributors, in sum, warn of home-grown French 
values—like those of the Republican triptych: egalité, fraternité, liberté—receding 
in the wake of an “Islamic advance” (p. 43). This text exemplifies the social 
phenomenon Cohen (1980) has termed a moral panic, when “a condition, 
episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests; its nature presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media” (p. 9). 
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 The propos of another writer, novelist Richard Millet, establishes that the 
right’s moral panic about Muslim youth is laced through, additionally, with an 
anxiety about people of color. During an appearance on public television channel 
France 3 in 2012, Millet commented on his perceived transformation into an 
ethnic minority within France:  
“I would like, no, not to play the devil’s advocate, but I would like to depart from 
another position, that of my singularity. What am I? I am an ethnically French person 
(un français de souche). ((raises both hands, palms forward)) How dreadful (quelle horreur)! 
Catholic. How dreadful!. Heterosexual. How dreadful! I have everything going against 
me. I would like to say, for example, that I am haunted by the question of identity, not 
only my identity but also the national identity. How dreadful too, of course. I would like 
to say, for example, that I take the RER [subway] on a quotidian basis. For me, the 
Châtelet-Les-Halles station at 6 in the evening is an absolute nightmare, especially when 
I am the only white person. So, am I allowed to say that or not? Is it playing along with 
the National Front, Mr. Guéant, or who knows who. No! There is pain for me associated 
with having to ask myself which country I am in, ethnically, racially, religiously, 
etc.” (2.7.12) 
In a short essay entitled “Chronique № 3” that appeared on his personal website 
two years later, Millet further fleshed out the nature of his dismay upon passing 
through the Châtelet-Les-Halles subway terminal: 
“French civilization is dead at Châtelet-les-Halles, I thought, the other night, around six, 
at the moment when, for lack of another option, I entered into that human mustiness 
(remugle), all races and ethnicities confounded in one feverish body in search of social 
legitimacy (…) This post-racial laboratory, this accelerator of multicultural particles, this 
uterus of the radical inversion of all values, was able to produce nothing more than that 
characteristic state of contemporary servitude in which the human forgets himself to the 
point that he begins to smile internally, in the Babelian swarm where each ignores the 
other while keeping him under close watch, dreading to be assimilated into the mystical 
body of the French nation, which is dead nonetheless.” (Millet, 18.12.14) 
Millet paints an apocalyptic canvas in which, now that those once seeking entry 
to the French nation have been admitted, the ethnically French come to doubt 
their place, and whether they still want to partake, in “the mystical body of the 
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French nation.” The French motherland’s adoption of ethno-racially diverse 
individuals turns the “normal” order of aﬀairs on its head: as France draws her 
adopted children closer to her bosom, now her biological children feel estranged, 
their just complaints at this treatment now grounds for others’ exclamations of 
“quelle horreur!”  
 This strategy of depicting a radically inverted world reappears throughout 
right-wing discourse. Philosopher and Académie Française member Alain 
Finkielkraut, for instance, explained the prevailing mood in France to New York 
Times journalist Rachel Donadio with the description, “people are homesick at 
home” (Donadio, 1.8.15).  With these words, Finkielkraut implied that an 13
unspoken force had transformed the French landscape, making it  
unrecognizable to those who call it home. Finkielkraut’s comments show 
distinct similarities to the rhetoric used in the 1980s by radical right-wing 
Germans who were against the presence of Turkish guest workers. In the 
infamous Heidelberg Manifesto, for instance, a circle of professors expressed 
their fears that Turks were irreversibly transforming the German people, 
language, culture, and religion. They cautioned that “Many Germans already feel 
foreign in their own neighborhoods, workplaces, and homeland in 
 This interview took place, quite by coincidence, two days prior to the terrorist attack by a pair 13
of young Frenchmen of Algerian descent on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. 
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general” (Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007, p. 112). This kind of account, 
whereby locals and foreigners switch places due to an “invasion” by the latter, 
has long been popular with the far-right National Front party in France as well. 
In 2010, Marine Le Pen, who was then campaigning to become the president of 
the National Front, likened Muslims’ Friday prayers in the city of Lyon to an 
occupation of French territory: “Sure, there aren’t any tanks. There aren’t any 
soldiers. But it’s an occupation all the same, and it weighs on the residents” (Le 
Figaro, 12.11.10). To summarize, politicians and writers speaking from France’s 
political right bear in common a tendency to narrate themselves as silenced, 
dispossessed, occupied, and lost. These predicaments are, furthermore, typically 
identified as bred by the presence of Muslims and people of color in France.  
 Discourse from the political left partakes in a parallel idiom of loss and 
disorientation, only the demographic portrayed as straining to return to its 
bearings, in this case, is French Muslim youth themselves. Only a couple of 
weeks prior to Copé’s remarks on the campaign trail about Muslim youth 
stealing pains au chocolat, the leftist weekly Marianne circulated an installment 
about the abject circumstances under which French Muslim youth live in 
Northern Marseille (Marianne, 10.15.12). This issue of Marianne came to my 
attention the same way as most, with its headlines— “Marseille, lost territory of 
the Republic: Delinquency, unemployment, poverty, corruption”— beckoning to 
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me from the windows of the café (and horse-race betting shop) at the foot of my 
apartment building. The 8 a.m. lineup at the café, with punters from all walks of 
life riveted to the television screen and the café owner alternating between 
brewing coﬀees and taking bets, set a vivid backdrop to the article's potemkin 
tale of a city doing its best to dissimulate the likes of gerrymandering, hashish 
rings, mafia vendettas (to the tune of nineteen homicides since the beginning of 
the year), and destitution beneath the town’s aﬄuent sectors and world-class 
attractions. The city had become irrecuperable due to “decades of disastrous 
policies” (n.p.), noted the article. Those who suﬀered disproportionately from 
the “apartheid-era” socioeconomic gap resulting from this mismanagement, 
however, were the immigrant and immigrant-descendant inhabitants living in 
the city’s northern quarters, who were lacking employment, transportation, and 
security (n.p.). The author all but sounds the death knell for the city, concluding 
that Marseille’s government oﬃcials have left residents roaming “free of their 
moorings and of any authority” (n.p.). The article’s explanation that such forms 
of social agitation result from a lack of imposed authority harks back once more 
to Durkheim’s (1951[1897]) theory of anomy, or normlessness. According to 
Durkheim, delinquent practices can be seen as resulting from a break-down in 
the amount of social regulation to which people are subject. Below, I present 
studies undertaken by leftist sociologists and state-funded statistical institutes 
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that have followed this line of reasoning further, identifying various failed forms 
of social regulation thought to have set diasporic youth, in particular, adrift.  
 A sociological study by Lagrange (2010), carried out in the project of Le 
Val Fourré in Paris’ western suburbs, identified higher percentages of secondary 
school failure, delinquency, and joblessness among male adolescents of 
Maghrebi and West African descent specifically. Lagrange traces the diﬃculties 
faced by male youth raised in West African families, in particular,  to African 14
mothers’ relative lack of parental authority over them compared to fathers and 
both parents’ diﬃculty at being educational role models for their sons. The 
establishment of healthy relationships between mother and son, argues 
Lagrange, would be aided by “empowerment policies” designed to help women 
“extend their activities…and develop their autonomy” (p. 25). Whereas 
Lagrange looks to weak filial relationships as the source of youth’s instability, 
others like Brouard and Tiberj (2005) identify disproportionate unemployment 
as the primary characteristic distinguishing youth raised in Muslim (African and 
Turkish) households from other French youth.  The authors are of the mind 15
that the youth from these households that they studied did not consistently 
 Lagrange singles out the countries of the Western Sahel, Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali, and 14
also the countries near the Gulf of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Benin, Togo, the 
Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 Brouard and Tiberj’s (2005) study was based on survey data collected from two samples of 15
people: one of 1006 ethnically French people above 18 years of age, and one of 1003 people 
above 18 years of age, born to Maghrebi, African, and Turkish parents. 
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share in a common aﬃliation or practice of Islam. They report great variation in 
their sample population’s responses on this count. They conclude, rather, that 
the main sense in which youth from Muslim households could be seen as 
“communitarian” (p. 121) lies in their joint economic marginalization from 
mainstream society.  
 Another much larger survey-based study, conducted by National Institute 
for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute for 
Demographic Studies (INED) in 2010, yielded findings about the religiosity of 
second and third-generation youth in France that contradicted Brouard and 
Tiberj’s conclusions. The “Trajectories and Origins,” or TeO, study was 
administered to 9,600 immigrant descendant youth and 9,600 first-generation 
immigrants (INSEE & INED, 2010). It revealed that the French Muslim youth in 
the sample exhibited greater religiosity and transnationality than either, non-
Muslim descendants of other religious backgrounds, or their first-generation 
parents. Religiosity was evaluated on Likert scale responses to questions like “do 
you attend religious events” and “do you wear religious paraphernalia?,” while 
conclusions about transnationality were drawn from responses to questions like 
“where do you want to be buried,” “how frequently do you visit your parents’ 
home country,” “do you stay in touch via online media,” “do you vote there,” 
and “do you send remittances?” Lagrange (2010) hailed the TeO study’s findings 
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as indicative of a reverse secularization phenomenon, whereby, since the end of 
the 1960s, each generation of Muslims in France has increased its adherence to 
Islamic norms over the former.  
 Although the TeO study’s authors do not oﬀer any causal explanations for 
these trends among French Muslim youth, they nonetheless flag two other, 
possibly related, tendencies that disproportionately aﬀect immigrant 
descendants from Muslim households. The first is these individuals’ greater risk 
of finding themselves unemployed compared to the ethnically French: 
“For descendants of immigrants from Turkey (1.3), sub-Saharan Africa (1.7), Morocco or 
Tunisia (1.6), Algeria (1.8), and for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (1.7) and 
Algeria (1.8), the risk of unemployment is significantly greater than that of [ethnically 
French] natives.” (INSEE & INED, 2010, p. 59)  16
The second trend is for these same individuals, descendants of immigrants from 
the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey, to report a greater likelihood of 
racist encounters, of being refused employment for unjust reasons, and of being 
questioned about their “real” origins despite being born in France. The authors 
conclude that “these discriminations are essentially an issue relating to visible 
minorities” (p. 131).  
 To summarize, this appraisal of discourse from the French left has 
allowed a glimpse into the left’s portrayal of French Muslim youth as a “lost 
 The numbers within parentheses correspond to these individuals’ risk of being unemployed 16
compared to the mainstream French population. In all cases, immigrant descendants of these 
origins are at greater risk of being unemployed; in some cases, their risk is almost twice as great. 
The sample looked at immigrant descendants aged 18 to 50.  
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generation,” teetering on the edge of lawless anomie. The causes proposed to 
account for their unmooring are various: lack of parental supervision, few 
employment opportunities, racial discrimination. A general account seems to 
have emerged, however, of the results of such anomy; namely, that youth react 
to their relative freedom and unmet expectations by veering towards strict 
observance of Islamic norms for conduct. In the upcoming section, I describe 
how through my research project I have endeavored to rectify this 
understanding of French Muslim youth as culturally lost or afloat.     
III. This Study: The Scope of the Inquiry, Sites, and Methods 
 My dissertation research consists of an ethnography in which I examined 
the forms of cultural belonging youth from Muslim households in Marseille 
performed on a daily basis. Over fourteen months, between 2012 and 2013, I 
documented the cultural as well as linguistic dimensions of how individuals in 
several youth friendship-groups positioned themselves, whether with respect to 
their diasporic peers, their immigrant parents, or mainstream society and State 
institutions in Marseille. My goal in undertaking this research was to trouble the 
State’s homogenization of French-Muslim youth: as a demographic moving 
homogeneously towards religiosity and transnationalism. By examining youth’s 
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speech practices—both what they said and how they said it—I learned a great 
deal about what religiosity and transnationalism signified for them personally. 
Specifically, I found that youth’s concepts and practices relating to religiosity and 
transnationalism held little similarity to those described in the survey-based 
literature, where the behaviors in which such youth engage are typically 
designated as “foreign” or being at odds with France.  
 Rather, youth nurtured aspirational trajectories that, while they may have 
involved Islam and transnational movement, were nevertheless solidly crafted in 
the byways of Marseille. Nowhere was the local nature of youth’s personal 
aspirations more clearly reflected, furthermore, than in the language varieties 
they selected to index their identities. The youth who partook in my research 
drew on both, family and peer-learned non-standard repertoires of Marseillais 
French, dialectal Arabic, and other heritage languages (e.g., Wolof, Comorian), 
as well as standard repertoires of Arabic and French learned in French schools 
and neighborhood prayer rooms, when projecting images of themselves as pious 
cosmopolitan Muslims or savvy project (quartiers) dwellers. After conducting this 
research, it is my contention that immigrant descendants in Marseille exhibit a 
host of signs indicating their cultural belonging. It is, quite evidently, when 
others do not recognize such youth to belong, denying them cultural citizenship, 
that youth experience varying measures of alienation from home.   
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Data Collection: Sites and Analysis 
 Marseille provided the ideal research site in which to investigate the 
aspirations and identities of diasporic youth born to Muslim families. Marseille 
is France’s second-largest commune, with 859,543 people, of whom 34,776 are 
Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian nationals, 11,774 are sub-Saharan African 
nationals, 61,281 are French by acquisition, and 725,689 are French-born 
(INSEE, 2008).  Since at least de-colonization, it has also sheltered generations 17
of immigrants from Muslim countries in North, West, and East Africa, a fact 
that makes of Marseille today home to many young people with diasporic ties 
(Sayad, Jordi, & Témime, 1989). Marseille’s Muslim communities are thus 
longstanding and highly active in community, educational, and worship activities 
throughout the city’s diﬀerent neighborhoods, as evidenced for example by the 
plethora of Muslim community associations (e.g., Institut Méditerranéen 
d'Études Musulmanes, Union des Familles Musulmanes, Association des 
Travailleurs Algériens), the existence of private Muslim primary and secondary 
schools, locally produced Muslim radio programming (Radio Galère, Radio 
Gazelle), and the current struggle to build Marseille a central mosque (Le 
Monde, 10.27.11). 
 These INSEE figures do not account for the large number of undocumented immigrants of 17
various origins living and working in Marseille, nor for numbers of immigrant descendants. 
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 The majority of the sixty or so youth, aged thirteen to thirty, with whom I 
carried out this research were young men and women I met through the 
educational institutions in which they were enrolled, whether for full-time 
school or for elective classes at night or on the weekends. Thanks to personal 
connections I made within Marseille’s public school system and in a handful of 
private Islamic organizations with didactic missions, I was able to spend time 
with youth, as well as adults, in these settings, and also render my services as a 
part-time Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and English teacher. The main 
educational settings and groups of people with which I carried out ethnographic 
research, continuously over the 2012-2013 academic year and during the 
adjoining summers, are the following:  
1.  I observed MSA and French language arts classes two-three times weekly at 
a public collège (secondary school) located in Marseille’s northerly 16th 
arrondissement. There, I followed students in the bilingual French-MSA track 
who were in grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème, and 3ème , though the students I became 
most familiar with were those in 3ème, which is to say fourteen-year old 
students finishing their last year before high school. I accompanied this class 
on a school field-trip to Paris and also spent time with the students and the 
MSA teacher after school and on the weekends. 
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2. A second site where I conducted research was a private Muslim secondary 
school or collège, likewise located in Marseille’s northern neighborhoods, in 
the 15th arrondissement. As a part-time English teacher at this school, I became 
acquainted with students in all four grades (i.e., 6ème, 5ème, 4ème, and 3ème), aged 
11 to 14. My time at this school likewise involved participation in 
community and worship activities as well as a week-long trip to London with 
the 3ème class in April, 2013.  
3. At the local public university, a further group of participants comprised 
young, highly devout Muslim women in their first and second years in the 
MSA bachelor degree program. With this group of female friends, I attended 
various MSA classes at the University, tajwīd  classes and Friday prayers at a 18
nearby mosque, Muslim speaker events, and recreational activities such as 
Muslim sisters’ parties, meals, and hiking.  
4. Observation and several interviews were likewise conducted with 
administrative and teaching personnel in the three above-mentioned 
institutions. At the public secondary school, I interviewed and frequented a 
handful of the teachers. I also met several times with the woman who served 
as the academic inspector for MSA classes in this school as well as in other 
schools across Southern France. At the private Muslim secondary school, I 
 MSA tajwīd refers to classes in Koranic elocution.18
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interviewed teachers, administrative personnel, recess monitors, and 
religious leaders present in the school community and also observed classes 
other than my own (i.e., MSA, Islamic Studies, French language arts). At the 
public university, I interviewed one of the principal professors in the MSA 
degree program.  
5. Remaining spheres of participation included attendance at the adult MSA 
classes of a Muslim community center (3rd arrondissement), tutoring high 
school students in various languages at the Union des Familles Musulmanes 
downtown (1st arrondissement), teaching a once-weekly adult MSA class to 
adult French and heritage-language (Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian) 
speakers at a secular community center downtown (2nd arrondissement), and 
weekly Wednesday outings with 12-16 years olds who attended this same 
community center. In addition to my interactions with youth in these spaces, 
I also interviewed adults with whom they spent much of their time, 
including their parents and siblings, community members, and school and 
community center monitors.  
 The methods of investigation for this research were qualitative, combining 
traditional ethnographic methods for data gathering, including participant 
observation, semi-formal interviews (Briggs, 1986), document collection, and 
the writing of field notes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), with discourse 
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analysis and linguistic anthropological techniques for collecting and analyzing 
data, as well as the gathering of video footage and data from youth’s social 
media interactions.  I recorded my participants’ speech with a professional-19
grade digital voice recorder and used a regular video camera and a tripod to 
capture video footage, when necessary.  The speech data I collected represented 20
a mix of interviews and spontaneous speech behavior, allowing me to mine my 
participants’ speech for examples of reflexive social activity, or metapragmatic 
discourse, as well as speech tokens “in action,” or pragmatics (M. Silverstein, 
1976). When analyzing my data, I transcribed audio with the aid of a 
transcription pedal and the softwares ExpressScribe, and video with the software 
InqScribe. When the need arose to analyze speech in a more phonetically 
detailed way, I used the audio-editing application Audacity and the acoustic-
analysis software Praat. Most of my phonetic transcriptions using the 
International Phonetic Alphabet remain impressionistic, however, leading me to 
believe that, given more work, further information could be gleaned from more 
precise transcriptions in the future. As for the conceptual tools I employ to 
analyze my data, I provide more information about each of these tools when, in 
the course of my chapters, they present themselves as useful to the cases at 
 As per IRB regulations, youth signed consent for each of these types of data collection. 19
 Approximately one-hundred hours of audio data were recorded and fifteen hours of video 20
data.
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hand. A final note is that the overwhelming majority of my research participants 
preferred to have their real names appear in this work. To respect their wishes 
and yet maintain a semblance of confidentiality, I have omitted people’s last 
names. I have also, of course, used pseudonyms when people did not want their 
first names mentioned or when the material they provided was politically 
sensitive. 
VI. Overview of Dissertation 
 This chapter explored the divide between a France that grants legal 
citizenship and yet occasionally withholds other, more subtle, sorts of 
recognition, like cultural citizenship, from diasporic youth. Chapter Two is a 
short ethnographic chapter that serves as a complement to Chapter One. In 
Chapter Two, I introduce some of my research participants and show, via three 
ethnographic snippets, how diasporic youth from Marseille are constructed by 
others as “foreign” or “un-French.” Chapter Three, in turn, focuses in on the 
daily lives and cultural practices of a group of students who attend a public 
school MSA class in Marseille’s 16th arrondissement. This chapter demonstrates 
that these young men and women express various emic guises of cultural 
belonging to Marseille, even if these manifestations may not always match the 
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mainstream French population’s definition of Frenchness. Chapter Four turns to 
address how youth from the same MSA class negotiated their relationships with 
people from their parents’ home countries and also ethnically French people 
from more aﬄuent parts of Marseille. In Chapter Five, I examine the experiences 
of diasporic youth from Marseille who identify as orthodox Sunnis. There, I 
analyze the alienation youth report in regards to their home town, its gendered 
nature, and the measures some orthodox young women are taking to remedy 
their lack of a sense of home. Chapter Six presents an in-depth look at the social 
ramifications of a particular educational initiative, begun in 2012 by Marseille’s 
Ministry of Education, whereby a new, revamped kind of MSA was being taught 
to local youth from Muslim households. Chapter Seven, finally, attends to how 
certain gender ideologies, prevalent among the students in the MSA class from 
Chapters Three and Four and the orthodox-identified youth presented in 
Chapter Five, aﬀected these respective groups’ feelings about what kinds of 
language were appropriate or inappropriate to use, and were in turn influenced 
by these youth’s socialization into Islamic norms about sexuality and modesty.  
 Taken together, my hope is that the chapters of this dissertation provide 
the reader with a more nuanced, multi-faceted view of how diasporic youth in 
Marseille position themselves, whether vis-à-vis their home town, their parents 
and their parents’ countries of origin, and the French State and France’s 
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mainstream population. This work also places special emphasis on youth’s 
language practices. This is because I found such practices to aﬀord unique 
insight into youth’s life-worlds and aspirations, helping to answer questions 
about where they were coming from and where they were headed. My optimistic 
perspective is that any step towards increasing general familiarity with the 
experiences of such youth will, over time, aid in brightening their futures.   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II. Snippets from Contemporary Marseille: 
Cultural Belonging without Cultural 
Citizenship 
I. Introduction 
 This section introduces some of the key dynamics taking place among 
social groups in Marseille. How does the city’s mainstream population perceive 
the diasporic youth with whom they are generally unfamiliar? How do ethnically 
French adults who work with such youth in the public school system understand 
their behavior and aspirations? Also, how do sub-populations of diasporic youth 
perceive one another? The three anecdotes I narrate will begin to describe a 
dichotomy that will be more fully fleshed out in subsequent chapters, between 
outsiders’ perceptions of diasporic youth as foreign or wayward individuals, and 
their own sense of themselves as belonging culturally within France. The three 
interactions I analyze provide examples of how particular listeners went about 
judging the cultural aﬃliations of diasporic youth, often with reference to their 
speech, but also, quite probably, in response to certain visual signs, like youth’s 
appearance. I propose that the accuracy of a listener’s judgement about a 
speaker’s identity and intentions is mediated by their social proximity to that 
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speaker, and also by their past experiences with ethnic others. I show how, in 
other words, diasporic young people’s foreignness or Frenchness resided 
primarily in the ears and eyes of their beholders. 
II. A Drive with a Cabbie from Marseille: “A Connotation of the 
Maghreb” 
 On a crisp morning in November, 2012, I toted my suitcase to the Place 
de la Joliette and got in the only waiting taxi. Speeding along the empty freeway 
towards the airport, the driver was interested to learn that I lived in the 
neighborhood of La Joliette but am originally from San Francisco. He 
volunteered that “seventy percent of people that work in, or, that come to La 
Joliette are people exterior to Marseille.” He told me that people arrived by fast 
train or plane, often from Paris, because of the growing business opportunities 
in the neighborhood. La Joliette, we were both aware, has since 1995 been the 
target of a seven billion dollar, mostly private urban renewal project called 
l’Euroméditerranée. Historical buildings tied to the docks of La Joliette’s port 
are undergoing Fawzive renovations, as are its Haussmannian boulevards (e.g., 
Rue de la République, Boulevard des Dames, Boulevard de Paris). This 
commercial investment and beautification has placed La Joliette back on a par 
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with downtown Marseille (le Centre Ville), spelling an expansion of the city’s 
center to include previously industrial areas. For many, this reorientation of La 
Joliette, away from its historical links to industry and port activities, and 
towards the city’s civic center and Marseille’s bourgeoisie (Roncayolo, 1996), 
has been accompanied by no small degree of nostalgia. La Joliette is no longer 
cloaked in blue, as Albert Londres (1929) described it upon his visit, referring to  
the dockers of all ilk stationed at its docks and bars in their coveralls. Whereas 
for the past 150 years La Joliette has housed mostly working-class immigrants, 
and, at key moments, also refugees (Attard-Maraninchi & Témime, 1989), in the 
past couple of years its has become agleam in glass buildings, banks, hotels, and 
restaurants. From Monday to Friday, well-dressed workers file in and out of 
silvery oﬃce buildings and restaurants with lunch-only hours, returning to their 
home cities in the evenings or on the weekends and leaving La Joliette to the 
few original inhabitants who can still aﬀord to live there.  
     The driver, himself a descendant of Neapolitan immigrants to 
Marseille, continued with his reflections on Marseille’s shifting demographics. 
“Marseille’s population today has little in common with its population in the 
1960s” (c.f., Transcript 2.1). Given our previous discussion, I assumed he was 
referencing the gentrification of La Joliette. I inquired whether he saw “a change 
in accent” as a result. To this, he gave an enthusiastic yes, only he went on to 
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describe, not the more standard (or français d’oïl) French accents accompanying 
the Parisians and other urbanites commuting to La Joliette (Trimaille & 
Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013), but the Maghreb-connoted speech of youth from “the 
banlieues,” or peripheral suburbs.  
Transcript 2.1.  Changing Demographics 21
The driver’s reference to youth from Marseille’s banlieue puzzled me, particularly 
because, unlike Paris or other French cities, Marseille never developed a true 
banlieue. Instead, the housing projects clustering at its northern and southern-
most extremities remain within Marseille’s municipality (Donzel; 1995; 
Roncayolo, 1996). I asked the driver for clarification about what he called a 
 This interview dates from 11-12-12. 21
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French Original English Translation
Driver: La population qui fait Marseille 
maintenant n’a plus rien à vo::ir avec une 
population des année:: des années soixantes. 
Cécile: Mhm, mhm, et vous voyez un accent-
pardon, et vous voyez un changement dans 
l’accent?  
Driver: Oh oui! Oui, oui, oui, les gens 
maintenant, du fait de la mixité ont un accent qui 
est, disons, de banlieue. Nous on le ressent parce 
que- ((windy))  
Cécile: -Qui est plus quoi?  
Driver: Qui est plus un accent de jeunes de 
banlieues-  
Cécile: -Aha-  
Driver: -!Que de Marseille. Il y en a de 
l’intonation… Ils ont une façon de parler qui est 
plu:s ((clicks against teeth)), on dirait qui est pl-y 
a plus de connotation de…du-du Maghreb.
Driver: Marseille’s population today has 
little in common with its population in the 
1960s. 
Cécile: Mhm, mhm, and do you see an 
accent-sorry do you see a change in accent? 
Driver: Oh yes! Yes, yes, yes, as a function 
of the social diversity now people have an 
accent that is, let’s say, from the banlieue. 
We detect it because- ((windy))  
Cécile: -That is more what?  
Driver: That is more of a banlieue youth 
accent-  
Cécile: -Aha-  
Driver: -Than from Marseille. There’s an 
intonation… They have a way of speaking 
that is mo:re ((clicks against teeth)), we 
might say that is mor-there’s more a 
connotation of the… the-the Maghreb.
banlieue intonation. “We understand each other, no problem,” he replied; only 
youth from Marseille’s northerly projects “take pathways (passerelles) in their 
speech diﬀerent from those of this country’s speakers.” Whereas his own speech 
he qualified as “sing-song” (chantant), youth’s speech, he said, “drags much 
more” (beaucoup plus trainant). In an eﬀort to appeal to my cultural coordinates, 
he analogized his Marseillais accent to the English of a fourth-generation Irish-
American in Texas. How diasporic youth speak French, by contrast, he compared 
to the English that might be spoken by a Mexican person in Texas.  
 Although the driver began by noting a demographic shift aﬀecting La 
Joliette, it quickly became clear that the more crucial demographic—and 
sociolinguistic—shift for him was the changing population of the city’s working-
class northerly neighborhoods (les quartiers) since the 1960s. He was concerned 
that the European immigrant populations, whose families had “one or two 
children,” were being outstripped by “foreigners,” who “easily have four to six 
children.” This immigration narrative, of first “Europeans” and then “foreigners”  
arriving in Marseille, revealed that his cultural baseline was likely that of the 
first wave of immigration to Marseille, the Italian wave, the smells of which 
likely graced his own family’s kitchen. Indeed, Italian immigrants immigrated 
most numerously to Marseille between 1830 and WWII (López & Témime, 
1989), residing in the working-class neighborhoods north of the Canebière 
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(Naudeau, 1929). Today, however, most people living in Marseille’s quartiers are 
immigrants or are descended from immigrants coming from North, West, and 
East African countries (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001). The 
driver’s anomalous use of the term banlieues to cover Marseille’s quartiers, as 
such, served as an indicator of his misgivings about the ethnic transformation of 
such neighborhoods, banlieues in Paris and other cities typically showing large 
populations of African immigrants and their descendants.  
 If the driver’s cultural baseline was the Italian-descended community in 
Marseille, his linguistic point of reference was, not Standard French, but the 
Marseillais accent. Certainly, how he spoke throughout our conversation, 
making liberal use of the velar nasal syllable-finally, word-final schwa, and gently 
aﬀricating his stop consonants (e.g., gentil ‘nice’ [ʒəŋʧi]), was decidedly 
representative of the old-timing Marseillais accent (Binisti & Gasquet-Cyrus, 
2003). It was with reference to this “sing-song” accent that he judged diasporic 
youth to have a “dragging,” Arabic-connoted learner variety of French. 
Sociolinguists have identified other urban youth vernaculars (Rampton, 2011) 
from throughout France as having a similar “Arabic coloration” (coloration arabe; 
Billiez, 1992, p. 120), whether in phonology (Billiez, 1992; Gasquet-Cyrus, 
2009; Jamin, 2005), lexical borrowings (Caubet, 2001; Doran, 2002), intonation 
contours (Fagyal & Stewart, 2005, 2011), or pragmatics (Tetreault, 2009). Billiez 
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(1992) drew the interesting conclusion that Arabic phonology, once embedded 
in a French surround, was suﬃciently emblematic so as to dissimulate its French 
surround. This resonates, too, with Agha’s (in press) remarks that even the 
slightest breach of an enregistered variety can warrant listeners to characterize 
such breaches as “slang” ways of speaking, easily equating their linguistic 
deviance with social deviance.  
 Sitting in the airport after leaving the cabbie behind, I was struck by how 
a son of Neapolitan immigrants was led to call a slightly younger generation of 
immigrant descendants, from the same working-class neighborhoods as him but 
with African parents, “foreigners.” He appeared to be operating on an ideological 
premise according to which European immigrant-descendants could become 
“locals,” but non-European immigrant-descendants would remain culturally 
foreign. Although due to the fleeting nature of my relationship with the driver I 
cannot estimate what exactly motivated his use of the label “foreigner” for 
people born locally, perhaps he, like other actors in French immigration debates 
throughout the 20th century who gestured to skin color as a reason for certain 
immigrants’ inassimilability (Camiscioli, 2009), was also moved by a perception 
of youth’s phenotypic diﬀerences from Europeans to interpret them thus. 
Perhaps this axis of diﬀerence, combined with a soupçon of linguistic diﬀerence, 
prevented the driver from hearing in such youth’s French the hallmarks of the 
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very Marseillais accent in which he was addressing me (c.f., Chapter Three). 
This driver oﬀers an illustrative example of what Roxy Harris (2006) has 
discussed as the need to “think with the ears rather than think with the 
eyes” (p. 11). Harris recommends that sociolinguists, interestingly, avoid 
making superficial, ethnicity-focused judgements of diasporic Europeans’ 
identities by listening to them more carefully.  It would appear that this kind of 22
attentiveness could also benefit members of the European public more generally, 
though how realistic it is to divorce the acts of seeing and hearing one’s 
interlocutors from one another remains an open question. In this case at least, 
the cabbie’s assignment of such youth to the category of “foreigners” likely 
proceeded from his perception that they diﬀered from him on multiple 
dimensions, some of which he had ideologized as irreconcilably distinct.  
III. In the Teachers’ Lounge with Charlotte: The “Wesh Wesh” Local 
Vernacular 
 Each week on Wednesdays, Charlotte and I enjoyed a mid-morning free 
period together before classes resumed, English classes for her and Modern 
 Harris (2006) says that whereas a visual approach might lead the English to perceive such 22
youth as Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis (or alternatively, Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims), 
paying attention to their speech enables their reassessment as British or even London-born. 
Based on his own work with diasporic youth from West London, he concluded, for example, that 
they embody “an everyday low-key Britishness, albeit a Britishness with new inflections” (2006, 
p. 1).
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Standard Arabic classes for me. We would sit in the teachers’ lounge, chatting 
and drinking espressos from the coin-operated machine. Through the lounge 
window, we could see the main thoroughfare separating the public secondary 
school from La Castellane Project across the street. Visible, too, beyond the six 
towers of La Castellane, was the northern sweep of Marseille’s industrial bay. 
Charlotte, a woman in her thirties raised by Parisians in southwestern France, 
had been teaching English at this public school for six years. The Ministry of 
National Education had placed her in this “educational priority area” (zone 
d’éducation prioritaire) based on a point system of teacher seniority. Teachers with 
relatively few years of teaching under their belts headed to schools in 
challenging neighborhoods, like this one. The school in eﬀect catered to two 
projects: La Castellane, with around 7,000 residents, and, right above the 
school, La Bricarde, with around 2,000 residents. These projects provided 
government-subsidized housing to working-class, primarily immigrant families, 
a disproportionate number of whom, more than 50%, were living below the 
poverty line (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001).  
 Charlotte taught English to the same class of students, Class 3B, that I 
observed in their Modern Standard Arabic and French classes. One morning, I 
conducted an interview with her in order to learn more about her perspective, as 
one of these students’ teachers, on why these youth spoke the Arabic-accented 
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French remarked upon by the taxi driver in the first anecdote. Charlotte’s initial 
point was to distinguish between two local types of speech: first, Marseille’s 
historical vernacular, which she called le parler marseillais; and second, the type of 
French her students speak, which she termed le parler local, or the vernacular 
local to Northern Marseille’s projects. Charlotte explained that she always made 
a point of correcting the students’ local kind of French, so much so, in fact, that 
the students wondered “if that lady is a French or an English teacher.” Charlotte 
clarified, furthermore, that whereas Marseille’s historical vernacular could be 
recognized by any northerner as autochthonous to Marseille, her students’ 
vernacular was so circumscribed as to be unrecognizable anywhere outside of 
the projects. She reminded her students of this fact by feigning 
misunderstanding when they would use their vernacular in class. The Castellanois 
fashion of pronouncing the Standard French adverb après (‘after,’ [ɑpʁε]) was to 
drop the “p” and add a geminated rasping “x” sound, yielding akhé ([ɑχχε]). 
Charlotte would play on the quasi-homonymic word for bus stop in Standard 
French, arrêt ([ɑʁε]), quizzing the students thus: “Stop? Which stop, the bus 
stop?” (“Akhé [ɑχχε], quel arrêt [ɑʁε], l’arrêt [lɑʁε] de bus?” ). She reported 
coaching students to pronounce the letter ‘p:’ “p-p-p, a-près!” and reminding 
them that this “thing is not in fact the real language.”   
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 Although Charlotte routinely modeled Standard French pronunciation for 
her students, this routine did not seem to derive from a view of them as second-
generation “semi-linguals” deficient in French (Bloomfield, 1927; 
Christopherson, 1948). Charlotte recognized, for instance, that which heritage 
language, if any, her students heard at home (e.g., Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, 
Comorian, Wolof, Turkish, Romani) had little bearing on how they spoke French 
amongst themselves. She reflected that “the kids can, uh, just as likely be a 
Gipsy as a Kurd as a Comorian and yet not pronounce the ‘p’.” Rather, Charlotte 
recognized youth’s stylistic use of the parler local and corrected instances of akhé 
on the conviction that such linguistic trappings would not serve them well in 
the future. Charlotte’s insight into youth’s speech as a vernacular in its own 
right contrasts sharply with how the cab driver in the last section designated 
diasporic youth’s speech as a learner variety of French. Her reflections resonate, 
in fact, with decades of sociolinguistic research asserting that children or 
grandchildren of people who migrate to new countries come to speak, not 
learner varieties of those countries’ majority languages, but vernaculars capable 
of expressing certain identities (Bills, 1977; Fought, 1997; Hinskens, 2011; 
Kotsinas, 1988). Charlotte’s description of the project vernacular with the label 
parler is also telling in this regard, intimating an awareness that devices like akhé 
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hang together with several other elements in a coherent speech style shared by 
youth of varying backgrounds.  
 Charlotte went on to delineate the demographic scope and speech 
ideologies that made her students’ vernacular unique. “We say akhé. We’re from 
the Northern Projects,” she imitated. According to Charlotte, the parler local was 
traceable to the northern projects, spanning the youth of all diﬀerent familial 
backgrounds who lived there. Marseille’s traditional vernacular (le parler 
marseillais), by contrast, was typically considered the purview of white, working-
class folks who live near l’Estaque or Marseille’s Vieux Port (c.f., Binisti & 
Gasquet-Cyrus, 2003). As for the social meaning of her students’ parler, 
Charlotte summed up that “it’s all about holding onto a form of social status.” 
In Transcript 2.2, Charlotte sheds light on what she means, exactly, when she 
says that  “holding onto a social status” motivates her students to speak as they 
do. 
Transcript 2.2.  The Wesh Wesh Vernacular 23
French Original English Translation
Charlotte: Ils aiment bien parler ce que j'appelle 
le wesh wesh, donc “We::sh, je m’en bats [əmbɑ:] 
les couilles, ma main [mã] sur [syχ] le Coran 
[ko:χə]̃.” Donc du coup je les imite si je les croise. 
Je fais “Ouais, j’habite dans le 1-3. Je mets la 
casquette à l’envers." Ils parlent un peu comme ça 
aussi- 
Charlotte: They like to speak what I call 
the wesh wesh, so “We::sh, I don’t give a 
fuck, my hand on the Koran.” So I just 
imitate them if we cross paths. I say “Yeah, 
I live in the 1-3. I wear my hat backwards.” 
They talk kind of like that too- 
 This interview dates from 6.10.13.23
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 This transcript is edifying insofar as it reveals that Charlotte, despite 
teaching students from La Castellane and La Bricarde projects on a daily basis, 
lacks in familiarity with the precise modalities and social meanings of their 
vernacular. She introduces yet another label for their speech, “le wesh wesh.” A 
reduplication of the Algerian interrogative word for ‘what,’ wesh [wɛʃ] served the 
students of Class 3B as a way of saying “what’s up?” Charlotte likewise attempts 
to phonetically imitate her students’ wesh wesh speech, rasping the “r” ([χ]) in 
the words sur [syχ] and Coran [ˈko:‧χə]̃ and speaking with a rap-like meter. 
Cécile: -Mmm- 
Charlotte: -Pour faire style justement “je suis du 
93 à Paris,” mais bon, ils n'ont pas l'accent d'un 
ban-d'un banlieusard parisien 
Cécile: Pas du tout c'est très diﬀérent- 
Charlotte: Non pas du tout MAIS ils aiment bien 
quand même faire un peu "wesh wesh.” “Wesh wesh 
la famille.” 
Cécile: Mmm, et pour toi ça te rappelle un peu 
les banlieues parisiennes-c'est ça, un peu leurs- 
Charlotte: -Ben PLUS euh, oui, fin le kaid de 
banlieue parisienne. Voilà, on veut ressembler au 
kaid de banlieue. 
Cécile: Mhm, tu connais un peu ce milieu la à 
part la télé? 
Charlotte: Bah à part-non…. J’ai pas la télé… euh 
((laughs)) 
Cécile: C’est bien ça. ((P laughs)  
Charlotte: Le rap, euh, voilà, puis de se balader à 
Paris dans le RER et tout. Ça, ils accèdent au 
centre de Paris. Et puis, euh, j'avais des cousins 
aussi qui habitaient en banlieue parisienne. Donc-
c'est plus après, en eﬀet, par les medias quoi, la 
radio, le cinema… toutes formes de medias.  
Cécile: -Mmm- 
Charlotte: -Just to put on the style of “I’m 
from the 93 in Paris,” except that, well, 
they don’t have the accent of a ban-of 
someone who lives in the Parisian banlieue  
Cécile: Not at all it’s very diﬀerent 
Charlotte: No not at all BUT they like 
putting on their wesh wesh anyway. “Wesh 
wesh your family.”  
Cécile: Mmm, and it reminds you a bit of 
the Parisian banlieues-that’s kind of their- 
Charlotte: -Well MORE uh well the kaid 
from the Parisian banlieue, yeah they want 
to act like the Qaid from the banlieue 
Cécile: Mhm, do you know that milieu a 
bit, apart from the T.V.?  
Charlotte: well apart-no… I don’t have a 
T.V. uh ((laughs)) 
Cécile: That’s nice. ((P laughs)  
Charlotte: Rap, uh, yeah, plus walking 
around Paris, in the RER and all. They 
serve central Paris. And, uh, I had cousins 
too who lived in the Parisian banlieue. So 
it’s more through the media actually, the 
radio and the movies… all forms of media, 
it turns out.
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However, she employs neither the word-final schwa, nor the open-mid, 
unrounded back vowel /ɔ/, nor the velar nasal /ŋ/, features that students in 
Class 3B would surely have stamped on words like couilles, which she renders as 
[kuj:], Coran, which she pronounces in Standard French, without the velar nasal 
[ˈko:‧χə]̃, and habite, on which she omits the word-final schwa [ɑbit]. The only 
features of her imitation that hark back to youth at the secondary school would 
be wesh and the devoicing of French ‘r,’ and even these phenomena have been 
described for French youth vernaculars in banlieues elsewhere (c.f., Doran, 2007 
for Parisian examples of Algerian wesh; Billiez, 1992 for examples of voiceless “r” 
in Grenoble).  Similarly, her use of the back ‘a’ [ɑ] (e.g., embats [əmbɑ:]) recalls 24
Jamin’s (2007) description of the same feature among youth in the Parisian 
banlieues of La Courneuve and Fontenay-sous-Bois, but not her own students’ 
speech per se. Further, the rising-to-falling pitch contour Charlotte gives to the 
penultimate and ultimate syllables of the intonation phrase Coran [ˈko:‧χə]̃ and 
famille [ˈfɑ‧mij] parallels the tonal pattern observed among Parisian youth from 
La Courneuve by Fagyal (2005). Last but not least, Charlotte mentions the 13th 
arrondissement as the neighborhood to which her students pledge allegiance 
(“Yeah, I live in the 1-3. I wear my hat backwards”), though both La Castellane 
 In the French popular media, wesh is also stereotypically associated with how youth greet one 24
another in the Parisian banlieues. The expression came to greater notoriety in the 2001 film 
“Wesh wesh qu’est-ce qui se passe?,” which was set in the 93rd department, northeast of Paris in 
the Île-de-France region.
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and La Bricarde Projects are located in the 16th arrondissement. Charlotte’s 
rendition, as such, does not only fail to pinpoint youth from Northern Marseille 
in any unmistakable way; it channels youth from the Parisian banlieues.   
 The larger point to be taken from these observations is that Charlotte, 
despite her more enlightened perspective on her students’ strategic use of a 
youth vernacular, nevertheless perceives few diﬀerences, in repertoire or in 
social function, between the youth vernaculars of La Castellane and La Bricarde 
projects, of other projects elsewhere in Marseille, or, indeed, of the Parisian 
banlieues. Her imitations and understanding of the function of her students’ 
vernacular appear to be inspired, less by careful observation of their practices, 
than by an idea of dynamics in the Parisian banlieues, gleaned perhaps from travel 
or media exposure. She suggests, for instance, that just as youth from the 
Parisian banlieues wish to act out “the kaid,” so, too, do her students locally 
aspire to emulate this trouble-maker type when they speak in their parler local. 
Charlotte’s underlying assumption is that youth who live in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, regardless of their location in France, engage in 
parallel forms of linguistic deviance in order to strategically perform the same 
kind of social deviance. Hence, whereas the taxi driver in the previous anecdote 
put youth’s linguistic departures down to their cultural diﬀerence or 
foreignness, in this section Charlotte constructs an account of diasporic youth 
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from Marseille as using their speech and behavior to expressly reinforce their 
social marginality. As will become clear in Chapter Three, the students in Class 
3B performed their in-group speech register (Agha, 2007a) in line with an 
identity and aspirations that bore little resemblance to Charlotte’s account of 
their parler local’s significance. Thus, although Charlotte frequented these youth 
on a daily basis, her comments attest to the degree of social and cultural 
unfamiliarity, or distance, that she continued to maintain vis-à-vis their desires 
and cultural aﬃliations.  
IV. Coﬀee with Two Administrators at a Private Muslim School: “Animal 
Sounds” 
 No recess break eluded Fawzi, the recess monitor, as an opportunity for 
some good-natured teasing. Popping his head into the makeshift teachers’ shed 
from the yard, he found me making photocopies of a handout for my upcoming 
English class. “Un caccuppino?,” he oﬀered with a grin. I shook my head no but, 
before I could even begin to laugh at his word games, he was already back in the 
yard with the kids. The school where Fawzi and I worked is a private Muslim 
secondary school serving children ages 11 to 17. Nestled in Northern Marseille’s 
15th arrondissement, about a twenty-minute bus ride from the public school where 
Charlotte teaches, this school serves a more orthodox community of Sunni 
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Muslims. When the director and his wife, Anwar and Hanan, founded the school 
and its adjoining mosque, they envisioned a school that would not only teach 
religion, Modern Standard Arabic, and Islamic history classes alongside the 
French national curriculum, but one that would remain financially accessible to 
the neighborhoods it serves. Parents pay one-hundred and fifty Euros a month 
to have their child attend this private school, rather than other public schools in 
Northern Marseille for free. For many of these parents, who made a living 
working blue collar or retail jobs, or were unemployed, and often depended on 
government-subsidized project housing, paying this monthly sum nevertheless 
remained a hardship.  
 After teaching my English class, I wended my way to the central 
administrative oﬃce of the school. The corner-view sécretariat oﬃce was a 
magnet of sorts for teachers and administrators alike throughout the day, both 
because Lamia, the head secretary, was responsible for pacing the school day, 
and because, unlike other rooms in the still partially built school, the sécretariat 
had consistent heat. Instead of Lamia though, I found Fawzi in the oﬃce with 
Yaman, the assistant director, chatting and enjoying cappuccinos.   25
 Fawzi was 23 years old at this time and Yaman was in his early thirties. Fawzi was born in 25
Marseille to Kabyle parents from Algeria, while Yaman was born in Morocco but came to 
Marseille at a young age. 
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 Both were well familiarized with my research questions, and neither 
missed a beat when I wondered aloud why the kids at this school, who are 
almost exclusively born in Marseille to parents hailing from North, West, and 
East African Muslim countries, spoke so diﬀerently from the same-aged kids 
with similar cultural and socio-economic backgrounds that I observed at the 
public secondary school no more than a couple kilometers away in La 
Castellane. “Isn’t it simply that they don’t frequent the street as much?,” 
tendered Yaman. Fawzi agreed with Yaman straightaway. Raising his volume and 
lowering his pitch in a clear imitation, Fawzi added that the “no one scares 
me”—je crains dégun [ʒə kχəŋ dεgœŋ]—way of speaking can really be acquired 
simply by hanging out with the wrong crowd. He went on to tell us how he and 
his twin brother received diﬀerent “educations.” Whereas Fawzi attended a 
small sleep-away high school one-hundred kilometers from Marseille, during the 
same period his brother began living in the northern project of La Busserine and 
“stayed in the street hanging around (à trainer) with some guys (gars).” Fawzi 
recounted how his brother became someone light years away from him in terms 
of speech and behavior. As his brother’s friends and activities diverged, he 
“spoke more...he had more of, well, an accent, because he would insist on some 
words and accents but not on others.” He began using expressions Fawzi did not 
understand, such as tu duhes [dəħ], ‘you’re pissing me oﬀ,’ and khéner dégun [χεnε 
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dεgœŋ], to ‘not be bothering anyone.’ “It’s all Comorian to me!,” exclaimed 
Fawzi as Yaman looked on, bemused.  
 I recognized the expressions Fawzi imputed to his twin immediately, if only 
because the students I observed in Class 3B over at the public school used them 
as well. Such expressions, which in fact constituted Arabic-sounding 
neologisms, with Arabic phonemes like /ħ/ and /χ/, were part of the youth 
vernacular that Charlotte, and also Yaman and Fawzi here, identified as 
characterizing the social persona of the youth from Marseille’s projects. Though 
many of the students who attended this private Muslim school lived in housing 
projects as well, Fawzi and Yaman drew distinctions in the way their students 
were being educated at the school. They were being taught to emulate the 
Prophet Mohamed in demeanor as well as speech. And, added Fawzi, “if, short 
of going all the way back to the Prophet, the students want to resemble 
someone, they already have a strong example in the Director. Not only does he 
hold a doctorate in mathematics, he is a director, an imam, almost a statesman!” 
In the following transcript, Yaman and Fawzi elaborate further on how an 
Islamic education comports with “correct” speech, whereas a street education 
connotes coarseness and is indexed by the raucous speech style of the projects.   
!60
Transcript 2.3.  Teaching French, but What Kind of French? 26
French Original English Translation
Cécile: C’est quoi un peu la philosophie du collège 
par rapport à l'enseignement du français? Vous 
voulez leur enseigner un français de Paris, un 
français de Marseille, un français comment? 
Yaman: Euh 
Cécile: Un français international, un français quoi? 
Yaman: Qu’ils s'expriment correctement et qu'ils 
savent surtout écrire correctement, donc euh… 
Cécile: Mmm… après, les accents, euh, de quartiers 
tout ça, vous…- 
Yaman: -Ah non, les accents de quartiers c'est 
même pas un français. C’est-c'est, c’est, une       
révoltele le milieu du quartier- 
Fawzi:c'est une horreur 
Yaman: -Ce n'est du français. C’est des, des, des, 
cris animaliers!!! 
Fawzi: Voilà! ((Yaman laughing)) Wesh! 
Yaman: Akha [ɑχɑ],wakha[wɑχɑ]              
Fawzi: Akha[ɑχɑ], akha [ɑχɑ] 
Yaman: Je te jure, des fois, si j'entends les élèves 
d'en face s-s’invectiver, mais je… mais on se croirait 
dans un zoo! Je te jure…   
Fawzi: C’est comme akha [ɑχɑ]. Je regardais 
undocumentaire 
Yaman: Ah oui? 
Fawzi: Je regardais un documentaire, eh, TF1 la- 
dessus. Le Black, comment il s’appelle? 
Yaman: Roselmack 
Cécile:Ah  
Cécile: What is kind of the school’s philosophy 
with regards to how French is taught? Do you 
want to teach them a Pari:sian French or one from 
Marseille, what kind of French? 
Yaman: Euh 
Cécile: An international French, a what kind of 
French? 
Yaman: That they express themselves correctly 
and that they know how to write correctly in 
particular, so uhm… 
Cécile: Mmm… and as for the accents, uh, from 
the quartiers and all you- 
Yaman: -Oh no, accents from the quartiers are not 
even a type of French. It’s it’s it’s revoltingthe 
quartier milieu- 
Fawzi: It’s a horror 
Yaman: -It’s not French. It’s, it’s, it’s animal 
sounds!!! 
Fawzi: Yes! ((Yaman laughing)) Wesh! 
Yaman: Akha [ɑχɑ],wakha[wɑχɑ] 
Fawzi: Akha[ɑχɑ], akha  
Yaman: I swear, sometimes when I hear the 
students across the street a-assailing one another 
well I… well you would think we were in a zoo! I 
swear it…     
Fawzi: It’s like with akha. I was watching a                                                                 
documentary 
Yaman: Oh really? 
Fawzi: I was watching a documentary, eh, TF1 on 
that the black guy. What is his name? 
Yaman:Roselmack 
Cécile:Ah 
 All of the speech that I cite in this anecdotal section is drawn verbatim from a long interview I 26
held in the main oﬃce on December 13th, 2012. 
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 Earlier on, Fawzi had explained how the “words and accents” being used by 
his brother during his transformation into a “project guy” were as foreign to 
him as the Comorian language, an oft-heard language in Marseille due to the 
sizable Comorian immigrant population. In Transcript 2.3, he goes on to mock 
how Harry Roselmack, the TF1 television anchor renowned for being the first 
black man on the French nightly news, reported on a project in Northern 
Marseille. Fawzi takes on a journalistic, disembodied kind of diction and syntax: 
“one hears what one might call ‘the watchdogs’” (on entend ce qu'on appelle ‘les 
guetteurs’). The punchline comes, of course, when Fawzi imitates Roselmack’s 
dictionary-like definition of akha [ɑχɑ] as a word that “means ‘be careful’ in 
Arabic.” Although akha is indeed a vocative that certain youth from Northern 
Marseille rely on to draw attention or exclaim at some occurrence, and it does 
display the Arabic phoneme /χ/, Yaman and Fawzi and his fiancée are well aware 
Fawzi: Roselmack commence à faire un reportage 
oû bien súr il dénigre les musulmans ((sniggering)) 
et les, euh, les jeunes maghrébins, et il dit “dès 
qu'on arrive on entend ce qu’on appelle ‘les 
guetteurs.’ Leur rôle? La surveillance.” Et dès qu'ils 
voyaient quelqu’un de suspect ils crient "akha kha 
kha" [ɑχɑ χɑ χɑ]((sounds like a crow cawing)) et là 
ils disent-il dit “‘a-kha,’ ce qui veut dire ‘attention’ 
en arabe.”((Yaman sniggers)) Alors Leila elle dit 
“ah bon,” et elle me fait “moi non plus j'étais au 
courant”((Cécile and Fawzi laugh)) 
Cécile: Ça veut dire quoi akha en fait? 
Fawzi: Ça-ça veut rien dire akha 
Cécile: Mmm
Fawzi: Roselmack starts doing a report in which 
of course he denigrates Muslims ((sniggering)) 
and the, euh, young Maghrebis, and he says “as 
soon as one arrives one hears what one might call 
‘the watchdogs.’ Their role? Surveillance. And as 
soon as they see a suspicious person they yell ‘akha 
kha kha’  [ɑχɑ χɑ χɑ]((sounds like a crow cawing))” 
and then they say-he says “‘a-kha’ this means ‘be 
careful’ in Arabic” ((Yaman sniggers)). Then Leila 
says “really?” and adds “I didn’t get the memo on 
that one” ((Cécile and Fawzi laugh)) 
Cécile: What does akha mean really? 
Fawzi: It-akha, it means nothing 
Cécile: Mmm
!62
that it represents a neologism created in Marseille’s projects. Fawzi, for instance, 
imitates his fiancée’s sarcasm (e.g., “Really? I didn’t get the memo on that one”) 
at the idea that lexemes from Marseille’s project vernacular could in any way be 
associated to “Arabic,” dialectal or standard. Although the school staﬀ members’ 
dismissal of Roselmack is worth a laugh, the most intriguing detail in this 
transcript is their stance on the youth vernacular spoken by kids from 
Marseille’s projects. Earlier in the transcript, Yaman laid out his disgust at the 
“accents from the quartiers,” stating that these “revolting” accents more closely 
resemble “animal sounds” than the French language. He relays his impression of 
being “in a zoo” when he hears the students from the nearby public school 
talking in the street. In the course of this conversation, as such, Yaman and 
Fawzi eﬀectively renounce the project vernacular’s ties with “Arabic” of any sort, 
or with French.  
 In Chapter Five, in which I focus on youth who practice an orthodox form 
of Islam in Marseille, like Fawzi and Yaman and the students at their school, I 
elaborate further on how the ideologies such individuals hold about what 
qualifies as “good” or “real” language are closely tied to the orthodox 
community’s self-imagery of themselves as being sophisticated, global-minded 
Muslims who happen to live in Marseille. Not unlike Charlotte, who flouted 
youth’s parler local for being too insular, orthodox-identified Muslims in 
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Marseille perceived all non-standard accents in Marseille, including Marseille’s 
historical vernacular and youth’s project speech, as undesirable insofar as they 
were illegible at the French national level and internationally. Another point of 
comparison between Fawzi and Yaman’ remarks and those of Charlotte and the 
taxi driver is that, while all similarly cast out the project register associated with 
youth from Marseille’s projects, only the ethnically French people read 
foreignness, or Maghrebi connotations, into the project way of speaking. At the 
private Muslim school, meanwhile, the diasporic people who worked there 
interpreted the project vernacular as an exaggeratedly Marseillais, or Marseille-
specific, form of speech. This became apparent when one of Fawzi and Yaman’ 
colleagues, an accountant named Halima, joined the previous conversation. She 
specifically described the project way of speaking as “the super-pronounced 
Marseillais accent” (l’accent Marseillais super-prononcé). This depiction is in fact 
quite accurate, leading to the conclusion that individuals who are situated close 
to, or who share in, the experience of living in Marseille’s projects may also be 
more capable of detecting important sociophonetic information conveyed in 
people’s speech. Another complementary interpretation is that diasporic people 
of color, even if they belong to a distinct social sub-group, such as the orthodox 
Muslim community in Marseille, do not draw conclusions about other diasporic 
individuals’ identities based primarily on their visual appearance. The same may 
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not be true for white people in Marseille, whose aural perceptions seem to be 
tinted by their interlocutors’ appearances. A conspicuous instance of this 
dynamic was that of the cab driver, who esteemed that youth from Northern 
Marseille whose speech connoted the Maghreb were “foreigners” parallel to 
Mexicans recently arrived in Texas.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has dealt with how individuals in Marseille who are situated 
at various degrees of social remove from, or proximity to, the city’s northerly 
housing projects apprehended youth who live there. Through three examples, 
one of a taxi driver who was largely unfamiliar with youth from Muslim 
households in the projects, a second with a teacher who instructed youth from 
two projects on a daily basis, and a third involving the young diasporic Muslim 
staﬀ at a denominational school, I showed the way in which perceptions of 
project youth’s foreignness or wayward aspirations relied, less on these youth’s 
actual manifestations of any cultural belonging or lack thereof, than on the 
ideologies and experiences of the person doing the perceiving. My suggestion, as 
such, is that diasporic individuals are more likely than other French people to 
experience disjuncture while maneuvering in French society. Despite a diasporic 
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person’s move to emically declare him or herself a cultural member of Marseille, 
evincing what I term cultural belonging, others may nevertheless not recognize 
him or her as such, eﬀectively denying them the right of cultural citizenship. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five, in particular, revolve around the forms of 
cultural belonging that myriad groups of diasporic youth from Marseille exhibit.  
 In addition to airing this contradiction between cultural belonging and 
citizenship a bit further, this chapter has also insinuated the existence of micro-
diﬀerentiations taking place within the broader minority group of diasporic 
youth in Marseille. An interesting question in this regard is whether highly 
practicing Muslims like Fawzi or Yaman confer cultural citizenship upon other 
diasporic youth who embody what they called “street” education, and whether, 
likewise, Charlotte’s students in Class 3B would see Frenchness in the cultural 
attachments of orthodox students from Yaman and Fawzi’s school. Certainly, 
Halima the accountant’s understanding of project youth as speaking in a 
profoundly Marseillais way would portend a positive answer. What, though, of 
Yaman’ disparaging portrayal of project speech as non-French animal sounds? In 
what way does this portrayal diﬀer from the racist way individuals in French 
history have painted immigrant populations? One might think, here, of 
Naudeau’s (1929) comments, for instance, when he visited immigrant 
residences north of the Canebière and said that “Marseillais slums (taudis 
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marseillais)...reduce humankind to the level of animality” (p. 198). A seamstress 
I once visited in Marseille provided another more contemporary example of this 
kind of metaphor. A pieds-noir who relocated to Marseille from Algiers after the 
War, she spoke to me, without the slightest whiﬀ of shame, about the immigrant 
“fauna” (la faune) with their dishonest ways who plagued her existence in 
Marseille. Although Yaman compared the speech of impious project youth to 
animal sounds, his motive was by no means a racist one, however. 
 Rather, for youth and adults who practiced orthodox Islam in Marseille, a 
key part of projecting an image of themselves as pious, ethical sophisticates was 
to formulate others, by contrast, as wholly unlike them. Merton (1968[1949]) 
discusses this practice of managing one’s self-image in relation to others in 
terms of “reference groups,” or when “people take the standards of significant 
others as a basis for self-appraisal and evaluation” (p. 40). Practicing Muslims in 
this context, as such, saw fit to juxtapose themselves besides less pious 
diasporic individuals precisely because they viewed them as comparable 
(“significant”) to them; as people who, in other words, warranted placement in 
their social landscape. In terms drawn from linguist Trubetzkoy’s (1969) theory 
of phonological features, these diasporic subcultures coexisted, not in a privative 
relation to one another, but in one of equipollent opposition. In this analogy, 
communities of diasporic youth in Marseille enjoyed their own range of “plus” 
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values, even if such values were formulated using one another as comparative 
anchors.  
 Of further note is that, their inner distinctions not withstanding, diasporic 
youth groups in Marseille faced the same kinds of diﬃculties with the 
mainstream granting them cultural citizenship. As presented in Chapter Five, 
for instance, the French mainstream in Marseille tended to view youth who 
practiced orthodox Islam as especially diﬀerent from them, culturally speaking. 
Visual indicators such as religious clothing and skin color prevailed in the 
calculations that French-origin individuals made of pious youth’s cultural 
aﬃliations, and they were more often seen as foreign than diasporic youth who 
did not assiduously practice Islam. Ironically, the mainstream’s dependency on 
visual indicators eﬀectively prevented this pious community’s recognition as a 
model of the very kind of assimilation French politicians crave (Haut Conseil à 
l’Immigration, 2000), that of a “French Islam” (Bassam, 1992; Ramadan, 1999). 
Pious individuals like Fawzi and Yaman, as such, represent an ill-starred foil to 
the experience of Asian Americans and other so-called “model minorities” in the 
United States (Stacey, 1996). Since the 1960s, Asian Americans have been 
constructed by mainstream America as a model minority. When accusations of 
racism and communist paranoia were running high during the Cold War and 
Civil Rights years, for instance, mainstream Americans appeased these charges 
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in part by holding up Asian Americans as a case of successful integration into 
American society, a “model minority” (Reyes, 2004). In the case of pious 
diasporans in Marseille, in contrast, these individuals in eﬀect constructed 
themselves as exceptional citizens and yet the mainstream did not acknowledge 
them as such. More will be revealed about diﬀering diasporic youth’s 
constructions of self and aspirations in the following chapters.  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III. The Projects: Linguistic Antics              
of Class and Ethnicity in the 
Mediterranean Borderlands 
I. Introduction: Residents of the Borderlands 
"Nosotros los Chicanos straddle the borderlands. On one side of us, we are 
constantly exposed to the Spanish of the Mexicans, on the other side we 
hear the Anglos' incessant clamoring so that we forget our language. Among 
ourselves we don't say nosotros los americanos, o nosotros los españoles, o nosotros 
los hispanos. We say nosotros los mexicanos (by mexicanos we do not mean 
citizens of Mexico; we do not mean a national identity, but a racial one). We 
distinguish between mexicanos del otro lado and mexicanos de este lado. Deep in 
our hearts we believe being Mexican has nothing to do with which country 
one lives in. Being Mexican is a state of soul—not one of mind, not one of 
citizenship. Neither eagle nor serpent, but both. And like the ocean, neither 
animal respects borders." (Anzaldúa, 1999[1987], p. 84).  
 This chapter investigates the stories told by youth from La Castellane 
housing project about where they were coming from and where they were 
headed. Through their telling of tales about themselves and their parents, but 
also about Marseille’s projects and their parents’ home countries (or bleds), it 
becomes clear that these youth considered themselves French enough to diﬀer 
in crucial ways from someone born in the bled (a blédard/e) but, simultaneously, 
similar in suﬃcient respects to their blédard parents to be immediately 
distinguishable from a French person lacking that ethnic and linguistic heritage. 
In the spirit of Anzaldúa's reflections above, youth were neither Marseillais in 
the mainstream sense, nor people born in the bled, but somehow both. To wit, 
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between the poles of the Marseillais and bled identities, youth discerned another 
identity for themselves. They described themselves as cultural products of 
Marseille’s quartiers, or Marseille’s neighborhoods that revolve around housing 
projects, an identity here argued to exemplify the concept of the borderlands 
(Anzaldúa, 1999[1987]). This chapter illustrates the enregisterment (Agha, 
2005), or historical elaboration, of the way of speaking youth call Castellanois, 
alongside other kinds of conduct, as emblematic of this quartiers identity. 
Through a detailed analysis of how youth communicated with one another in 
their peer groups, I also tease out diﬀerences between Castellanois and two other 
“enregistered voices” (Agha, 2005, p. 39) that youth invoked in their 
interactions, both of which are further detailed in Chapter Four. Across this 
chapter and the next, both of which look at youth from Class 3B in the 16th 
arrondissement, I argue that youth in fact made recourse to three phonolexical 
registers: Castellanois, which indexed youth’s own identity; clando, via which 
youth performed their parents’ generation; and paillot, how they enacted 
ethnically French people in Marseille. These three enregistered voices served 
youth as resources for enacting proximity or distance to certain social positions, 
and also for taking stances on issues involving race, class, religion, and matters 
of comparative national development. 
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 This chapter likewise explores what it means to say that borderland 
identities and languages are syncretic, a case of neither, nor, but both. My use of 
the term syncretism to describe the identity and way of speaking characteristic 
of youth from Marseille’s Castellane Project, in particular, opens up an analytic 
space within which to regard their practices as actions that explicitly positioned 
them in relation to other people and places. How youth behaved, in other words, 
did not reveal them to be the uneasy bearers of hybrid, fragmented identities; 
nor did these diasporic youth seem to inhabit a "third space" (Bhabha, 1990) 
wholly diﬀerent from France and their parents’ home countries. Rather, young 
people from La Castellane are shown to lean on a variety of communicative 
resources, including linguistic “interferences” (Haugen, 1956) between French 
and Arabic varieties, accent stylizations (Rampton, 1995, 1999), music, clothing, 
and bodily hexis, to relate to past generations and class and race configurations 
in Marseille and, hence, position themselves within the French post-colonial 
legacy.  
 The remainder of the chapter is split into two sections. Section II reviews 
a handful of labels that anthropologists and other social scientists have leaned 
on to capture the supposed neither-here-nor-there-ness of youth like those who 
appear in this chapter, including second-generation, hybrid, mobile, and 
transnational. A summary of these critiques paves the way for my argument, in 
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Section III, that youth from La Castellane Project can more precisely be 
considered what Martínez and Sayer (1994) have called border people—or 
diasporic locals, in my own idiom. Section III proceeds through a first sub-
section in which I introduce life in the 16th arrondissements’ projects and the 
quartiers identity claimed by a particular classroom of students in a local school, 
and then a second sub-section where I detail the forms of linguistic syncretism 
these youth called Castellanois. Overall, this chapter adds to understandings of 
post-colonial subjectivities the insight that the communicative forms of play in 
which such youth engage double as implicit claims to their own French but 
diasporic and working-class ethnic identity. 
II. Labels for Diasporic Youth: Critiques and New Directions 
 A forceful critique of the “second-generation” label comes to 
anthropology from Rumbaut (1976; 2004), a sociologist who operationalized the 
idea that important diﬀerences exist intra-generationally. In a 1976 study, for 
instance, Rumbaut pointed out how the Cuban generation “1.5,” who arrived in 
the United States from Cuba in the 1960s and came of age there, was influenced 
by the concept of exile in a way the Cuban second-generation was not. Rumbaut 
(2004) further refined his “decimal” typology (e.g., generation 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 
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2, 2.5), meant to capture these diﬀerences in educational, linguistic, and 
occupational outcomes between generational cohorts, with the understanding 
that outcomes could also be guided by the personal circumstances of a particular 
cohort. Thus, in a study of  refugee youth from Southeast Asia who moved as 
adolescents to San Diego, Rumbaut and Ima (1998) found that youth’s adaptive 
resources varied along with their national origins, reasons for relocating, and 
contexts of reception. 
  Rumbaut’s (2004) insights into acculturation have been further nuanced 
by anthropological scholarship, especially with respect to how diasporic youth 
form their ethnic identities. Lo and Reyes (2004), for instance, do not approach 
terms like first and second generation as a priori categories. Rather, their 
analyses burrow into the “indexically emergent” (p. 119) lives of such 
categories. In order to better grasp why “particular categories become relevant in 
the moment of speaking” (Lo & Reyes, 2004, p. 119), the authors are attentive 
to local discourses about ethnicity and their circulation. Emic ethnic categories 
have been illuminated by Kang and Lo (2004) and Rosa (2010), in two pieces 
that address how youth use such labels to position themselves and others in 
interaction. In Kang and Lo’s (2004) study with Korean-American youth in Los 
Angeles, for example, local ethnonyms like “Korean Korean” or “Korean-
washed” stepped in to replace more etic categories based on generation. Rosa 
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(2010), too, shows that youth apply local ethnic labels in ways that frustrate 
generational categorizing. He describes the context of a school in Chicago 
marked by ethnic solidarity between youth of varying Mexican and Puerto Rican 
heritages. There, children with one Mexican and one Puerto Rican parent, who 
in other settings might have identified as the “MexiRican” or “PortoMex” 
members of generation 1.5, instead pronounce themselves “Latino.”  
 These examples stipulate that diasporic contexts call for a sharper 
analytical lens than generational cohorts or ethnicity, if thought of as a 
preformed essence that inheres in people. In a move away from such categories, 
Mandel (2008) chooses to speak of “processes of ethnicization” (p. 2) in her 
research with Germans of Turkish origin in Berlin. She interrupts Germans’ 
representation of diasporic Germans as monolithic “Turks” by documenting how 
diasporic Germans reappropriate Turkishness and identify in complex 
combinations of the following dimensions: “rural, urban; elites, working-class; 
Sunnis, Alevis; Turks, Kurds; Islamist, secular; or naturalized Germans, Turkish 
nationals” (p. 2). Mandel (2008) hence uncovers a gap between etic views of 
ethnicity and the more emic, processual understandings explained by diasporic 
individuals.  
 The latter concept of ethnicity is a close cousin to what Stuart Hall 
designated under "new ethnicities" in 1992. Below, he urges a new usage of 
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“ethnicity,” one reflecting the historical specificity—and discursive basis—of 
ethnic identities:  
 “If the black subject and black experience are not stabilized by Nature or by some other 
essential guarantee, then it must be the case that they are constructed historically, 
culturally, politically - and the concept which refers to this is 'ethnicity.' The term 
ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language, and culture in the construction of 
subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, 
situated, and all knowledge is contextual. Representation is possible only because 
enunciation is always produced within codes which have a history, a position within the 
discursive formations of a particular space and time” (1992, p. 226)  
The construction of ethnicity, understood in this broad sense of the cultural 
attachments developed by a person in a specific time and place, turns out to be 
the elemental activity underway in the discursive exchanges between youth 
studied in the remainder of the chapter. Specifically, the transcripts reveal the 
ethnic categories invoked by youth from La Castellane project to be only loosely 
tied to the generational cohorts to which they technically belong or to the ethnic 
categories to which they might etically be ascribed (e.g., West African, 
Maghrebi). Rather, it is youth’s living circumstances, mainly, their 
neighborhood, friends, and school, that play a key role in the ethnic stances they 
develop, with ethnicity understood in the processual and overarching way 
outlined above. 
 If labels like second-generation or etic ethnic terms no longer qualify as 
descriptive, given the historical contingency of how youth claim ethnic 
identities, then what additional purchase might other descriptors for diasporic 
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youth (e.g., hybrid, cosmopolitan, transnational) hold, if any? Friedman (2002), 
for one, rues the uncritical application by anthropologists of adjectives like 
transnational, hybrid, and mobile to the people they study. He argues that 
certain anthropologists’ tendency to use these terms rests upon, on the one 
hand, a vision of people as culture “containers,” and on the other, a fear of 
falling into the structuralist reverie of bounded and homogeneous languages, 
individuals, or nation-states. The  “moral-political solution” (Friedman, 2002, p. 
25) to the essentialism and boundedness that skulk in the shadows of the 
discipline, says Friedman, is for anthropologists to answer with cultural analyses 
averring the hybridity and transnationalism of their research subjects. He notes 
that this inclination dissimulates an anthropological position that is both etic 
and highly privileged:  
 “It is the discourse of global elites whose relation to the earth is one of consumerist 
distance and objectification. It is a bird's-eye view of the world that looks down upon 
the multiethnic bazaar of ethnic neighborhoods and marvels at the fabulous jumble of 
cultural diﬀerences present in that space. Hybridity is thus the sensual, primarily visual, 
appropriation of a space of cultural diﬀerence.” (Friedman, 2002, pp. 27-28) 
Friedman further illustrates his point with a comparison of the emic and etic 
meanings attributed a traditional Papua New Guinean shield. Its maker had 
decorated the shield with an advertisement for a popular but foreign beer, and 
the shield presented as a hybrid object to unfamiliar viewers, one fusing a 
Western, modern product with local traditions. The shield maker later explained 
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to Friedman, however, that he had chosen the beer advertisement because it 
symbolized danger, prowess, and the “life force” of war. Friedman summarizes 
his point by saying that labels such as hybrid and transnational tend to lean on 
scholarly analyses that are inattentive to the ways in which the people involved 
may be reappropriating and integrating cultural elements into meaningful 
wholes. A similar critique can be summoned in the case of other theoretical 
catchphrases as well, notably “superdiversity” (Blommaert, 2010). To deem the 
European “landscape” superdiverse in human and linguistic terms connotes, not 
only the observer’s degree of remove from people’s precise biographies, but 
likewise their own baseline of “normal” diversity.  
  A parallel logic can be applied to the uncritical exercise of labels like 
mobile, migrant, cosmopolitan, and transnational. Friedman (2002) asks what 
to make of the anthropological readiness to see a world busied with roving 
people, particularly when “less than 2 per cent of the world's population is on 
the move, internationally” (p. 33). Taking up Friedman’s question, Hage (2005) 
submits in response that it may be worth examining the very way mobility is 
labeled, for distinct positionalities may be revealed in the process. Why was it 
that when he left Lebanon to do his doctorate in Australia, this movement was 
not called migration but simply going abroad to study? He wonders if the 
Lebanese merchants and bankers whom he researches would be accorded the 
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same terminological benefit of the doubt. They do not speak of their movement 
in terms of migration either: “They say I am ‘living’ in New York, I am living in 
Paris, or, ‘where were you living during the war?’” (Hage, 2005, p. 470). 
Migration thus appears more of an etic term, but what of other labels? Mandel 
(2008) oﬀers similar reflections on German double-standards in the use of the 
term cosmopolitan. She contrasts an enlightenment version of cosmopolitanism, 
such as underpins the German State's campaign to replace Germany’s Second 
World War reputation with one of a cosmopolitan and world-open (Weltoﬀen) 
society, with the more “demotic” cosmopolitanism oﬀered by Turkish Germans. 
Only what Turkish Germans bring to Germany, quite tellingly, is not called 
cosmopolitanism at all (p. 14). That it is socioeconomic or physiognomic 
parameters which lead migrants to be distinguished from non-migrants (or from 
refugees, as per the current debate), or cosmopolitans from immigrants, reveals 
both the highly etic nature of these determinations and the political stakes 
involved in qualifying people in this manner. Given these positional discourses, 
it may be that in the theoretical scramble to dismantle borders and illustrate 
globalization, some anthropologists have trodden over not-inconsiderable 
inequalities in terms of people's ability to move and the importance of locally 
based practices. Thankfully, there not need be, as Friedman (2002) remarks, a 
contradiction between the fact of building lives and cultures locally and being 
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open to global influences. Indeed, it is precisely this play with the global from a 
local position that the “borderlands” heuristic aﬀords—if not more emically, 
then more empirically.   
 The late Gloria Anzaldúa (1999[1987]) writes of a certain Chicano 
identity that spans the border between Mexico and the United States. As she 
specifies in the anecdote that began this chapter, this border identity is a racial 
one, not a national one. It is also, in her formulation, communicated primarily 
via a “Chicano” language, and in her own case by a Chicano Tejana language. She 
explains further that, “for a people who are neither Spanish nor live in a country 
in which Spanish is the first language; for a people who live in a country in 
which English is the reigning tongue but who are not Anglo; for a people who 
cannot entirely identify with either standard (formal, Castillian) Spanish nor 
standard English, what recourse is left to them but to create their own 
language?” (Anzaldúa, 1999[1987], pp. 77). To these ethnic and linguistic 
mainstays of her Chicano Tejana identity, Anzaldúa joins other memorable 
sensations: the corridos songs that “wafted through her bedroom window," 
"woodsmoke curling up to an immense blue sky,” and “homemade white 
cheese...melting inside a folded tortilla” (p. 83). Anzaldúa's homeland perches on 
the Texan border with Mexico, and yet she experiences it, not as fragmented, but 
simply as where she comes from, a place she cannot but evoke through multi-
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sensorial memories. In other words, despite the the Chicano borderlands being 
“neither eagle nor serpent, but both” (p. 84), these places are nevertheless 
regular homes for those who inhabit them. This coincides with Jackson’s (2005) 
description of how Harlemites, via their “ghetto fabulousness” and “the 
underside of the global” it represents, declare “social margins quite central to 
the people who live there” (p. 60). In Section III below, I delve into how youth 
from Marseille’s northern housing projects construct a broadly ethnic identity 
and corresponding language for themselves that, in their syncretism, point to 
youth’s location in the Mediterranean borderlands.  
III. Class 3B: La Castellane Project and Castellanois 
 It was 7:45am and the students of Class 3B were readying themselves for 
the first class of the year. On the sixth floor of bloc (‘tower’) one, inside the 
housing project known as La Castellane, Kader was reviving yesterday’s 
mohawk. Ayman, his next-door neighbor, dropped by and they carved two 
matching slits into their left eyebrows. On the fourth floor, Kardiatou parted her 
hair into pigtails, stepped into pink Palladium hightops, and slipped on some 
Senegalese bangles. One floor down and over in bloc 2, Sabrina backcombed and 
then smoothed her bangs into a crest atop her head. Two-hundred steps above 
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the six towers of La Castellane lies a smaller but taller project called La Bricarde. 
Sheyreen and Kenza left La Bricarde and were making their way down the steps 
to the secondary-school below, not minding the September sun in their 
imitation Adidas tracksuit and Burberry scarf.  
 Minutes later down in Madame Chérif ’s third-floor classroom, warm air 
wafted in through the horizontally cocked windows as the students filed in for 
the first time of the 2012-2013 school year. As they passed the teacher and 
headed to their seats, each student said Ṣbaḥ al-khayr, ustedhah (MSA. 'good 
morning, teacher') to the teacher, who responded with Ṣbaḥ al-nūr (MSA. 'bright 
morning'). 8am rang and old friends gave up conversation while roll was called. 
The Ustedhah’s roll continued undisturbed until her call of “Abdel Kader” [ʕabdəl 
'qɑ:-dəɻ] was met with a drawled “no need for the Abdel [abdεl] piece” (“c'est pas 
la peine Abdel [abdεl]”) from Kader.  
 Along with his peers from Class 3B, Kader was beginning his fourth year 
of a bilingual Modern Standard Arabic and French track at the secondary level. 
This year was their last in collège, or secondary school, and they were slated to 
choose at the end of the year whether to move on to high school or vocational 
programs. In spite of three years of MSA study with the old teacher, Monsieur 
Bashir, Kader continued to prefer a shortened, more French version of his name. 
He disclaimed how his new teacher pronounced his name, as a compound with 
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MSA phonology (e.g., /ʕ, q, ɻ/), in favor of simply “Kader” [ka-'dεχ], which 
conforms to neither MSA nor Standard French phonology. At the end of the day, 
while on the bus running from Northern Marseille towards the center of town, 
Madame Chérif filled me in on similar name preferences shown by her students 
of past years at the same public school:   
 “For compound names, like the Abd [ʕabd]-such-and-such, the Abdallahs [ʕabdɑl:ɑ] 
become Abdel [abdε:l], the Abdel Kaders [ʕabdəl qɑdəɻ] become Kader [kadεʁ], the Abdel 
Majids [ʕabdəl maji:d] become Majid [maji::d]... It’s, well, that! A portion is removed 
because it strikes them as long and seemingly ridiculous.”  27
Certainly, the lengthy, compounded first name called out by Madame Chérif, 
replete with MSA phonemes ‘ayn [ʕ], qaf [q], and a dark ra [ɻ], sounded unlike 
anything Kader was used to being called by his friends. While in her words, 
above, Madame Chérif imagined he would prefer the Standard French version of 
his name, namely Kader [kadεʁ], instead he and his friends opted for a neither-
nor pronunciation. Indeed, their usual pronunciation of “Kader” [ka-'dɛχ] 
switched [k] in for MSA’s qaf /q/, used French stress rules, and yet also replaced 
the typical French 'r' /ʁ/ with the Arabic phoneme /χ/. I learned about this local 
rendering of Arabic-sourced names through a blunder of my own, albeit in a 
diﬀerent setting. In the private Muslim secondary school where I taught, early 
on in the year I was introduced by Hanan, the school director’s wife, to one of 
 “Pour les noms composés, si tu veux en ‘abd-katha ‘abd-katha [ʕabd-kaða ʕabd-kaða], les 27
Abdallahs [ʕabdɑl:ɑ] c’est Abdel [abdε:l], les Abdel Kader [ʕabdəl qɑdəɻ] c’est Kader [kadɛr], les 
Abdel Majid [ʕabdəl majid] c’est Majid [maji::d]... C’est, donc, voilà! On supprime une partie 
parce que ça fait long, parce que ça fait ridicule” (Madame Chérif, 4.4.12).
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the recess monitors, Nasser. I touched a palm to my chest and said in French, 
"Nice to meet you, Nasser [‘nɑ:-sɪʀ]." Hanan quickly corrected me, "Nasser! 
[na-‘sœʁ]." To my surprise, Hanan, who speaks fluent Tunisian and excels at 
MSA, was asking me to pronounce Nasser’s name not in MSA but in French. 
She was being respectful of his own background as a diasporic individual who, 
like Kader, grew up in the projects, only on the south side of town. I later 
learned that, being his usual polite self, Nasser had in fact refrained from cluing 
us into the exact pronunciation he preferred. Throughout the school year I 
witnessed Nasser introducing himself to visitors at the school as [na-'sœχ]. 
Much like Kader, Nasser chose not only French stress and vowels (which Hanan 
had gotten right) but additionally the Arabic-sourced voiceless fricative /χ/ in 
lieu of French "r" /ʁ/.    
 Among young Castellaners, linguistic syncretism of this sort did not end 
at names. It stretched from discourse markers, to run-of-the-mill words, even to 
expressions that youth freshly imagined. Although what they spoke was 
recognizably French, young people from La Castellane consistently employed 
consonant and vowel inventories and lexis that did not tally exactly with 
Standard French, nor Marseille’s historical vernacular, nor MSA or dialectal 
varieties of Arabic. When asked about the languages he spoke in his daily life, 
Kader listed Algerian as the language he spoke to his Algerian father, French or 
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Algerian as what he spoke to his French mother (herself born of two Algerian 
parents in Marseille), and “Castellanois” as what he used with his four brothers 
and friends. Unlike French or Algerian, Castellanois was about “traﬃcking in 
words” (trafiquer des mots) from both, explained Kader. Another classmate named 
Sheyreen, whose mother is Algerian and step-father is Egyptian, shed further 
light on Castellanois and this type of French’s relationship to dialectal Arabic. 
“We make remixes, actually” she said, explaining Castellanois as speaking 
“French with an Arabic accent.” By her estimation, Parisians and “those who 
don’t speak [dialects of] Arabic” lacked culture because they spoke only “French, 
French, French.” By comparison, “we speak the project version (version quartiers) 
because growing up in Northern Marseille (Quartiers Nord) we basically come to 
mix languages.”  Before turning to examples of how youth used Castellanois, 28
below I present how the students of Class 3B described the significance of 
growing up in the quartiers.  
Tough Love in the Quartiers 
 The demographics of the projects of La Castellane and La Bricarde 
resembled those of Class 3B, the classroom in the public school across from La 
 “Nous on parle version quartier parce que comme on a grandit dans les Quartiers Nord en fait 28
on mélange les langues. Des fois on crée des mots avec des langues diﬀérentes. On fait des 
remixes en fait. On fait des remixes” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12). 
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Castellane, only writ large. Of all the students in the four MSA classes Madame 
Chérif taught at the secondary school (6ème-3ème, or 5th-8th grades), only a 
young man named Florian in Class 4B was recognizably French by the students’ 
standards. Teased on account of his blond hair, blue eyes, and Catholic name, he 
countered with accounts of his trips to visit his Tunisian grandpa in the bled, or 
country of origin. Each of the other students boasted a bled of aﬃliation, whether 
by dint of one or both parents’ birthplace or, less frequently, grandparents’ 
birthplace. For the majority of the students from Class 3B, that bled of aﬃliation 
was Algeria. There were also students, however, whose parents came from 
Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, the Comoros Islands, Mayotte, Egypt, and Yemen. 
There were likewise three students who came from mixed marriages between 
someone from one of these countries and someone born in France. One of these 
three French-born parents said she had French ethnic heritage and came from a 
working-class (ouvrier) milieu in the North of France, while the other two 
themselves grew up in Algerian households in La Castellane.   
 Like Class 3B, the population of the 16th, 15th, 14th, and 13th 
arrondissements, together called the Quartiers Nord, was characterized by a greater 
number of people born in the bled or having bled origins than people ethnically 
identifiable as French-origin (français de souche). This preponderance of French 
people of Arab, West African, and East African (mainly Comorian) origins living 
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in Northern Marseille is not well captured, however, in the census statistics 
published every ten years by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies (INSEE). France is unique in choosing not to collect statistics on its 
citizens’ and residents’ ethnic identities. The only available figures that might 
serve as a proxy pertain to immigrants versus French nationals. Thus, for 
example, INSEE (2002) reports that 87% of people living in Marseille are French 
citizens and the remaining 13% are immigrants. Not surprisingly, such numbers 
ill-reflect the numerical and cultural significance of the city’s French diasporic 
population. These percentages also dissimulate the relatively greater 
concentration of diasporic citizens in Northern Marseille. Although all of 
Marseille’s population has been shaped by “successive immigrations (apports de 
population) from outside,” the neighborhoods to Marseille’s North have, 
historically, received more numerous immigrants from North and sub-Saharan 
Africa (Maurice & Deloménie, 1972, p. 34).  
 Northern Marseille was predominantly settled by foreign workers who 
came to support Marseille’s industry and port in the 19th and 20th-centuries. If 
before World War II these workers were overwhelmingly Italian and Spanish, 
then between 1945 and the 1970s French colonial ties and later decolonization 
would prompt the arrival of new workers in Northern Marseille, namely, North 
Africans and sub-Saharan Africans from France’s (ex)colonies, as well as other 
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smaller contingents, like the Romani, the Portuguese, and the Turks.  During 29
this period, quite diﬀerent housing arrangements arose in the north of the city 
than in its southern neighborhoods. Maurice and Deloménie (1972) describe 
how, in the 1960s, projects like La Castellane were drafted with northerly 
coordinates and targeted working-class, mainly foreign residents:  
“La Castellane welcomed, much as expected, a youthful population, with few  
qualifications, of heterogeneous social provenance, and more mobile as well. The policy 
outlook of the organizations promoting its construction contributed to aggravating the 
arrondissement’s marginalization. If, in the South, public organizations and private  
entrepreneurs each took shares of real estate, in the 16th only HLMs were built” (p. 37, 
my translation).  
This development of HLMs (Habitations à Loyer Modéré), or rent-controlled and 
government-subsidized housing, to the city’s north was the result of zoning 
policies that aimed to create homes for foreign workers close to their places of 
employment along the Northern littoral, the site of Marseille’s industry.  
 Urbanization policies of this sort, attempting to circumscribe the 
movements of Marseille’s immigrant population, continue to present. They 
remain apparent, for example, in the city’s unwillingness to extend Métro 
transportation any further north than the Bougainville Métro stop, which lies at 
the southernmost edge of the 15th arrondissement. Likewise, the city’s cheap 
public bike network, called Le Vélo and begun in 2007, has its northernmost 
 In 1972, North Africans represented 45.8% of the foreign population of Marseille. To illustrate 29
their unequal distribution over urban space, there were at this time five times as many Algerians 
in the 16th arrondissement as in the southerly 9th arrondissement (Maurice & Deloménie, 1972) .
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stations in the 2nd arrondissement near the Docks, which belongs to the central 
part of town. As such, the main means of transportation around the Northern 
arrondissements is the bus network. Due to construction delays and the relatively 
larger size of the northern neighborhoods compared to those downtown, 
however, most residents contend with long bus rides. To illustrate, my 7-km (4-
mile) commute between Bougainville Métro, which is already located in 
Northern Marseille, to the project in La Castellane would take between 50 
minutes and an hour and ten minutes. Perhaps due to this relative isolation, the 
students in Class 3B maintained secluded lifestyles to the north of the city, only 
rarely venturing downtown or to the beaches and parks of the southern districts. 
It was, for instance, quite an undertaking when I invited female students from 
Class 3B to visit me on Sundays where I lived at the Northern edge of Central 
Marseille. Their mothers got quite anxious about them using public 
transportation and would go through considerable trouble to find someone from 
the neighborhood who owned a car and could chaperone the girls back and forth 
from the 16th arrondissement. This worry carried over to a school-organized trip 
some of the students and I were planning to take to Paris in April as well. As 
neither the students nor many of their parents had ever been to the nation’s 
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capital, some parents came along to both see the sights and reassure themselves 
about their children’s whereabouts.   30
 Members of Class 3B, hence, shared in identifying as immigrant 
descendants of their parents’ respective bleds and as Marseillais who, born and  
raised in one of the city’s northern housing projects, continued the diasporic 
history of the city. Class was a major part of this diasporic identity, and the 
students saw their bled backgrounds and ethnicities as bound up with their 
working-class status. To have bled origins, summed up a student named 
Sheyreen, is to live in a “rotten neighborhood” (quartier pourri). Césari, Moreau, 
and Schleyer-Lindenmann (2001) have written about how, in Marseille, often 
being diasporic or being an immigrant means a greater likelihood of both, 
residing to the city’s north, and being either working-class or below the poverty  
line. The map in Figure 3.1 clearly depicts this clustering of poverty to 
Marseille’s North. The intensity of the color red corresponds to the percentage 
of people living below the poverty line, which INSEE (2002) defines as having a 
monthly revenue of less than 621.38 Euros. The 16th arrondissement is shown in 
varying shades of red and pink, meaning that between 25-50% or, in some cases, 
more than 50%, of its population make do with less than the sum mentioned. Of  
 Although these 13 and 14 year-olds’ sphere of movement within Marseille and France is 30
relatively reduced, many of them have at some point in their lives been traveled to their parents’ 
respective home countries, via the 9-hour ferry to close North African destinations like Oran or 
Algiers, or (less frequently) via plane to places like Grande Comore or Dakar, etc. 
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Figure 3.1. INSEE Map (2002, p. 19) 
the forty parents of students in Class 3B, about half were unemployed. Mothers 
were more often unemployed than fathers, but students also spoke about how  
their fathers were seeking work or else stayed at home. On the first day of the 
school year, for instance, I heard it rumored among students that Kader’s father 
had come in to a teacher-parent conference about his son and threatened to put 
explosives in the school should his son be “excluded” again from class this 
school year. Madame Chérif confided in me that Kader’s father was a nice if 
strange man, but that he had probably lost his marbles after spending so many 
consecutive, unemployed days on the couch. If they had jobs, the students’ 
fathers worked in boat repair, as mechanics and plumbers, and in 
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manufacturing. The mothers who worked jobs, in turn, were employed as 
housecleaners, nannies, and cooks. Another anecdote, drawn from my 
observation of the public school across from La Castellane where students 
attended Class 3B, illustrates the perceived connection between being from the 
bled and working blue-collar jobs. In this excerpt from my fieldnotes on October 
18th, 2012, I describe a conversation I held in passing with the recess monitor.  
The new recess monitor started work today at school. In the yard, he asks me if I’ve 
heard the joke about “les générations.” I say no. He starts: “Well, there’s this man in 
Algeria dreaming about France. He thinks to himself, ‘The streets are paved in gold...’ 
But, shortly after arriving in France, he discovers three things. One, the streets aren’t 
paved in gold. Two, sometimes, they aren’t paved at all. And three, he’s the one who’s 
supposed to pave them!” 
The monitor’s joke expresses cynicism about his parents’ generation being 
brought to France to do strenuous jobs, and students expressed similar 
frustrations about the lack of options they felt were available to them other than 
blue-collar jobs. The students’ French teacher, who was born in France to an 
Arab family, tapped into students’ concern and organized a project where 
students had to locate somebody from the projects who had what they would 
define as success. Students brought in journalists, lawyers, and others who had 
grown up in La Castellane, and they generally seemed enthused to have these 
additional role models.    
 If sometimes students were frustrated to be working class or poor, other 
times they were proud too. One from student Class 3B, named Karim, doggedly 
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aﬃrmed his pride at being from the housing projects by wearing a t-shirt that 
read “100% carshare.” His t-shirt made a reference to highly publicized comments 
made by Nicolas Sarkozy, then-Minister of the Interior, in 2005. Following an 
episode of gun violence in the housing project of La Corneuve outside of Paris, 
Sarkozy had vowed that he would “flush out the housing project with a high-
pressure hose” (nettoyer la cité au kärcher). Karim’s shirt could thus be read, in 
other words, as “100% project material.” Kader flaunted his project pride by 
loudly singing the lyrics to songs by local band Zbatata in the hallways at school 
or before classes started. This one was one of his favorites, and he shared the 
music video with me. The chorus is a mantra upholding the “busted” (cramé) 
nature of the northern neighborhoods: 
“Marseille is the Quartiers Nord. Marseille is busted (cramé). It’s, it’s, it’s trouble (chaud). 
It’s boiling. We don’t give a fuck (on s’en bat les couilles). Khuya (Algerian ‘brother’), that’s 
Marseille. It’s, it’s, it’s only picking up speed.”   31
Even some of the teachers in the school maintained a working-class outlook, 
whether out of solidarity or their own political leanings, I do not know. One day 
in the teachers’ lounge, for instance, I overhead one of the teachers complaining 
of another who refused to unionize. He fumed about how “there’s nothing 
worse than a working-class guy who’s made it” (un ouvrier enrichi). These 
examples attest to the working-class spirit prevalent within La Castellane and its 
 “Marseille c’est Quartiers Nord. Marseille c'est cramé. C’est, c’est, c’est chaud. C’est bouillant. 31
On s'en bat les couilles. Khuya, c’est Marseille. Ça, ça, ça démarre, ça y est.”
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adjoining school. Students’ comments about their diasporic links to the bled, 
moreover, are shown to be inseparable from both their frustration and pride at 
being from the northerly, socio-economically marginalized parts of the city.  
 As will be detailed further in Section IV, the relevant contrast to their 
own diasporic identity for students from Class 3B was people who were French 
by descent. Tellingly, they avoided the term for such individuals that is more 
typical among French-speakers nationally, français de souche. Instead, they 
discussed such people as being “sans origines,” or without any origins, thus 
positioning their own kind of ethnic heritage as the default. Castellaners also 
used the label “paillot” for the ethnically French.  Their use of paillot tended, 32
furthermore, to cue stereotypic associations with wealth and with living in 
central or southern Marseille, as the following two examples indicate. Thus, one 
day at the ice-rink in a southern arrondissement, Sheyreen and two other girls 
from Class 3B looked on as two teens skated and spun at the center of the rink. 
Sheyreen oﬀered in French, “it’s the paillot families that can aﬀord ice-skating 
classes.” To make sure I understood, she then glossed her use of paillot with “les 
françaouis” [lε fʁə̃ˈsawi], using one of the words for French person in North 
African varieties of Arabic [fʁə̃ˈsawi] but adding a French article and French 
 The term paillot is more widely used than just in La Castellane. That said, the diasporic youth I 32
taught in the central districts used the term bodge in lieu of paillot. Bodge appears to have 
approximately the same scope of reference. 
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plural morphology. With this gloss, Sheyreen made it apparent that paillot 
involved an Arabic-speaking person’s perspective on ethnically French people. A 
second example demonstrates how youth consider paillots to be, in addition to 
better oﬀ than diasporic Marseillais, also less likely to live in the housing 
projects. Hence during an afternoon chat at my apartment, a student named 
Soumia was speaking with me and some girlfriends about how La Castellane 
was primarily meant for people without means—but also people with bleds. She 
mused, “I once heard there was an older French lady (femme française) living in 
my tower but I’ve never actually seen her.” These anecdotes speak to youth’s 
conception of these opposing identities in intersectional (Crenshaw, 1992) 
terms. While being a diasporic Marseillais subsumes a geographic location to 
the North, being working-class or poor, and having bled origins (or being of 
color), so, too, does being a paillot Marseillais, according to the diasporic youth I 
polled at least, involve living in Southern Marseille, being middle or upper class, 
and being bled-less (or white).  
 Insofar as youth from Class 3B defined their diasporic identity in a 
manner that additionally invoked ethnicity and class, I witnessed youth engaging 
in interesting manipulations of other sister categories, like “Muslim” or “Arab.” 
One took place at the public school on the special day of the school calendar 
known as “Language Day,” where each language class invites outsiders into their 
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classroom to learn about the language they are learning. In front of an audience 
of students, parents, and administrators, a student from Class 3B explained that 
“our MSA class is for les arabes.” Madame Chérif shot the student an amiable 
wink lest she go on portraying the class as an ethnic ghetto for Arabs only, and 
she looked as though she was jotting a mental note to herself to address the 
student’s misunderstanding at a later time. On an afternoon later that week, 
Madame Chérif gathered the students’ attention and opened the floor to a 
discussion of what unified the students of the class, whether it was in fact being 
Arab or perhaps their Muslim upbringing. To her surprise, students in the class 
were in agreement that Arabs and Muslims were the same. “There is no 
diﬀerence. All Muslims are Arab and all Arabs are Muslims,” explained one 
student. At this point, Madame Chérif looked incredulously at Kardiatou, whose 
parents are Senegalese Pulaars, and Nacima, whose parents are from Grande 
Comore. She asked the class to meditate on how these two students were from 
Muslim but non-ethnically Arab families, but to little avail. The students 
appeared to be thinking about what it meant to be Arabe from a diﬀerent, 
project-centric perspective. Unlike other instances where I saw the label Arabe 
being used to specifically point out an individual’s Arab ethnic heritage, in this 
instance Arabe served as something other than an ethnonym.  
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 The following case-in-point demonstrates how Arabe can also serve as a 
placeholder for the diasporic Marseillais identity, which is to say being working-
class and having ties to a bled, any bled. In a more centrally located community 
center, I was parti to a conversation between a group of 14-year old girls. Four of 
them had Arab parents and the other three did not. The issue was for the four 
girls to find the appropriate label for the three seemingly white girls in their 
midst. It was decided that Cloë and Mado, who were born to French parents and 
were middle-class, lacked origins and were hence paillot. Antonia, who looked no 
less white than Cloë and Mado, was by contrast judged “une Arabe like us.” 
Significantly for the arbitrating girls, Antonia not only grew up in State-
subsidized housing (HLMs) and knew the right gab, but she also had a bled. She 
had two bleds, to be precise, her mother being Romani and her father Polish. The 
group determined, further, that Antonia was as Arabe as Dalila was paillot. Dalila 
was the 25-year old organizer for their outings, and both her parents are 
Algerian. The girls felt, however, that on account of her higher economic means 
and purely French way of talking, Dalila did not qualify as une Arabe.  
 In both the case of Kardiatou and Nacima from Class 3B, and that of 
Antonia and Dalila from the community center, narrower categories like 
musulman (Muslim), Arabe (Arab), and paillot (ethnically French) were deployed 
in unexpected ways. This flexible deployment owed to the adjudication of these 
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young people’s identities with respect to the umbrella category of being 
diasporic, and the class and bled dimensions this category entails within 
Northern Marseille. Within that category, it was of vanishing importance 
whether Kardiatou and Nacima’s parents were from Senegal and the Comoros, 
or Antonia’s were from Romania and Poland. As long as these young women 
were tied to a bled and the working class, they could claim status as diasporic 
youth within Marseille. Arabe could, in this sense, be used in this setting 
synonymously with diasporic or pan-ethnic status. Hall’s (1992) remarks that, 
depending on how ethnicity is constructed under particular historical 
conditions, ethnic categories may grow to absorb other categories of shared 
experience, seem quite à propos in this regard. If, conversely, one has a bled but 
is from a diﬀerent class background or does not speak like the projects, as in 
Dalila’s case, failure to meet the minimum requirements of the diasporic 
experience in Marseille, or failure to be Arabe in the second sense outlined here, 
can lead to one being positioned as white-washed.         
 Before turning to language, a final dimension of the shared experience of 
youth from La Castellane, which also begs discussion, is Islam. As intimated 
above, being Muslim was also part of being a diasporan from Marseille. Of the 
twenty students in Class 3B, all self-identified as “musulman” when asked about 
their religion. How they lived their religion, however, was tied into social life in 
!98
La Castellane and La Bricarde. The students’ practice of Islam involved mainly 
observing three principal traditions. They celebrated Muslim holidays, 
particularly the Ramadan fast, did not eat pork, and avoided alcohol. In 
observing these rites, they nevertheless tolerated a bit of flexibility. During 
Ramadan, for example, although they fasted youth paid no more heed to prayer 
times than during the rest of the year. Likewise, while all stayed away from pork, 
eating religiously sanctioned (or ḥalāl) meat was often bracketed for 
convenience’s—or hunger’s—sake. I often ate with the students in the fast food 
shops at the nearby mall, and none seemed concerned that the hamburgers were 
not ḥalāl. Lastly, it was, and especially for the boys, not beyond the scope of 
possibility to drink an occasional beer. Islamic obligations beyond these big 
three, including such practices as prayer and rules of dress, were largely 
dispensed with, and this choice did not seem to overly burden the students' 
consciences.  
 In fact, students would often advertise their nominal form of Islam, or 
modicum of religious practice, in Madame Chérif ’s class. This took the form of 
students mocking religious expressions in MSA, which the students were well 
aware had the duplex quality of being both the sacred language of Islam and the 
secular target language for their instruction. When for example one day Madame 
Chérif asked the class “How do we say ‘my big sister’ [in MSA]?,” Nacima 
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retorted with a loud “Allahu Akbar! [MSA. ‘God is great’],” playing on the correct 
answer’s use of the same elative structure (MSA. ukhtī al-akbar). Likewise, no 
scheduling of the homework or an exam ensued without a great number of 
students pointing out the hoped-for contingency of such dates with 
exclamations of “In Shā Allah! In Shā Allah!” (MSA. ‘If God wills it’). Yet another 
student’s favorite retort to her peers when she was being called out for being 
disruptive was to silence them with the religiously loaded, “Shaytān!,” or ‘devil’ 
in MSA. Students looked forward, nevertheless, to the time spent with their 
families and friends during Ramadan, and happily took days oﬀ from school for 
Islamic holidays not observed in the French school calendar. This shared 
commitment to upholding the Islamic faith, if minimally, contributed to the 
feelings of solidarity among the inhabitants of the 16th arrondissement’s projects 
that I describe below.  
 The diasporic Marseillais identity documented thus far is summed up, in 
the words of Class 3B students, as “être du quartier,” or being from the projects. 
Above and beyond having a bled, being working class, and keeping with some of 
the Islamic pillars, this identity is also something youth sensed in their 
interactions around the 16th arrondissement. More specifically, youth from Class 
3B relayed the belief that interactions within the projects were marked by a sort 
of tough love. For instance, when asked where he wanted to live as an adult 
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Mohamed from Class 3B emphasized the importance of staying in the quartier 
where his Moroccan parents raised him: “That way my son has a project 
upbringing (l’éducation quartiers)... He won’t let anybody mess with him... A 
project upbringing means he is tough, that he’s scared of nobody.”  Oussama, 33
too, wanted to stay in La Castellane: “I’ll always stay here because it’s where I 
grew up, in La Castellane. And people are sociable, solidary.”  According to 34
these young men, increased strength of character and community solidarity were 
worthy prizes for toughing it out in Northern Marseille’s projects. In another 
interaction, this time with a young taximan raised in the 16th by East African 
parents, Northern Marseille was described as having a “certain ambiance.” The 
young man recalled “rocky living conditions,” when for example his single 
mother struggled to put meals together for him and his siblings at the end of the 
month. This was coupled with a feeling of attachment or indebtedness to the 
projects as well, however: “Even when we have almost nothing, we are still 
happy to be in Marseille... It’s still a paradise. It remains a little paradise (un petit 
paradis) regardless.”   35
 “Comme ça mon fils il a-du-il a l’éducation quartiers. (…) Il se laisse pas faire. L’éducation de 33
quartier c’est il est dur, il a peur de personne” (Mohamed, 4.2.13). 
 “Moi je veux vivre à Marseille parce que c’est là où j’ai grandi, à La Castellane. Et les gens sont 34
sociables, solidaires” (Oussama, 4.2.13). 
 “C’est Marseille, il y a quand même une certaine ambience qui fait que même si on a presque 35
rien on est quand même contents d’être à Marseille (…). Ça reste un paradis. Ça reste un petit 
paradis quand même Marseille” (Taxi driver, 4.8.13). 
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 This mantra of tough love also manifested in a common family metaphor 
youth used to talk about quartiers interactions. One day, during a walk with 
several students down the main thoroughfare of La Castellane, I observed an 
exchange between Nacima, whose parents are Maorese, and a 20-year old 
guetteur, a scout paid to make sure drug sales run smoothly and alert higher-
ranking others to the presence of the police in the project. Though he did not 
know her well, the guetteur recognized Nacima and greeted her with “ça va ma fille 
[fijə]?” (‘how are you my daughter?’), appending the word-final schwa of the 
project’s youth vernacular to the word “daughter.” Nacima was obviously 
pleased at her interaction with the young man but chagrined that it had to take 
place in front of her girlfriends. A young woman of Comorian descent, Rouqiya, 
helped her out by playing down the interaction to the group. Rouqiya explained 
to me in a voice loud enough for the others to hear: “Everyone knows and 
watches out for everybody else in La Castellane. It’s the capital of all bleds.”  As 36
shown by this anecdote, Castellane residents recognized the project’s designated 
role in reuniting the people in Marseille who have bled ties. Rouqiya, for one, 
indicated that if there existed an imaginary nation reconstituted from the home 
countries of all of Marseille’s immigrants, then Marseille would be its diasporic 
 “Tout le monde se connait et veille sur les autres à La Castellane. C’est la capitale de tous les 36
bleds” (Rouqiya, 4.11.13). 
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capital. The residents of La Castellane, as such, modeled their interactions with 
one another, both passing and more intimate, after ones between kin. Although 
they were joined by bled rather than blood, the step to create of the projects a 
metaphoric family aﬃrmed residents’ intention to combat poverty through 
solidarity. In the second subsection, I address the kind of language youth have 
created to reflect these experiences of growing up in the housing projects of 
Marseille’s 16th arrondissement.  
Castellanois and Syncretic Linguistic Interference 
 At the beginning of this section, I introduced Castellanois as the French 
syncretic register, in Agha’s (2007a) sense, youth from La Castellane used to cue 
their belonging to Marseille’s northern housing projects.  Here I will describe 37
this register, and its use and evaluation, in more detail. As per Agha (2007a), 
registers are social formations that often involve language but may also include 
other modalities of human behavior. To signal this multi-modal aspect, Agha 
also refers to “registers of conduct” or “semiotic registers.” He defines a register, 
thus, as “a repertoire of performable signs linked to stereotypic pragmatic eﬀects 
by a sociohistorical process of enregisterment” (p. 80). This definition encloses 
 Although I became most familiar with La Castellane and, hence, foreground the way young 37
Castellaners term their speech (“Castellanois”), students in Class 3B who were from La Bricarde 
housing project also participated in this register. I use the term Castellanois because the students 
called it thus, but it could just as well have been called Bricardois. 
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the three dimensions of register organization he proposes. The first dimension is 
the forms or signs, linguistic and para- or non-linguistic (e.g., gesture, bodily 
hexis, clothing, etc.), that constitute the register’s “repertoire” (Agha, 2007a, p. 
169). The second dimension, “social range” (p. 169), is the range of pragmatic 
or social uses to which such forms can be put. As the definition above indicates, 
the register’s forms acquire pragmatic eﬀects only through their repeated linking 
to social types. This linking takes place over time and itself constitutes a sphere 
of discursive activity in which people comment on social life and its significance, 
what M. Silverstein (1979, p. 209) has called “ethnometapragmatics,” and Lucy 
(1992), language’s “reflexive activity” (p. 11). The third dimension, “social 
domain” (Agha, 2007a, p. 169), is the demographics of the register. Who uses 
it? Who cannot use it but can recognize it, although they may ascribe diﬀerent 
values to its use? For whom is the register outside the scope of recognition? I 
discuss these dimensions of Castellanois below in order to arrive at a more 
comprehensive picture of the register’s “total linguistic fact,” comprising form, 
use, ideology, and domain (M. Silverstein, 1985a; Wortham, 2008).  
 Perhaps like most registers, speaking Castellanois in order to index oneself 
as a quartiers youth is primarily an act of self-versus-other positioning. As Said 
(1978) argued in the context of the West’s construction of the “Oriental” East, 
self-concepts are “made up of human eﬀort, partly aﬃrmation, partly 
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identification of the Other” (Said, 2003 [1978], xvii). Lo and Reyes (2004, p. 
118), too, speak of the “relational unfoldings of identity” as Americans tangle 
with one another. They write that, “there is no Asian Pacific American without 
Caucasian American, no African American without Latino, no self without the 
other” (p. 118). Through the following vignettes, it becomes apparent that the 
type of linguistic syncretism the students of Class 3B have created, namely, 
between Marseille’s working-class vernacular and dialectal varieties of Arabic, is 
first and foremost an eﬀort to aﬃrm their own diasporic project identity, while 
also carefully setting themselves apart from the first-generation immigrants 
from the bled and the paillots with whom they might be confused.  
 Transcript 3.1 serves as an initial foray into Castellanois. This transcript is 
drawn from a longer video interview I held with three female students from 
Class 3B towards the end of the school year. By this time, I had spent two 
semesters in their company, both in and outside of school, and they were 
confident I knew enough about them to understand their linguistic playfulness. 
Before the transcribed segment, I was asking Soumia, Samia, and Asma about 
how they would characterize their own speech in reference to other people’s 
speech. To answer my question, the young women produced three diﬀerent 
pronunciations of the French word “midi,” or ‘noon.’ The first is their attempt to 
say midi in Standard French, with an alveolar [d]. To understand the meaning of 
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this form, it is important to preface that the students associated speaking 
Standard French with people from Paris, on the one hand, and with ethnically 
French paillots who live in Central and Southern Marseille, on the other. For 
instance, earlier in the year, Sheyreen had drawn the following verbal map of 
language use for me. She compares people who speak in “o,” or use Standard 
French and its word-final phonology, to people like herself who speak in “eng,” 
her way of capturing the word-final phonology of Castellanois.  
“Downtown, they have a weird kind of accent. It’s kind of like the Parisians too. They  
talk in ‘o’ [õ]. ‘Comment [kɔmõ] ça va?’ They all talk in ‘o’ [õ], like pourquoi [puʁkwõ], 
comment [kɔmõ]. All the syllables with “eng” [əŋ] are transformed into “o” [õ].”  38
Indeed, one of the particularly salient diﬀerences between Standard French and 
the strongly Marseillais way these youth speak is the transformation of Standard 
French’s word-finals nasalized vowels into vowel plus velar nasal /ŋ/. Above, 
Sheyreen likewise locates people who speak in “o” in Paris and in “downtown” 
Marseille. To return to the transcript at hand, the second iteration of midi given 
by the three girls is the Castellanois pronunciation, with a post-alveolar aﬀricate   
[ʤ]. Soumia oﬀers this pronunciation as an example of her own way of saying 
midi. The third pronunciation of midi, with a dental [d̪], is the students’ 
imitation of the way their first-generation parents pronounce the word, 
 “Au centre, ils ont un accent un peu bizarre aussi, comme un peu les parisiens. Ils parlent en 38
‘on’ [õ]. ‘Comment [kɔmõ] ça va?’ Ils parlent tous en ‘on’ [õ], genre pourquoi [puʁkwõ], 
comment [kɔmõ]. Toutes les syllabes en ‘eng’ [əŋ] ils transforment en ‘o’ [õ].” (Sheyreen, 
10.29.12). 
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influenced no doubt by Arabic dialectal speakers’ tendency to produce a dental 
[d̪] before high, front vowels. Aside from brief excursions into voicing the paillot 
(e.g., [midi]) and the first-generation speaker of French (e.g., [mid̪i]), the three 
girls carry out the conversation mainly in Castellanois. I have bolded its 
characteristic phonetic features in the French-language transcript to direct the 
reader’s attention, and I continue to do so throughout the remainder of the 
transcripts in this chapter.  
Transcript 3.1.  Midi 39
French Original English Transcription
Soumia: On peut pas dire [ʤi:χ] midi [midi] 
Asma: Midi [midi]  
Soumia: Midi[midi] 
Samia: Mide [midε]      
Soumia: J'arrive pas!  
Soumia: Midji [miʤi]  
Samia: On dit [ʤi] midji [miʤi 
Asma: Midji [miʤi]  
Samia: Midji [mi:ʤi]  
Asma: Midi [midi] 
Soumia: Mon père il dit midi [mid̪i] 
Samia: Mon père aussi! Mon père aussi il dit 
midi [mid̪i]…midi [mid̪i] 
Soumia: Et akhé [ɑχχε] quand il me dit “il est  
quelle heure?” et je dis [ʤi] “midji [miʤi]” hein, 
il se moque de moi.                                            
Samia: Il dit “Non! C’est midi [mid̪i]!”  
((giggling)) 
Cécile: Pourquoi il se moque de toi?    
Soumia: Ouais parce que je dis midji [miʤi]. Il  
me fait “arrête de dire [ʤi:χ] midji [miʤi]  
dis [ʤi] midi [mid̪i]”  
Soumia: We can’t say midi [midi] 
Asma: [midi]  
Soumia: [midi] 
Samia: [midε]      
Soumia: I can’t do it! 
Soumia: [miʤi]  
Samia: We say [miʤi] 
Asma: [miʤi]  
Samia: [mi:ʤi]  
Asma: [midi] 
Soumia: My dad says [mid̪i] 
Samia: My dad too! My dad says it too  
[mid̪i]...  [mid̪i] 
Soumia: And akhé [ɑχχε](‘then’) when 
he asks  
me “what time is it?” and I say “[miʤi]”  
hah he makes fun of me                                              
Samia: He says “No! C’est [mid̪i]!”  
((giggling)) 
Cécile: Why does he make fun of you?  
Soumia: Yeah because I say [miʤi]. He’s  
like “stop saying [miʤi]. Say [mid̪i]”  
 This video clip dates from 5.30.13.39
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 In this transcript, Soumia, Samia, and Asma manifest their greater 
alignment to the identity indexed by the Castellanois pronunciation of midi than 
to either of the two personas cued by midi’s other pronunciations. They, for 
instance, aﬃrm their diﬀerence from paillots by claiming inability to pronounce 
the word with an alveolar [d]—even as they are, in fact, pronouncing it. The way 
their first-generation parents pronounce midi with a dental [d̪], by contrast, 
strikes them as amusing. Unlike the paillot pronunciation, however, they do not 
claim inability to pronounce midi like their parents. This stance-taking unfolds 
entirely through these three young women’s remarkable orientation to phonetic 
detail. Their awareness of minute, indeed allophonic, variations in sound 
suggests that these particular forms have already become “enregistered” (Agha, 
2005) in group-centric ways, along with others, as indicative of social types like 
the paillot or the first-generation immigrant. The social type of the project youth, 
and its association with the aﬀrication of /d/, also appears to have some 
measure of social recognition beyond its domain of speakers. Although not a 
Asma: Midi [mid̪i] 
Soumia: Ouais, j'arrive pas  
Asma: Midi [mid̪i] 
Samia: Midi [mid̪i] 
Cécile: Parce que pour lui midji [miʤi] ça fait  
comment?   
Soumia: Parce que ouais en fait midji [miʤi] ça 
fait trrrop [tχɔ::] accent marseillais [mɑχsεjε] 
quoi ... midji [miʤi]!   
Asma: [mid̪i] 
Soumia: Yup, I can’t do it  
Asma: [mid̪i] 
Samia: [mid̪i] 
Cécile: Because what does [miʤi] seem  
like to  him? 
Soumia: Because yeah, you know, [miʤi]  
seems  too:: Marseillais accent, you  
know... [miʤi]!
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speaker of Castellanois, Soumia’s father understands his daughter’s 
pronunciation of midi to be, not simply Marseillais, but heavy-handedly so (“trop 
accent marseillais”). That he judges an additional social element, beyond being 
just Marseillais, to inhere in his daughter’s use of aﬀrication or palatalization is 
telling. Likely familiar with the host of features that characterizes his daughter’s 
register, Soumia’s father knows that, when used jointly, they index the 
laminated identity of being both from Marseille and diasporic.  
 A quick glance at the bolded features in Table 3.1 reveals Castellanois’ 
greater proximity to Marseille’s historical vernacular than to Standard French. 
Before youth from La Castellane began aﬀricating, Marseillais of varying class 
and cultural backgrounds had been palatalizing their stop consonants before /i/ 
and /u/ for many decades (Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013). Another mainstay of 
Marseille’s historical vernacular that also appears in Castellanois is the realization 
of Standard French /o/ as [ɔ], as in trop (“too much”) below. Castellanois also 
diﬀers in its forms from Standard French and Marseille’s vernacular. Its 
speakers, for example, use a greater intensity of aﬀrication, realize French “r” as 
Arabic-sourced fricative [χ], borrow words from Arabic varieties (e.g., za’ama 
[zaʔma] Algerian discourse marker ‘like’), or else invent new French but Arabic-
sounding words (e.g., axé [ɑχχε], ‘then’). Sheyreen, ever the lucid language 
critic, explained during an afternoon visit to my apartment that youth from the 
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16th arrondissement speak like the South of France, “only project version” (mais en 
version quartier, 10.29.12).   
Table 3.1. Marseille’s Sociolinguistic Landscape from Youth’s Point of View (Examples from 
Transcript 3.1)  40
  
 To summarize, these students’ Castellanois does, in eﬀect, use several 
phonetic features characteristic of a broad Marseillais accent, including the velar 
nasal /ŋ/ syllable-finally, word-final schwa, an opened rounded back vowel /ɔ/ 
Type of 
Speech 
Register
Standard French          Marseille’s                     Castellanois                   L2 French 
                                    Historical                                                                                                
                                    Vernacular               
Indexed 
Social 
Persona
The well-oﬀ paillot       White, working-class     Diasporic                     First- 
from Marseille,           Marseillais                     Marseillais youth         generation          
the Parisian                                                                                           immigrant 
                                                                                                              from the bled 
Repertoire 
of Forms
midi “midday”             midi/miʤi                   miʤi                            mid̪i                       
(alveolar or                                                       (voiced post-                (dental [d̪]        
pre-alveolar [d])                                               alveolar aﬀricate)         <dialectal 
                                                                                                              Arabic/MSA)                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                         
ɑpʁε “after”                 ɑpʁε                             ɑχχε ‘then’             
(voiced uvular                                                   (voiceless uvular  
fricative)                                                            fricative) 
maʁsεjε                       maʁsεjε                          mɑχsεjε    
“Marseillais”                                                     (voiceless uvular 
(voiced uvular                                                    fricative) 
fricative)                                                                       
tʁo “too much”            tʁɔ                              tχɔ  
(voiceless uvular         (voiceless                       (voiced  
fricative, closed           uvular fricative,              uvular fricative,  
mid-back V)                open mid-back V)          open mid-back V)
 Bolding in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicates features of interest, not necessarily Castellanois features. 40
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where in Standard French it would be closed, and left dislocation of an object or 
adverb (e.g., toujours je fais ça, “I always do that”). It is the very features that 
occur in Castellanois and not in the Marseille vernacular, however, which serve to 
invest it with its singular indexicality. These include the substitution of the 
uvular voiced fricative /χ/ for Standard French uvular voiceless fricative /ʁ/ in 
most environments, the heavy aﬀrication of dental stops before front vowels /i, 
ε/ and back vowel /u/, the insertion of Maghrebi Arabic (and occasionally, 
Comorian, Romani, etc.) lexemes and discourse markers, and the creation of 
new “Arabic-sounding” words (e.g., ham-ham [ħamħam], ‘slut’). It follows, of 
course, that although Castellanois and Marseille’s vernacular partially overlap in 
repertoire, any single form of Castellanois does not have the same pragmatic 
eﬀect or social range as the corresponding form in Marseille’s historical 
vernacular. An instance of aﬀrication in Castellanois would evoke the diasporic 
project dweller to someone acquainted with it, whereas aﬀrication in Marseille’s 
historical vernacular would index the working-class, ethnically French fisherman 
mode of life depicted for example in the œuvre of cinematographer and author 
Marcel Pagnol, 1895-1974 (Binisti & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2003).   41
 Gasquet-Cyrus (2013) reports, quite interestingly, that since the 2000s palatalization and 41
aﬀrication have become increasingly associated within Marseille with how youth from the 
Northern Quarters talk and less linked to Marseille’s vernacular. Were this kind of form in 
question, then, its indexicality would likely depend on the speaker’s other behavior.  
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 Transcript 3.2 oﬀers an example of the non-identity—in pragmatic terms
—of homophonous forms shared by Standard French, Marseille’s vernacular, and 
Castellanois. In this video excerpt, three young women from Class 3B and I are 
brainstorming names that are typical of first-generation immigrants, whom the 
students stereotypically call clandos.  Halfway into the transcript, Samia and 42
Soumia begin talking about how they dislike the bled pronunciation of their 
names, with first-syllable stress and three syllables (see right-most column in 
Table 3.2). They prefer the Castellanois pronunciation of their names, with 
second-syllable stress and two syllables (see Castellanois column below). Samia is 
also worried, however, that due to homophonous pronunciations of her name 
between Castellanois, Standard French, and Marseille’s vernacular, people might 
mistakenly take her preferred pronunciation to mean she belongs to one of these 
other groups, rather than to La Castellane.  
 Section IV deals specifically with the social figure of the clando.42
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Table 3.2. Examples of Register Forms 
Transcript 3.2. Soumia and Samia 
Type of 
Speech
Standard French             Marseille’s                      Castellanois                L2 French                                                                      
                                       Vernacular                                                       (Native Arabic 
                                                                                                                Speaker)
Example 
Forms
sa-'mja: ‘Samia’     =       sa-'mja:               =        sa-'mja:                     'sa:-mi-ja 
(short [a],                                                                                              (long [a],  
stress on 2nd σ,                                                                                       1st σ stress, 
disyllabic)                                                                                               trisyllabic) 
su-'mja: ‘Soumia‘   =      su-'mja:               =        su-'mja:                     'su:-mi-ja 
(short [u],                                                                                        (long [u],  
stress on 2nd σ,                                                                                       1st σ stress, 
disyllabic)                                                                                               trisyllabic)
French Original English Translation
Soumia: ((laughing)) Zulikha [zuliχɑ] 
Samia & Asma: Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!  
Samia: Ça c'est un nom qui fout le- 
Soumia: Tranquille [tχəŋkilə]! Mais putain [pytəŋ], 
ça va aller dans le video 
Cécile: Et pourquoi ce sont des noms clandos en fait? 
Samia: Chez pa::s... Zulikha [zuliχɑ]  
Asma: Non, c’est pas des noms clandos. C'est- 
Samia: -C’est pas des noms clandos. C’est des noms  
qui fait chauﬀer quoi  
Soumia: Chez pas. T’es dans la classe, tu [ʧy] 
entends “oh Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!” Tu [ʧy] te retournes 
directemente vers la persone tu [ʧy] la regardes                      
Cécile: C’est des noms qui font...? 
Asma: Remarquer  
Soumia: Chauﬀer 
Samia: Chauﬀer  
Cécile: Chauﬀer ça veut dire quoi? 
Samia, Asma, Soumia: Remarquer 
Cécile: Mmm mmm mmm 
Soumia: Bon, moi je parle pas parce que mon  
prénom est un peu aussi [ɔsi]- 
Samia: -Ouais moi moi je-j’aime pas au lieu de-les  
gens les Arabes et tou::t au bled... Ici ils disent Samia 
['sa:-mja]. ((pause indicating she is now talking  
about the bled)) 'Sa:::m-i-ya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. Ils disent  
toujours “i”
Soumia: ((laughing)) Zulikha [zuliχɑ] 
Samia & Asma: Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!  
Samia: It’s a name that screws shit u- 
Soumia: Chill! Crap, that’s going on the 
video Cécile: And why exactly are these 
clando names? 
Samia: Dunno... Zulikha [zuliχɑ] 
Asma: No, they’re not clando names. The- 
Samia: -They’re not clando names. They’re  
names that make you stand out y’know? 
Soumia: I dunno. You’re in class, you 
hear "oh Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!" You turn right 
around and look at the person   
Cécile: They’re names that make you...? 
Asma: Noticeable 
Soumia: Stand out 
Samia: Stand out 
Cécile: What does “stand out” mean? 
Samia, Asma, Soumia: To be noticed 
Cécile: Mmm mmm mmm 
Soumia: We::ll, I shouldn’t talk because  
my name is a bit like that too- 
Samia: -Yeah I-I do-don’t like it when  
people-Arabs and all in the bled... Here  
they say Samia ['sa:-mja]. ((pause  
indicating she is now talking about the  
bled)) 'Sa:::m-i-ya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. They  
always say the "i"
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   Samia’s head gesture is key to understanding how homophony in forms 
may not be identity at the level of pragmatics. Like Kader and Nasser from the 
initial anecdotes of the chapter, Samia prefers her name pronounced in 
Castellanois, with French stress and vowel length. Meanwhile, she acknowledges 
that there may be more aﬄuent diasporic people in Marseille who, to indicate 
that class belonging, pronounce their own Arabic-sourced names in Standard 
French. Samia’s head wag shows her negative stance on uppity people of that 
sort. Possible confusions notwithstanding, Samia continues to prefer her name 
pronounced like in La Castellane: “Here, they say Samia [sa-'mja].” This 
transcript likewise allows a second glance at some of Castellanois’ characteristic 
forms, bolded in the original French text. As before, there is aﬀrication of /d/ 
and /t/ (e.g., tu > [ʧy], dire > [ʤiχ]) and use of the open-mid back vowel /ɔ/ 
Soumia: Moi suis toujours Sou-mi-ya ['su-mi-ja] 
Samia: Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. Viens là Sa:::miya  
['sa:::-mi-ja]. J'aime pas! 
Soumia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja] 
Samia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja], ah! C’est pas beau!  
((giggling)) ... Non…  
Cécile: Pourquoi, tu-tu prefères quoi? 
Samia: Samia [sa-'mja:]! Mais Samia [sa-'mja:] ça  
fait aussi un petit peu:: ((((circular head movement  
indicating snobbery)) 
Soumia: Bah c'est normal. On dirait [ʤiχε] au bled il 
va dire[ʤiχ] Samia [sa-'mja]?  
Samia: Non non c’est p-  
Soumia: Ah c'est pas comme ça  
Samia: Ils rajoutent des [ʀa:::] des [qa:] à la fin ....  
Ah, c'est pas drole [dχɔl] 
Soumia: I’m always Sou-mi-ya ['su-mi-ja] 
Samia: Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja] come here   
Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. I ha:::te it! 
Soumia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja] 
Samia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja], ah! It’s so  
ugly!  ((giggling)) ... Na::w 
Cécile: Why, what do you-you prefer? 
Samia: Samia [sa-'mja:]!  Even if Samia  
[sa-'mja:] seems a bi::t ((((circular head  
movement indicating snobbery)) 
Soumia: Hey that’s normal. Really think 
someone from the bled would say Samia 
[sa-'mja]?  
Samia: No no, it’s mor-  
Soumia: Nope, that’s not how it goes 
Samia: They add [ʀa:::]s and [qa:]s in at 
the end.... Ah it’s not even funny 
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(e.g., osi > [ɔsi], dʁol > [dχɔl]).  The velar nasal also appears in lieu of a 
nasalized word-final vowel (e.g., [pytəŋ], and French /ʁ/ is consistently replaced 
with Arabic-sourced /χ/ (e.g., tʁɑk̃i:l > [tχəŋkilə]).            
 I turn now to discussing linguistic syncretism in greater depth. Why have 
youth from La Castellane created and made of Castellanois, specifically, a vehicle 
for expressing their diasporic Marseillais identity? The majority of students in 
Class 3B grew up exposed to both Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal Arabic 
varieties. As such, they were particularly well positioned to exploit their 
knowledge of both of these linguistic systems. Kurylowicz (1964, p. 40) defines 
linguistic syncretism as “the suppression of a relevant opposition under certain 
determined conditions.” Hill and Hill (1986), and later Woolard (1999), would 
draw upon this definition in their further elaboration of linguistic syncretism. 
Hill and Hill (1986) contribute the insight that bilingual speakers may 
compromise the usual degree of separation between two linguistic systems for 
an express cultural purpose of their own making. Woolard (1999), in turn, 
creates a typology of linguistic syncretism in which she includes the phenomena 
of bivalency, interference, and code-switching. These three linguistic phenomena 
have in common that they take place in bilinguals’ communication and involve 
“live, unresolved copresences” between two (or more) languages, thus allowing 
speakers to “thrive in their tense intersection” (pp. 5-6). Castellanois is a register 
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that is characterized by a high degree of the interference type of syncretism, and 
below I will suggest some possible social functions for such interference 
phenomena.  
 Interference, as per Haugen’s (1956) early definition, represents a kind of 
“linguistic overlap” whereby bilinguals apply their two linguistic systems to a 
single linguistic form (p. 50). Woolard (1999) develops this idea, identifying 
interference as the special case of linguistic syncretism when a speaker actively 
selects both languages at once by drawing on their respective systems, often at 
diﬀering levels of language (e.g., phonology, morphology, syntax, prosody). 
Unlike the bivalent type of syncretism, where bilinguals deploy words or sounds 
that “could ‘belong’ equally...to both codes” and are hence ultimately decided 
based on the listener’s viewpoint (p. 7), speakers who engage in the interference 
type of syncretism find ways of choosing both languages at once in order not to 
have to settle on either alone. Hill and Hill (1986) provide examples of 
interference from their research with Mexicano (Nahuatl) and Spanish bilinguals 
in the Malinche Volcano region of Central Mexico. Mexicanos, for example, use 
the expression “sus personitas de ustedes” to mean “your respected persons” (p. 
196). Although the expression appears Spanish and looks as though it employs a 
regular Spanish diminutive, the form personitas in fact represents a calque from 
Mexicano honorific morpheme -itas. Hill and Hill (1986) argue that this and 
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other instances of interference in their data capture the desire of certain 
Mexicano-Spanish bilinguals to put on an authentic or legitimate Mexicano 
persona. When speaking in Spanish, such individuals nativize the European 
language’s phonology, morphology, syntax, and prosody, thus taking on the 
“Mexicano accent in Spanish” that will eﬀectively convey their purist persona (p. 
198).  
 Below, I enumerate and analyze various examples I observed of youth 
doing interference between Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal varieties of 
Arabic. Involving the consistent overlap of these varieties at some level of 
language, these examples reveal Castellanois to be a “double-voiced” register, in 
Bakhtin’s (1984, p. 189) sense. Bakhtin coined the term double-voicing to 
capture how certain linguistic texts are uttered or written from more than one 
perspective, or voice. He found that double-voicing was in fact an utterance-
specific manifestation of the more general condition of the speech community he 
called “heteroglossia” (1981, p. 272) or its composition by many voices in 
tension with one another. Since Bakhtin, a handful of ethnographers and 
linguists have shown how actual linguistic varieties characteristic of a social 
group, or “registers” in the technical sense already given, may also be double-
voiced. Urciuoli (1996), for instance, studied English-Puerto Rican Spanish 
syncretism in the “ordinary bilingual speech” of Puerto Rican-Americans in New 
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York (p. 35). Meanwhile, Meeuwis and Blommaert’s (1998) pieced together that 
immigrants to Belgium from the Democratic Republic of Congo were using 
Lingala-French and Swahili-French as monolectal, unmarked codes. Eisenlohr 
(2006), too, investigated how Hindu Mauritians shifted between two 
linguistically syncretic voices, creole fransise and a purist Bhojpuri mixed with 
Hindi. These ethnographies have demonstrated that two (or more) linguistic 
codes may be jointly enregistered as indicative of one social identity. This kind of 
lamination between codes looks “diverse” at the level of practices but, at the 
level of ideologies about speaker types, coheres into a single, double-voiced 
persona. Castellanois represents yet another instance of these “hybrid social 
voices” (Agha, 2009, p. 254) and is perhaps best thought of as the coloration of 
French with dialectal Arabic. Interestingly, moreover, it appears that, so 
intimately have Castellanois’ forms been associated with the social identity of the 
diasporic project youth that the mere insertion of a Castellanois form, even into a 
language like MSA or English, can cue the same identity. In other words, due to 
the enregisterment of a particular social range for Castellanois linguistic forms, 
youth from La Castellane are able to gesture to their identity within multiple 
languages. This holding steady of identity across languages presents an 
interesting comparison case to research showing that bilinguals diﬀer in how 
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they express their identity, depending on the language in which they are 
speaking (Koven, 2004).  
 The following example demonstrates how youth draw upon their 
knowledge of Marseille’s vernacular, in eﬀect the matrix language for 
Castellanois, when looking for places to interpose Arabic-sourced elements. Thus, 
during an MSA lesson in which Madame Chérif was introducing new vocabulary, 
she brought up the MSA words ustādh and ustādhah, male and female teacher, 
respectively. She began with, “What is the meaning of ustādh?” (؟ذاتسأ ىنعم ام), to 
which the students collectively replied “professeur!,” or teacher in French. She 
then asked the same question, only with ustādhah (ةذاتسأ), emphasizing the 
feminine singular morpheme, -ah, at the end. Surprised to see the student 
named Sabrina uncharacteristically raising her hand, Madame Chérif called on 
her. Sabrina drawled: “Ça veut dire professeuse [sa vœ ʤiχ pχɔfεsœ:wz]” (‘it means 
teacheresse’). Sabrina’s sentence begins with a subject and verb that could 
equally have belonged to Standard French. The latter two forms, “dire professeuse” 
(‘means teacheresse’), could only be read as Castellanois, however. These forms 
display several kinds of interference, both morphological and phonological. 
From the morphological standpoint, Sabrina brought the incorrect French 
feminine morpheme (-euse) to bear on the word for teacher. Sabrina, seeking to 
highlight the feminine semantics of the MSA word ustādhah, had likely found the 
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correct French feminine morpheme, -e, unfitting due to its non-pronunciation in 
professeure. She thus borrowed from French another more evidently feminine 
morpheme, -euse. The eﬀect was to create a fictive but French-sounding calque 
of the MSA word for female teacher. Rendered in Castellanois phonology, both her 
calque and the preceding infinitive verb dire brandish the typically Marseillais 
features of aﬀrication (e.g., Standard French [diʁ] > [ʤiχ] and the realization 
of /o/ as [ɔ] (e.g., Standard French [pʁofεsœr] > [pχɔfεsœ:wz]). In both dire and 
professeuse Sabrina likewise substitutes the two French ‘r’s’ /ʁ/ for Arabic-
sourced [χ] (e.g., [pχɔfεsœ:wz]). As if to corroborate Soumia’s father’s remark 
about Castellanois being heavy-handedly Marseillais (c.f., Transcript 3.1), Sabrina 
also exaggerates [œ] by lengthening it and latching on an atypical [w] to 
heighten its roundedness. Her entire sentence now reads as one in Castellanois. 
Like slang varieties more generally (Agha, in press), a key feature of Castellanois 
is that its utterances resemble Standard French or Marseille’s vernacular, but 
only fractionally so.  
 As apparent from this analysis, what distinguishes Castellanois’ repertoire 
is a partial resemblance to these other two varieties but also, quite importantly, 
interference from Arabic phonology. This interference is an active one, as 
Woolard (1999) has argued. Woolard reuses the term interference in Haugen’s 
(1956) sense, meaning not the unwilling intrusion of one’s first language into 
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one’s second language, but how bilinguals can expressively deploy both their 
languages jointly in order to assume particular cultural stances. In their 
complementary work on Chicano English, another second-generation linguistic 
register, both Bills (1977) and Fought (1997) submit that Chicano English is not 
American Latino youth’s learner variety of English, interfered with by their 
knowledge of Spanish. Many of its speakers, Fought (1997) reminds the reader, 
do not in fact speak Spanish. Rather, Chicano English represents a 
“vernacular” (Bills, 1977) or a “dialect” (Fought, 1997), meaning a form of 
speech whose combination of California Anglo varieties and Mexican Spanish is 
mainly culturally elaborated. Castellanois is similar to Chicano English in at least 
two respects. First, youth from La Castellane had a regional variety of Arabic as 
a first language only very rarely. Perhaps two of the students, Kader and Siwar, 
spoke fluent Algerian and Tunisian, respectively. Second, youth from families 
that were not Arab also spoke Castellanois to claim project status. These two 
dynamics argue strongly in favor of categorizing Castellanois as a variety youth 
produce for its distinct cultural relevance, much of which owes to active 
interference phenomena. As demonstrated by Sabrina’s utterance, Castellanois 
syncretically joins two varieties and so, in a sense, adheres to neither one fully. 
The examples of interference in Table 3, below, show a similar tendency.  
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 Table 3.3 collects examples of Castellanois expressions, including a 
discourse marker, a vocative, verbs, adjectives, and nouns, that are used by 
students from Class 3B in syntactically French contexts. They all, however, 
display a measure of Arabic phonological influence, showcasing consonants 
like /χ/ and pharyngeal /ħ/, and also the back vowel /ɑ/, each existent in 
varieties of Arabic. Although such expressions might bring up associations of 
“Arabic” in the minds of French speakers unfamiliar with the language (c.f., 
Chapter Two), they do not in fact evince any ties to Arabic varieties’ lexicons. 
The one exception is l-hala, which has an etymological cousin in [l-ħa:la:], 
‘celebration’ in North African varieties of Arabic. This form, which also exists in 
other youthful varieties of French (c.f., Caubet, 2007), nevertheless departs from  
Table 3.3. Castellanois Expressions Showing Interference 
   
Castellanois Examples 
of Interference (in IPA)                                                                                                                        
ɑχχε ‘then’ (discourse marker)                          
ɑχɑ ‘careful!’(vocative call for attention) 
ʤəħ/χ ‘to annoy’ (e.g., tu djeuh [ʧy ʤəħ = you’re 
      pissing me off; djeuhman ‘an annoying person’) 
χεnε ‘to be uncool” (e.g., ce filme etait khéné = that 
movie was uncool) 
ħam-ħam ‘a slut’ (e.g., cette fille est une ham-ham =  
       that girl is easy) 
ħa:s ‘a crisis’ (e.g., c’est la hasse = it’s trouble) 
l-ha:la ‘trouble’ (e.g., arrête de faire l-hala = stop   
acting up)
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its etymological source insofar as young Castellaners depharyngealize the “h” 
and have degenerated its meaning to ‘trouble.’ I will elaborate on one of these 
examples in order to show how elements at various levels of linguistic 
organization, and from both Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal varieties of 
Arabic, converge in these forms.  
Figure 3.2. “Soumia Tu Djeuh” 
 On a class day when Madame Chérif had to briefly excuse herself to speak 
with someone in the hallway, a student named Soumia began doodling on the 
chalkboard. One of the male students told her, Soumia tu djeuh [su-'mja: ʧy ʤəħ] 
(‘Soumia, you’re annoying), aﬀricating the “t” in tu [ʧy] and the “d” of djeuh 
[ʤəħ] and emphasizing the pharyngeal “h” at the end (c.f., Figure 3.2). Soumia, 
as if to avenge herself, took to writing Mohamed’s complaint out on the board. 
Soumia wrote what Mohamed had said, first in French, then in MSA. Although 
she did not orthographically render Mohamed’s aﬀrication of stops in either her 
French or MSA sentences, her tidy MSA version of Soumia did in fact reflect her 
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preferred Castellanois pronunciation, adding a non-standard long “a” to indicate 
stress on the last syllable ([su-'mja:]). She also wrote in the letter “khā’” to 
represent how some Castellaners pronounce deuh with a [χ] sound. Both 
Mohamed’s initial sentence and Soumia’s rendition of it join the syntax and 
aﬀrication of Marseille’s vernacular with some phonological elements from non-
standard varieties of Arabic (e.g., /ħ, χ/). This type of syncretism abounded both 
in and outside the classroom. Thus, Chainez enjoyed bothering Madame Chérif 
with “Maḥdame!!” [maħda:m], inserting an unmistakable pharyngeal “h” into her 
pleas for the teacher’s attention. Another insisted that the teacher spell and 
pronounce her name, which would have been Jihad [ʒiha:d] in MSA, as the 
aﬀricated Castellanois version, Djihad [ʤiha:d]. Upon seeing Djihad write her 
name on the board for all to see, spelling it with the letters dal, jīm, ha’, alif, dal 
(داهجد), Madame Chérif laughed and asked another male classmate also named 
Jihad whether he, too, preferred the aﬀricated pronunciation. Having only 
recently arrived from Yemen, he quite predictably demurred. Another student 
introduced me to her cat, whose name, bandit [bəŋʤi], she pronounced with the 
heavy aﬀrication and velar nasal of an exaggerated Marseillais accent.  
 The overall eﬀect of such Castellanois forms on the Francophone or 
Arabophone listener is to impart the impression of someone speaking 
Marseillais-like French but layered with Arabic-like elements; neither listener 
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would recognize their language completely. That said, it is important to note 
that what young Castellaners speak together remains highly recognizable as 
being a variety of French. In a similar vein, Deumert (in press) has remarked 
that the syncretic South African register called Tsotsitaal is unlike Europe’s so-
called “multi-ethnolectal” youth vernaculars (c.f., Kern & Selting, 2011) in one 
important respect. She observes that, “African urban vernaculars are more 
heavily mixed and often deliberately unintelligible to outsiders (indexing their 
origin as secret languages), while European ethnolects show limited mixing and 
are generally intelligible to outsiders” (p. 10). Although Castellanois forms can, 
indeed, often be understood by outsiders, it nevertheless remains the case that 
accessing their corresponding sphere of ideological meanings requires familiarity 
with those who live in Marseille’s northern projects.  
 Thus far, I have described how circulating youth discourses about what 
being from the projects means have contributed to enregistering a linguistic 
variety, syncretically composed of Marseille’s working-class vernacular and non-
standard varieties of Arabic, as indexical of the diasporic youth persona typical 
of Marseille’s projects. These discourses, presented earlier in Section III, 
described La Castellane as the solidary capital of all bleds, also the role of being 
raised in the projects (l’éducation quartiers) in making you tough, and lastly how 
youth represented project interactions in kin terms. The linguistic behaviors 
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shown to cue this identity, moreover, were marked by interference-type 
syncretism between Marseille’s vernacular and non-Standard Arabic.  
 To close this section, below I review some examples suggesting that 
forms showing linguistic inventiveness more generally, whether in French, MSA, 
or even English, were also read by young Castellaners as signaling the same 
project identity. This overall spirit of linguistic freedom was once conveyed by a 
student named Chainez, when during a small tutoring session at school she 
shouted out, “We’re from Marseille. We talk like we want. We are 
Marseillais!” (On est de Marseille. On parle comme on veut. On est des Marseillais). The 
following examples evince general linguistic playfulness at the intersection of 
the standard-to-non-standard continua of both French and Arabic, and 
specifically in the guise of Castellanois’ intrusion into other languages than 
French. One day, a student named Fares responded to the teacher’s question of 
“Can you open your notebooks?” with the Arabic-inflected English aﬃrmation 
“yas!” [jɑs], prompting laughter and the recycling of this response for the 
remainder of the year. On another occasion, Madame Chérif invited Yamin and 
Karim to the front of class to perform a dialogue they had memorized from the 
textbook. The interaction unfolded like this: 
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 Karim: Min ayna anta? (MSA. ‘where are you from?’) 
 Yamin: Ana min al-Maghreb [maχʀεb] (MSA. ‘I am from Morocco’) 
 Karim: ((bent over laughing)) Ouais, makhhhreb! [maχχχʀεb] (French ‘Yeah,   
 makhhhreb!’) 
 Madame Chérif: ((says nothing and moves on while students laugh))  43
Here, Yamin seemed to forget his location in the MSA classroom and produced 
the Castellanois form al-Maghreb [maχʀεb] (‘Morocco’). He swapped out the 
voiced uvular ‘r’ /ʁ/, which exists equally in MSA and in French, for Castellanois 
‘r’ [χ] and francisized the final vowel to [ε], neglecting to give the correct MSA 
pronunciation of the word for Morocco: [al-maʁʀib]. Needless to say, Karim 
found the mismatch between Castellanois’ usual setting and Yamin’s use of it in 
the MSA classroom, and in MSA to boot, exceedingly funny. For eﬀect, he 
repeated and exaggerated what Yamin had said, making the other students 
dissolve into laughter.  
 Madame Chérif was well aware of youth’s use of Castellanois. Unlike other 
teachers, who tried to coach students on their pronunciation as if Castellanois 
was an unconscious failure of their articulatory organs, she most often ignored it 
altogether when her students brought such features as the Castellanois /χ/ into 
the MSA class, as above. She appeared to understand a great deal about 
Castellanois’ interactional meanings as well. This excerpt from my fieldnotes 
 This interaction dates from 10.24.12.43
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describes a telling interaction between Madame Chérif and a male student 
named Ayman: 
Watching Sara (Madame Chérif) seat Ayman at the back of class, Kenza looks at me and 
says “he’s a non-stop panic attack” (il a une crise de nerfs). Today, he’s got his hair gelled like 
James Dean. He’s wearing tight faded jeans tucked into white Lacoste hightops and a grey 
t-shirt with gothic-like script. He has “Allah” written in Arabic on his right hand in purple. 
Throughout class, Sara calls on him repeatedly on purpose. In his responses, he 
pronounces anti as antchi and i’dadati as i’dadatchi, but she doesn’t correct him.  
Here, Madame Chérif resisted correcting Ayman’s transformation of MSA anti 
‘you’ into [anʧi] and MSA i’dādyatī ‘my prep school’ into [jʔda:djaʧi], perhaps 
because she had read his use of Castellanois-like pronunciation in MSA as a 
defiant stance on his part and preferred not to engage him in that behavior. 
Other times, she would simply laugh at what the students came up with, as 
when she introduced the new MSA verb sakana ‘to reside,’ and Fares felt inspired 
to go to the board and conjugate the verb in the present-tense of French: “Je 
sakane, tu sakanes, nous sakanons...” She would likewise smile when Anisa’s 
classmates called her “Anisatun,” with the MSA (indefinite nominative) case 
ending, which they did to mock her when she answered too many questions 
right about MSA grammar.  
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
 To conclude, this chapter addressed, first, the spirit youth from La 
Castellane and La Bricarde believed to characterize these projects and their 
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residents, and second, how youth expressed this spirit of “tough love” through 
communicative means. Specifically, youth linguistically invoked their working-
class solidarity through heavy use of features and lexis from Marseille’s 
vernacular, while they indexed their diasporic bled ties by peppering this broad 
Marseillais with phonological and other elements drawn from non-standard 
varieties of Arabic. The resulting syncretism, which they termed Castellanois, 
represented a double-voiced speech register whose interference phenomena and 
linguistic inventiveness pointed to the singular persona of the diasporic project 
youth. The linguistic analyses in this section focused on how youth created 
multi-vectorial junctures between several varieties in their repertoires at 
diﬀerent levels of language, the total eﬀect of which was to “tinge” their 
vernacular Marseillais base with Arabic-like additions. 
 From a more theoretical perspective, this chapter has addressed how to 
define the borderland and, relatedly, what it means to be diasporic. The term 
borderland, as Anzaldúa’s opening remarks established, is not primarily meant 
to capture how certain places are geographically situated near or on a border 
between countries. Rather, the borderlands are a theater in which actors are 
brought to confront their country’s historical imbrication with bordering 
countries. Whereas the residents of places more distant from the border may 
stray from such “connected histories” (Subrahmanyam, 1997), imagining them 
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to be parallel, borderlands residents mingle daily with people from neighboring 
places. In Marseille, for instance, no diasporic person remains unaware of French 
traditions in their environment, just as no ethnically French person may live in 
Marseille and forget France’s colonial history. Further, when people from 
diﬀerent social groups meet in Marseille, it is often not on equal footing. Thus, 
youth from Class 3B may be downtown doing an internship in a department 
store and encounter French-origin youth who call downtown home. Marseille, as 
such, can be considered a “contact zone,” which as per Pratt (1991) is a place 
“where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of 
highly asymmetrical relations of power" (p. 34). It might also be viewed as a 
“spotty borderlands,” in Zartman’s (2010) formulation. He writes about how, in 
addition to national borders, some borderlands are characterized by other 
internal borders. Northern Marseille illustrates this concept insofar as its 
population is grouped into cultural “islands” isolated from the larger population; 
although, as Zartman says, individuals who live in these enclaves nevertheless 
have “diverse contacts and influence” across internal and external borders alike 
(p. 8).  
 These reflections inspire the question of whether border places more 
closely resemble buﬀer zones that function to separate the countries on either 
side, France from its Southern border countries, for instance; or whether they 
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might also play a role in bridging connections across countries. Speaking of the 
Mediterranean specifically, Darling (2006) proposes that its borders function to 
"overlap and blend" neighboring societies (p. 55). Although this kind of blending 
might be observed in architecture or cuisine, nowhere is it clearer than in the 
cultural practices of diasporic or so-called “border people” (Martínez & Sayer, 
1994). Youth from La Castellane exemplified this syncretism, characteristic of 
the borderlands as Anzaldúa described them. Their cultural and linguistic 
practices were not, however, arbitrarily hybrid. Instead, students from Class 3B 
elaborated culturally syncretic practices that explicitly positioned them in 
relation to other places, like Paris, Central and Southern Marseille, and the bled, 
and to other people, like Parisians, paillots, and clandos, the latter two types of 
people being the subject of the next chapter. In other words, no third national 
category of, say, Arab-Frenchness or French Arabness, became necessary to 
capture the cultural singularity of these youth. Youth from La Castellane, rather, 
were observed simply to be expanding upon what it means to be French today. 
Kulick (1998) arrived at a similar conclusion in a quite diﬀerent context. 
Summarizing his work with Brazilian travestis (or transgendered male 
prostitutes) in Salvador de Bahia, he argues that gender studies has no need of a 
“third gender” space to accommodate travestis' gendered subjectivity. Rather, he 
encourages scholars of gender and sexuality to see travestis as expanding upon 
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the gender binary. They are not trying to “squeeze themselves into the ‘wrong’ 
gender” (p. 232). To the contrary, he recognizes their articulations of gender 
(e.g., their desire for men, their feminine beauty standards, their God-inspired 
aversion to sex-change operations) as “distillations of patterns that exist 
throughout Brazilian society” (p. 236). In a similar vein, the identity and 
practices of youth from Class 3B highlighted elements of the French 
mainstream, Marseille’s working-class culture, and the North and sub-Saharan 
African societies they call bleds. In so doing, youth succeeded in 
recontextualizing discourses circulating within such borderlands societies, 
particularly with respect to Islam, ethnicity, immigration, and, as will become 
apparent in Chapter Four, modernity. 
 A final consideration is what these youth’s practices disclose about the 
construction of ethnicity. As Anzaldúa implied when she said being a Chicano 
person from the borderlands is a “racial identity” (1999[1987], p. 84), border 
places subject national identities to racial and ethnic identities. This chapter has 
illustrated how youth from La Castellane articulated an ethnic identity, in Stuart 
Hall’s broad sense of the term “ethnicity” (1992), that encompassed nods 
towards class, nation, Islam, and race. Diasporic projecthood is, by this 
definition, an ethnic identity, and its construction is indeed both ideological and 
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processual, as Mandel (2008) has argued about ethnicity construction in the 
German context. 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IV. Indexing the Self by Distancing the 
Other: Clando Versus Paillot Imitations 
I. Introduction  
 If in Chapter Three I examined how through Castellanois youth gestured to 
their own coherent, if syncretic, identity, in this chapter I present two other 
phonolexical registers, and their corresponding personas, from which youth 
playfully distanced themselves. A first section presents the stories youth tell 
about the bled and people from the bled. I contend that youth’s chronotopic 
formulations (Agha, 2015) of the bled and blédard people as backward helped 
them position themselves, as youth born in France, as forward-thinking and 
sophisticated, by contrast. I also examine the particular linguistic features youth 
have enregistered as indexical of people from the bled, as well as examples of 
how youth deployed this register—which they labeled clando—to diﬀerentiate 
themselves from the first generation of immigrants to France, their parents’ 
generation. I argue, additionally, that clando is a persona that youth have 
repossessed from French mainstream discourse, where the persona of the 
“clandestin” (clandestine person) circulates and is negatively viewed. A second 
section reports on how, similarly, youth mock Standard French to set themselves 
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apart from the ethnically French. Specifically, I cover instances of youth using 
Standard French speech forms in an exaggerated way to mock the ethnically 
French and well-to-do people who live on the south side of Marseille. The 
distant stance youth take on the paillot persona represents yet another case, 
alongside that of clando, of Castellanois youth’s use of “othering” to position 
themselves (Said, 1978). 
II. Stories of the Bled and Clando Imitations 
 Right before Winter Break, Madame Chérif began a new chapter in the 
textbook with the students of Class 3B. The dialogue for that chapter took place 
in a Moroccan city and mentioned the sights and sounds of a central plaza. It 
was several minutes into the lesson when Kader blurted out “I didn’t know 
there were movie theaters in the bled!” Madame Chérif looked at him squarely, 
and responded, “You know, the bled is better than La Castellane.” This prompted 
a loud “Of cou::::::::rse” (bien sur) from Mohamed. Again, Madame Chérif made 
her point: “You guys think it’s great here and the bled is a Third World country.” 
The last word on this topic was Mohamed booming “This place is Vegas!” (ici 
c’est Las Vegas!). This section addresses how youth from Class 3B constructed 
their parents’ home countries, or bleds, as both distant in style and backwards in 
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time compared to Marseille’s projects. I argue that, by giving the bled a “there-
and-then” chronotopic formulation (Agha, 2015), youth not only positioned 
people from the bled as located in that particular envelope of time and space; 
they also chronotopically formulated the projects and project dwellers like 
themselves to exist in the “here-and-now.” The main activity through which 
youth articulated these contrastive time-space frames was a mocking routine 
that involved imitating how native Arabic speakers pronounce French and thus 
dissociating themselves from the persona of the first-generation immigrant. I 
begin by introducing examples of youth enacting this L2 French register, and 
then I turn to analyze the various stereotypic qualities and chronotopic 
dimensions in play when youth performed this register.  
 The students in Class 3B were quite familiar with how native Arabic-
speaking adults in their milieu pronounced French, and they often took the 
liberty of imitating them speaking thus. Their imitations fell into two broader 
types. Some followed a reported speech construction, in which youth reported 
on what someone, a parent for instance, had said, while others represented 
instances of what Vološinov (1986) calls free direct style, or when “elements of 
the reported message creep into and are dispersed throughout the entire 
authorial text” (p. 133). In these cases, youth enacted the learner French register 
themselves, without any framing devices signaling the presence of reported 
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speech.  A first example showcases the youth stereotype according to which 
Arabic speakers have trouble producing words with consonant clusters, varieties 
of Arabic showing two but no three-consonant clusters. I overheard a male 
student ask his friend the following: “Have you seen the guys at the Porte d’Aix 
who say ‘Marlboro? Marlboro? Malobo? Mal au dos [malodo] (back pain)?’” The 
student was referring to mostly male immigrants who illegally lay out their 
wares on the sidewalk around the Porte d’Aix, one of Marseille’s central 
landmarks in the heart of a mostly Muslim neighborhood. He plays on the 
similarity between the name for the cigarette brand Marlboro, which features a 
three-consonant cluster (r-l-b), and the expression for back pain, mal au dos, in 
which the vowel ‘o’ breaks up the consonant cluster. While this example 
involved the reporting of an unknown individual’s (likely fictitious) French 
speech, students from Class 3B also reported the genuine speech of people they 
knew, especially their parents and neighbors.  
 In Transcript 4.1, for example, Mohamed recounts to a group of male 
classmates and myself an encounter he had with Anisa’s mom. Anisa is a female 
student in Class 3B, and she and her family, who have roots in Algerian Kabylia, 
live in the same tower of La Castellane as Mohamed and his family. Mohamed 
tells how he came across Anisa’s mom on the way back from the supermarket 
while on summer vacation. He had been surprised at her invitation to eat some 
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home-made rice cake at their place.  Although he mostly narrates the story in 
Castellanois, the IPA renditions of which are shown in bold, when he relays what 
Anisa’s mom said to him, he switches to Arabic-influenced learner French and 
some Berber-like nonsense sounds.  
Transcript 4.1.  Mohamed’s Story about Anisa’s Mother 44
 Here, Mohamed switches between Castellanois register in the preface to 
his anecdote (e.g., dit [ʤi]) and a modified learner French in his reported speech 
clause. He cues his imitation of Anisa’s mother by transforming French vowels 
according to the cardinal “i-a-u” Arabic vowel system (e.g., chez > shi [ʃi]), fais > 
fi [fi]), using a swinging pitch, rolling his “r’s” (e.g., riz [ʀi], and no longer 
French Original English Translation
Mohamed: Et vous connaissez Anisa qui est dans 
la classe? 
Cécile: Ouais, bien sur. 
Mohamed: Eh ben sa mère- 
Elias & Kader: Oooh ((hooting)) 
Mohamed: -on descendais de Carrefour. Elle  
est venue me voir et l'été je devais aller  
en Algérie 
Cécile: Hmm ((K laughing in background)) 
Mohamed: Elle m'a dit [ʤi] quoi, elle m'a dit 
[ʤi]: Tu [ty] viens chi↑ [ʃi]  moi ↓. Je te fais [fi] un 
cake↑ [kik] du:::↓ [dy] riz [ʀi] chi [ʃi] moi. Ha ma 
tcho tcho tu [ty] auras" 
Elias: À poile 
Mohamed: Elle fait trop [tχɔ] rire!                            
Mohamed: And you know Anisa who’s in 
class? 
Cécile: Yeah, of course. 
Mohamed: Well, her mom- 
Elias & Kader: Oooh ((hooting)) 
Mohamed: -we were coming down from 
Carrefour. She came to see me and that 
summer I was supposed to go to Algeria 
Cécile: Hmm ((K laughing in 
background)) 
Mohamed: You know what she said to 
me, she said “You’ll come to my house. I’ll 
make you a rice cake at my place ha ma 
tcho tcho you’ll have” 
Elias: Naked 
Mohamed: She really makes you laugh!
 This transcript dates from 2.11.13.44
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aﬀricating his ’t’s’ and ‘d’s.’  In this anecdote, the voice of the first-generation 45
parent appears to be one stereotypically associated with qualities like providing 
people with a down-south kind of welcome. This warm welcome suggested by 
Mohamed’s portrayal of Anisa’s mother was likely, furthermore, to have led 
Elias to slip in the typically adolescent male tag-along “naked” at the end of 
Mohamed’s story. Mohamed wraps up his story, tellingly, with the pleasant 
captioned “She really makes you laugh.” This transcript, in sum, exemplifies 
how youth at times drew on a register associated with first-generation 
immigrants to France, and, in so doing, commented on these individuals’ 
distinguishing qualities as compared to the speakers, their French-born children.  
 In addition to reported speech constructions, students from Class 3B also 
exploited this stereotypical Arab French-language learner register when 
narrating themselves. These instances displayed a quality aptly described by 
Vološinov (1986) as “reciprocal infectiousness” (p. 133), holding between the 
narrated world of characters (like the first-generation immigrant) and the young 
diasporic narrators. In simpler terms, when youth spoke thus, they eﬀectively 
imbued themselves with some of the stereotypic qualities they tended to 
associate with the register. A first example of this took place on a school day 
 As far as I have been able to ascertain from a conversation with a native Berber speaker, 45
Mohamed uses Berber-like gibberish at the end of his imitation (ha ma tcho tcho). 
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when Madame Chérif had assigned Class 3B an MSA test. One male student, 
Elias, was unable to take his test because several of his friends stole his paper 
from him and scribbled across the front in red. By the time I saw the test during 
the break period, Madame Chérif already given Elias a grade for (what she 
presumed was) his work: 0/20. Above the grade, however, were the French 
sentences: ‘I am the boss! Give me the answer and give me a 20’ (“Je suis li boss! 
Donne li réponse et mi moi 20”).  I have underlined how, in pretending to be him 46
taking the test, Elias’ friends substituted French vowels with Arabic’s cardinal a- 
Figure 4.1. Elias’ MSA Test 
 The Standard French orthographic rendition of these sentences would be “Je suis le boss. 46
Donne les réponses et mets-moi 20.” (Though this was written to the teacher, the students used 
informal tu forms). 
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i-u vowels, a hallmark of this phonolexical register. 
 This example reveals yet another realm of stereotypical qualities youth 
linked to the first-generation immigrant, those relating to being overly direct 
and perhaps academically inept. Elias’ friends intended to invest Elias with some 
of these qualities by giving him such a voice. Madame Chérif was herself quite  
angered by the gesture, though she thought Elias was the culprit. When she 
placed the test on the table in front of me in the teachers’ lounge, she 
declaimed: “He’s making fun of Arabs!” I will comment more on how first-
generation people like Madame Chérif reacted to this routine at the end of this 
section. 
 If in the previous case, Elias was forced to speak in the first-generation 
register, there were also many instances when youth willingly took on the 
learner register to perform certain traits. Figure 4.2, for instance, is drawn from 
students’ favorite medium, cell-phone texting. It shows a texted conversation 
between two female students from Class 3B. One student poses a question in  
French: “Have you seen The Maze Runner it looks tooooo good oulalaan I really 
want to see it.” Her text evidences two tokens of the aforementioned vowel 
transformations according to Arabic phonology, specifically her substitution of 
“ju” [ʒu] for je ‘I’ and “lu” [lu] for le ‘it.’ Her transliteration of French oh-la-la 
with an “n” at the end is likely the velar nasal of Castellanois. Perhaps inspired by  
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Figure 4.2. Text about the Maze Runner Movie 
the sprinklings of the Arab French-learner register in her friend’s text, the other 
young woman takes fully to the register in her response: “The truth, I’m 
drooling and all as soon as I see the trailer.” In this sentence, she does not miss 
a single opportunity to use Arabic “u” instead of French “o” and Arabic “i” 
instead of French “e.” Her friend’s response is “PTDRRR” (pétée de rire, ‘dying of 
laughter), showing clear amusement at her friend’s imitation. The young woman 
in the second text uses this register to express that she is, quite doltishly, 
drooling over the movie trailer. Here, the young women linguistically invoke the 
stereotypic figure of the first-generation Arab as a means to show their 
overexcitement at a new movie coming out.  
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 What I have been discussing until now as the persona of the first-
generation immigrant, which youth indexed through a particular French 
phonolexical register, was often labeled the persona of the clando. Though only 
linguistic behaviors have thus far been enumerated as indexical of the clando 
persona, other behaviors involving one’s actions and appearance likewise formed 
part of the clando figure’s repertoire. Importantly, first-generation as well as 
French-born diasporic youth could be said to be acting clando by engaging in any 
of these telltale behaviors. An example of how youth designated first-generation 
individuals clandos pertains to Class 3B’s teacher, Madame Chérif. On a 
particular week day, she came to school wearing a pair of high-heeled shoes, one 
of which had a wobbly heel. As Madame Chérif and I were walking down the 
hall after the last class of the day, the heel snapped oﬀ and she lurched forward. 
I managed to catch her, and we both righted ourselves only to hear Chainez, an 
MSA student in the 4ième class, yell down the hallway, “Madame Chérif is a 
clandotte!” The student’s use of the female version of clando in this context 
served to liken her teacher to a newly arrived immigrant who could perhaps not 
aﬀord a new pair of heels, a suggestion that left Madame Chérif obviously 
embarrassed. Significantly, however, youth never called someone a clando who 
was in fact an illegal immigrant to France. Though the label for the register itself 
was an apocope, or word-final clipping, of the lexeme clandestin, meaning 
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clandestine or paperless, youth only deployed the label clando to pick out 
diasporic individuals they knew who behaved in amusing ways and whom they 
wished to mock, gently and, occasionally, less gently.  
 Transcript 4.2 oﬀers an example of how youth also applied clando to their 
French-born diasporic peers when they found their behavior anomalous or out 
of sync with preferred modes of acting, dressing, and speaking. This case also 
illustrates how the figure of the clando was additionally accompanied by 
ideologies of time and space, or chronotopic formulations, which, as per Agha 
(2015), are time-space depictions that perdure for some period of time because 
people repeatedly orient to them. The ensuing conversation takes place between 
three female students from Class 3B: Fouhda, Sabrina, and Maisara. The three 
young women single out Kader, who is often teased in class about his facility 
with Algerian, and also about the fact that he and his brothers slept four to a 
bedroom at home, as being bled-like, or a clando.  47
 Fouhda is third-generation Algerian, Sabrina is half second-generation Algerian and half third-47
generation, and Maisara’s parents are Comorian. None of them speak a regional variety of 
Arabic. 
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Transcript 4.2. Kader is a Clando  48
 In this segment, Fouhda, Sabrina, and Maisara call Kader a clando to 
position themselves as cool in comparison to Kader’s uncool way of speaking 
and dressing. In order to achieve distance between themselves and Kader, the 
girls create contrastive deictic frames, mapping themselves into the “here” of the 
quartier and Kader into the “there” of the bled. Personal deictics create the first 
French Original English Translation
Fouhda: Kader [kadεχ] tout [ʧy] le monde dit 
[ʤi] que c’est un {cl-} 
Cécile: {-C’est quoi un clando voila pourquoi 
c’est-} 
Fouhda: -{clando} Parce que il a l’accent quand il  
parle, quand [kəŋ] il s’habille [abijə] et tout.  
Exemple [εksəmplə], genre [ʒəχ̃], quand [kəŋ]                            
il met des survêts long [lɔŋ] et que c’est l’hiver il  
va mettre des socquettes [sɔkεtə] et tout le monde- 
Sabrina: -((giggling)) Tu [ʧy] es un clando tu  
[ʧy] es {venu à la nage [naʒə] et tout} 
Fouhda: {Genre} [ʒəχ̃] et ici, en France et tout, on 
met pas des socquettes [sɔkεtə] avec un survêt. Ça 
se fait pas on met des chaussettes longues. Et lui 
non [nɑŋ]! Quand les ((unclear)) sur son pantalon 
remontent on voît tous les socquettes [sɔkεtə]((M 
laughing)) et tout le monde dit [ʤi] “ah, tu [ʧy] 
es un clando” {et tout}  
Sabrina: {T’es} [ʧε] venu à la nage du bled 
Maisara: Tu [ʧε] es venu de la nage   
Fouhda: Tout le monde dit t’es venu à la nage et  
tout, ‘che pas quoi… Ou des fois sa façon de  
s’habiller. Il va s’habiller tout en vert il va mettre  
des grosses [gχɔsə] chaussettes [ʃɔsetə]  
rouges [χu:ʒə] et tout. Attends dis [ʤi], arrête,  
c’est clando ça!                       
Sabrina: Mais genre [ʒəχ̃]... Il est bizarre [bizaχ]  
aussi [ɔsi] genre [ʒəχ̃]
Fouhda: Kader, everyone says he is a {cl}- 
Cécile: -{And what’s a clando, I mean, why  
is i}- 
Fouhda: -{Clando} because he has the  
accent when he talks, when he dresses  
and all. Example, like, when he wears long  
sweats and it’s winter but he’ll wear ankle  
socks, and everyone- 
Sabrina: ((giggling)) You’re a clando. You  
{came swimming and all}- 
Fouhda: {Like}, here in France and all, we  
don’t wear ankle socks with a tracksuit. It  
isn’t done. We wear long socks. But not  
him, he’s gonna wear ((unclear)) and  
when his pants get hiked up we see all  
those ankle socks, and everyone says “ah,  
you’re a clando” {and all} 
Sabrina: {You} arrived swimming from  
the bled 
Maisara: You arrived from-swimming 
Fouhda: Everyone says you arrived  
swimming and all. I don’t know what... Or  
sometimes his way of dressing. He’s  
gonna dress all in green, then wear thick  
red socks and all. Wait, come on. That’s  
clando! 
Sabrina: But he’s weird, too, like
 This transcript dates from 3.3.13.48
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deictic contrast. Whereas the young women speak as “I” (je), “we” (on), and 
“everyone” (tout le monde), non-present Kader is referred to as “he” (il) or 
addressed as “you” (tu). This personal diagram is then mapped into a spatial 
contrast. The girls situate themselves in La Castellane with the spatial deictic of 
proximity “here” (ici), while they transport Kader to the bled through the distal 
deictic “over there” (là-bas). Kader’s spatial “transposition” (Haviland, 1996) to 
the bled is further reinforced, additionally, by the girls’ reiteration of the 
derogatory statement “tu es venu à la nage” (‘you arrived here swimming’). 
Specifically, the verb venir (‘to come’), which is a path-encoding verb implying 
movement from an outside location towards an origo coinciding with speaker 
location, implies a deictic origo for Kader that is in the bled, not in France.  
 Considering Stasch’s (2011) definition of the chronotope as “scale of 
spatial and temporal horizons within which some events are understood as 
meaningfully occurring” (p. 3), a Bakhtinian (1981) chronotope—or, more 
technically, a chronotopic formulation (Agha, 2015)—is thus discernible in the 
girls’ narrative. What the girls appear to be constructing in this segment is a 
chronotopic formulation of the quartier versus another of the bled. Marseille’s 
projects are given a position as spatially central, and also present in the 
contemporary “now” of France. In this here and now, as the girls indicate, long 
socks are worn in winter under one’s sweats. This project chronotope is made 
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central to the above interaction, moreover, through the de-centering of the bled. 
Kader is depicted, not only as distant in space from the girls, but also as 
removed in time. He, quite anachronistically, wears ankle socks in winter and 
mismatched colors to class. Students also contrasted the time and space of the 
bled to those of La Castellane in the opening anecdote to this section. In that 
instance, Kader doubted if there were any movie theaters in Morocco and 
Mohamed pronounced La Castellane “Las Vegas.”  
 This chronotopic formulation of La Castellane as flashy and cool, and of 
the bled as backwards and stagnant, echoes Dick’s (2011) reflections on how 
diasporic individuals often speak about movement in ways pervaded by 
discourses of modernity and progress. In her piece on the modernist chronotope 
deployed by Mexican Uriangatense immigrants to the U.S., Dick (2010a) 
concludes that the way immigrants, returnees, and those who stayed discussed 
migration revealed that people’s physical movement to the U.S. was often talked 
about in terms of time. Likely influenced by circulating discourses of progress 
and modernism, Dick’s informants conceived of moving to the U.S. as moving 
forward in life (seguir adelante), an advancement that was contrasted with staying 
in Uriangato, México, made equivalent to being trapped in a benighted place. 
Just as the people who stayed in Uriangato were perceived as backwards in time 
and immigrants as forward-looking, so, too, does the narration by these three 
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young women chronotopically position the projects and its diasporic inhabitants 
as forward, and the bled and those who come from there as retrograde.  
 Another transcript furnishes evidence that students from Class 3B justify 
some of the binaries sketched above, between the bled and the projects, and the 
clandos and young project dwellers, through the semiotic process of iconization 
(Irvine & Gal, 2000) in addition to chronotopic formulations. Specifically, in 
Transcript 4.3 below a group of six male students is shown to naturalize the 
“rawness” of people from the bled by sketching iconic links between the 
“scratchy” sounds of their languages (e.g., Algerian, Tunisian, etc.) and the 
types of people they are. Quartiers youth, by contrast, are smooth-talking and 
street-wise, as presupposed by the syncretic lilt of Castellanois. The linking of 
sound to shape or sound to texture can be understood as a form of synesthesia, 
or the apperception of one sense in terms of another. Eisenlohr (2006), for 
instance, documents how in the French ex-colony of Mauritius, speakers 
iconically link the articulatory movements needed to produce Standard French 
phonemes [ʃ] and [ʒ], namely, a “pointing” of the lips, to a speaker’s degree of 
precision or refinement. Gasquet-Cyrus (2013) reports, similarly, that the 
Standard French spoken by Marseille’s bourgeoisie can be described, depending 
on the listener’s perspective on people in this social group, as either “l’accent 
pointu,” the pointed-lips or tidy accent, or the “cul de poule” (literally, chicken 
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anus or, figuratively, uppity) accent. Whereas in both those examples speakers 
gave certain articulatory movements, or shapes, ideological meanings, in the 
excerpt in Transcript 4.3, by contrast, youth focus on the connection between 
active articulatory organs, the texture of the resulting sound, and people’s 
qualities. 
 The Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov is catalogued in the Dictionary of 
Hallucinations (Blom, 2010) as having experienced a form of conceptual 
synesthesia. He himself describes in his autobiography how the thought of one 
or several letters was immediately accompanied by a secondary perception of 
color, shape, and texture.  
"The long a of the English alphabet...has for me the tint of weathered wood, but a French a 
evokes polished ebony. This black group also includes hard g (vulcanized rubber) and r (a 
sooty rag being ripped). Oatmeal n, noodle-limp l, and the ivory-backed hand mirror of o 
take care of the whites. I am puzzled by my French on which I see as the brimming 
tension-surface of alcohol in a small glass. Passing on to the blue group, there is steely x, 
thundercloud z, and huckleberry k." (Nabokov, 1989[1947], p. 34).  
Was Nabokov a victim of this parade of sensory ideas or visions? Or was he 
involved, perhaps creatively, in the linking of these sounds (or imagined 
graphemes) and ideated sensations over the course of his lifetime? Whereas 
Nabokov suﬀered synesthesia as an individual neurological ailment, this 
transcript suggests that synesthesia can also be explored as a group-centric 
process whereby pairings are made between sounds and sensations and form the 
basis of ideologies that naturalize types of people. Below, I asked the young men, 
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whom I had gathered in an empty classroom, to identify male and female names 
they would say are typically clando. In response, they developed two themes. 
First, they portrayed clando people from the bled as tough or rough-hewn, 
inasmuch as they iconically resemble the throat-itching, stomach-breaking 
phonemes /ħ, χ, ʀ/ required to produce their names. Secondly, and by contrast, 
the image of the suave, street-wise youth from La Castellane is aﬃrmed by the 
creamy, pomade-like Castellanois that youth from the project speak, exemplified 
by how they render their names.  
Transcript 4.3.  Clandos Names 49
French Original English Translation
Cécile: Ouais, c'est quoi des-des noms clandos en  
arabe? 
Ayman: Oh Haj Issa::: euh genre les trucs avec  
[ħ:::] [eħ:::] 
Oussama: Mahmoud [maħmu:d] 
Elias: Avec un "h" dedans, non [nɑŋ] mais t'as 
[ʧɑ] compris quand [kəŋ] il y a un “h” devant 
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d] 
Mohamed: Abdel Kader [abdεl kadεχ] 
Cécile: Et pourquoi Rashid? 
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]- ((someone makes an  
[aħħħħħħħħ] sound)) parce que c’est un prénom  
arabe 
Cécile: Donc c’est clando? 
Oussama: Non [nɑŋ], mais il y a des rashids qui  
parlent français 
Mohamed: Et ouais le frère à Sheyreen- 
Kader: ((loudly)) Elle m’a quitté [kiti], je  
m’appelle Rashid [ʀaʃid::]! ((laughing))   
Kader: Ah Khaled [χχ:alε:d] ((laughing, someone  
tapping on table)) 
Cécile: Yeah, what are some clando names  
in Arabic? 
Ayman: Oh Haj Issa::: Well, like, things  
with [ħ:::] [eħ:::] 
Oussama: Mahmoud [maħmu:d] 
Elias: With an "h" in them, no, but you 
know, with an “h” in front 
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d] 
Mohamed: Abdel Kader [abdεl kadεχ] 
Cécile: And why Rashid? 
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]- ((someone  
makes an [aħħħħħħħħ] sound)) because it’s  
an Arab first name 
Cécile: So it’s clando? 
Oussama: NO, but there are some rashids  
who speak French    
Mohamed: Uh yeah, like Sheyreen’s  
brother- 
Kader: ((loudly)) She left me, my name is 
Rashid [ʀaʃid::]! ((laughing)) 
Kader: Ah Khaled [χ:alε:d] ((laughing,  
someone tapping on table))
 This transcript dates from 4.2.13.49
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Ayman: [χχa] Genre [gəχ̃:] euh tu [ʧy] dois 
prononcer avec ta gorge, avec ta gorge 
Oussama: Je m'appelle Khadija [χadija] 
Elias: Ça pique le [χχχχχχχχχ]! 
Cécile: Il y en a pas de ((unclear)) dans les noms  
clandos? 
((unclear)): Khamisa [χamisa] 
Oussama: Parce que [paχs-kœ] ça c’est en français 
((now to tablemate)) Commence pas! 
Ayman: Ka:::- Kader [kadεχ] 
Cécile: Kader? 
Kader: Ça passe crème [kχεmə]! 
Cécile: Ça passe quoi? 
Mohamed: Ça passe POMADE ((laughing)) 
pomade 
Cécile: Et les noms pour les filles cl-clandottes? 
Multiple: KHADIJA [χadija] 
Ayman: Zohra [zuħra] 
Kader: Rashida [ʀaʃida] 
Oussama: NON, NON, Zouliha [zuliħa] 
Ayman: Attends, attends, attends! Vas-y CASSE 
LE VENTRE! 
Oussama: Non, Cutter Cutter [kœtεχ] 
Mohamed: Zinouba [zi:nubɑ] ((laughing)) 
Kader: Cutter c’est les parents à Samia ça  
Elias: Lakhdar [lɑχdɑʀ] 
Kader: C’est le frère à Kenza, Lakhdar ((laughing)) 
Sabah [sabεħ] 
Oussama: HOUDA [ħudɑ] ((shrieking)) 
Elias: Même le street factor il n’y est pas 
Ossama: ((talking about Ayman)) Il sort les 
prénoms de ses cousines obligé ((laughing)) 
Ayman: Oh par Allah [ɑɫ:ɑ:] que non. La tête de  
ma mère que non. Non, genre [ʒəχ̃] mon arrière  
grandmère-             
Oussama: -istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:](MSA ‘may  
God forgive you’) 
Ayman: Mais c'est vrai ((laughing)) elle s’appelle- 
je me moque pas d’elle 
((unclear)): Istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:] 
Kader: istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:] Ayman 
Ayman: MAHJOUBA! [maħju:ba] 
Ayman: [χχa] Like uh you have to 
pronounce with your throat, your throat           
Oussama: My name is Khadija [χadija] 
Elias: The [χχχχχχχχχ], it itches! 
Cécile: There isn’t any ((unclear)) in  
clando names? 
((unclear)): Khamisa [χamisa] 
Oussama: Because that’s in French ((now 
to tablemate)) Don’t start! 
Ayman: Ka:::- Kader [kadεχ] 
Cécile: Kader? 
Kader: It goes over like butter!         
Cécile: Like what? 
Mohamed: It goes over like POMADE 
((laughing)) pomade 
Cécile: And what about names for cl-
clandottes? 
Multiple: KHADIJA [χadija] 
Ayman: Zohra [zuħra] 
Kader: Rashida [ʀaʃida] 
Oussama: NO, NO, Zouliha [zuliħa] 
Ayman: Hold up, hold up, hold up! Now 
go for it-BREAK YOUR STOMACH! 
Oussama: No, Cutter Cutter [kœtεχ] 
Mohamed: Zinouba [zi:nubɑ]  
((laughing)) 
Kader: Cutter that’s one of Samia’s  
relatives  
Elias: Lakhdar [lɑχdɑʀ] 
Kader: It’s Kenza’s brother, Lakhdar 
((laughing)) Sabah [sabεħ] 
Oussama: HOUDA [ħudɑ] ((shrieking)) 
Elias: There’s not even any street factor 
Oussama: ((talking about Ayman)) He’s 
pulling his girl cousins’ names out of the 
bag ((laughing)) 
Ayman: By Allah I’m not. On my 
mother’s head I’m not.No, but like my  
great grandmother- 
Oussama: -istaghfirullah[istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:]  
(MSA ‘may God forgive you’) 
Ayman: No, but seriously. ((laughing))  
Her name is-I’m not making fun of her 
((unclear)): Istaghfirullah[istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:]  
Kader: istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:] Ayman 
Ayman: MAHJOUBA! [maħju:ba]                   
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 Beyond the extreme amusement being had all around, it is also worth 
suggesting that the male youth in this segment are likewise engaged in drawing 
ideological, and especially iconic, links between the texture of certain sounds 
and the people who speak them. The boys state, for example, that in order to 
produce such clando miracles as Mahjouba [maħju:ba], one must “pronounce with 
the throat” and “break the stomach.” People from the bled are thus constructed 
as rough-hewn and capable of doing diﬃcult things, like braving immigration to 
France for instance. Mid-way through the transcript, Kader introduces his own 
name, only he pronounces it in Castellanois, as [kadεχ]. He informs me that 
“Kader” rendered in this way goes over smooth as hair gel (ça passe pomade). It 
dovetails perfectly, moreover, with the “street factor” required of project youth. 
This transcript serves to show how youth from La Castellane naturalize the 
speech repertoires associated with the personas of both the diasporic youth and 
the clando. On the one hand, this group of young men establishes ties of 
resemblance between the “raspy” varieties of North African Arabic and the first-
generation clando. To this they contrast, on the other hand, how their own street 
cool reflects in Castellanois, a register whose forms correctly apportion the 
phonological softness of French and the brawn of non-standard Arabic. 
Cécile: Wow c’est ta grandmère? 
Ayman: Non, mon arrière grandmère 
Kader: Elle a fait fort hein [œŋ]
Cécile: Wow that’s your grandmother? 
Ayman: Non, my great grandmother 
Kader: She did a solid job. Yep. 
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Importantly, constructing people from the bled as tough but unsophisticated 
enables youth from La Castellane to position themselves as a degree less tough 
and a lot more up-to-date. Kiesling (2001) calls this type of self-other 
positioning the strategy of “marking the other” (p. 102). Just as in Kiesling’s 
piece white fraternity boys indirectly made a subject position for themselves by 
creating a diﬀerent category for African Americans, the examples in Transcripts 
4.2 and 4.3 likewise demonstrated how clando imitations diminished people born 
in the bled as they also, if implicitly, carved out a sophisticated identity for youth 
from Marseille’s projects.  
 A final set of comments addresses the social repercussions of youth’s 
clando mocking routine. Was it the case that, insofar as Madame Chérif was 
oﬀended by her students’ deployment of clando register, youth’s routine was 
somehow a pejorative one? Did youth’s recycling of the figure of the clando, 
along with its backward temporal qualities, for instance, spell youth’s reiteration 
of negative “First-World” perspectives on the “Third World”? Did overhearers 
tend to construe instances of clando mocking as having a voicing structure where 
diasporic youth from the projects were “animators” who, ultimately, had French 
people prejudiced towards immigrants as their “principal” (Goﬀman, 1979, p. 
17)? For various reasons, it would seem not. First, as mentioned, people whom 
youth positioned as clando were, in the instances I witnessed, never in fact illegal 
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immigrants. They were, rather, often close to the speaker, a relationship typically 
gestured to via co-textual cues bespeaking aﬀection. Thus, Mohamed wrapped 
up his story about Anisa’s mother with kind comments about her comicality, 
and Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda in fact got along quite well with Kader, who 
incessantly teased them back. Secondly, although Madame Chérif was ill-at-ease 
with youth’s clando imitations, it may have been the case that she was unfamiliar 
with the full social range of the clando register and its more innocuous uses. 
Certainly, youth themselves seemed to find great pleasure in finding new 
behaviors, like Kader’s “ankle socks,” or new social stances, like eagerness at a 
new movie, that could be grouped under the clando persona. Their keenness to 
exploit all of clando’s possible indexical niches is reminiscent of other strategic 
uses of foreigner-type talk in France, notably by foreigners. Vigoureux (2011) 
writes about how West African marabouts or clairvoyants in France, in composing 
paper advertisements to market their healing services, played up all possible 
linguistic marks of being African learners of French in order to perform the 
“authentic African persona” that they believed their French clients would 
entrust with their healing needs. Lastly, the clando imitations reviewed here 
were, moreover, enacted by youth who were in fact diasporic, meaning their own 
parents were from a bled.  
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 In a final transcript, I give an example of a mainstream French person 
making a joke that negatively represents clandestine immigrants. Transcript 4.4 
represents a joke that Nathalie, one of the ethnically French adult students in 
my MSA class, which was held at a community center in downtown Marseille, 
told to our class. Her joke tells the story of a North African male who wishes to 
leave for France and, in preparation, attempts to perfect his French as much as 
possible.  
Transcript 4.4.  Nathalie’s Joke 50
The joke’s punchline plays on the contrast between the man’s assiduous 
linguistic preparation for life in France and how he thoughtlessly botches his 
whole plan to “pass” as French in exchange for a brioche, since there are no 
croissants. Focused as he is on either the brioche or complying with the French 
French Original English Translation
Nathalie: Il y a un autre c’est un-c’est un, 
pareil, un-il y en a un qui veut aller en France. 
On lui dit “Bon, il faut que tu apprennes bien 
à parler français. Il faut pas qu’on sente que 
t’as un-.” Alors il apprend euh pendant dix 
jours la même phrase: “Bonjour monsieur, je 
voudrais un cafe s'il-te plait et deux 
croissants." Alors il arrive à Paris, il rentre 
dans un bar. Il dit "Bonjour monsieur, je 
voudrais un cafe et deux croissants." “Ah, il y 
a plus de croissants." "Bah c'est pas garave 
[gaʀaf], don-ne [don:ə] moi une biroche 
[biʀioʃ]" ((other classmates laughing))
Nathalie: There’s another (joke). It’s it’s a-it’s 
a, same thing, there’s one (guy) who wants to 
go to France. He’s told “Okay, you have to 
learn to speak French well. It’s best if no one 
hears that you have a-.” So he learns uh the 
same sentence during ten days: “Hello sir, I 
would like a coﬀee please and two croissants.” 
So he arrives in Paris, and he walks into a bar. 
He says, “Hello sir, I would like a coﬀee please 
and two croissants.” “Oh, there aren’t any 
more croissants.” “Oh, that’s not a problem, 
give me a brioche [biʀioʃ]” ((other classmates 
laughing))
 This transcript dates from 5.3.13. 50
!155
barman, the character slips back into his natural Arabic-influenced French, 
trilling his ‘r’s,’ inserting vowels between consonant clusters, and pronouncing 
‘v’ as ‘f.’  The image produced is one of the Arab who settles for less, speaks 51
broken French, and lacks the ability to juggle two thoughts at once. Although 
Nathalie does not explicitly use the label clandestin, by telling this joke she 
nevertheless contributes to constructing the figure of the newly arrived 
immigrant to France and his stereotypical qualities.  
 To summarize, clandestin is a pejorative label that certain individuals in 
mainstream France use to talk about and denigrate a minority group. Like other 
pejorative labels or slurs, such as the word nègre in French or dyke in English, 
clandestin appears to have been reappropriated by those who constitute the 
collective referent of the term. In parallel to the Négritude Movement or Dykes on 
Bikes, the youth of Class 3B repossessed clandestin and now appear to be using it 
for their own, wholly transformed, purposes as they perform and identify clandos 
in their midst.  
 Nathalie was in her ninth month of MSA study when she told this joke. When she, for 51
example, pronounces the ‘v’ as an ‘f,’ she seems to be drawing on her knowledge of the Arabic 
alphabet, such as the non-existence of ‘v’ in the Arabic alphabet.
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III. Paillot Imitations 
 The section above demonstrated how students in Class 3B have 
enregistered a repertoire of Arab-learner French as indexical of the figure of the 
clando, or first-generation immigrant to France. If through clando mocking youth 
were able to identify themselves as French-born diasporans, at a contrast to 
their parents’ generation, this section deals with how by invoking  
yet another figure and linguistic repertoire, that of the paillot and Standard 
French, youth eﬀectively cued their diﬀerence from ethnically French people in 
Marseille. On the very first day I observed Class 3B, for instance, I had a telling 
interaction with a female student named Jihad. At that time, the students knew 
little about me, such as the fact that I was in fact born and raised in the United 
States. All they knew was what they could garner from examining me and 
Madame Chérif ’s brief introduction: I was white and I had a French, Catholic 
name. Thus, Jihad (the same one who prefers her name spelled Djihad) took the 
desk directly behind mine, beside another student. As I took out my notebook, I 
caught Jihad making exaggerated motions to unpack her backpack, with flicks of 
the hand I can only describe as prissy. I then overheard her say to her tablemate 
in a sing-song voice, “You are so very kind” (Vous êtes si aimable). Jihad’s use of 
the pronoun for formal, second-person address (vous), her school-like diction 
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(aimable ‘kind’), and her standard pronunciation of très [tʁε:] and aimable 
[εmɑ:bl], was immediately recognizable as a parody of Standard French.  I was, 52
of course, the target for this mocking, and Madame Chérif later summarized the 
situation, which she had also noticed, saying “Oh, she was just performing for 
you.” Inoue (2006) writes that often a mocking stance can be enacted through 
hyperbole in the narrating event; in other words, through the speaker’s 
impeccable, almost too-perfect performance of a voice. To wit, it was through an 
exaggeratedly standard form of French that Jihad succeeded at commenting, 
cynically, on the original form of that speech (namely, Standard French) and 
those who employ it. In this last section of Chapter Four, I compare paillot 
register to that of clando and consider the possible social functions of paillot 
mocking for youth from Northern Marseille.    
 As described when introducing Marseille’s geographic divisions, the city 
is marked by a geographic and social separation between its North and South 
that dates to the 19th century, when the city’s industrial landmarks began 
clustering to the North of the Commune (Roncayolo, 1996). The Castellanois 
lexeme “paillot” mirrors this history of the city. Insofar as youth invoke paillot to 
 Her pronunciation was recognizable as Standard French because, first, it lacked Castellanois’ 52
word-final schwa on aimable, second, she used French “r” [ʁ] in lieu of Castellanois ([χ]) in très, 
and thirdly, she inserted the long back [ɑ] in the second syllable of aimable that is typical of posh 
Parisians’ way of speaking. For an example of this way of speaking, see the 1993 film Les Visiteurs. 
The character Béatrice, played by Valérie Lemercier, plays the descendent of French nobility and 
uses an unmistakable back [ɑ] in some vocalic contexts. 
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pick out aﬄuent people of French souche (or ethnic origin), who likewise operate 
in Standard French, the label is keyed to Southern Marseille and its residents. As 
Central Marseille has become more gentrified, however, less vernacular and 
more standard forms of French have begun to be stereotypically associated with 
central arrondissements as well (Trimaille & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013). Perhaps this 
gentrification phenomenon will widen paillot’s social range, which until now, has 
designated people who live in Southern Marseille, dress “BCBG” (bon chic bon 
genre,’like a yuppie’), speak Standard French, and are generally middle or upper 
class. The word paillot, as such, is often a human referent noun. It can also, 
however, function as an adjective. One Sunday afternoon, for instance, a group 
of girls from Class 3B came to visit my apartment. They sat chit-chatting around 
my kitchen table while I made tea and prepared snacks. When I oﬀered them 
navettes, dry biscuits that are traditional Marseillais fare and whose long shape 
commemorates that of the boat that brought St. Lazarus and his sisters to 
Marseille from Jerusalem, I was met with polite refusals from around the table. 
Anisa finally blurted out “That’s a paillot thing. You know, a French thing.” The 
lexeme paillot itself derives from the Standard French word for straw (paille). A 
glance at an etymology dictionary will show that, in the Middle Ages, it referred 
to straw bedding or insulation for granaries. It then joined the ranks of argot in 
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the 19th century, coming to mean ‘door mat,’ and now appears to have fallen out 
of use in perhaps all but Castellanois.  
 The following interaction takes a look at some of the social contrasts 
signaled by paillot. Like the clando register, paillot is also organized in terms of a 
repertoire of linguistic and other forms and a stereotypic social indexicality 
(Agha, 2007). In Transcript 4.5, I asked Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda about how 
they talked versus how people in downtown Marseille talked. The transcript 
points to how these three young women link their own Castellanois speech to the 
projects and Standard French to paillot people, whether Parisians or people in 
Central and Southern Marseille.  
Transcript 4.5.  Speaking French Well and Speaking it Badly 53
French Original English Translation
Cécile: Mais vous parlez de la même façon que les  
gens en Centre Ville?  
Sabrina: Ça dépend en fait. Ils parlent plus paillot.  
Vous voyez? Ils maitrisent[mεtχiz]                                                                                                             
mieux que nous, Madame. Nous on dit [ʤi]  
n’importe [ĩpoχtə] quoi des fois.            
Cécile: Paillot c’est quoi? 
Sabrina: Paillot c’est euh... Comment on appelle...  
((yelling to Maisara)) Ça veut dire [ʤiχə] quoi  
paillot? C’est quoi le paillot?                    
Maisara: C’est-c’est les parisiens [paʁizjəŋ] quand 
ils parlent.                                  
Sabrina: ‘Chez pas, paillot, genre [ʒəχə]...Madame, 
ils parlent bien [byεŋ]                                                       
Maisara: Non [nɑŋ], c’est des français.             
Cécile: So do you speak the same way as 
people downtown? 
Sabrina: It depends, actually. They speak 
more paillot. You know? They have it
(Standard French) down better than us, 
Madame. Sometimes, we say any old 
thing. 
Cécile: And what’s paillot? 
Sabrina: Paillot is uh... How do you say...   
((yelling to Maisara)) What does paillot  
mean? What’s the paillot? 
Maisara: It’s-it’s Parisians when they talk. 
Sabrina: I dunno, paillot, like...Madame,  
they talk nice 
Maisara: No, they’re French people.
 This transcript dates from 11.12.12. 53
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As indicated by the bolded IPA transcriptions, for the most part Sabrina and 
Maisara narrate in Castellanois, dotting their French with Marseillais lexis (e.g., 
dégun, ‘nobody’) and vernacular features like word-final schwa, the velar nasal, 
aﬀricated stops, but also with Arabic-sourced wesh (‘what’s up?’) and voiceless 
fricative /χ/. When, however, Sabrina imitates paillot people, she switches to 
Sabrina: Ils parlent bien [byεŋ]! Vous avez vu, 
nous on parle [paχl] tro::p [tχo::] mal. Oh c’est pas 
pareil [paχεj]avec les... 
Cécile: Avec les quoi? 
Sabrina: C’est pas pareil [paχεjə]! Nous, exemple,  
on dit [ʤi].. On dit [ʤi] pas, ‘ça va’ et tout. On dit  
‘Wesh’ [wεʃə] et tout, vous avez vu?                                                   
Cécile: Mmm 
Sabrina: Eux ils disent [ʤi:z] “Salu:::t” [salu:::w]  
et tout “Coucou:::” [kuku::::]. Nous on dit [ʤi]  
‘Wesh’ et tout. ((Maisara laughing)). C’est ça,  
Madame, paillot.  
Cécile: Vous, vous ne dites pas ‘coucou’? 
Sabrina: Non [nɑŋ]        
Cécile: Pourquoi? Coucou ça fait quoi? 
Sabrina: Les paillots ils disent [ʤiz] “Salut, ça va,  
coucou.” Nous on dit “Wesh, bien [byεŋ] ou bien   
[byεŋŋ]?” ((then, to Maisara and Fouhda, who look  
like they’re about to cross the street to La  
Castellane)) Tu vas où Maisara? Fouhda! ((to  
Maisara and me)) Les paillots disaient [ʤizε]  
“Salut, coucou, ça va? Tu as [ʧu a] passé des  
bonnes vacances?” [vakəŋsə]. Nous on dit “Wesh,  
bien [byεŋ]ou bien[byεŋŋ]? C’était  
comment [koməŋ] tes vacances?”  [vakəŋsə] et  
tout 
Maisara: ((laughing)) Wesh, bien ou bien. T’as  
[ʧja] bien passé tes vacances? [vakəŋsə]     
Cécile: Et c’est qui qui parle comme ça dans votre 
classe? 
Sabrina: Dégun! [dεgœŋŋ] 
Maisara: Personne, Madame. C’est plus vers le 
Centre Ville.
Sabrina: They talk nice! You know, we  
speak bad (French). Oh, it’s not the same  
with the... 
Cécile: With the what? 
Sabrina: It’s not the same! Us, for  
example, we say... We don’t say “how are  
you (ça va)?” We say “Wesh” and all, you  
see? 
Cécile: Mmm 
Sabrina: Them, they say “Hey (salut)” and  
all, “Hiya (coucou).” Us we say “Wesh” and  
all. ((Maisara laughing)). That’s it,  
Madame, that’s paillot. 
Cécile: You guys don’t say “Hiya  
(coucou)”? 
Sabrina: Nope 
Cécile: Why, how does it seem? 
Sabrina: The paillots, they say “Hey, how  
are you, hiya (Salut, ça va, coucou).” We say  
“Wesh, good or good? ((to Maisara and  
Fouhda, who look like they’re about to  
cross the street to La Castellane))Maisara,  
where are you going? Fouhda! ((then, to  
Maisara and me)) The paillots would say  
“Hey, hiya, how are you, hiya (Salut, 
coucou, ça va)? Did you spend a nice  
vacation?” We say “Wesh, good or good?  
How was your vacation?” and all. 
Maisara: ((laughing)) Wesh, good or good.  
Didya have a good vacation? 
Cécile: And who talks like that in your  
class? 
Sabrina: Dégun! (Nobody) 
Maisara: No one, Madame. It’s more a  
downtown thing. 
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higher pitch, uses diﬀerent greetings (e.g., salut, coucou) and phraseology (e.g., 
comment ça va?), and adheres to super-standard syntax (e.g., c’était comment tes 
vacances?), in a way reminiscent of the nerdy speech Bucholtz (2001) studied in 
the San Francisco Bay Area.  
 Although Sabrina’s imitations of paillot were not as naturalistic as Jihad’s 
performance of paillot for her classmates (at my expense), the boundary she 
erected between “us” in Northern Marseille and the “paillots” elsewhere in 
Marseille partook in positioning youth from La Castellane as diﬀerent from their 
urban neighbors in non-negligible ways. When youth from Class 3B invoked the 
paillot voice through use of Standard French, such performances often tended to 
interactionally position the speaker, by contrast, as a person both of color and 
with diasporic ties to the bled. Sabrina also intimated in her remarks above, 
however, that despite her dismissal of Standard French, she was nevertheless 
aware that its mastery was useful for certain ends. These youth’s relationship to 
Standard French is analyzed in greater depth in Chapter Seven. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 Taken together, this chapter and the previous chapter underlined how 
youth from La Castellane ideologized their own diasporic project identity, as 
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well as the identities of those from whom they sought to diﬀerentiate 
themselves, the paillots and clandos, in ways that were both multi-modal and 
multi-scalar. These registers’ repertoires comprised linguistic forms, but also 
clothing styles, accessories, and attitudes. Likewise, in her research with Latina 
gangsters (cholas) in the San Francisco Bay Area, Mendoza-Dentón (2008) has 
shown that claiming certain personas, like that of the macha gang girl, requires 
the performer’s attention to such diverse aesthetic ingredients as speech, 
eyeliner, music, and body weight, among others. Similarly, discourses about 
diasporic projecthood also enregistered a range of sign types as indicative of this 
persona. This was apparent, for example, when the student named Ayman 
enacted defiance of his teacher using Castellanois linguistic forms, the word 
“Allah” drawn on his hand, and a James Dean-like getup. Kader, too, was 
positioned as a clando by his female classmates on the basis of his ankle socks, 
incorrectly colored clothes, and way of speaking.  
 Youth’s registers were also multi-scalar in at least two senses. First,  
speech forms or bodily behaviors only achieved meaning through youth’s 
ideological roping of these diﬀerent behaviors together, and this took place at 
the level of reflexive discourses or metapragmatics. It is, likewise, for this 
precise reason that sociolinguists and ethnographers who study French youthful 
varieties are treading cautiously in their suggestions that a “youth 
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vernacular” (parler jeune) exists across France (c.f., Jamin, Trimaille, & Gasquet-
Cyrus, 2006; Trimaille & Billiez, 2002). Although this remains an open 
question, the previous chapter contributed the observation that identity at the 
level of form (such as aﬀrication being spread over diverse French settings) 
often belies ideological diﬀerences in how specific groups articulate their 
identities. A second sense in which registers like Castellanois and Clando, at least, 
were multi-scalar was in the chronotopic formulations youth attributed these 
personas. In many of the example transcripts, students’ positioning of someone 
as a project youth or a clando comported with depictions of that person’s spatial 
aﬃliations and temporal qualities, such as being avant-garde and hip or old-
fashioned and regressive.  
 Some last questions deal with where youth from Class 3B are headed, 
moving forward. As time marches on, will the young men and women of Class 
3B, who are now in high school and working jobs, continue to speak their ethnic 
identity and Marseille’s quartiers into being? When I knew them, these youth 
envisioned futures locally. They hoped to live in the projects, work nearby, and 
marry other second-generation Marseillais. It is possible, however, that since 
then new aspirations have come to vie with those of La Castellane. Likewise, 
what might the outcome of their linguistic mocking routines turn out to be? 
Will their imitations end in the reanalysis of the values stereotypically associated 
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with language varieties like Standard French and the learner French spoken by 
some first-generation immigrants to Marseille, or will they ultimately contribute 
to reinforcing certain stereotypes even as they subvert others? Both Bucholtz 
(2001) and Barrett (1999) have observed, in their respective research sites, how 
embedding others’ voices in one’s speech can have unexpected, and sometimes 
discriminatory, eﬀects. Bucholtz (2001), for one, addresses how nerds’ use of 
intelligence to perform hyperwhiteness may have been meant as a critique of 
mainstream white norms but, even so, ultimately exposed racially diﬀerent 
access to intelligence as a strategy for taking social stances, hence reinforcing 
racial markedness. Barrett (1999), in turn, contends that imitating white 
women’s speech if you are a black drag queen may serve to question racist and 
homophobic assumptions even as it potentially reproduces misogynistic ones. 
Similarly, Class 3B youth’s resort to the voice of the clando to perform 
interactional stances, like lack of motivation or goofiness, may have tempered 
more abjectly derogatory stereotypes about the first generation but also 
potentially yielded new oﬀ-shoots of pejoration. It remains to be seen if their 
attempts to ridicule Standard French, and its speakers, as prissy and 
unimaginative will succeed in yielding new counter-hegemonic evaluations of 
that language. In sum, thus far I have contrasted two types of heteroglossic 
speech: the double-voiced, syncretic register of Castellanois, on the one hand; and 
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youth’s embedding of two other enregistered voices, paillot and clando, in their 
speech for the purposes of mocking, on the other. As it stands, mocking reveals 
itself to be quite ambiguous in its politics. Syncretic language, by contrast, 
seems to push away from tradition and pull towards invention (Lindquist, 
2002), potentially upheaving the script.   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V. Alienated at Home: Marseille’s Muslim 
Orthodox Youth Carry Forth Two 
Histories of Islamic Piety  
I. Introduction 
“Went down the harbour and stood upon the quay /  
Saw the fish swimming as if they were free: /  
Only ten feet away, my dear, only ten feet away.”  
 Written by W.H. Auden (1967) in 1939, these three verses describe the 
plight of European Jews who, for lack of the right papers or a dearth of departing 
ships, could not leave for safer shores during World War II. The port city of 
Marseille was, during France’s non-occupied years of 1939-1942, one such point 
of frozen departures. Auden, who was not Jewish, emigrated to the United 
States himself that same year. Nevertheless, he appears to have sympathized—
perhaps as a queer Englishman living abroad (Roberts, 2005)—with Jewish 
fugitives’ sentiment of feeling alienated while at home.  
 Roughly three quarters of a century later, the atmosphere in Marseille is 
again weighing heavily on its human margins. Only now those seeking refuge 
are a pious generation of young Muslim men and women who, while born in 
Marseille, are made to feel unduly foreign in their hometown. Such youth, born  
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to parents from Muslim countries in North, West, and East Africa and raised in 
Northern Marseille (Quartiers Nord), report sensing rejection from Marseille’s 
non-Muslim inhabitants in both conspicuous and more subtle ways. The forms 
of discrimination they enumerate include harassment, hate speech, and being 
barred from the public school system, rental housing, and the job market (in 
spite of high school and university degrees). It is, moreover, precisely the same 
visual signs which such orthodox youth use to signal belonging to their 
community, from the floor and wrist-length outfits (e.g., ’abāyah, jilbāb) and 
accessories like the ḥijāb or gloves worn by young women, to the beards, short 
pants, and caps donned by young men, that are to most non-Muslim people in 
Marseille cause for suspicion, fear, and, not uncommonly, loathing.  
 This chapter gathers narrative and behavioral accounts of how youth have 
chosen to live their religious commitments, whether by remaining in Marseille 
or leaving. These accounts and my analysis of them are the result of 
ethnographic engagement with several orthodox-identified youth peer groups 
between 2012 and 2013, and also continuing interactions with them over 
Facebook and Skype between 2014 and 2016. While my face-to-face interviews 
took place in both individual and group settings, the majority of the Facebook 
discussions here reported consisted of online conversations between several 
friends and acquaintances, of which I was but one. More detail will be provided 
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about the circumstances in which I met and knew each of these participants 
when I present them in turn. The firsthand and online ethnographic data 
assembled for this chapter provide, I believe, a richer picture of the variety of 
resources youth marshal to communicate about their experiences of being 
Muslim in Marseille.  
 As prefaced in Chapter One, a guiding question in this project has been to 
inquire into the diversity or convergence in the experiences of those who profess 
Islam in Marseille. This question was prompted by the observation of a nation-
wide tendency for the French State (e.g., INED/INSEE, 2010) to group youth 
whose parents hail from France’s African ex-colonies into the broad category of 
“Muslim.” Not surprisingly, my ethnographic findings in this chapter 
demonstrate that even just within the circumscribed area of Marseille’s northern 
housing projects, people practiced Islam quite diﬀerently. These nuances were 
not lost on residents of the projects themselves, who could easily name a 
handful of local Muslim “types” and their corresponding lifestyle choices. Here, 
my concern is primarily with a particular Islamic “figure of personhood,” a term 
that Agha (2011, p. 172) defines as a social type that has been linked to a set of 
performable behaviors by a precise population. Specifically, I discuss how a 
particular sub-set of my diasporic research participants qualified themselves as 
“pious Muslims” or “Sunnis.” By this label, they meant that they observed the 
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instituted model within Islam according to which one undertakes, not only the 
behaviors obligatory under Sharia (Sharī'ah), but also a series of actions 
imitating the Prophet and believed to bestow additional spiritual benefits (Asad, 
1986; Gleave, 2010). Even for the young men and women who identified as 
“orthodox Muslims” or  “Sunnis,” however, there remained a measure of fluidity 
as to how piety was conceptualized. This chapter takes a magnifying glass to 
ideological divergences in youth’s understandings of piety and shows, 
specifically, how these diﬀering perspectives led to youth performing piety in 
two particular ways, and with not-insignificant repercussions on their personal 
trajectories.  
 Concretely, some youth—young women, in particular—ascribed to an 
ideology of piety according to which one must emulate the Prophet’s 7th-century 
migration and relocate to places in the Muslim World. For example, in the first 
section below I examine a narrative given by a young woman who analogizes her 
circumstances in Marseille to those that led to the Prophet’s hijrah, or migration. 
I argue that her account shows “interdiscursive” links (M. Silverstein, 2005) to 
texts penned by 20th century proponents of Wahhabism, in which they moved to 
define piety in terms of al-Walā‘ and al-Barā‘, or loyalty to Muslims and 
dissociation from non-Muslims, respectively (Wagemakers, 2012a, 2012b). A 
handful of social media examples in the first section illustrate, furthermore, how 
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these young women believe it is through leaving Marseille and residing in the 
Muslim World that they will be able to tighten their ties to Muslims (al-Walā‘) 
and relinquish their ties to unbelievers (al-Barā‘). In the second half of the paper, 
by contrast, I gather other narratives and social media instances that point to a 
competing ideology of piety, one that deemphasizes the importance of 
dissociating from non-Muslims (al-Barā‘) and understands al-Walā‘, or Islamic 
solidarity, as arising mainly through local social activism on behalf of Marseille’s 
Muslim community. This latter ideology, too, builds interdiscursively upon 
radical Muslim thinking, only in this instance on the modernist discourses 
crafted by 19th and 20th century Islamic reformers against colonialism. Broadly 
speaking, I analyze this central ideological tension, between piety as a 
movement away from Marseille and piety as a step towards Marseille’s Muslims, 
as a “double movement” in Polanyi’s (2011[1944], p. 136) sense. Insofar as the 
majority view the choice to leave Marseille as a form of social dislocation that 
does not serve the interests of Muslims at large, I also discuss measures taken 
by the community to keep this understanding of piety in check.     
 The theoretical objectives of the chapter are two-fold. On the one hand, the 
data I use to make my arguments indirectly restate the utility of using 
complementary forms of media in conducting ethnographic investigations. Both 
the first and second sections below furnish textual and visual materials culled 
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from diverse media, including face-to-face meetings, Facebook interactions, and 
also conversations via Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications like 
Skype and BlackBerry Messenger. The sheer volume of the computer-mediated 
data I collected, only a portion of which made its way into this chapter, attests to 
these media’s important role in how youth convey—but also disseminate—their 
versions of pious personhood. Moreover, from a methodological perspective, as 
the ethnographer I was frequently led by the imagery a young man or woman 
posted to their Facebook status feeds to confirm or reject an interpretation I had 
made of their behavior while in other “live” social settings. No doubt the 
process I went through, of deciphering youth’s visual cues on social media and 
trying to understand which identities were being indexed, has quite a bit in 
common with how young people themselves read each other’s displays as they 
unfold on the screen. 
 The chapter, on the other hand, also adds fuel to the growing movement 
within religious and Islamic studies to study religion and belief in terms, not of 
holy texts and theological tenets per se, but of the “embodied, material features 
of lived religion” (Morgan, 2010, p. 7). This focus on lived religion reorients the 
gaze towards the ways in which basic Islamic concepts are reworked into local 
practices and heterodox traditions by “small-scale, relatively isolated 
communities” (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 37). Such reworkings of religion 
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and piety, writes Asad (1993), proceed principally through the discursive 
articulation of ideologies in situ. Asad remarks that “The connection between 
religious theory and practice is fundamentally a matter of intervention—of 
constructing religion in the world (not in the mind) through definitional 
discourses, interpreting true meanings, excluding some utterances and practices 
and including others” (p. 44). In the case of the youth presented here, my study 
of their discourses on religion reveals how, by formulating two definitions of 
piety specifically linked to Marseille, such youth have in eﬀect localized the 
broader orthodox or Sunni understanding of piety. I consider these ideologies of 
piety to be “of Marseille,” on the one hand, insofar as individuals came to 
understand piety in one way or another based on their specific biographies and 
the opportunities or limits they encountered growing up in Marseille. These 
ideologies are also broader than Marseille, on the other hand, because in 
creating them youth draw on specific discourses about piety that are more 
properly associated with geographic regions like North Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula. The geographically distant discourses from which they draw 
inspiration are also removed in time, dating from the 19th to mid-20th centuries. 
Thus, I note how in their spoken and written texts youth use the theorizing of 
past Muslim authorities to both think through their own circumstances and 
impart legitimacy to their own definitions of piety. This embedding of Islamic 
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reformist and Wahhabi discourses on piety in their narratives serves as an 
example of what Bakhtin (1981) described in a well-worn remark as one of the 
mundane features of language: the past “thickens, takes on flesh” (p. 84) as 
people knowingly and unknowingly reference the others’ “voices” in their 
speech. This interdiscursive process is central to how youth go about 
positioning themselves within Marseille’s thriving culture of Islamic orthodoxy. 
This chapter, as such, attends to youth’s ideologies about piety as well as their 
pious practices in order to capture the subtle “interplay between personhood 
and religiosity” (McIntosh, 2009, p. 21); in a word, how these young individuals 
personalize piety on a daily basis.  
II. One Ideology of Piety: Al-Barā‘ or Disavowal  
 Like other school days, I stepped onto the 25 bus line at Bougainville, the 
northern-most end of the metro line. As I looked for a seat, I met eyes with 
Kenza, a young woman I had met only two weeks earlier at an “all-girls” dinner 
to celebrate our mutual friend Safiya’s wedding. I told her I was going to my 
teaching job at the private Muslim school a bit further north, in the 15th 
arrondissement, and asked where she was headed. Kalima explained that she was 
on her way to a café to meet with a young man who had previously lived in 
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London. He could tell her what it was like in case she decided to move there. 
Looking out the bus window at Northern Marseille, Kalima mused, “In London, 
I can be myself, I think.” I wanted to know what about her native Marseille 
made her want to leave, so she went on: “I’m too sensitive. It’s diﬃcult to live 
here with the stares... I’m French on my mom’s side and Algerian on my dad’s, 
but everyone calls me ‘foreigner.’” Looking at Kalima momentarily from the 
perspective of the Marseillais on the bus, I imagined they might indeed wonder 
at her use of fashion gloves in April and the large gray ‘abāyah, or floor-grazing 
dress, on this willowy twenty-one year old. Her way of speaking about Marseille, 
describing alienation and the sense of a truer home elsewhere, was familiar to 
me, however, from conversations with other young women from the self-
identified Sunni, or orthodox, community in Marseille.   
   Young women like Kalima dealt with their feeling of being “stuck” in 
Marseille by thinking about migration, often to the Islamic heartlands though 
occasionally to North Africa and the United Kingdom as well. They dreamed of 
exchanging Marseille, the place to which they should hypothetically belong (as 
natives to the city), for places that would welcome them and enable them to 
fulfill their personal, spiritual, educational, and professional goals. Lacking long-
term jobs and husbands, they also reasoned that there could be no better 
moment to pick up and leave. The prospect of relocating was nevertheless 
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fraught with uncertainty for the majority of these young women, who lacked 
financial autonomy from their parents and had often developed only tenuous 
contacts in the places to which they hoped to move, whether Algiers, London, or 
Doha. An important, if not central, consideration for them as they made their 
decisions, whether to move or not, was what religious authorities and sources 
had to say about young Muslims relocating from the West to the Muslim World 
and, more specifically, about young women doing so on their own. The anecdote 
that follows exemplifies how youth tacked back and forth between their own 
circumstances and religious texts in determining how to handle the social 
dislocation they felt in Marseille.  
 In the written narrative I analyze below, a young Marseillaise named Qailah 
writes on her Facebook page about her desire to break with the alienating 
experience of living in Marseille. She settles upon relocation as the most pious 
path forward, resting this judgment on comparisons she makes between her lack 
of religious freedom locally and the circumstances of religious persecution faced 
by the Prophet Mohammed in Mecca. The parallel Qailah draws, along with her 
representation of relocation as the utmost confirmation of piety, are examples of 
Qailah’s engagement with ideals of piety developed by Wahhabi scholars in 20th-
century Saudi Arabia. The distinguishing mark of the pious believer, in these 
writings, was his or her willingness to practice “disavowal” (al-Barā‘) and 
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distance oneself from non-Muslim places, practices, and people in the name of 
God (Wagemakers, 2012a). A detailed description of Qailah’s transition towards 
a pious lifestyle, given below, highlights how she first passed through an 
alternative understanding of piety, one centering upon social activism for local 
Muslim causes, before settling on the al-Barā‘ concept of piety requiring 
movement away and dissociation from non-Muslims.  
 Over the course of the 2012-2013 school year, I spent time with Qailah in 
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) classes oﬀered by a private religious institute 
located in Downtown Marseille. Qailah was a woman in her early twenties who 
came from an Algerian Kabyle household in one of  Northern Marseille’s 
housing projects. Between our first encounter and now, I have observed Qailah 
change from being a non-practicing Muslim, to being highly involved in 
Marseille’s Muslim community, to restricting her sphere of contacts as she 
retreats from Marseille. The first of these phases was exemplified by her 
behavior at the beginning of the school year. When I first met her, other 
priorities seemed to come before Islam. Qailah had, for instance, signed up for 
the Institute’s MSA class, and another in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), but only 
attended when class times did not interfere with the coursework she needed to 
finish her master’s in social work. In keeping with her nominally Muslim 
background, she likewise joined the other students at prayer times only 
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occasionally and wore loose sweatpants and long sweaters, with her brown hair 
uncovered, throughout the first months of class. Qailah’s classmates were also 
amused by her use of Marseille’s “project accent” (accent de quartier) in this 
Islamic setting. Indeed, for the pious Muslims in attendance, the sounds and 
turns-of-phrase associated with the vernacular speech of Marseille’s projects 
cued hyper-local associations that were quite opposed to the kind of Islamic 
cosmopolitanism they tried to cultivate, mainly by adhering to more standard 
forms of French and Arabic.  
 By late in the fall, Qailah’s demeanor showed novel facets, however. In a 
first instance, she began keeping a tight prayer schedule. This was accompanied 
by her adoption of the sporty head-to-knee-length veil known as a jilbāb, which 
she wore over long skirts and tennis shoes. Qailah additionally took to 
conducting da‘wāh,  or the Islamic social activism and missionizing encouraged 1
in the Koran. When for example one of the institute’s founders, Bin Omar, 
organized a meeting to enlist volunteers from among the students to collect aid 
money for the Palestinian cause and the war in Syria, Qailah was among the first 
to step forward and oﬀer her services. She likewise became the director of 
Marseille’s branch of a France-wide Muslim charity association. Via the 
 MSA for teachings and doings in the name of Islamic unity (Canard, 1999), though often 1
synonymous with Islamic outreach and social activism. 
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Facebook page she managed for the charity, Qailah coordinated all manner of 
social and financial assistance to Muslim families and (mainly divorced) 
“sisters” in need, ranging from soliciting blankets, clothes, and monies, to 
finding safe housing and distributing free meals. Her posts on behalf of the 
charity read much like this one, which she put up in November of 2012.  
“Salâm 3alaykoum wa rahmatou Allah wa barakâtouh” (‘Peace be upon you and the mercy  
and blessings of God as well’). Are you familiar with the principle of marauding? It  
involves a group vigil during the evening and overnight as we roam the area looking for 
homeless people. (...) During our marauds we distribute meals, drinks, warm  
clothes/covers/blankets, and smiles!”  2
In accordance with the pious ideological preference of hewing to the Arabic and 
French standards, Qailah opens with an elaborate Muslim greeting in MSA and 
then continues in a quasi-academic register of French, using such standard turns 
of phrase as “il s’agit de” (‘it involves’) and diction as 
“sillonnant” (‘traverse’/‘roam’).   3
 “Connaissez-vous le principe des maraudes? Il s’agit d’une mission de veille sociale en soirée et 2
durant la nuit sillonnant le territoire à la rencontre de personnes sans domicile fixe. (....) Lors de 
nos maraudes, nous distribuons des repas, boissons, et des vêtements chauds/couettes/
couvertures et des sourires!” (Qailah, 11-15-13).
 It is worth noting, here, that although this greeting is one typically associated with religious 3
settings and hence with MSA, Qailah renders it in what Palfreyman and Khalil (2007) term 
“common romanized Arabic” (p. 48), meaning the romanized transliteration of Arabic. Her use 
of this orthography, typically associated with youth fora online, rather than the more religiously 
associated Arabic script, perhaps proceeds from her desire to connect with her charity’s young 
Facebook users. She also transliterates the long “a” of salām in French fashion as “â” and the 
nominative case ending plus possessive suﬃx of barakāt (‘blessings’), typically barakātuhu in 
MSA, using the dialectal Arabic possessive suﬃx /-uh/. These inconsistencies in Qailah’s use of 
MSA speak to her ongoing transition towards assuming both, a pious lifestyle, and the language 
ideologies associated with such an existence. 
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 Three years have passed since Qailah’s initial forays into Marseille’s Islamic 
milieu. She no longer runs the charity as before and has closed its Facebook 
page. In September of 2015, I received a phone call from another member of our 
old MSA class who filled me in on how Qailah, among others, were doing. This 
classmate was happy to report that Qailah had married a local Shaykh from a 
Comorian background, but was more downcast when he told me that he only 
ever encounters Qailah by accident now, since she no longer feels comfortable 
joining in the reunions for the MSA class. He explained that when, not long ago, 
he crossed Qailah in the street, he did not in fact recognize her because she was 
covering her face and hands. The Facebook post I examine below dates from 
January of 2014, when her page was still up and running but Qailah no longer 
used it, as before, to make weekly requests for donations. I interpret the 
narrative she gives, along with these more recent developments in her Islamic 
practice, as Qailah’s movement towards a notion of piety that requires she 
socialize less with people in Marseille and, indeed, distance herself from 
Marseille altogether. It becomes apparent that Qailah’s current performance of 
piety is in fact part and parcel of a broader stance of aversion she has developed 
towards Marseille and its inhabitants. The aversion she shows, moreover, is 
matched by an equal attraction to the possibility of decamping to places more 
properly part of the Muslim world.   
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Figure 5.1. Qailah’s Initial Facebook Post 
 Thus, on a morning in January of 2014, Qailah posted on her charity’s 
Facebook page for the first time in several months (c.f., Figure 5.1). She 
implored her charity’s followers in French: “May Allah help us to leave this 
country. France is going from bad to worse. Mayday!!!!!!!!!!!!”.  Her post 4
inspired aﬃrmative replies of “wallahi” (MSA. ‘by God’) and “amin” (MSA. 
‘amen’) from several group members. Then a friend, pressing Qailah, inquired 
further, “To go where?”.  Yet another protested, “But France is our home! Let 5
those who don’t like us leave France!”.  This last sentiment seemed not to 6
resonate with the majority of commentators on Qailah’s post, none of whom 
liked the post. The next post, however, was met with five likes. This female 
friend supported Qailah’s desire to leave and spoke, specifically, or her desire to 
conduct a religious emigration or hijrah to distance her from the French:  
 “Qu’Allah nous aide à quitter ce pays. La France, c’est de pire en pire. Au 4
secours!!!!!!!!!!!” (Qailah, 1-23-14, 7:34 a.m.)
 “Pr aller où?” (1-23-14, 9:35 a.m.)5
 “Mais on est chez nous en France! Et ceux qui nous aiment pas, c’est à eux de quitter la 6
France! ” (1-23-14, 10:35 a.m.)
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“Salam wa3leyki oukhty. Naam Allahuma amin (MSA. ‘Peace be with you as well, my  
sister. Yes O God amen’). May Allah ease our hijra quickly because I hate them [the  
French] more and more and I cannot take it here anymore.”   7
This young women alternates between religious phraseology drawn from the 
Koran (e.g., Allahuma, MSA. ‘O God’) and standardly written French, and her 
post is noteworthy for her use of elements of a francized orthography of MSA 
(e.g., oukhty ‘sister’/naam ‘yes’) together with examples of the romanized 
orthography of MSA (e.g., wa3leyki ‘and upon you’) used by many youth 
communicating in Arab countries online or by SMS. Most tellingly, however, is 
that this young woman expresses alienation from France through these two 
languages and asks Allah, moreover, to facilitate her relocation to a Muslim 
country. Underlying the comments made by Kalima (from the section’s initial 
anecdote), Qailah, and this Facebook friend of Qailah’s, is a reconceptualization 
of Marseille as no longer their home. Specifically, in their discourse these 
orthodox young women repositioned Marseille as a place of temporary exile, 
rather than their home. A female university student named Bushrah, for 
instance, often joked with her girlfriends about being “apatride,” or country-less, 
despite her status as a French citizen and local of Marseille. Another young 
woman named Radya pointed out, whereas in Marseille she felt disoriented, 
 “Salam wa3leyki oukhty. Naam Allahuma amin. Qu’Allah nous facilite rapidement la hijra 7
parce que je les déteste de plus en plus et je ne tiens plus ici.” (1-23-14, 5:06 p.m.)
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“when I go to Algeria, I don’t experience country shock.”  The act of 8
presupposing the existence of a true home located elsewhere, which these young 
women were simply waiting to rejoin, allowed them to indicate their greater 
kinship with places in the Muslim World and thus subvert their feelings of 
alienation from Marseille. 
 This transposed reckoning of home was facilitated by a particular analogy 
young women elaborated between circumstances in Marseille and conditions in 
7th-century Mecca. A follow-up post by Qailah on the same Facebook 
conversation illustrates this analogy and its eﬀects on young women’s plans for 
the future. At 8:29 p.m., Qailah chimed back in to the Facebook conversation 
she had begun that morning, citing only Verse 97 of the 4th Sūrah (Al-Nisā’) from 
a French translation of the Koran:   
“The angels will ask those whom they claim back while steeped in sin: ‘What were you 
doing?’ ‘We were oppressed in the land,’ they will reply. They will say: ‘Was not the earth 
of God spacious enough for you to fly for refuge?‘ Hell shall be their home: an evil fate.”  9
Here Qailah cues a parallel between the oppressive conditions facing early 
Muslims in Mecca during the 7th century and those she and her peers face in 
contemporary Marseille. On September 24th, 622 C.E., following a decade of 
 “Je me sens pas depaysée quand je pars en Algérie.” (Radya, 9-19-12)8
 This English version of Qailah’s French translation comes from Dawood’s (2000, p. 93) 9
translation and exegesis of the Koran. Qailah’s French original reads: “Ceux qui ont fait du tort à 
eux mêmes, les Anges enlèveront leurs âmes en disant: ‘Où en étiez-vous?’ (à propos de votre 
religion) - ‘Nous étions impuissants sur terre,’ dirent-ils. Alors les Anges diront: ‘La terre 
d’Allah n’était-elle pas assez vaste pour vous permettre d’émigrer?’ Voilà bien ceux dont le 
refuge et [sic] l’Enfer. Et quelle mauvaise destination! (Sourate 4 verset 97).”
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severe persecution at the hands of his own tribe (the Quraysh) in Mecca, 
Prophet Mohammed relocated dozens of his Muslim followers to Medinah. Not 
all those who had professed Islam by that time participated in this migration, 
known as the hijrah in MSA, and certainly the majority of the Quraysh remained 
in Mecca, preferring paganism and their worldly possessions to this lone 
Prophet and his monotheistic message (Saleh, 2010). The Verse Qailah cites 
above describes the wrath of God and his angels at those who were able to leave 
Mecca but decided instead to stay behind.  Forsaking Medinah as their true 10
home, as the Verse states, guaranteed these sinful individuals an eternal home in 
Hell.   
 By invoking this Verse, Qailah maps not only parallels between now and 
then but also, quite importantly, parallels between the pious and sinful Muslims 
of yore and the good and bad Muslims living in Marseille. The Verse’s criticism 
of those who did not accompany the Prophet (“fly for refuge”) goes hand-in-
hand with the attribution of moral superiority to those who did in fact emulate 
the Prophet and his decision to move. As described by Afsaruddin (2010, p. 
184), in this early period a hierarchy of moral excellence took shape according to 
sābiqah, or one’s precedence in converting to Islam, and whether one had been 
 Some Muslims were physically unable to accompany the Prophet in his hijrah but were 10
nevertheless “never charged with apostasy or cowardice” (Armstrong, 1993, p. 151). This 
immunity was due both to their inability to relocate and to their steadfast commitment to the 
Prophet and his mission.
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among the first to accompany the Prophet in the dangerous hijrah journey North. 
These muhājirūna, or emigrants, risked their lives to stand by the Prophet during 
the hijrah and combat religious persecution. They also replaced their kinship ties 
to their Meccan brethren with a new allegiance they claimed in Medinah, namely 
loyalty to the Ummah or Islamic community (Rubin, 2010). Qailah appears to 
support the idea that, just as piety belonged only to those who conducted hijrah 
and stood by the Prophet, so must Muslims in Marseille lift themselves from 
their circumstances in order to be pious. The morning after her initial post, 
Qailah warns those among her charity’s online followers who plan to remain in 
Marseille of the dangers this poses to their piety: “At the risk of losing 
authenticity, our residence [in France] must be provisional, 
temporary...” (1-24-14, 8:51 a.m.). The authenticity of one’s piety, writes Qailah, 
relies on one’s sincere intent to relocate, followed upon by an actual relocation. 
One of the first signs of this intent, as intimated above, lies in how young 
women ideologically recast their continued residence in Marseille in terms of a 
life of pious exile. Their discourses frame Marseille as if it was a waiting room to 
be abided en route to their true homes, articulated to lie in the Muslim World. 
Their stopover in Marseille is, moreover, made tenable only through planning 
their departures; as Kalima said in the beginning anecdote, real home awaits 
elsewhere.  
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 Several of the points Qailah touches on—the utmost piety of the first 
Muslims who followed the Prophet, her contempt of France, and the need to 
relocate—suggest influences on how she conceptualizes piety that come from 
other than herself or her unmediated reading of Koran and Ḥadīth (codified 
narrations about the Prophet’s life). The understanding that special moral 
distinctions are bestowed upon the Prophet and the next two generations that 
followed him is, tellingly, the central idea of the geographically dispersed 
movement in Islamic thought called Salafism. Indeed, the very term for the 
movement derives from its followers’ strict intent to follow the conduct of al-
salaf al-ṣaḥiḥ, or the pious predecessors, described by the Prophet himself to be 
“khayr ummatī,” or the best of his (literally, “my”) community (Wagemakers, 
2012b, p. 3). Despite some terminological confusions over which thinkers, 
precisely, considered themselves proponents of Salafism (c.f., Lauzière, 2010), 
Salafism is here understood in Wagemakers’ (2012b) sense as the movement 
proper to 20th-century purists who used textual analysis of Ḥadīth to strictly 
imitate Islam’s pious predecessors in as many domains of life as possible.  11
Although Qailah’s stance might be said to point in some respects towards a 
more Salafi interpretation of Sunni Islam, it could also be said that in her 
 Due to Salafis’ close following of Koran and adherence to the ways of the salaf as described in 11
Ḥadīth texts, they notably do not follow any of the five schools (madhhab) of Sharia within 
Sunnism.
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contempt for Marseille and intent to move away Qailah approaches the tenets of 
the Najdi Saudi branch of Salafism better known to the public as Wahhabism (al-
Wahabiyyah). Influenced by the earlier writings of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703-1792), 20th-century Wahhabi scholars like the Saudis ‘Abd al-‘Azziz b. al-
Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad b. Salih al-‘Uthaymin (d. 2001) theorized piety as 
depending upon the duplex practice of al-Walā‘ and al-Barā‘. Practices 
corresponding to al-Walā‘, defined as showing loyalty only to Muslims, and al-
Barā‘, meaning the disavowal of anything related to disbelief (kufr) and 
disbelievers (kuﬀār), included not greeting non-Muslims or celebrating their 
holidays, not showing attachment to non-Islamic people, places, and things, and 
refusing to live in or visit the West unnecessarily—all at the risk of being ex-
communicated from the community of believers (Wagemakers, 2012a).  
 The way in which Qailah positions relocation as central to her ongoing 
piety reveals two specific interdiscursive ties to Wahhabi creed. As per M. 
Silverstein (2005), interdiscursivity takes place when an individual on a certain 
occasion creates a text, spoken or written, that reveals their “retrospective or 
recuperative relationship to either another discursive event (in what I term a 
manifestation of “token”-interdiscursivity) or to an internalized notion of a type 
or genre of discursive event (in what I term “type”-interdiscursivity)” (p. 9). 
Both Qailah’s interdiscursive gestures can be considered examples of type-
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interdiscursivity insofar as she references, not a certain event or writing of 
Wahhabi scholars, but their sphere of ideas and thought process. The first 
interdiscursive link of Qailah’s, as such, is the way in which she sequentially 
retraces in her Facebook comments the originary reasoning of Salafism. 
Specifically, she provides a Koranic verse speaking of disbelievers in the 7th 
century and then she warns against Muslims in Marseille displaying the same 
inauthenticity. Thus, she recreates the parallel upon which Salafi philosophy was 
founded, that between the moral Muslims of yore and those of today. Her 
second interdiscursive indication lies in her advocacy for relocation. Her 
insistence on leaving Marseille, or planning to, channels an ideology of piety 
resembling Wahhabi scholars’ insistence on al-Barā‘, or the disavowal of non-
Muslim conditions. After bridging Islamic time, as described, Wahhabis move to 
single out al-Barā‘ as “the litmus test to separate the ‘true’ Muslims from the 
rest” (Wagemakers, 2008, p. 4). In other words, Wahhabis’ understanding of 
hijrah as an instance of the Prophet showing disavowal (al-Barā‘) projects a 
course of action for Muslims like Qailah who, wondering about their un-Islamic 
surroundings, find their way to the al-Barā‘ interpretation of residence in the 
West. 
 Qailah likely became familiar with this mode of reasoning through reading, 
her classes at the Institute, or through her contact with other young women also 
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seeking a way of addressing their feelings of alienation. It is worth noting, in 
this regard, that within Marseille the ideology of piety as relocation is something 
I have only encountered among young women. It may be the case that young 
Muslim women, given their relatively more visible styles of dress compared to 
young Muslim men, are more liable to feel unloved and alienated by Marseillais 
society and are hence more likely to seek redress through stringent religious 
solutions to their predicament. This section has described a growing subculture 
of piety specific, for the moment, to young orthodox women. In the next section, 
below, I analyze several images and texts from social media to illustrate the 
importance of these networks in solidifying this particular understanding of 
piety, namely, as warranting relocation and other forms of disavowal.   
Practices of Piety: Exemplifying Al-Barā‘ 
 In this section, I examine three examples of social media engagement by 
young orthodox women to document how the disavowal of non-Muslims, or the 
ideology of piety known as al-Barā‘ (‘disavowal of non-Muslims’), is in eﬀect 
practiced. The first example, drawn from conversations with Radya, presents 
how this young woman is going about planning to in fact leave Marseille. A 
social media network she has developed is shown to play a pivotal role in her 
willingness to relocate to Doha, Qatar. The second two examples, gathered from 
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two young women who do not have the means to leave Marseille but 
nevertheless yearn to, demonstrate how they practice disavowal from within 
Marseille, in part via social media. All three cases point to the centrality of social 
media as young women either, network in preparation for their departure or, 
alternatively, seek to communicate their commitment to disavowing Marseille to 
their peers while still living in Marseille. 
 Radya, who turned twenty this year but was seventeen when I met her, 
occasionally attended the same private institute where Qailah was taking MSA 
classes. A couple of months into the 2012-2013 class year, however, Radya 
stopped visiting the Institute in Marseille altogether, preferring to spend her 
time mostly at home, an apartment in a housing project on the outskirts of Aix-
en-Provence. When I asked her why she stopped attending classes, Radya 
replied, “I never go outside. What for? I’d rather stay home and speak to 
interesting people.”  Since her junior year of high school, Radya had in fact 12
begun leading an unusual life for a French-born seventeen-year old.  Inspired by 13
visits to her mother’s family outside Algiers, back in Marseille Radya began 
wearing the ḥijāb and removing it before entering school premises. She likewise 
 “Je sors jamais dehors. Pour quoi faire? Je préfère rester à la maison et parler avec des gens 12
intéressants.” (11-2-12). 
 Radya’s father was born in Marseille to a Moroccan father and a pied-noir (or French) mother. 13
Her mother was born in Algeria, of Arab heritage, and speaks to Radya in Algerian. 
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became increasingly disenchanted with the French public curriculum and, in 
particular, with her history and geography teacher’s perfunctory treatment of the 
French-Algerian War, and took to skipping classes. Hence, at the outset of her 
baccalaureate year, Radya left high school and enrolled in distance-schooling.  
 The “interesting people” with whom she conversed at home during this 
period were three women, two from Qatar and another from Saudi Arabia, 
whom she had met while shopping in a boutique in Aix. Radya surprised the 
tourists with her cosmopolitan allure, mainly her subscription to the New York-
based online magazine Fashion Week and her use of Algerian that sounded 
markedly un-Algerian in accent. During her trips to Algeria, Radya had observed 
a diﬀerence between how people from the capital spoke Algerian, namely with 
many contributions from French and Berber, and how people from her family’s 
province of Batna spoke Algerian, “with accents from there [Batna] but only in 
Arabic words...their dialect is more [standardly] Arabic.” She began emulating 
this way of speaking, reassured that even if she was far from perfecting her MSA 
at least she could use a pure Algerian untainted by non-Arab influences. In an 
interesting turn of events, Radya has since her encounter with these women 
three years ago also become fascinated with learning from them how to speak 
Saudi and Qatari (Khalījī) Arabic. These varieties, she now believes, display the 
greatest linguistic proximity to the speech forms from the Arabian Peninsula 
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that participated in shaping MSA during and in the centuries following the 
Prophet’s lifetime (Suleiman, 2012). Intent on fashioning herself into one of 
these “true Arabs,” as she calls them, Radya spends her afternoons and evenings 
conversing and texting in Saudi and Khalījī. This she does via several Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications, notably Skype, BlackBerry Messenger, and 
Viber, with her girlfriends in Abha (Saudi Arabia) and Doha (Qatar), as well as 
their friends and relatives.  
 In the Fall of 2014, Radya was able to arrange an initial trip to Doha to visit 
her friends there. She returned with stories of what life was like for young 
Muslims “in the real Muslim lands” (dans les vraies terres musulmanes): the 
courtesy of strangers, modesty in the streets, and the ease with which her 
friend’s family hosted her for two months. Now back in Marseille, Radya has 
discontinued her distance learning and given up on her baccalaureate. Based on 
assurances from the well-to-do family in Doha that they can easily find her 
employment in the fashion sector in Doha, Radya bides her time sketching 
designs for modern ‘abāyahs (head-to-toe dresses) and awaiting the day when 
she can leave Marseille to settle “back home” (chez moi), as she refers to Doha. 
Akin to Yang’s (2009) description of online communities as fora allowing the 
Chinese to express and aﬃrm their “utopian impulses” (p. 156), Radya has and 
continues to use VoIP applications as networking devices to further define many 
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of her hunches, whether about Marseille’s depravity or the Arabian Peninsula’s 
paradisiacal oﬀerings for young Muslims. Since her last visit to Doha she has, 
moreover, resolved to use Khalījī in her VoIP correspondence. Learning Khalījī 
constitutes a central piece of preparation before leaving for Doha, and I argue 
that Radya’s formulation of a local Gulf persona for herself is one among several 
measures she is taking to ease her impending resettlement.  
 Figure 5.2 depicts a Messenger conversation between Radya and her friend 
Maha, who is from Abha, Saudi Arabia. In the conversation, Radya and  
Figure 5.2. Radya’s BlackBerry Messenger Conversation with her Saudi Friend Maha 
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Maha resume a previous joke about how Maha is counting on Radya—now the 
recognized world traveler—to reserve her a ticket to Japan. Maha pleads in 
Saudi, “Just don’t let me go back to Saudi Arabia. Reserve for Japan instead.” 
Radya laughs and says “of course” (min ‘uyūnī), using a generic expression that 
literally means ‘from my eyes.’ Maha then sends kisses of appreciation and 
finishes with “bless your eyes” (tuslim ‘uyūnij). Although Maha usually sticks to 
Saudi Arabic, in this instance she opts to address Radya with the Khalījī 
possessive suﬃx -j rather than the Saudi -sh or -s or MSA -k. When I inquired 
with Radya via as to why Maha had chosen the Khalījī rather than the Saudi or 
MSA suﬃx, she laughed and explained in French that Maha has grown 
accustomed to Radya using the Gulf dialect in her speech: “Every time Maha 
uses the Saudi way, I say ‘lol,’ so now she just addresses me using the way I 
prefer.”  In a Whatsapp text to me later that afternoon, Radya clarified in 14
English: “usually in saudia they don’t use ج [j] but she seen that i am speaking 
like this... yeah coz when she use ك [k] i always answer with ههه [hhh] ج [j]!”  
This text conversation is telling because it illustrates how, by 2015, Radya has 
clearly taken to playing the role of a Khalījīyyah (or woman from the Gulf) with 
 “Chaque fois que Maha utilise la façon saoudienne je dis LOL, donc maintenant elle 14
m’addresse de la façon que je préfère.” (5-24-15). 
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her acquaintances, even when they come from elsewhere and are less familiar 
with Khalījī speech. Moreover, unlike the female university students from the 
United Arab Emirates studied by Palfreyman and Khalil (2007), who preferred 
the “common romanized Arabic” orthography in their online conversations, 
Radya and Maha employ the Arabic script to exchange with one another. This 
choice to use the Arabic script, typically associated with Arab culture and the 
history of Islam, harks back to Radya’s intent to speak in varieties, like “pure” 
Algerian or Khalījī (Gulf Arabic), that she believes will align her with the pious 
purity and linguistic past of MSA. In sum, Radya’s VoIP interactions with people 
in the Gulf help her to both, learn varieties like Khalījī, through which she 
presents herself to her acquaintances as a pious person aﬃliated with the 
geographic nucleus of Islam, and set up relationships with people in the region 
who are likely to facilitate her actual departure. 
 Whereas Radya leans on social media to network for her relocation and 
develop the kind of Gulf-based pious persona she imagines for her life in Doha, 
other orthodox young women from Marseille nurture the same dream but 
currently lack the means to undertake their hijrah, or religious emigration. Manal 
was a 24-year old university graduate when I met her in 2013. Born near 
Marseille to two Arab Algerian parents, Manal grew up with little religious 
education. Friends at Marseille’s local university helped her in that regard, and 
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she began practicing and wearing the veil in 2010, later switching to the more 
modest jilbāb. Since her graduation, Manal’s main source of income has been a 
low-paying retail position. She nevertheless holds out for a more prosperous 
future and the means to relocate permanently to Algeria. Though she was not 
born there, she refers to it as “my country” (mon pays) and returns often via the 
ferry between Marseille and Algiers. Manal, like Radya, grew up with both 
French and Algerian spoken in her household. As part of her pious ethic, she, 
too, would like to improve her MSA. For lack of time, however, she instead 
dedicates herself to making her French as polished as possible, with the 
understanding that to speak Standard French and not Marseille’s iconic 
vernacular is yet another way of disaligning with the city. 
 One of the French-language fora she participates in online is a private 
Facebook group for women entitled “Hijrah to Algeria.” There one can listen to 
clips in which religious scholars speak in French about the meaning and 
necessity of conducting hijrah, particularly from European countries, and read 
French-language articles about why a young Muslim woman does not need a 
maḥram, or male escort, in order to conduct hijrah to the Muslim World. French-
born women also contribute posts on a weekly basis dealing with the novelties 
and diﬃculties of creating new lives in Algerian locales. Topics discussed include 
where to send their children to school, best places to grocery shop and get a gym  
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Figure 5.3. “Faith” (Imān) Magazine 
membership, and which religious resources are available. The page also 
addresses more practical concerns, like how to obtain Algerian papers and work 
permits as a French-born person. Manal occasionally reposts interesting articles 
from this forum on her Facebook page, such as the promotion for a magazine 
issue shown in Figure 5.3. Posted in March of 2015, the image depicts the cover 
of an Islamic magazine published in France called “Faith” (Imān). This issue in 
particular features the title “Desire to leave... Special Issue on hijrah” and a 
photo of a Muslim woman beside a suitcase on a desert landscape. Below this, 
the elegantly composed French captions read: “Once upon a time, emigration;” 
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“The reason behind hijrah;”  “Why stay? Why leave?;” “Travelers in this 
lifetime;” “They left;” and “En route to a new life.”    
 These examples of Manal’s engagement with Facebook demonstrate its 
duplex utility for her. On the one hand, her Facebook page serves as a platform 
through which to convey to her friends and acquaintances her plans to relocate 
and, thus, her commitment to this understanding of Islamic piety. On the other, 
Facebook also allows her to tap into online social networks like the Hijra en 
Algérie group and hence glean information about the technicalities involved in 
hijrah. Judging from the posts made by recent emigrants to Algeria and the 
number and specificity of comments that accrue to each post, this Facebook 
group no doubt aids young French Muslim women in working out the details of 
their plans to move to Algeria. Most recently, for example, a “sister” posted 
about her positive experiences newly living in the capital, Algiers. She writes 
that “since I began living in Algeria, I have really advanced in the knowledge of 
our religion. I have started reading and writing the [Modern Standard] Arabic 
language... I have also been able to enroll my children in a private Muslim school 
run by the Saudi Arabian Embassy.”  Several sisters who presumably live in 15
France followed up with her in the comments section, pleading with her to 
 “Depuis que je vis en Algérie, j’ai beaucoup avancé dans l’apprentissage de notre religion, je 15
commence à lire et à écrire la langue Arabe... J’ai d’ailleurs pu scolariser mes enfants dans une 
école privée islamique dirigée par l’ambassade d’Arabie Saoudite d’Algérie.” (11-13-15). 
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provide more information about her children’s school. One wrote: “Salam 
alaykoum (MSA. ‘peace be upon you’) would it be possible for the sister [who 
posted] to contact me min fadlikum (MSA. ‘please’) I have some questions 
concerning the private school.”   16
 The two previous examples showed how among the various channels 
through which Radya and Manal communicate their pious desire to live in the 
Muslim World, social media  proved particularly useful in broadcasting the 
imminence of their departure from Marseille. This final example illustrates the 
use of social media to exhibit young women’s disavowal of Marseille and France, 
much in the same vein as Qailah’s “Mayday!” post. Expressing fatigue and 
disgust with life in Marseille is, in eﬀect, the other side of the coin of departure. 
Thus, in 2012-2013, I met an orthodox young woman named Bushrah who was 
studying for her B.A. in Arabic and Arab civilizations at the local university. 
Then, after leaving Marseille, we became friends on Facebook. I was intrigued by 
the trajectory of one of her posts in particular. In November of 2014, Bushrah 
changed her profile picture to the image depicted in Figure 5.4. The image 
captures a cartoon drawing of a man who, as he steps back with both hands up, 
claims in a mix of French and MSA: “No one loves me. I do not love anyone. Al-
 “Salam alaykoum serait-il possible que la sœur me contacte min fadlikum j’aurai des questions 16
concernant l’école privé” (11-13-15). 
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ḥamdulilleh (thanks be to God).” In choosing this image, along with its 
accompanying text and content, Bushrah conveyed to her Facebook friends a 
strong sense of apathy towards the nature of social relationships in France. 
Initially, her change of picture solicited no replies and only a few “likes” from 
friends. However, when several months later, on January 8th, Bushrah added the 
hash-tags #JeSuisCool (#ImChill) and #TeamJeMenFouDeTout 
(#TeamIDoNotGiveACrapAboutaThing) to her profile picture, friends 
contributed a torrent of comments. January 8th, 2015 was, tellingly, the day after 
the shootings at the Charlie Hebdo Magazine headquarters. 
Figure 5.4. Bushrah’s Profile Picture 
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 Bushrah’s addition of two hash-tags, one claiming that she “is chill” and 
the other that she “does not give a crap,” at this moment of crisis in French 
society eﬀectively transformed her apathetic attitude to a clearly anti-French 
stance, one on a par, for instance, with the pro-Muslim “I am not Charlie Hebdo” 
campaign that circulated on some of my research participants’ Facebook pages in 
the days after the shooting. Contributing to her anti-French stance here, 
additionally, is a voicing contrast Bushrah sets up through a change in linguistic 
footing. The cartoon’s text, on the one hand, alternates between a more 
standard form of written French, which insists on the formal non-contracted 
personne ne m’aime (‘no one loves me’),  and the MSA formula Al-ḥamdulilleh. 17
These linguistic varieties are consistent with the language practices and 
aspirations of Muslim orthodox youth in Marseille, as described in the cases of 
Qailah and Manal. If the text and image represent the voice of the pious French 
Muslim youth, then the hash-tags, by contrast, “style” (Hill, 1999; Cutler, 1999) 
the voice of the non-Muslim French person. What reveals Bushrah’s hash-tags to 
be be an instance of voicing the other is her extra-normative resort to profanity 
(e.g., je m’en fou, ‘I do not give a crap/fuck’),  a language practice otherwise very 18
negatively viewed within her peer group. One of Bushrah’s best girlfriends 
 The more informal counterpart, common in speech, would be personne m’aime, without the 17
negative particle ne. 
 I have kept the mispelling of je m’en fous as is, given its appearance in the hash-tag. 18
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described their group’s avoidance of profane language thus: “One mustn’t say 
bad words or speak loudly in the street. We have to be respectful, say sorry, and 
smile when insulted. One can never be vulgar.”  Bushrah’s deployment of 19
profanity, thus, reveals that she is assuming the voice of the non-Muslim French 
“other,” also indicated by her use of French slang borrowed from English in the 
hash-tags (e.g., cool, team). As Cutler (1999) has proposed in her article on how 
an adolescent white male adopts African American Vernacular features in his 
speech, or Barrett (1999) has described in his article on how African American 
drag queens employ a register of “white women speech” in their performances, 
embedding speech associated with an out-group in one’s own talk can act as a 
metacomment on those who are in fact thought to speak in such a way. Here, 
Bushrah animates the voice of the non-Muslim French youth to cue her skeptical 
stance on the degree of “team commitment” such youth display. Via her 
hashtags, Bushrah suggests that these are the kinds of comments non-Muslim 
French youth make when French Muslim youth face troubles in their midst. Not 
only is she cynically returning the favor of not showing solidarity, but, by using 
their type of speech to do so, she signals that her move to dissociate from the 
 “Il faut pas dire de mots grossiers, ni parler fort dans la rue. On doit être respecteux, dire 19
pardon, sourire quand on nous insulte. Il faut jamais être grossier.” (10-29-12). 
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French victims is an echo of previous moves the French made to disalign with 
her.  
 Some of Bushrah’s friends found this cynicism amusing, as was the case 
of one friend who likened Bushrah’s attitude to that of the Japanese cartoon 
character Calimero: “Mdrrr, #BushryModeCaliméro ACTIVÉE!” (Lol, 
#BushryCalimeroMode ACTIVATED). Calimero is a black chicken who 
complains of being unfairly treated in his family of yellow chickens and hence 
goes about life with a rather negative, defensive outlook. Other friends, by 
contrast, were disappointed by Bushrah’s transition from apathy, as connoted by 
the original image and text, to her outright declaration of disregard for the 
French victims, as purveyed by her hash-tags. One writes “Moi je 
t’aiiiiiime” (‘Me, I loooooove you’); another, “Oui moi aussi je t’aime 
Soumy” (‘Yeah, I love you too Soumy’); then a third young woman named Mimi 
adds a large emoticon with tears running down its face. These three female 
friends seem to be urging Bushrah away from this ideology of piety as disavowal 
of the French and towards a less combative stance vis-à-vis the French. Indeed, 
as I intimated in the introduction, some orthodox-identified youth from 
Marseille were proponents of an ideology of piety requiring aﬃliation with 
Marseille, one that contrasted starkly with the ideology of piety as disavowal 
being incarnated here by Bushrah.  
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 Via these three examples, it becomes apparent that social media provide 
useful spaces, for both, evincing one’s commitment to leave Marseille, as in the 
examples concerning Radya and Manal, or communicating disavowal of France, 
as demonstrated by Bushrah. Because these ideological takes on piety are also 
reflected in the language ideologies held by youth, it becomes of particular 
importance to take these fractally recursive (Irvine & Gal, 2000) ideologies into 
account when interpreting how youth engage with one another through online 
media. Without knowing, for instance, that Radya puts Gulf Arabic on a pedestal 
based on an etymological link she draws between it and MSA, which she 
considers the utmost religious language, her use of Khalījī could not be 
recognized as a display of piety in hopes of relocation. Likewise, in the absence 
of familiarity with the ideology, prevalent in Marseille’s orthodox community, by 
which one’s adherence to standard varieties of French and Arabic is performative 
of piety, Bushrah’s change of footing, from her own voice to styling the other’s 
voice, could not be read as a cynical gesture. 
II. Another Ideology of Piety: Al-Walā‘ and Knotting New Ties to 
Muslim Marseille  
 Karl Polanyi (2011[1944]) coined the term “double movement” (p. 136) 
to describe a social dynamic whereby some part of society acts to weaken the 
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social fabric and then those aﬀected gather and push back to protect themselves. 
Although he used the expression to capture the dehumanizing eﬀects of market 
capitalism on the laborer and the protective measures people developed to check 
those eﬀects, a kind of protective countermovement nevertheless appears to be 
afoot within Marseille’s community of faithful youth. Above, I hinted at the 
significance of how friends commented on Bushrah’s post in ways that 
challenged her stance of apathy and disavowal. Indeed, the majority of the 
orthodox youth I encountered while in Marseille did not consider that piety was 
best exemplified through actions showing al-Barā‘, or disavowal of Marseille’s 
non-Muslimness. Rather, the majority deemed dreams like Qailah’s or Radya’s, 
to forsake ties to hometown and nation and pursue an unencumbered Islamic 
life in the Muslim World, unnecessary and, in their penchant towards 
individualism, not truly of service to the Islamic Ummah. According to the youth 
presented in this latter part of the chapter, piety was instead a function of 
whether they contributed to the well-being of the Muslim community in 
Marseille. Specifically, their ideology of piety emphasized al-Walā‘, or Islamic 
solidarity, in the form of Islamic social activism conducted on local Muslims’ 
behalf. In order to understand the means and ends associated with this 
interpretation of piety, I consider a narrative by a young teacher named Saleh. In 
his historical narrative, Saleh informs me of how French colonialism 
!205
incapacitated religious education in Algeria and, with it, people’s ability to be 
pious Muslims. His solution, however, lies not in disavowing the French. Rather, 
he discloses a plan for fostering Islamic education and, through it, the quotient 
of Islamic piety within France. In the final section, I discuss examples of how 
this concept of piety involves a “move towards” Muslims within Marseille. I 
argue, furthermore, that pious behaviors of this sort illustrate, first, a 
commitment to an unrecognized school of thought (madhhab) within Islam that 
the late Shahab Ahmed (2016) called the “madhhab of Love” (p. 41), and second, 
what Ghazzal Hage (2005) has termed “existential mobility” (p. 470).   
 On a Tuesday afternoon after teaching at a private Muslim secondary 
school in Northern Marseille, I happened to catch the same train to nearby Aix-
en-Provence as Saleh, the 28-year old history and Islamic civilization teacher at 
the same school. Saleh lives in Aix but was born in Istres, a small city about 50 
kms northwest of Marseille, to Kabyle parents who had immigrated there from 
Tizi Ouzou, Algeria. He grew up in a family that was only nominally Muslim, or 
only practiced “the big three,” meaning no pork, no alcohol, and the Ramadan 
fast. Living in a small city, Saleh had few opportunities to meet Muslims until he 
went to high school. There, he made friends with other North Africans who 
frequented the one prayer room in Istres and began to learn about what it meant 
to be a practicing Muslim. More than a decade later, Saleh is now married with 
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two children, a highly committed Muslim, and a teacher for Marseille’s only 
private Islamic secondary school.  
 We chatted on the train about the course his life had taken and how it 
diﬀered from those of many second-generation teens living in Marseille today. 
Saleh calmly critiqued how such youth “refer themselves to their national 
identity—Comorian, Algerian, Tunisian—without knowing exactly what it is... 
It’s superficial. They don’t have a veritable identity, especially because they’re 
detached from their country of origin.” A younger Saleh would also have said he 
was Kabyle, the tendency being to claim one’s parents’ identity in the diaspora, 
he explains. Curious what his current preference was, I asked “Kabyle rather 
than...French?” To which he responded, “My-my uncle died so uh you can’t say 
‘I’m French,’ not even as a child could I say that. Not even today, though that 
has to do with something else, not with the war in Algeria. The [Kabyle] 
identity now has little to do with me, but when I was little it did.” Saleh’s uncle 
was a martyr in the Algerian War for independence from the French 
(1954-1962), and as young man he identified as Kabyle rather than French in 
part due to this painful family history. I was curious about this “something else” 
that prevented him from feeling French today as well. So I wondered aloud “and 
now you feel a little...?”, to which Saleh said promptly in MSA, “Muslim, Muslim, 
khalaṣ” (Muslim, Muslim, that’s it). Today, Saleh’s kinship loyalties are primarily 
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to other “brothers” and “sisters” in the Muslim Ummah, both past and present. 
This loyalty to Muslims, says Saleh, is something he exercises mainly in the 
realm of education. Éducation, he reminds me, is in fact the means through 
which to arrive at “the veritable understanding of Islam.” Saleh goes on to 
explain the rigorous process of self-edification he went through in becoming a 
practicing Muslim: “One has to make the eﬀort to understand, to learn. That is 
what Islam is about. Lazy people aren’t tolerated! I didn’t know anything, 
anything, anything! But now I understand.” The eﬀorts Saleh made to educate 
himself in certain Islamic subjects and languages were only the means to his 
piety. The ends of his auto-didactic penchant, specifically, were to educate 
himself as a Muslim in order to then be able to pass this knowledge on to his 
students. In other words, piety for Saleh lay in the commitment he could show 
to Marseille’s Muslim community through his educational talent.   
 Aside from learning about Koran and the other subjects of Islamic 
knowledge, Saleh was also working to spruce up his French and learn MSA. 
Speaking about the importance of improving one’s French, Saleh remarked on 
how the French language can also be a vehicle for Islamic piety: “The Muslim 
who comes [to Marseille] must speak French correctly, because the Muslim is 
aiming for perfection; plus, it’s a beautiful language, so to speak vulgarly, well...” 
Then Saleh cautions that the utmost vehicle for conveying piety is, of course, 
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MSA: “it is the language that permits access to a truth—to the truth.” He delights 
in the fact that the school’s director, who is also the in-house Imām, gives his 
Friday prayer message (khuṭbah) in MSA, and he uses the opportunity to jot 
down new vocabulary and try out his listening comprehension. Despite his 
individual study of the language, Saleh nevertheless pronounces himself 
“psychologically unable” to converse in MSA with the more educated Muslims 
around him at the school. He feels as though making mistakes when speaking 
would be akin to “making mistakes in the religion.”  
 The significance placed on perfecting one’s French and MSA, and 
minimizing one’s use of Marseille’s vernacular and regional varieties of Arabic 
(e.g., Algerian, Tunisian), derives from the potential these languages—in their 
“perfected” state—hold for strengthening the Muslim community. MSA, in 
particular, does not simply enable comprehension of Islam’s sacred texts. Rather, 
says Saleh, when French Muslims harbor knowledge of MSA it safeguards them 
against possible cultural and religious incursions against them by the French, 
who might otherwise seek to divest them of their community’s strength. Saleh 
details his understanding of MSA as a tool for resisting oppression and, by the 
same token, building Islamic solidarity, in the narrative below. While still on the 
train, I asked Saleh about which Arabic he was studying in his free time. He 
replied: 
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“Fuṣḥā [MSA]. Yes the-for me dialect is one-are the languages that were developed 
and accompanied by uh the colonizers to divide a world that was unified as its 
origin... They destroyed the Koranic schools teaching the [Standard] Arabic 
language, the universities, the elites, because that’s how it was done... It’s through 
force, that’s how it’s always been in order to destroy the elites... During French 
colonization for example the first thing that they organized was the destruction of 
the madrasahs, of the Koranic schools, and to bar Algerians from educating 
themselves... First consequence? Ignorance, diﬀusion of ignorance. Second 
consequence? Diﬀusion of-well, development of dialects... And not just that, 
because if there’s something well known it’s that the elimination of elites who 
mastered this [Standard Arabic] language and who taught it, whether among 
women or men, scholars or intellectuals... If there is something well understood in 
history it’s that even a majority of the people who dominated during the 19th and 
20th centuries used this procedure to avoid-because it’s always the elite bourgeoisie 
who carry out the revolts, who spearhead the resistance, etcetera... That’s why we 
had to wait 50 years in Algeria to see the-to start down the path of resurrection.”  20
By Saleh’s account, the ignorance and social fragmentation sewn by the 
French became possible only once they prevented Muslims from accessing 
Islamic and MSA-medium education. As an educator and parent of young 
Muslims living in France today, Saleh feels he and other Muslim educators 
have the responsibility to ensure that youth who belong to the diasporan 
Sunni community in Marseille never face that sort of crisis in their 
 “Fushaa, oua le-pour moi le dialectale c’est un, c'est des langues qui ont été développées et 20
accompagnées par, euh, les colonisateurs pour diviser un monde uni à l’origine. En détruisant les 
écoles coraniques de langue arabe, les universités, les élites, parce que ça s'est fait comme ça (C: 
hmm). C’est la voie de la force. Ça a toujours été comme ça: détruire les élites. Pendant la 
colonisation française, par exemple, première chose que-qu’ils ont organisée c’est la destruction 
des madrassas, des écoles coraniques et d’interdire l'éducation aux Algériens. Première 
conséquence? L’ignorance, diﬀusion de l’ignorance. Deuxième conséquence? Diﬀusion des-fin 
développement des dialectes, dialectes aujourd’hui... Parce que il y a quelque chose qui est 
connu, c’est l'élimination des élites qui maîtrisaient ces-ce langage et qui l'enseignaient (C: oui) 
que ça soit parmi les femmes, ou les hommes, euh les savants, ou les intellectuels… Voilà, c’est- 
c'est quelque chose qui est connu en histoire. Même la plupart des gens qui ont dominé au 19ème 
20ème siècle utilisaient ce procédé, hein, pour éviter-parce que c’est toujours la bourgeoisie, 
l’élite qui mène les révoltes, qui mène la résistance, etc. Une fois que tu as plus ces gens là, c’est 
bon. C’est pour ça qu’il faillait attendre jusqu'à 50 ans en Algérie pour voir les-aller vers une 
résurrection (Yamin, 4.3.13). 
!210
education, and their faith, again. He imagines himself and other young adult 
Muslims carrying forth a historic mandate, passed to them by martyrs like 
his uncle and a generation of war-time Algerian militants for Islam and 
independence: to continue educating children in MSA and their faith at all 
costs. Only thus, he thinks, will young French Muslims retain a measure of 
intellectual and religious independence amidst mainstream French society. 
In the following paragraphs, I delve briefly into the lives and philosophies of 
piety of a handful of Islamic reformers who resisted European colonialism. 
This historical detour serves to demonstrate the measure of interdiscursivity 
between Saleh’s conceptualization of piety and that evidenced in writings by 
these Islamic reformers. It becomes apparent that Saleh’s vision of piety, as 
resting on Muslims’ eﬀorts to edify themselves and fortify their community, 
gathers inspiration from the modernist and militantly community-oriented 
ideology of piety espoused by these Islamic reformers.  
 Many historical figures, Algerian and otherwise, participated in 
identifying Islamic edification and MSA as the twin pillars of—what Saleh 
terms above—“the path to resurrection” for Muslims under colonial rule. 
These ideas germinated in earnest much earlier, however, namely during the 
Ottoman Empire. Indeed, in the first half of the 19th century a group of 
oﬃcials, oﬃcers, and teachers began organizing across the East (e.g., 
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present-day Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt) to create Islamic reform within 
the Ottoman Empire (Hourani, 1962). The Egyptian Rifā’a al-Ṭaḥtāwī and 
the Caucasus-born Khayr al-Dīn laid down a modernization program 
according to which the future of the Islamic Ummah lay in Muslims’ ability to 
study the modern world, reinterpret Sharia in light of it, and emulate 
Europe’s justice-based political governance, its free media, and its education 
system (ibid.). Many living in the Fertile Crescent at the time perceived a 
failure on the part of (Classical) Arabic to participate in these modernizing 
tendencies. Thus, in 1836, al-Ṭaḥtāwī opened a School of Languages in Cairo 
with the mission of translating European documents into Arabic and 
training oﬃcials and translators in the expanding language (Holes, 2004). In 
1919, the new Damascus Academy was tasked with rendering Arabic capable 
of expressing modern ideas while retaining its purity (ibid.).   
 A diﬀering and slightly later generation of Islamic reformers, including 
the Persian Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, the Egyptian Muḥammad ‘Abduḥ, his 
Lebanese student Amīr Shakīb Arslān, and the Syrian Rashīd Riḍā, among 
others, continued to call for reform within Islam but likewise militated for 
pan-Islamic unity in the face of an encroaching Europe. With WWI 
impending, these thinkers endorsed solidarity in the Ummah as the means of 
fending oﬀ European colonization and restoring Islamic civilization 
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(Hourani, 1962). According to Riḍā in 1922, the Ummah’s natural bond 
inhered in MSA, the only adhesive strong enough to unite Muslims across 
interpretations and cultural diﬀerences (Holes, 2004). Perhaps no figure was 
as complex and influential in the first half of the 20th century, however, as 
Shakīb Arslān, whose translated French writings were widely circulated and 
positions often cited within conversations between Muslim orthodox youth. 
 From an educated Druze family with noble bloodlines, Arslān could be 
described as an aspiring Ottoman diplomat who, upon the Ottoman 
Empire’s collapse, riveted his considerable energies on fighting European 
colonialism through print and his networking abilities. His pro-Ottoman 
loyalties during WWI led to his branding as a dangerous troublemaker by 
the French and to his eventual exile to Berlin (Cleveland, 1985). From there, 
he financed MSA-medium political journals and wrote about the Ummah’s 
degeneration at the hands of European colonial powers (Arslān, 2008 
[1939]). He likewise became an itinerant intellectual, traveling often to 
advise elite Muslim circles across the Eastern and Western Arab world (or 
Mashriq and Maghrib) in the ideology of pan-Islamism and resistance tactics, 
and recruiting writers to his publications. His eﬀorts to unite the Mashriq 
and Maghrib and active mentorship to younger resistance thinkers in 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia during the interwar years brought his 
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contemporaries to salute him as a “sincere militant” (Riḍā’s preface, Arslān, 
2008 [1939], p. 11). His biographer likewise pens that Arslān both believed 
in and himself embodied a “modern jihād ethic” (Cleveland, 1985, p. 119). 
Arslān earned his other moniker, “the prince of eloquence” (amīr al-bayān), 
thanks to his skill in MSA and rhetoric (Cleveland, 1985, p. 84). When 
during the 1930s, for instance, the Salafiyyah Association of Algerian 
‘Ulamā‘ (Islamic jurists) needed to navigate between their program for MSA-
medium progressive Koranic schools and placating the French, it was Arslān 
they called upon to temper their monolingual MSA approach with the 
requisite French political strategizing (ibid.).   21
 To return to Saleh’s narration, historical inquiry confirms that the 
French dispossessed Algeria’s religious establishment and urban elites, even 
as early as the 1840s, by dismantling MSA-medium education (Cleveland, 
1985). In turn, across both the Mashriq and Maghrib intellectuals like Arslān 
and his predecessors sought to regain political power and Islamic unity by 
reclaiming MSA as their vehicle of edification. MSA also served reformers 
like Arslān as a tool for communicating political rhetoric, organizing, and 
laying the foundations for the Ummah’s pan-Islamic future. The pious ethic 
 MSA-medium schools with a similar quest for Islamic revival, called “free schools,” were also 21
run by the Salafiyya during the Moroccan Protectorate (c.f., Halstead, 1967). 
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these reformers embodied, and which Saleh evidently admires, is one whose 
principal goal was to bolster the Ummah. Underpinning their piety, in other 
words, were political and community commitments in addition to 
individualized religious goals. As apparent from the emphasis in Saleh’s 
narrative on keeping Muslims together, the Ummah is evidently a key 
reference for him. Euben (2013) labels this sort of social commitment, 
which has moral entities rather than the nation-state as a significant frame 
of reference, “Muslim cosmopolitics” (p. 298). Indeed, both Islamic 
modernists and Saleh incarnated a measure of openness to the world’s 
resources as they sought solutions to bolster the Ummah. In sum, the 
ideology of piety spearheaded by modernist Islamic reformers, which was 
equal parts moral, political, and communitarian, finds a foothold among 
orthodox youth like Saleh as they use education to militate on behalf of the 
Muslim community.  
Practices of Piety: Illustrations of Al-Walā‘ 
 In this final section, I furnish examples of how the concept of piety as a 
“movement towards” local representatives of the Muslim Ummah in fact 
materializes in the lives of several individuals. Above, I discussed how speaking 
MSA and Standard French was considered a form of pious behavior due to these 
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languages’ centrality to keeping the Muslim community strong. Here, I give a 
handful of examples of how young Muslims turn to these languages to perform 
piety. Via an example of how a young woman named Halima uses highly 
standard French, I also demonstrate how youth who ascribe to an ideology of 
piety as edification may be drawn to edifying themselves in quite French subject 
matters, displaying a “movement towards” non-Muslims as well as Muslims. 
Lastly, I present social media instances in which youth visually promoted the 
Islamic community-based ideals of love, solidarity, and militantism.  
 As laid out by Saleh, learning and speaking MSA plays a key role in 
nurturing intellectual and religious community and is a central component of 
behaving piously. It is in this spirit that several of Saleh’s colleagues at the 
private Muslim secondary school practice MSA with their young children on a 
daily basis. One of the mosque coordinators, Ghazzal, for instance, decided that 
he would always address his children in MSA, while his wife would speak to 
them in Algerian (he only asks that they respond in MSA while at the dinner 
table, however). Ghazzal, who is Algerian-born, emphasizes that fluency in MSA 
will not only enable them to understand Koran and their Islamic studies classes 
but will also allow his children to be comfortable “in any Arab 
country” (5.14.13).  The school director, Anwar, who also serves as Imām, and 22
 (MSA. fī aī makān fī al-duwal al-‘arabiyyah) ةّيبرعلا لودلا يف ناكم ّيأ يف22
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his wife Hanan instigated a similar linguistic policy in their household. 
According to Hanan, the policy was “Anwar: MSA (arabe littéraire), me: French.” 
Because Hanan was born and raised in Alsace-Lorraine within a Tunisian family 
and Anwar was born and schooled near Tunis, then obtained his doctorate in 
mathematics from a university in Nice, both parents had the linguistic skills 
necessary for educating their children in highly standard versions of French and 
Arabic. Akin to the sentiment in Saleh’s narrative, their decision to use these 
languages in the home was specifically motivated by a desire to endow their four 
children with the educational and linguistic resources to stand on their own two 
feet as young Muslims in France. Hanan spelled out her and Anwar’s thinking 
process for me:  
“We told ourselves, we both have the capacity. Let’s play the game. And we also  
harbored that little bit of resentment, hmm, militant at the beginning. So the language 
of this country [France] and then there was the language of the Koran, which is 
important.”   23
Tellingly, even as Hanan reveals her and her husband’s resentment of the 
French, she nevertheless concludes that utter mastery of the French language 
will protect her family and assure their position while living in France. Her 
husband, too, finds French useful for Muslims. Referencing the linguistic policy 
Hanan set up for the household, Anwar admitted to certain lapses in his MSA-
 “Comme on s’est dit on a la capacité tout les deux, on joue le jeu. Puis on avait un petit peu ce 23
côté revendicateur, hein, au début militant revendicatif. Donc la langue, euh, de ce pays et il y 
avait la langue du Coran. Elle est importante” (Hanan, 4.16.3). 
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only role. In fact, he emphasized that he more often speaks in ‘MSA-ified 
French’ with his children than MSA.  Hanan then oﬀered an example of what 24
this MSA-like French, or Standard French with an Islamic tenor, resembled. She 
related how when their infant son arrived at French nursery school: 
“He didn’t know how to say ‘I have to go pee-pee.’ He would say ‘I would like to use the 
bathroom’ while his classmates would say ‘I have to go pee-pee.’ He would ask me, ‘What 
does pee-pee mean?’...I told him ‘Pee-pee means go to the bathroom.’ He didn’t dare say 
it.”   25
The aspiration to outfit oneself and one’s children with the language form 
acknowledged to be the most perfect, whether in Arabic or in French, is closely 
tied to the ideal of performing piety through edification, as prefaced in Saleh’s 
contributions. The more eloquence or balāghah one displays linguistically, 
whether in MSA or in French, the greater commitment one demonstrates to, on 
the one hand, strengthening the educational level of the Muslim community in 
France, and on the other, heightening their status in the eyes of the French. 
 The experience of Halima, a young woman raised in an Arab Algerian 
family in Northern Marseille, adds further reinforcement to the idea that 
Muslims living in Marseille use French to perform piety within their community 
but also to perform their educational level to others. Though Halima has not 
 (MSA. afḍal an yatakallam al-nas al-lughah al-‘arabiyya al-fuṣḥā lākin anā la atakallam al-‘arabiyya al-24
fuṣḥā bal al-franciyyah al-fuṣḥā fī l-bayt) ىحصفلا ةّيبرعلا مّلكتأ لا انأ نكل ىحصفلا ةّيبرعلا ةغللا سانلا مّلكتي نأ لضفأ 
تيبلا يف ىحصفلا ةّيسنرفلا لب
 “Il ne savait pas comment dire ‘j'ai envie de faire pipi.” Il disait ‘j'ai envie d'aller aux toilettes.’ 25
Ses camarades disaient ‘je veux faire pipi.’ Il me disait ‘ça veut dire quoi pipi?’... Je lui dit ‘pipi ça 
veut dire aller aux toilettes.’ Il osait pas le dire” (Hanan, 4.16.3). 
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learned MSA to her satisfaction, she comments on how French can convey piety 
to Muslims as well as expressive brio to the French:  
“I have made it a matter of personal pride (un point d’honneur) to speak [French] as 
correctly as possible, with people in my community as well as people outside. And maybe 
even I am more careful, and this is a fault of mine I am trying to correct, maybe I am more 
careful with people outside my community because I always see myself mirrored in others’ 
eyes. I see myself as the veiled woman who doesn’t know how to express herself, etcetera. 
So it’s my special pleasure to show them that, in fact, no! ((laughing)) It’s horrible. Still, 
they react with a ‘hmm, how about that.’ Well, it’s not like my language is extraordinary 
but even just speaking without an accent can be surprising.”   26
Indeed, Halima often doted, if modestly, on her linguistic transformation from a 
child with a Marseillais accent to an “accent-less” Muslim adult. Having grown 
up in the projects raised by a Marseille-born gardener (whose parents were 
Algerian) and an Algerian-born seamstress, Halima smiles to remember the 
Marseillais working-class accent she inherited from her parents. Over a staﬀ 
coﬀee break she recounted, for instance, what her French sounded like as an 8 or 
9-year old on family videos. “Maman [maməŋ], Amina a laissé ses chaussettes [ʃɔsεtə] 
dans la salle [salə] de bains [baŋŋə]!” (mom, Amina left her socks in the 
bathroom!).”  Halima says she replaced this “strong accent” with a French 27
approximating the Standard when she began practicing Islam in her late teens 
 “Je mets un point d’honneur à parler le plus correctement possible, autant avec les gens de ma 26
communauté qu’avec l’extérieur. Parce que j’ai toujours, euh, le miroir dans les yeux de l’autre. 
Je me vois comme la femme voilée qui sait pas s’éxprimer, etc., donc je prends un plaisir en fait 
leur demontrer qu’en fait non! C’est horrible. Mais c’est vrai qu’ils se disent quand même ‘oh 
tiens.’ Bon, c’est pas extraordinaire comme langage mais voilà, rien que de parler sans accent 
c’est, des fois c’est surprenant” (Halima, 6.19.13). 
 Note that syllable-final schwa, post-velar nasal, and the realization of Standard French /o/ as 27
[ɔ] are stereotypically associated with the way that working-class people speak in Marseille. 
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and was regularly attending the local university’s classes in biology. “Now it’s 
true that people think I am from Paris...I go into a store in Marseille and people 
say ‘you must be coming through on your way to Paris’!”  
 Halima’s desire to speak French eloquently was made ever keener by her 
experience working at the same Muslim private school as Saleh, where she 
began managing accounting after finishing her bachelor’s degree. She and her 
23-year old male colleague Fawzi described to me how, if one sought a more 
immediate role model than the Prophet himself to emulate linguistically, the 
school was rich in Muslim examples of piety. Fawzi gushed that Anwar the 
director, for instance:  
 “So, he uses a [French] language that is mostly sophisticated, very, very, more-never 
mundane. Utterly sophisticated. Very, very, very, uh, simple to understand and very 
pleasant to the ear (…). When it’s [Modern Standard] Arabic it’s, it’s (I don’t understand 
entirely, but) it’s, it’s a symphony! My father, who speaks MSA very well, says he [Anwar] 
has a magnificent Arabic. He has a subtle kind of [Modern Standard] Arabic.”   28
Perhaps inspired by these local examples, Halima now says she actively pursues 
“elevated language, eloquence, and a broader vocabulary” in French via a 
number of media. In addition to reading poetry and watching speech eloquence 
competitions (concours d’éloquence) on the Internet, she bashfully admits to 
watching the 2005 film Pride and Prejudice (based on the Jane Austen novel) “on 
 “Alors, il utilise un langage souvent soutenu, très, très, plus-jamais courant, jamais. Souvent 28
soutenu. Très, très, très euh simple à comprendre, et très sympathique à entendre. (…) Quand 
c’est de l’arabe c’est, c’est (je ne comprends pas entièrement) mais c’est, c’est une symphonie! 
Mon père, qui parle très bien l’arabe, il dit qu’il [Anwar] a un arabe magnifique. Il a un arabe 
subtil” (Fawzi, 12.13.12). 
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loop.” The film, which she watches dubbed in French with English subtitles, 
stands alone in her mind as the prime example of French linguistic elegance, not 
to mention behavioral and sartorial modesty (pudeur). Indeed, her frequent 
citation of one of the more intricate French lines from the film, “Père, n’avez-vous 
d’autre objection que la conviction de mon indiﬀérence?” (Father, have you no other 
objection than your belief in my indiﬀerence?), led me to teasingly call Halima 
“Lizzy” around school in deference to the film’s heroine and author of the above 
line, Elizabeth Bennett. Her fascination with the film rested on both linguistic 
and romantic parallels Halima found between Victorian-era romantic 
relationships and Muslim courtship. In the film, estimated Halima, “Things 
proceed as slowly as possible; a touch of the [lover’s] hand is no less than 
electric... It’s the Muslim relationship par excellence! The only kiss in my book is 
the kiss on the hand.” Not surprisingly, she was particularly drawn to the film 
while she was going through her fiançailles (engagement) to her now-husband, 
posting several images of Elizabeth Bennett to her Facebook page (c.f., Figure 
5.5). Although her then-fiancé did not, according to Halima, share in her 
preference for the film, he did grant her that “Islam teaches modesty” to all its 
followers. 
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 Figure 5.5. Halima’s Facebook Profile Picture of Elizabeth Bennett from Pride and Prejudice 
 Halima also spoke of further parallels she found, interestingly, between 
Jane Austen and the 11th century Andalusian Muslim philosopher Ibn Ḥazm. His 
Neoplatonic writings on love, which she consulted in a French translation of The 
Ring of the Dove: A Treatise on the Art and Practice of Arab Love (1953), focused on 
spiritual kinship and its basis in people’s sensory (e.g., visual, aural) recognition 
of beauty in one another’s appearance or comportment. Basing herself on Ibn 
Ḥazm, Halima often deliberated on contemporary Muslims’ need to do away 
with the taboo surrounding love and passion in Islam. As long as love transpires 
in the elegant, delicately scripted ways typical of Jane Austen’s novels, she 
maintained, love is nothing if not an example of the Islamic injunction to 
perfection, edification, and modesty. It occurs to me that Halima’s willingness to 
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draw connections between pieces of Western popular culture in French and 
guidelines to Islamic piety shows an openness to finding a pious lifestyle within 
France. Her focus on love as a religious virtue, moreover, echoes comments by 
Ahmed (2016) to the eﬀect that it is love that seals Muslim’s shared identity 
within the Ummah. He bases this conclusion on a body of literature he argues 
counts as evidence for the existence of an as yet unorthodox “madhhab (school of 
Islamic law) of love” (p. 41). Given the calls to Islamic solidarity within this 
local culture of orthodoxy, it appears likely that virtues of love and activism may 
contribute equally to this local ethic of piety as “association” or al-Walā‘.  
 Where local Muslims’ relationships to non-Muslims in Marseille are 
concerned, many of the comments above describe, perhaps not kinship or a 
movement towards non-Muslims, but a gentle engagement with them. I am 
reminded of an outing with a group of young orthodox “sisters” (sœurs) on a 
rainy day. As we were going down the escalator into the Metro, a young man 
going up opposite us said “How go the umbrellas? (ça va les parapluies?) in 
reference to how the girls looked in their long wet dresses. I recall being 
surprised when one young woman in the group, Amina, gave him a shy smile, 
and then turned to us and whispered, “Isn’t it so much better to return an insult  
with a smile?” According to these and other orthodox youth who wish to stay in 
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Figure 5.6. Mimi’s New Picture: “Allah is gentle” 
Marseille despite similar bouts of being alienated, politeness and kindness are 
the hallmarks of l’éducation, or being educated, and count as part of one’s pious 
contribution to the community. When one is nice to others outside the 
community, Amina says, then the community’s image improves and this results 
in non-Muslims being nicer to Muslims in turn. In  this spirit, Miriam, who goes 
by “Mimi” among her friends, a nickname but also a pun on the French slang for 
“cute” (mimi), often posts reminders to her Facebook page that Allah prefers 
gentleness and good manners. Figure 5.6, for instance, reads “The Prophet, 
peace be upon him, said: ‘Allah is gentle, and he loves softness in all things.’”  
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Figure 5.7. Militant for the Islamic Community 
 Besides showing love to the Muslim community by being polite to Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike, an important part of building up the Muslim community 
also lies in being militant for the right causes. In the following three images  
from Facebook, Halima and Miriam (“Mimi”) communicate militant feelings on 
behalf of the Ummah, and hence display piety. In Figure 7, for instance, Halima 
emphasizes diﬀerences between what Islamic militancy means within  
Marseille’s Muslim community and from without. Several images represent 
what certain people think a Muslim “community militant” (militant associatif)  
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does with their time. The translation of the image captions reads: What I think I 
do; What my father thinks I do; What the State thinks I do; What Muslim 
brothers think I do; What I really do: “Come on people, no one came to the  
meeting!!! It’s the third time we’re rescheduling it!!! We have to find another 
date!” Muslim community organizing, as Halima well knows from her work at 
the Muslim school, is quite mundane and mostly revolves around getting 
participating members to come to meetings. 
Figure 5.8. Palestinian Woman Wearing Kufiyyah Slings Rocks in Gaza  
 In another Facebook profile picture (c.f., Figure 5.8), Halima turns her 
militant sentiments to issues abroad that negatively aﬀect the global Ummah, like 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Figure 5.9, by contrast, shows an image and story 
reposted by Mimi entitled “In the skin of a thug.” Accompanying the image of a 
Muslim woman unwaveringly pictured behind a gun barrel is a story telling of 
how this woman, who is in fact a French convert to Islam, realized the hurtful 
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ways the French act towards Muslims only once she became a Muslim herself. In 
this instance, Mimi circulates militant imagery to alert her Facebook friends to 
the ills experienced by Muslims in France.  
Figure 5.9. Mimi’s Status Post: “In the Skin of a Thug” 
 This section documented ways in which orthodox youth who plan to stay 
in Marseille take it upon themselves to change the city from the inside-out. As 
Hanan mentioned in describing her household language policies, there are 
myriad channels that Muslims in France can use, both to improve their own 
community and lodge complaints about French non-Muslims. Not all of these 
channels are typically “Islamic,” however, as Halima’s recontextualization of 
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Pride and Prejudice  in terms of Islamic virtues demonstrated. Rather, these 
channels—edification, MSA, Standard French, teaching, politeness, militant 
social activism—are lent an allure of piety insofar as they represent means to the 
broader end of reinforcing ties within the Muslim community in Marseille.  
III. Concluding Remarks: Two Double-Movements 
 This chapter has examined the role of discourse and practices, both in 
personal interactions and via social media, in shaping two iterations of the 
particular figure of personhood I subsume under the rubric of the Islamic 
militant youth from Marseille. The contrastive accounts of piety given in the first 
versus the second section reveal this figure of personhood to be neither singular 
nor unchanging. Rather, youth’s practices and discourses point to increasingly 
divergent definitions of what constitutes pious behavior. Despite orthodox youth 
sharing in the sort of prejudice they face in Marseille, they have found diﬀering 
ways of both understanding and addressing the resulting experience of 
alienation from their hometown.  
 Gender, in particular, appears to have played a distinct role in the 
development of an understanding of piety as requiring relocation. Pious young 
women are more likely to struggle to visibly fit into their surroundings and to be 
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excluded from French institutions, like secondary schools, that have a direct 
bearing on their ability to later integrate the French workforce. Imagining a 
future for oneself in a country where one does not meet the job market’s 
barriers to entry is a daunting task indeed. Radya, for example, was unable to 
find an alternative to French school and thus found herself alone in her 
apartment year-round at 17. The prospect of moving forward again as she learns 
about Doha and prepares a life there has been a source of great excitement for 
her. In a Skype conversation at the close of 2014, for instance, Radya articulated 
her enthusiasm at finding a new home, whether in London or Doha, with 
obvious emotion: “Let me tell you something. I hope, well, I hope to be stable. 
And I’ll be stable in whatever it will be, in one of these places, and I would be 
very very very happy if you would come visit.”   29
 I find that Hage’s (2005) remarks on types of mobility capture the 
dynamics of young orthodox women in a particularly elegant and concise way. 
Hage explains what he calls “existential mobility” (p. 470) as the shared human 
desire to feel like we are “going places” in our lives. He writes, moreover, that 
“migratory physical mobility is only contemplated when people experience a 
crisis in their sense of existential mobility” (p. 471). As such, the young female 
 “Je vais te dire une chose. J'éspère, fin, j'éspère être stable... Et je serai stable dans quoique ça 29
soit, dans un de ces endroits... Je serais très très très contente que tu viennes là-bas.” (12-31-14)
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proponents of hijrah that I have presented can be said to be experiencing a crisis 
in their existential mobility that, at least to them, appears to have few exit 
routes. This crisis renders a dissociative practice of piety more appealing and 
leads, ultimately, to their relocation. In the interim, however, which is to say 
between the moment when youth feel irreversibly alienated and when they 
actually depart Marseille, online media play a vital role for them in at least two 
ways. First, networking via online media was shown to help young women lay 
the social groundwork to facilitate their relocation. This was the case for Radya 
as she went about getting to know people and seeking jobs in the Arabian 
Peninsula through Skype and VoIP applications, as it was also the case for Manal 
and the other subscribers to the Facebook group “Hijrah to Algeria,” who scoped 
out pleasant Algerian cities or good schools for their children through contacts 
made online.  
 A second advantage of young women’s activity online was that it enabled 
them to enjoy a modicum of “existential mobility” (in Hage’s terms above) 
while still in Marseille. As Qailah disseminated her desire to move to friends on 
Facebook or Radya chatted about the Gulf with her friends in Doha through 
BlackBerry Messenger, these young women were able to feel as though they 
were in the throes of planning to leave Marseille. Such exchanges granted them 
the sense that they were moving forward, conducting a virtual hijrah, as it were, 
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even as they continued living in Marseille’s housing projects. One sister spoke to 
the mental importance of this planning phase for French women conducting 
hijrah in a follow-up post to the status post by Qailah analyzed in the first 
section of the chapter. This woman urged her fellow French sisters to start 
planning: “A piece of advice for all of you: make a project, get organized, and 
prepare your departure. (...) I am myself ethnically French, but believe me, this 
country is no longer mine, and of this I am reminded every day by the French 
themselves. So come up with some plans. If your intention is in keeping with 
Allah, Allah will ease your hijra...”  This young woman’s comments about 30
feeling disoriented within France despite her Frenchness connect to one of the 
larger points made in this chapter. It emerges from the young women’s stories I 
have presented that the ongoing apprehensions the French exhibit towards 
French Muslims, and especially young orthodox women, have deleterious eﬀects 
on their ability to imagine futures for themselves in their French places of 
origin. As apparent from these young women’s discourses on piety, their online 
practices, and their multilingual use of language, home has in eﬀect become a 
moving target for them. 
 “Un conseil pour tous: faites un projet, organisez vous, et préparez le départ... Je suis moi-30
même française de souche, et croyez moi ce pays n’ai [sic] plus le mien, et ça c’est les français 
eux-mêmes qui nous le font comprendre chaque jour. Alors donnez-vous des objectifs, et si votre 
intention est pour Allah, Allah vous facilitera votre hijra...”. (1-24-2014). 
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 Perhaps another factor shaping youth’s attraction to diﬀerent poles of 
Islamic thought on piety, whether Wahhabi Salafism or Islamic reformism, are 
the peer groups in which they participate or the adults with whom they interact, 
including parents, religious teachers, other role models, or indeed, the websites 
they frequent. Saleh, for instance, looked to the model of piety performed in 
front of him on a daily basis by Anwar, who was both the Imām of the mosque he 
attends and the director of his school and supervisor for his teaching. A mix of 
factors seems contributes to whether youth lean in one or another direction on 
what constitutes piety. 
 It also appears to be the case that, for the youth who came to view piety in 
associative terms, as a movement towards Marseille’s Muslim community, this 
in turns eased their feelings of alienation. Halima’s willingness to engage with 
myriad facets of French life certainly paved the way to lighter social relations 
with French non-Muslims and Marseillais, even if her practice of reading Islamic 
piety into French popular culture or sewing politeness in her public interactions 
represented a way to turn France into a more pleasant place for herself and her 
community. I believe that Halima’s kind of outlook might be just what former 
Interior Minister Pierre Joxe or former president Nicolas Sarkozy intended when 
they spoke about fostering un Islam de France, or a French form of Islam (Bowen, 
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2009). Meanwhile, the French public has yet to decide on the measure of Islamic 
community they will tolerate on French soil. 
 As such, the young proponents of the two types of piety discussed in 
sections one and two, respectively, can be said to engage in not one but two 
types of “double-movement” (Polanyi, 2011[1944], p. 136). On the one hand, 
there is an ideological movement in conflicting directions. While some youth see 
piety as requiring dissociative al-Barā‘, others push back with a notion of piety 
highlighting association or solidarity, al-Walā‘. On the other hand, youth appear 
to be physically moving in opposite directions where their life plans are 
concerned. For youth who feel their lack of existential mobility is 
insurmountable, this crisis renders a dissociative practice of piety more 
appealing and leads, ultimately, to their relocation. Other youth, meanwhile, are 
led by their inclination to an associative practice of piety in a movement towards 
their community via such activities as activism and education within France. 
These practices in eﬀect grant them existential mobility and a sense of 
community, and thus they remain in Marseille in spite of the obstacles life there 
presents to the highly pious. Which of these directions will ultimately come to 
identify the Islamic personhood characteristic of orthodox youth in Marseille 
remains to be seen. 
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VI. The French State Imagines the 
Mediterranean: The Making of Place and 
People through Modern Standard Arabic 
Education and Cultural Programming 
I. Introduction 
 It was December of 2010 and Ben Omar stood to welcome the wide range 
of guests who had come to participate in the conference being hosted by his 
community association. Many of the attendees known to him, including Modern 
Standard Arabic (MSA) teachers from other Muslim community associations 
and from Marseille’s private Muslim secondary school, raised palms in greeting 
or oﬀered salaams in anticipation. “On the occasion of our 2010 conference on 
the ‘Realities and new challenges of Arabic teaching in the region of Provence,’” 
he began in French, “how fitting to find ourselves convened in the Alcazar 
Library, in the city of Marseille.” After a meaningful pause, he reframed: “al-qaṣar 
fī l-Marsah, Marsīlia” (MSA. the castle in the port of Marseille). A rumble of 
laughter aﬃrmed that the facilitator’s puns were not misspent at on least some 
members of this audience, whose minds, upon hearing the name of the 
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municipal library rendered in MSA, promptly visited the mosaic courtyards of an 
11th century Andalusian palace (MSA. al-qaṣar). 
 Only this palace was located, according to the speaker, not in the city 
baptized "Massalia" by the Greeks in the 6th century B.C.E but in a Marseille 
named for al-Marsah. Marsah means “port” in Arabic, but within which port was 
Ben Omar locating this library-turned-castle? Was he imagining an Al-Andalus-
era palace within Marseille's Vieux Port, a possible gesture to Muslim 
immigrants’ central role in the last hundred years of the port city's history? Or, 
being from Tunis himself, was he drawing a connection between Marseille and 
the Tunisian suburb of the capital, Al-Marsah? The neighborhood of Al-Marsah, 
significantly, lies on the site of Ancient Carthage. The Phoenician city saw 
protracted battles between its Semitic custodians and marauding Greek and 
Roman forces from the 6th to 2nd centuries CE (Abulafia, 2011; Naylor, 2015). In 
either case, Ben Omar began this event about MSA teaching in Marseille by 
discursively gathering Marseille and North Africa into the fold of a Semitic if not 
Islamic yore, obscuring the Mediterranean's Greek and Latin heritages in the 
process.  
 Over the course of this chapter, it will become clear why Ben Omar, a 
leader within Marseille's orthodox Muslim community and the secretary for the 
community association called l’Institut Méditerranéen d’Études Musulmanes, or the 
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Mediterranean Institute for Muslim Studies, should seek to situate Marseille 
within a more broadly Islamic Mediterranean. Although his dusting of Marseille 
in such a light seemed, in a first instance, little more than amusement for the 
Muslims in his audience, Ben Omar was also laying claim to one of Marseille’s 
incarnations over another. Those who would dispute this Marseille were also 
present and comprised mainly representatives of the French State employed in 
Marseille’s education system and municipal government. Expressly invited by 
Ben Omar, this coterie of people included tenured Arabists from the nearby 
University of Aix-en-Provence, teachers appointed to teach MSA in Marseille's 
public schools, those tasked with developing MSA curricula by the Ministry of 
National Education, and also Mayor Patrick Menucci of Marseille’s central 
metropolitan district. Despite the diversity in their roles for the State, these 
individuals shared in a common vision of Marseille, namely, as a secular and 
cultured city whose Mediterranean dimension draws from Classical Antiquity. It 
was in the spirit of exposing and perhaps negotiating this discrepancy between 
the Muslim and French State visions for Marseille that Ben Omar had solicited 
the participation of these functionaries, and his opening remark left little doubt 
as to the side of the debate he supported.  
 This chapter examines competing depictions of the Mediterranean’s past, 
whether Semitic and Islamic or Greek and Roman, as claims upon Marseille’s 
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present and future. One of these claims appeared in Chapter Five, where some 
orthodox Muslims imagined Marseille to stand for pan-Islamic solidarity as the 
Mediterranean stood for it in the past. Thus, the Sunni youth in Chapter Five 
modeled their social activism in Marseille upon the same commitment to Islamic 
community-building they understood to have inspired anti-colonial movements 
around the Mediterranean, as elsewhere (c.f., Morocco: Burke, 1972; Halstead, 
1967; Egypt: Suleiman, 1996; Syria: Cleveland, 1985; in Zanzibar: Ghazal, 
2010). Marseille was, according to them, another place in which to carry forth 
the Mediterranean’s Islamic history. This chapter focuses, in turn, on the 
alternative imagining of the Mediterranean as “Classical” purveyed by the 
French State’s local arm in Marseille. Specifically, I document how activities 
undertaken by the Municipality and the local branch of the Ministry of 
Education both before and during Marseille’s year (2013) as European Capital of 
Culture functioned to disseminate the State notion of the Mediterranean’s 
Classical cultural essence. Through an analysis of cultural programming, 
including museum exhibits and advertising for Marseille’s year in the spotlight, 
as well as educational policy in MSA public classrooms, I show how State actors’ 
depiction of a Greco-Roman Mediterranean past is also, in eﬀect, a play for an 
upwardly mobile Marseille and for the secular nature of its inhabitants.  
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 Textual and visual depictions of Mediterranean Antiquity are analyzable, 
in this sense, as State-led forms of “place-making” (Bank, 2011; Deumert, 2013; 
Lefebvre, 1991 [1947]), on the one hand, and “people-making” (Deumert, 2013; 
Dick, 2010, 2011), on the other hand. For example, the local Ministry of 
Education’s new initiative to transform the classrooms in which many second-
generation youth from Muslim families learn MSA into “Classical Language 
Workshops,” in which MSA is co-taught alongside Greek and Latin, sought to 
entail that Marseille was a gentrifying city and that the diasporic youth in 
attendance were up-and-coming, secular professionals. Meanwhile, State 
depictions of the Mediterranean also ethnographically illustrate Agha’s (2007) 
contention that “entextualized projections of time cannot be isolated from those 
of locale and personhood” (p.  320). Indeed, this selective re-imagining of 
Mediterranean history by State actors is shown to have very real social eﬀects in 
Marseille, whether in the guise of ongoing neighborhood renewal projects to 
“mediterranize” historic immigrant neighborhoods, or in pedagogical practices 
that de-Islamicize the MSA transmitted to students in public classrooms. The 
State argument for a particular kind of Mediterranean is, as such, a chronotopic 
formulation in Agha’s (2015) sense, juxtaposing time, space, and personage in a 
representation to which people anchor themselves.  
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 Bakhtin (1981) described chronotopes as jointly temporal and spatial 
backdrops upon which characters’ actions are inscribed. Although Bakhtin 
mainly used chronotopes to characterize artistic genres of novels, Agha (2007b) 
reanalyzes Bakhtinian chronotopes, which Bakhtin associated with plot 
structures in novels, by arguing for the prevalence in social life of “cultural 
chronotopes,” which Agha relates to discursive semiosis in general. Agha 
(2007b) shows that people orient to cultural chronotopes when “they engage 
each other through discursive signs of any kind” (p. 320). He explains the social 
reality of cultural chronotopes by showing, first, how temporal depictions 
comport with depictions of place and personhood, and second, how these 
portrayals may be animated as people give voice to them. Whereas literary 
chronotopes in Bakhtin’s understanding appeared to live in print artifacts like 
novels, Agha (2015) describes chronotopic formulations as emerging and 
perishing through the uptake they receive by others who respond to them. This 
animation or realization of cultural chronotopes was discussed in a diﬀerent 
idiom but similar way by M. Silverstein (1994), when he spoke of how narrators 
may align to narrated worlds and, in so doing, enable a "break through" (p. 52) 
of the narrated chronotope into the horizon of real-life social interactions. This 
breakthrough then allows qualities and characters that were previously only 
narrated to be leveraged by speakers as resources for social diﬀerentiation and 
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position-taking. To detect this process taking place, however, requires 
attentiveness to the various statuses social actors assume within a speech event, 
what Goﬀman (1979) termed the participant framework of an event, as well as 
to the roles performed by speakers, what Goﬀman likewise referred to as the 
event’s production format. Story worlds do, as such, hold the capacity to unleash 
new resources for meaning and social or political action in the world in which 
they are told, vindicating Haroun's father in Rushdie’s Haroun & the Sea of Stories 
(1991), who never once doubted the real-world value of stories that are not (or 
may not be) even true. Their realization relies, nevertheless, on real-world 
individuals’ willingness to align themselves with the imaginaries, or cultural 
chronotopes, circulated by society’s constituents.  
 This chapter finds inspiration, additionally, in Herzfeld’s (2005) invitation 
to anthropologists of the Mediterranean to “treat attributions of Mediterranean 
culture...as performative utterances that can, under the right ‘felicity conditions,’ 
actually create the realities that people perceive” (p. 50). In this spirit, I view 
portrayals of the Mediterranean not as representing an “original” Mediterranean 
history per se, but as instances of “imitation without origin,” in Butler’s (1990, 
p. 138) concise formulation. In other words, the cultural chronotope of the 
Mediterranean proﬀered by the French State is recognized to exist primarily in 
its performances, whether they take the form of advertised images posted on 
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billboards or pronouncements on MSA’s Mediterranean dimensions made by the 
academic inspector of MSA classrooms. Herzfeld’s reflection begs a further 
question, however. Above and beyond the performance of the Classical 
Mediterranean performed by powerfully positioned actors within Marseille, is 
this vision of Marseille in fact seized upon by those who live in Marseille as 
indicative of their reality? Like in Sufi mysticism, which “never assumes that 
everyone will always exist on the same plane, even if they physically exist in the 
same scene” (Varzi, 2006, p. 5), this chapter queries if indeed the diasporic 
youth who attend the Mediterranean museum exhibits and report every day for 
MSA class feel that living in Marseille is akin to walking in the footsteps of 
Alexander the Great or Marcus Aurelius.  
 The second section, below, discusses various means the State uses to 
channel their view that the Mediterranean’s singularity lies in its Classical 
heritage, focusing particularly on the city’s cultural programming during 
2012-2013 and its overhaul of MSA educational policy. The third section, in 
turn, examines the words of public MSA teachers and students for clues as to 
whether they in fact locate Marseille and themselves in this layer of 
Mediterranean reality, or perhaps in another. I argue that the State’s chronotopic 
imaginary did little to “interpellate” youth from Muslim families into the role of 
secular Mediterranean citizen of Marseille, speaking in Althusser’s (1971) 
!241
terms. Instead, I show how youth peered into this distinct imagining of the 
Mediterranean and Marseille, and then chose not to partake in the State’s script. 
For, as Varzi (2006) says, the layers of reality people inhabit more closely 
resemble curtains or veils than walls. Insofar as moving between one and 
another Mediterranean involves performance, one may slide between alignments 
or, indeed, opt out of aligning.  
II. The State’s Mediterranean: Languages and Images that 
Interpellate? 
 “It’s just the little pebble I bring,” shrugs Lara Durel in reference to the 
initiative in Classical languages she began in a handful of Marseillais high 
schools in the Fall of 2012. Madame Durel is the Academic Inspector for the 
MSA classes held in Southern France’s public schools, but she spends most of 
her time in Marseille, where the number of MSA classrooms rivals that in Paris. 
Her new program, which she describes as “a coupling of MSA and Latin based in 
the view that MSA is a Mediterranean language, like Latin,” more properly 
resembles a pebble in a rockslide that has, since at least Napoléon Bonaparte’s 
landing in Alexandria in 1798, claimed an exceptional Mediterranean bond 
between France and its Arab neighbors on the southern banks of the 
Mediterranean. This exceptional bond, argued to lie in France and North Africa’s 
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common Classical heritage, has long served France as an ideological touchstone 
in her economic and geopolitical interventions, notably Napoléon I’s invasion of 
Egypt (1798-1901), the colonial administration of French North Africa, and 
especially Algeria (1830-1962), and post-independence politico-economic 
overtures made by France to Arab States around the Mediterranean (e.g., 1995 
Barcelona Process, 2008 Union for the Mediterranean). In this section, I explore 
how various actors on behalf of the French State turn to the chronotope of the 
Classical Mediterranean yet again, only this time in the context of Marseille’s 
preparations for its year in the spotlight as European Capital of Culture-2013.  
 Specifically, I propose that Madame Durel’s new initiative for a “Classical 
MSA,” along with a Mediterranean imagery campaign coordinated by the 
Municipality of Marseille, represent concerted eﬀorts by French State actors to 
locally revive what several authors have termed the French myth of 
Mediterranean Antiquity (c.f., Basfao & Henry, 1991; Daguzan, 2009; Ruel, 
1991). Whereas previously the myth of the Classical Mediterranean had justified 
France’s interests abroad, namely in North Africa and the Levant, in this more 
recent case France directs its manifest destiny—to unite the Mediterranean 
around its common Greco-Roman heritage—inwards, seeking to “classicize” 
French youth from Muslim backgrounds and wash Marseille of any visible 
Islamic connotations. If, as I argue, the French State has identified Marseille as 
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the keystone to France’s Classical Mediterranean destiny, there are at least four 
factors that further contributed to the city’s strategic importance in 2012 and 
2013. I focus on these four factors in the following pages.  
 The first factor is that Marseille continues to be France’s foremost city on 
the Mediterranean Sea. As France’s second largest commune to-date, neither 
Nice nor Montpellier can compete with Marseille in terms of its size and 
economic importance. The second is that Marseille is a city that, one-hundred 
and fifty years ago as today, has a population with multi-generational ties to 
France’s Muslim ex-colonies.  The cultural import of the fact that Marseille is 1
home to all manner of people who identify as Muslims, while not immediately 
clear from demographic data, is often clear to those who live in Marseille as well 
as those who visit. By people deeply familiar with the city, Marseille has been 
called the African crossroads (Bertoncello, 2000), an Arab metropole (Tarrius, 
1987), and the door to the South (Londres, 1929). Those less familiar, too, 
recognize that, as noted by reporter Christopher Dickey for National 
Geographic, Marseille in the near future “may well be the first Western 
European city with a majority of its residents from Muslim 
 Census data ill-represent locally born individuals whose parents or grandparents come from 1
Muslim countries as well as undocumented immigrants and, as such, do little to illustrate the 
French post-colonial legacy in Marseille. In 2008, Marseille was listed as France’s second largest 
commune, with 859,543 people, of who 34,776 are Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian nationals, 
11,774 are sub-Saharan African nationals, 61,281 are French by acquisition, and 725,689 are 
French-born (INSEE, 2008).
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backgrounds” (March, 2012, n.p.). These geographic and demographic 
dimensions of Marseille do not, by default, single out the city for the type of 
inward-facing measures I will describe. Rather, two further factors are perhaps 
most helpful in explaining the clip at which the French State set about 
revamping Marseille and its inhabitants as belonging to a diﬀerent kind of 
Mediterranean. They are Marseille’s reputation as overrun by violent Muslim 
youth, on the one hand, and the financial urgency of making Marseille 
presentable in time for its Capital status, on the other.  
 Indeed, in mid-2012 the French State and Marseille’s municipality were 
concerned that, due to serial reports of criminality, drug traﬃc, gun violence, 
and clientelism, the city’s reputation was becoming irrevocably tainted. Only 
four months before the opening ceremony inaugurating Marseille as European 
Capital of Culture, for instance, the Mayor of the northern 15th and 16th 
arrondissements, Samia Ghali, pleaded with Minister of the Interior Manuel 
Valls to send the French Army to Northern Marseille. She cited turf wars 
between drug-dealing groups and the mounting number of drug-related 
homicides. He refused however, saying there was no interior enemy and hence 
only the police force could resolve the issue. Several weeks later, Marseille was 
again infamously portrayed in the French media by the magazine Marianne, 
which published an article entitled “Marseille: Lost Territory of the 
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Republic” (9.15.2012). The magazine described a city “parceled into 
willayas” (Arabic for “provinces”), seventeen counts of turf-related homicides by 
Kalashnikov, and a drought of services aﬀecting poor families from the Northern 
Quarters, who had neither the benefit of the Metro nor of the free bike system 
enjoyed by Central Marseille. Marseille’s government went into a tizzy not 
unlike that of State oﬃcials in Rio de Janeiro, who were faced with a wave of 
violence against the police in the summer months prior to the 2014 World Cup 
(New York Times, May 30th, 2014). Oﬃcials in Marseille were particularly 
anxious the news might dissuade the millions of expected people from visiting, 
and they struggled to present a united front. It was within this context that 
diasporic Muslim youth from Northern Marseille, in particular, became the 
target of Marseille’s eﬀorts to prove it could eﬀectively control its population.   2
 This narrowing of the government’s gaze must be understood, 
furthermore, in the context of a France-wide discussion about Muslim youth’s 
politically sensitive status. As detailed in Chapter One, a moral panic surrounds 
the figure of the “lost second-generation youth.” This panic is nowhere more 
alive than in the French popular media, although it also draws concrete 
inspiration from conservative academic literature (Brenner, 2002; Finkielkraut, 
 Documented immigrants and their descendants account for a disproportionate percentage of 2
the population in the Northern Quarters and are also disproportionately poorer than residents of 
other neighborhoods (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001).
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2013) and Republican political discourse (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 2000). A 
surge of sociological studies of urban youth have further filled in this sketch of 
the generic French Muslim youth who, frustrated with their French birthplace, 
aﬃliates him or herself with a vaguely conceived Islam. These surveys have 
likewise contributed to causally linking two phenomena: on the one hand, the 
high percentages of secondary school failure, delinquency, and joblessness 
documented among adolescents of Maghrebi and Sahelian descent, specifically 
(Lagrange, 2010); and, on the other, that Muslim youth exhibit a greater degree 
of religiosity and more numerous transnational ties to their parents’ countries of 
origin than either their first-generation parents or non-Muslim descendants of 
other religious backgrounds (INSEE & INED, 2010; Brouard & Tiberj, 2005).  
 In the wake of these circulating concerns, many politicians in Marseille 
wondered if Islam might be to blame for the violence gaining traction among 
young men in Marseille’s Northern Quarters. Michel Vauzelle, the president of 
the Department of Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, made comments to this eﬀect 
shortly after his appointment, on December 13th, 2012, to new president 
François Hollande’s “Parliamentary Mission for the Mediterranean.” In 
summarizing the Mission’s purpose, he remarked:  
“Arab peoples would do best to ponder what their future could be. Today, they have a 
choice between a Euro-Mediterranean future and a future situated to the East. This is to 
say either towards Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, an extreme model of Islam and the 
worse Islam has to oﬀer in terms of intolerance, or towards a less extreme model, more 
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like that endorsed by Turkey’s current government. The stakes are high.” (VMarseille, 
January 2013, p. 72). 
To push immigrant descendants in the right direction and break “this vicious 
cycle” in Marseille, Vauzelle proposed “soft-power” (or “participative 
diplomatic”) solutions, like organizing “meetings among young Mediterraneans” 
(p. 73). Another article of the same weekly magazine described how, after young 
men with guns entered the Diderot High School to get even with a student, the 
school administration encouraged teachers to take “aﬀective measures” to 
counter “the economic and familial ruptures experienced by certain 
students” (VMarseille, January 2013, p. 27). Among the soft-power measures 
considered useful in revivifying second-generation youth and turning them away 
from a religious culture perceived as archaic (and violent to boot), perhaps none 
was proposed with higher hopes than instructing youth in their home languages. 
Indeed, the European Commission’s Maalouf Report (2008) had previously 
identified home language instruction as crucial to Muslim youth’s integration 
into European societies. The authors of the Report had written that, insofar as 
instruction in one’s heritage language restores communication lines between 
Muslim youth and their parents, it can act as a “powerful antidote 
against...various types of fanaticism” (p. 5) and “social dysfunctioning which can 
lead to violence” (p. 20). I will address the shape that home language 
instruction took in Marseille after first commenting on the last of the four 
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factors in Marseille that militated in favor of the State’s Mediterranean 
intervention, so to speak.   
 To wit, the violence supposedly tarnishing Marseille’s reputation took 
place at a crucial moment in the city’s historical trajectory. In 2012 and 2013, 
Marseille was at the apex of its transformation by three social and economic 
projects of financial consequence. The first of these was the seven-billion Euro 
mostly private EuroMéditerranée Project begun there in 1992. Continuing to-
date and not projected to finish until 2025, this project is sited along Marseille’s 
industrial port, in La Joliette. This urban renewal project aims to attract “Neo-
Marseillais,” or young professionals and aﬄuent people from outside Marseille, 
to live or work in its new luxury flats and oﬃce towers and spend money in its 
recently renovated stores and restaurants (Trimaille & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013). 
Ironically, this “internationalization” of La Joliette has in large part depended 
upon the eviction and displacement of many of the neighborhood’s long-time 
residents, mostly immigrants and their descendants, to the less central 
neighborhoods along the Northern littoral.  
 The second of these developments is the partnership between 43 states 
begun in Marseille in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) by French 
ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy. Unlike its predecessor the Barcelona Process 
(1995-2008), whose membership was limited to the Northern “Club Med” 
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states, the UfM extended membership to all of the states around the 
Mediterranean Basin, whether in North Africa, the Middle East, or Southeastern 
Europe. Perhaps  judging they had as little to lose as to gain from accepting 
Sarkozy’s terms, all states agreed to the UfM’s terms. The UfM nevertheless 
remained quite vague in its policy architecture, simply requesting member states 
to cooperate politically, economically, and culturally with the UfM if and when 
doing so would not interfere with the European Union (Emerson, 2008). In his 
founding speeches for the UfM, Sarkozy doted especially on the supposition that 
Europe’s future was in all respects dependent upon its relations with the rest of 
the Mediterranean, and especially its southern perimeter (Daguzan, 2009). 
Sarkozy also called upon Marseille in particular, as France’s second largest city 
and its industrial and manufacturing beacon on the Mediterranean Sea, to put 
the country’s best Mediterranean foot forward in this new UfM. 
 The third development is of course Marseille’s designation as European 
Capital of Culture 2013 by the Council of the European Union. The radiance 
wished upon Marseille by Sarkozy was multiplied a hundredfold by the sheer 
quotient of investment, construction, and specifically “Mediterranean” cultural 
activity generated between 2012 and 2013. City councils, private sponsors, and 
the EU itself inverted 90 million Euros into a total of 900 cultural events 
attended by 11 million visitors (The Guardian, 4.1.13). In addition to the 
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renewal of investment in Marseille’s EuroMéditerranée Project, 2013 also saw 
the construction of several new museums. The most notable among them was 
the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations, or MUCEM, with its 
190 million-Euro price tag. The city used the budget, additionally, to repave and 
remodel Marseille’s historic waterfront, which now connects the Vieux Port via 
walkways to the Fort of St. Jean, the new MUCEM, La Majeure Cathedral, and  
 the Joliette district. This entire stretch was anointed the “Villa Méditerranée” and 
is pictured in the two top images of Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1. Top: The Villa Méditerranée, Middle: The MUCEM, Bottom: Advertisement in 
Marseille’s Airport for the EuroMéditerranée Urban Renewal Project 
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 It was against this political and financial backdrop that the State aﬃrmed 
its need for urgent solutions to its problems with violence and drug-traﬃcking 
among the young diasporic inhabitants of the Northern Quarters.   In the next 
subsection, I consider two types of State-led activities, Mediterranean cultural 
programming during 2013 and MSA educational policy over the 2012-3013 
school year, and how they together formed a campaign created to encourage 
Marseille’s young Muslim inhabitants to come to  resemble, act, think, and 
speak like Classical Mediterranean subjects.              
Cultural Programming and MSA Educational Policy: Place and People-Making 
 In his speech to inaugurate the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, 
then-president Sarkozy proclaimed that, thanks to their common denominator 
in the civilizations of Antiquity, the “European dream” and the “Mediterranean 
dream” are one. He continued: “the dream that was once Bonaparte’s in Egypt, 
Napoléon III’s in Algeria, Lyautey’s in Morocco. This dream which was less a 
dream of conquest than one of civilization...” (2.7.2008). Among the cultural 
exhibits put on by the city during MP-2013, as the Capital was called, two in 
particular further channeled Sarkozy’s vision of how the banks of the 
Mediterranean would attain unison by recalling their previous union in the 
period of Greek and Latin civilizations (between the 7th century BCE and the 5th 
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century CE). These are the permanent exhibit “The Gallery of the 
Mediterranean,” spanning the bottom floor of the MUCEM, and the exhibit 
entitled “Mediterraneans: From the grand city-states of yesterday to the people 
of today,” which ran through the Spring of 2013 at a renovated hangar on the 
waterfront. The MUCEM’s Gallery boasts objects and maps that trace 
connections between the Classical civilizations of yore and “the Mediterranean 
Society” of today, along with a special feature exhibit on Mediterranean 
citizenship. There, one learns that the foundations of the French notion of 
citizenship, that of rights and duties institutionalized by the French 
Constitution of 1793 and continuing to present, are to be found in the 
Antiquity-era concept of citizenship, which held it was both an ideal and a 
privilege. 
  Details about this Mediterranean form of citizenship were disclosed by an 
ad campaign circulated by the Municipality in  promotion of the MUCEM’s 
exhibit. Indeed, posted on bus stops and billboards throughout the city were 
portraits of people against recognizably Mediterranean landscapes. Whether the 
depicted person was wielding a handful of white sand or had donned a Roman 
Centurion helmet, a floral perhaps Italian print, or a Moroccan kaftan shirt, the  
caption below announced that the MUCEM was all ears to their stories: “All of 
the Mediterranean tells its story at the MUCEM.” The people held up as all  
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Figure 6.2. Composite of Four Separate Advertisements for the     
MUCEM’s “Mediterranean Citizenship” Exhibit 
types of Mediterranean, however, overwhelmingly appear young, pale in skin 
color, and free of any indicators as to their religious aﬃliations. The text of the 
ad and the models’ juxtaposition with sun-washed backdrops nevertheless insist 
upon the Méditerranité of this particular group of  individuals—and none other. 
This campaign to represent (and in so doing, perhaps entail) a youthful, secular  
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Figure 6.3. Bus Stop Advertisement                    Figure 6.4. J1 Hangar Exhibit Poster 
 
Mediterranean citizenry was joined in force by another poster that went up 
around town for the J1 Hangar exhibit (c.f., Figure 6.4). Behind the words 
“Mediterraneans: From the Grand City-States of Yesterday to the People of 
Today” is a man whose shirtless torso and seafaring portrayal suggest the 
personage of Odysseus. Here, the viewer experiences a physical similarity in 
landscape between their own location in the J1, looking out onto Marseille’s 
harbor, and the Mediterranean backdrop of Antiquity implied by the poster. The 
desired eﬀect, it seems, is to lead the viewer to draw a genealogical link between 
oneself as a contemporary member of Marseille’s population and the type of 
person that inhabited such Greek city-states as Ithaca. As a group, these images 
and their accompanying texts reveal the Municipality’s intention to construct 
the space of Marseille as a particular kind of Mediterranean place. The 
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“conversion of spaces into places,” writes Bank (2011, p. 15), is a social, 
material, and importantly, discursive process. In his famous writings on space 
and place, Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) mostly described radical anti-capitalist 
appropriations of space that aimed to open urban places for alternative lifestyles. 
Place-making can also reflect top-down political subjectivities (Hart, 2002), 
however, and this seems to be the case in Marseille. Indeed, Marseille was 
subject to quite material forms of place-making in the name of gentrification, 
like the creation of an international business district from the ashes of La 
Joliette’s working-class immigrant port.  
               In her poignant ethnography of the culture of youth martyrdom in the 
Iran of the 1980s, Roxanne Varzi (2006) examines how filmic and still imagery 
were leveraged by Khomeini’s government during the Iran-Iraq War as its 
primary instrument for simultaneously creating martyrs and Islamic subjects. 
Only in death, she writes, were Iranian youth interpellated—in Althusser’s 
(1971) sense—as Islamic subjects. Moreover, she argues it was their numerous 
deaths which, ultimately, eﬀected the post-War conversion of the Islamic 
Republic into a consolidated nation. Inspired by Varzi’s analysis of how Iranian 
youth were visually interpellated to Islamic subjecthood, the question arises of 
whether the Muslim youth who viewed these images in Marseille, whether on 
the street or in the exhibits themselves, were also interpellated as subjects of 
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State’s secular Mediterranean. To use Althusser’s (1971, p. 173) turn of phrase, 
is this a case of a cultural chronotope that “hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects”? Althusser’s theory of interpellation turns on 
two recognitions. First, there are the holders of some ideology, who must 
recognize a human target for their ideologizing. Then, there are individuals in 
the world who, upon their interpellation by an ideology, recognize themselves as 
“always-already” subjects of that ideology (1971, p. 176). In Hughes (2014, 
unpublished), for example, he describes how some scholars in religious studies 
read a “liberal, inclusive, pluralistic, feminist, gay-friendly” version of Islam into 
historical data and, in so doing, seek to interpellate Muslims to recognize 
themselves in this Islamic past. Whether Muslims are in fact interpellated by 
this scholarly “mythopoesis” (ibid, n.p.) depends, however, on the 
institutionalization of such views, as through academic hiring decisions or 
teaching, for instance. To circle back to the case at hand, whether or not 
Marseille’s Muslims are being “lassoed” onto a coeval plane with this part-
hypothetical past, to adopt M. Silverstein’s (2005) expression, can only be 
discovered through conversing with them about their experiences with such 
images. For lack of data on youth’s uptakes of these images, in the next section 
(III) I furnish data collected with youth on their reception of the other main 
activity through which the State conveyed its Classical Mediterranean imaginary: 
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MSA language instruction. In what follows I share more details about MSA 
language policies and programs. I then turn to my uptake data and answering 
my question above about whether or not youth are in fact interpellated thus. 
 As prefaced, MSA education in the public system provided the State, in 
the form of the local arm of the Ministry of Education, with a vital arena for its 
attempts to create individuals consistent with its Mediterranean vision. In 
keeping with the recommendations of the European Commission’s Report 
(2008), the French Ministry of Education surmised that instruction in “Arabic” 
might speak to youth from Muslim families in a more intimate way than, say, 
German or Italian. The course of action undertaken by the Ministry of Education 
in Marseille departs in important ways from that advised by the Report, 
however, which emphasized instruction in youth’s home languages as the key to 
de-Islamicizing youth and reconnecting them to peaceful life-ways. Instead, 
Marseille’s branch of the Ministry invites youth from varied Muslim 
backgrounds, whose families may speak Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Wolof, or 
Comorian, to participate in various forms of instruction in MSA, the highly 
standardized language that nary a person in the Arabic-speaking world would 
call their home or heritage language.  One of the two MSA programs available 3
 Defined broadly, heritage languages are those languages other than the oﬃcial language(s) 3
spoken in a territory by an individual, a family, or a community.
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within French public schools nation-wide is nevertheless called a “heritage 
language” program (Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine, or ELCO). This 
elective option takes the form of an after-school program, or a pull-out class during 
the school day, and is mainly offered at the primary level (though it also exists at the 
secondary level).   The second, more commonly pursued option is the MSA as a 4
“foreign language” program (langue vivante étrangère). This is part of the national 
curriculum and is taught in public schools at the secondary and tertiary levels. The 
teachers involved in this kind of MSA instruction have likewise passed the requisite 
exams: the CAPES or l’Aggrégation, for the second and third degrees, 
respectively.  
 Marseille’s Ministry of Education has specific goals in mind for its 
“foreign language” oﬀering of MSA at the secondary level. When I met with 
Madame Durel, one of France’s three inspectors for MSA classes and the person 
responsible for the South of France, I hoped she could tell me more about a 
particular disconnect I perceived. Why, if MSA was being formulated by the 
Ministry as a “foreign language,” placing it on a par with other languages (e.g., 
 The Arabic ELCO programs result from a series of bilateral accords made in the 1970s-1980s 4
between France and North African countries from which France invited large numbers of 
immigrant workers. They are coordinated by the Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian Ministries 
of Education, and though each country independently trains, sends, and pays its respective 
teachers in France, the ELCO programs and the quality of instruction are subject to ongoing 
evaluations according to standards set by the Council of Europe and applied by the French 
Ministry of Education (e.g., Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, 
2000).
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English, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Mandarin) taught in the 
Hexagon, were there frequently only children from Muslim families enrolled in 
public school classes? I let her know, by way of illustration, that among the four 
MSA classes I observed in a northern secondary school (grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème, 
and 3ème, or ages 11-14), there was only one student with a Catholic name, and 
even he had a Tunisian grandfather on one side of the family. Madame Durel 
half-smiled and replied that this portrayal of MSA is supposed to encourage 
students to enroll in MSA classes “on motivations that are not exclusively about 
identity (identitaires) but on motivations that are professional, and cultural only 
in the broadest sense.” In other words, she used the foreign language label to 
cultivate in students an attitude of cultural detachment vis-à-vis MSA, but also 
an awareness of the pragmatic value of MSA for them as future professionals. 
Madame Durel was in fact pleased, or perhaps relieved, that Muslim-identified 
students were, at the very least, attending “our classes” rather than those held in 
prayer rooms or Islamic community associations.  She also believed the 5
pedagogic initiatives she had put in place were proving eﬀective against the mass 
exodus of Islamically curious students towards private religious MSA instruction
 In 2006 the 65,000 youth participating in private MSA education surpassed the 4,800 students 5
enrolled in public high school MSA classes, nation-wide, by a factor of 13.5 (Deheuvels & Dichy, 
2006).
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—what Falip and Deslandes (1994) have called MSA’s “progressive eviction” 
from public schools (p. 68). 
 Madame Durel was responsible for implementing three kinds of MSA 
instruction in Marseille’s public middle and high schools. One links up with the 
Ministry of Education’s broader approach to MSA instruction, while the other 
two represent innovative takes on MSA teaching. The first she summarized in 
her comments on MSA-as-a-foreign-language above. To solve the issue of 
parents and students placing their religious hopes on public MSA classes, 
Madame Durel accepts such students but instructs her teachers to reframe the 
symbolic value of MSA in the classroom. In what would be recognized within 
the language policy literature as an instance of “status planning” (Kloss, 1969), 
Durel strives to have the teachers under her supervision perform a type of MSA 
that is both communicative and professionally valuable. Durel’s “weapon of 
revalorization” (arme de revalorisation), as she calls it, is an MSA that, first, stands 
above the dialectal fray, not sliding towards the dialectal end of the MSA-to-
Arabic-dialect continuum, and second, eschews ties to Classical Arabic and, 
thus, Islam (Suleiman, 2012). Several educational events have been hosted in 
recent years with a view towards creating curricula suited to this conception of a 
secular professional register of MSA. These include the Ministry of National 
Education-led symposium to formulate protocols for Arabic teaching in the 
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French public system (2006), the Assizes held by the National Assembly in 
Marseille to regulate Arabic teaching (2008), and more informal workshops to 
discuss curricular development, like that held by the French Association of 
Arabisants in Aix-en-Provence (2013). Comments by Bruno Levallois, who is 
both France’s General Inspector for Arabic (MSA) instruction and Chairman of 
the Board at l’Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris, succinctly illustrate the spirit of 
these meetings. In his remarks at a Conference for Arabic Instruction in Europe 
held at the Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines in Lille, he spoke to the 
tonic eﬀects of teaching a forward-looking, communicative MSA, saying, 
“cultures are only alive if they are able to project themselves into the future; 
otherwise they don’t give wings to many dreams at all” (7.23.12). Levallois’ goal 
echoes that of Madame Durel: to make of MSA an international language that 
promises French Muslim youth opportunities for professional development and 
social mobility. Several weeks after our initial interview, I saw Madame Durel  
and thought to show her the cover of French-Maghrebi magazine Le Courrier de 
l’Atlas from April, 2013 (c.f., Figure 6.5), which features a boy holding the 
Arabic letter “Lam” and the French letter “T,” alongside a caption that reads 
“Speaking (Modern Standard) Arabic, now that’s classy!” She nodded and 
agreed that only changing MSA’s image would “get us out of this mess” (nous en  
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Figure 6.5. Le Courrier de l’Atlas 
tirer). Within the context of Marseille, the suggestion to change MSA’s image is 
not just a matter of modifying the language’s social status, an instance of status 
planning, however. Importantly, revamping MSA is also an exercise in 
remodeling the youth who take MSA. Indeed, the behavior of diasporic youth 
from Muslim families was transformed into an obstacle at the precise moment 
in Marseille’s history when the city was poised to gentrify and become an 
economic and cultural center of attention. MSA, as such, became the State-
chaperoned vehicle of youth’s desired transformation; it was remade in the 
image of the youth the local government sought to remake. Dick (2010b, 2011) 
describes this process in terms of “people-making,” or the understanding that 
people do not necessarily possess identities, but instead perform them, whether 
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for themselves or for others. Dick (2010b) explains how, not infrequently, the 
identities attributed to us by  others have little to do with the identities we claim 
for ourselves through cultural practices. I analyze the Ministry’s move to teach a 
professional, secular kind of MSA as an attempt at “people-making” in this last 
sense, and in the final section I provide examples of how classroom interactions 
were carried out partially in accordance with this pedagogic philosophy.  
 Durel’s two other projects for teaching MSA, while innovative on a 
national scale, represent variations on the same theme of “people-making” 
developed above. For one, Durel is testing out an initiative she calls 
International or Excellence Sections. The one class she has opened to-date 
specifically targets “students other than (dialectal) Arabophone students” (or 
French-origin students) from middle and upper-class neighborhoods. This type 
of section, she thinks, shows a real potential to free MSA from its dual 
connotations: with Muslims on the one hand, and with economically 
disadvantaged Arabophone youth, on the other. For the large majority of 
currently enrolled MSA students who do in fact fit this description, however, she 
has developed a second strategy that goes above and beyond the 
professionalization of the MSA that is taught. This strategy is the 
“Mediterranean sections,” which make of MSA classes, in Durel’s words, “a real 
cultural project” (un vrai projet culturel). If the MSA-as-a-foreign-language 
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program’s goal was to reorient youth from their cultural and religious identities 
towards a professional one, the “Classical Language Workshops” Madame Durel 
set up in 2012 and 2013 in a handful of high school classrooms embrace culture, 
as she says, albeit a particular notion of what counts as Mediterranean culture. 
Specifically, these classes require that Latin and Greek be taught alongside MSA, 
with all three teachers cycling through the classroom to present their respective 
materials and, occasionally, teaching co-taught lessons. In Transcript 6.1, below, 
Madame Durel fills me in on the vision of “culture” that underpins her 
Mediterranean MSA classes.   
Transcript 6.1. Mediterranean MSA Class Sections 
(CE: Researcher/LD: Lara Durel (Academic inspector for MSA) 
CE: How might one call these classes? 
LD: We call them “Mediterranean Sections for Mediterranean language and cultures” 
CE: I see... And how does it work, exactly? 
LD: Well, it’s a co-taught project between teachers of languages from Antiquity: Greek and 
Latin, and MSA. But other teachers can also join the project. A history teacher or someone else. 
Me, in the project I have at Cézanne [High School] a teacher of Provençal wants to join. I’m sure 
we’ll be able to do interesting things: on music, on love poetry, things like that.  
CE: That’s a great idea. Is it recent then? 
LD: Yes, yes. 
CE: And where did it come from th- 
LD: -it began as a shared reflection between people of good faith ((scoﬀs)) who think that uh 
Classical languages are in danger here, just like MSA is in danger. And that we must unite these 
forces. So it’s that kind of perspective, of the Mediterranean. Which is to say, specifically, that 
it’s all that that thinking about the Mediterranean, you know, Braudel uh but even the Union 
hmm for the Mediterranean, et cetera. All this is to reflect on-we’re anchoring anchoring France 
in a European geographic space but there is another space that has a real coherence, which is the 
Mediterranean.  
CE: Where France has been present for much more than a century! 
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LD: Indeed. Yes, yes. So the Mediterranean, in sum, it’s a very Braudelienne inspiration. By way 
of saying that there is a Mediterranean culture. Exchanges have taken place. It’s a very ancient 
theater for life, a space of sharing, combats, and of ties- 
CE: -yes, political ones-  
LD: -and that all of this it creates a shared culture, one we don’t make suﬃcient use of.  
CE: And the students, how do they respond to- 
LD: -well in the experiences we’ve had so far, very well! No problems to report. They’re happy. 
For example, in the project at Victor Hugo [High School], where two Classical language teachers 
and Norah [the MSA teacher] are collaborating, it’s neat mmm! They did some stuﬀ on 
Aristotle, on Alexandria, on-they went to Paris to see those manuscripts, from the Bibliothèque 
Nationale, the Greek and Latin manuscripts that passed through Arab hands, that were brought 
to the Occident by the Arabs. We try to put our little rock on the pile.   
CE: ((long pause)) And does this idea of the Mediterranean exist in other non-local MSA 
programs elsewhere? 
LD: No, no, it’s just a within-France thing. It’s local. I mean, outside of us, who is interested in 
MSA instruction? Nobody! In scientific terms? Nobody! In the Arab World there hasn’t been any 
development of MSA didacticism, of a scientific pedagogy for MSA. Nor in the other European 
countries. Nope! Because they, no, they don’t have-they just have university-level instruction. 
We have a real French specialty, we do. On the one hand, the long years of experience teaching 
MSA in France... it goes back to the 16th century. On the other hand uh, the colonial history as 
well. We can’t exactly omit it. To be exact, we have had a colonial history in the Arab World, 
mostly in the Maghreb, which has meant that the study of Arabs-of the culture of Arabic has 
been well developed. And it has given rise to a real thought process: which is, how can we teach 
MSA as a living foreign language? We are the only ones thinking about that.  
CE: In Europe, you mean? 
LD: Or even in the Arab World. Who in the Arab World is thinking about that? Nobody!  6
 Madame Durel, who was born in Morocco, of course knows that MSA is 
not a Classical language but rather a language whose base variety lies in the 
language of the Koran and the pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic poetry of the 
Arabian Peninsula (Suleiman, 2012). She holds, however, that the language’s 
own history has made of it a stale, archaic language. In order to concoct an MSA 
with communicative potential as a “living language,” she quite intriguingly 
reasons that it might need to be coupled to a diﬀerent past, namely that of 
 This interview was carried out in French on 4.3.13. The French original can be found at the end 6
of this chapter. 
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Antiquity. The idea to wed MSA to a pre-Islamic, Classical past maintains sight 
lines, indicates Madame Durel, with the perspective animating both the Union 
for the Mediterranean and the œuvre of French Mediterreanist Fernand Braudel. 
Indeed, in his speeches to inaugurate the UfM Sarkozy was anxious to speak of 
Mediterranean unification, depicting himself as “president of a France that 
places the Mediterranean on the pathway to reunification after 12 centuries of 
division and heartbreak” and the Mediterranean as “the first fraternal 
civilization” (Daguzan, 2009, p. 396). The historical portrayal of the 
Mediterranean as a unitary object is often traced back to Braudel (1985), who 
along with certain French contemporaries, like Louis Bertrand (1921) for 
instance, counterposed a unitary Mediterranean before Islam to a Mediterranean 
marked by civilizational clashes after Islamic expansion. This comparison is a 
fascinating one and is explored in more detail below in the context of Bertrand’s 
writing.  
 In his book Les Villes d’Or: Algérie et Tunisie Romaines (Golden Cities: Roman 
Algeria and Tunisia, 1921), Bertrand presents an early formulation of the 
contrast between a fraternal Latinate Mediterranean and a barbarous, derelict 
Islamic one. Bertrand is especially remembered for his vivid arguments in favor 
of the Latin character of North Africa, without which, notes Lorcin (2014), 
French settlers would have lacked the requisite “title deed” to North Africa (p. 
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201). Indeed, his book reads as an homage to North Africa’s Roman history. He 
writes in the preface, for example, that, “in entering Africa, we have done 
nothing but recover a lost province of Latinité...Inheritors of Rome, we invoke 
rights previous to Islam. Faced with the Arab usurpers...we represent...the true 
inheritors of this land... We represent the most exalted and most ancient Africa” 
(1921, p. 9). Likewise, in his descriptions Greco-Roman foundations peer out 
from beneath the Arab baths and cafés of Algiers, awaiting their liberation from 
Islam’s “white shroud of silence and death” (p. 31). Bertrand’s writings can, in 
fact, be recognized as ideologically underpinning the binary at the heart of the 
contrast the Ministry of Education formulates between religious MSA and 
professional MSA contrast. If religious MSA is silent and unmoving, ensconced 
in the blind alley of Islamic identity, then the communicative, professional MSA 
is—to borrow Bertrand’s description of the “golden cities” of Greco-Latin North 
Africa—“entirely exposed, external, public, welcoming, wide open...with 
windows and porticos looking out on the vast world, letting in air and 
light” (1921, p. 30). It appears that Madame Durel and her colleagues within the 
Ministry of Education erected their dream of a professionally mobile and 
fraternal MSA precisely upon Bertrand’s dream of a Mediterranean that is alive 
with the ferment of Antiquity.  
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 Notwithstanding Madame Durel’s varied strategies for boosting MSA 
instruction and making youth into secular Mediterranean citizens, these 
initiatives appear not to have had their intended eﬀects. In the next section, I 
show how students enrolled in MSA instruction within a northern secondary 
school failed to believe that their futures would be improved by this professional 
register of MSA. Their continued understanding of MSA in religious terms and 
their articulation of forms of cultural citizenship other than Classical 
Mediterranean citizenship suggest that the State’s interpellation of them 
“flopped.” Teachers, too, displayed little commitment to this non-cultural 
philosophy of MSA, often using their respective regional varieties of Arabic (e.g., 
Moroccan, Syrian) and making unsanctioned asides about religion in the 
classroom. As for Madame Durel’s “Classical Languages” initiative, it looks as 
though it will remain a passing experiment conducted during 2012-2013, as it 
garnered success neither with teachers nor at the ministerial level. In what 
follows, I describe for example how one MSA teacher in a Mediterranean Section 
did not understand why she was being coupled with such diﬀerent subject 
matters. Perhaps the greatest obstacle posed to the longevity of Madame Durel’s 
“Classical Languages” initiative, however, is a recently passed measure targeting 
secondary school funds called La Réforme du Collège. In April of 2015, Najat 
Vallaud-Belkacem, the Minister of Education since 2014, pushed through a 
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reform that is supposed to become active in 2016. Beginning then, each 
secondary school’s principal will have the option of deciding whether or not to 
oﬀer Latin and Greek. Even if they choose to oﬀer these ancient languages, the 
reform reduces the weekly hours that can be allotted to their instruction 
(Eduscol, 2015). Figures 6.6 and 6.7 below depict the calendar created by Latin 
and Greek teachers to protest this reform, in which they dressed up as Greek 
gods and captioned themselves as “the immortals.” For the reasons intimated 
here and detailed in the last section, it looks probable that any subsequent 
professionalization and “mediterranization” of Muslim youth will have to pass 
through other means than MSA oﬀerings at the secondary level.  
                        
Figure 6.6. 2015-2016 Calendar of Olympic Gods   
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Figure 6.7. December (Le Figaro, 9.3.2015) 
III. Reactions to the State’s Mediterranean 
 The previous section captured a contradiction in how Madame Durel 
sought to cordon oﬀ MSA’s symbolic functions from its practical use. Her MSA 
language policy aimed to dissociate the language from its historical religious and 
cultural dimensions and foreground its professional utility, and yet she described 
the co-taught (Greek, Latin, and MSA) Classical language workshops she 
instigated as a ministerial project to “bring culture” to MSA students. In what 
follows, I show how this intention to “replace” young Muslims’ culture was, not 
only typical of Marseille-European Capital of Culture-2013 more broadly, but 
also recognized as such by diasporic youth from the city, who contested it on the 
public stage as well as more intimately in the classroom.  
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 I begin, first, by describing the forceful public response to the State’s re-
imagining of the city’s cultural heritage penned by Minna Sif. A young woman 
who was born in Corsica and raised in a Moroccan family, Sif currently makes a 
living as a novelist in Marseille. She also works with second-generation youth 
from the Northern Quarters, where she lives, and supports their creative 
development by organizing writing workshops and spoken word performances. 
Perhaps three weeks after Marseille’s inauguration as Capital, Sif contributed an 
article entitled “Marseille: Capital of Another Culture” to the daily newspaper 
Libération (1.20.2013). In it, she deplored the disconnect between the 
Municipality’s “talk” (bouche) and their actions. Why was Marseille-European 
Capital of Culture-2013 sold to us as a capital “for all” (pour tous), she asks, 
when in fact its programming reveals a more exclusive definition of culture? She 
rages at the lack of spaces dedicated to hip-hop and the cultural production of 
Marseille’s youth of color, for example, and quizzes the city’s oﬃcials thus: 
“The ignominy of our decision-makers, those fearfuls of a culture for all, was to  
instrumentalize the multiculturalism at the heart of this city during the period of 
Marseille’s candidacy, only to better deny it after the fact [of Marseille’s election to 
European Capital of Culture]. (...) Where did the poets and poetesses of rap disappear 
to? (...) To not oﬀer them a platform from which to declaim their high hopes, rap about 
love and the fear of drugs, and denounce social injustice is non-sensical. (...) People talk 
to us about violence in our neighborhoods (quartiers). The worst violence is to prevent 
the other from expressing their singularity, to deny them precisely the opportunity to  
manifest their cultural wealth.” (1.20.2013, n.p., my translation).  
According to Sif, Marseille is not the next node in a series of Greco-Roman 
Mediterranean moments, with stops in Egypt and colonial Algeria along the way. 
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Sif describes her Marseille, rather, as “an emblematic place for the kind of 
multiculturalism I myself exemplify.” She and other youth from Marseille have 
great-grandparents who, in their time, “roamed the douars (Arab villages)...with 
a shoulder bag to denounce the injustices and ridicule the extravagances of this 
or that caïd or col blanc (white-collar person)” (1.20.2013, n.p.). Sif ’s Marseille, in 
other words, has a heritage that is working-class, multicultural, and opposed to 
being blindly directed from above.  
 Teachers and students in the MSA classrooms I observed between 2012 
and 2013 incarnated the spirit of tongue-in-cheek humor in the face of top-down 
policies that Sif transmits above. They were similarly aware of their cultural 
heritage and, although they may have imagined themselves as professionally 
bound, they did not recognize themselves—in Althusser’s second sense—as the 
secular citizens of a city defined by its Classical Mediterranean heritage, as the 
Municipality would have it. As will be highlighted by the transcripts below, how 
students and teachers perceived MSA and other languages, like English or 
Spanish, often flew in the face of the distinction formulated by the Ministry of 
Education, namely, between languages with symbolic functions and ones that 
are purely instrumental. Moore (2011) identifies this distinction as “the 
fundamental dichotomy that organizes the language consciousness of EU 
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oﬃcials and intellectuals” (p. 9). He cites the European Commission’s Maalouf 
Report (2008), which reads: 
“… we would encourage Europeans to take two separate decisions when it   
comes to  language learning, one dictated by the needs of the broadest possible 
communication, and the other guided by a whole host of personal reasons stemming 
from individual or family background, emotional ties, professional interest, cultural 
preferences, intellectual curiosity... (European Commission, 2008, p. 11). 
The European Commission’s recommendation that Europeans label varieties 
within their linguistic repertoires in such a way (e.g., home language, 
international language) is reflected within Madame Durel’s relegation of 
dialectal Arabic to the home and consecration of MSA to the professional and 
international realm. She envisaged, for example, that MSA students in her 
districts might capitalize on their Arabic skills to become interpreters at the 
United Nations, business men and women who exchange with the Arabic-
speaking world, or perhaps flight attendants on any number of Arab airlines. 
The picture she paints of a professionally mobile, communicative MSA with an 
elite, international sphere of possibilities is not echoed from the receiving end, 
however, as becomes clear from teachers’ and students’ comments below.  
 The conversation in Transcript 6.2 takes place in Class 3B, the MSA 
classroom whose students I discussed in Chapters Three and Four, as I am 
tutoring three female MSA students during their break hour. The three students, 
Maisara, whose parents are Muslim Comorians, Fouhda, who is third-generation 
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Algerian on both sides, and Sabrina, who is half second-generation Algerian and 
half third-generation, have taken MSA for the four years of collège both to please 
their families and because the school ushered them towards this particular 
bilingual track. They had little previous experience with the language, with the 
exception of Maisara, who attended a private religious preschool where she was 
taught to read MSA in order to memorize parts of the Koran. The conversation 
that unfolded resulted from my questioning them about why they take MSA. I 
was frustrated with the three girls because, although they had expressly pleaded 
with me to hold MSA tutoring sessions, sometimes they would sleep through 
first period and not attend, and other times they would come but not apply 
themselves. The girls defend themselves by stating that MSA is both diﬃcult to 
learn and useless where their professional futures are concerned.  
Transcript 6.2.  MSA is Good for Nothing 7
Maisara: Ça sert à rien l’arabe 
Fouhda: C’est vrai, ça sert à rien  
Cécile: Pourquoi? 
Fouhda: Parce que déjà chez nous on parle 
pas arabe. Ça sert à rien-  
Maisara: {ouais eh eh} 
Fouhda: {Et en plus} si chez nous on parle 
arabe c’est pas le même. Là c’est c’est l’arabe 
littéraire et, chez nous, c’est pas pareil
Maisara: Modern Standard Arabic is good for 
nothing 
Fouhda: It’s true. It’s good for nothing. 
Cécile: Why? 
Fouhda: Because already we don’t even speak 
(Modern Standard) Arabic at home. It’s 
useless-  
Maisara: {Yeah eh eh} 
Fouhda: {Plus} even if at home we speak 
“Arabic” it’s not the same one. In this case 
it’s Modern Standard Arabic and, at home, 
it’s not the same one
 This transcript dates from 4.3.13. 7
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In a first instance, Maisara states that MSA is not worth a dime. Fouhda nods 
and adds that MSA does not help her to communicate with Algerian, darijah or 
Algerian Arabic-speaking family members. Maisara clinches their case further, 
sighing at the many grammatical details that require study for MSA. Sabrina 
then contributes that perhaps the only utility of MSA is to read Koran “and all,” 
which likely captures the other religious duties for which MSA might be useful. 
Fouhda finishes oﬀ the topic of conversation by commenting on how whereas 
MSA is not useful “for later,” Italian and Spanish may prove themselves more 
bankable, so to speak. These three young women appear to easily dodge the 
Minister’s hailing of them as professional Mediterranean subjects in-and-
through a revamped MSA. Instead, they follow their parents’ lead, 
understanding MSA as a language that, while not useful in the home, remains 
useful insofar as it can provide a deeper knowledge of scripture. In a word, these 
students perceive MSA’s utility to coincide precisely with its cultural and 
religious symbolic value. Were it not good for “reading Koran and all,” it would 
serve very little purpose at all (indeed, it seemed that even that purpose held 
Maisara: Il y a trop de trucs ((sighs)) 
Fouhda: C’est pas du tout pareil donc ça va-
va nous servir à rien! 
Sabrina: Arabe c’est bien pour lire le Koran 
{et tout}  
Fouhda: {alors que} l’italien ou l’espagnol, je 
ne sais pas, pour plus tard et tout ça...
Maisara: There are too many details ((sighs)) 
Fouhda: It’s not at all the same one so it’s 
not go-gonna be good for a thing! 
Sabrina: (Modern Standard) Arabic is good 
for reading the Koran {and all} 
Fouhda: {Whereas} Italian or Spanish, I 
dunno, for later and all...
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meager interest for Maisara, Fouhda, and Sabrina). These young women were 
hence similar to Madame Durel because they, too, placed high importance on 
their future professional options; where they diﬀered, however, was on the 
languages they thought would guarantee them these futures.  
  Transcript 6.3 takes place with another group of female students from the 
same MSA class, named Sheyreen, Kenza, and Siwar. All three are second-
generation young women from Arab families who speak Algerian at home. This 
conversation took place during a video-taped interview at the end of the 
2012-2013 school year while we four were discussing how they felt about 
spending time with their extended families in Algeria over the summer. 
Sheyreen goes oﬀ on what is construed, by Kenza, as a tangential rant about her 
Algerian cousins’ paltry language skills. Sheyreen draws explicit comparisons 
throughout between the eﬀorts students in Marseille make to learn “other 
languages” and the lack of eﬀort she believes her cousins show in learning to 
speak anything but “Arabic,” which I understand broadly to refer both to the 
MSA that Algerians learn at school and the Algerian darijah spoken in most other 
contexts.  
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Transcript 6.3.  The Year 2013 8
Here, Sheyreen places special emphasis on the year 2013. As soon as she says 
“we’re in 2013,” the video shows that Kenza, who was doodling on a piece of 
paper, jerks her head up, laughs, and throws up a hand in exasperation as she 
says “what to do about her, hmm?” Kenza’s strong reaction to Sheyreen, I 
believe, relates to the fact that in her speech Sheyreen animates several catch-
phrases the students have heard from politicians and educators about 2013. 
French original English translation
Sheyreen: Moi, je me disais que peut-être 
parce que on est en 2013, et que- 
Kenza: -et elle, non?- 
Sheyreen: -c’est, c’est la nouvelle génération 
et que maintenant tout le monde 
normalement d- parler d’autres langues... Eux 
non! Ils restent... comme ça: ils parlent arabe, 
ils savent pas parler français. Ils savent pas 
parler anglais. Ils savent pas... ‘Che pas! En 
fin, tout le monde dit ils font des eﬀorts- 
Kenza: -Anglais- 
Sheyreen: -et eux non. Ils sont là, ils restent 
cons. Euh, ‘che pas. 
Kenza: Ça y est! Elle est partie dans son 
délire. ((to Sheyreen)) Oh! Calme-toi!  
Sheyreen: Non, mais ça m’énerve! Ça 
m’énerve. En France on fait tous des eﬀorts. 
On s’eﬀorce à apprendre l’anglais pour parler 
au monde entier. Et eux non. Ils restent dans 
leur coin, dans leur bulle. 
Siwar: Ils connaissent que l’arabe, et ils 
mentent- 
Cécile: -Mais, ils parlent bien français, non? 
Kenza: Oui, moi-serieusement- 
Sheyreen: -Non, ça dépend 
Sheyreen: I was thinking that maybe since 
we’re in 2013, and that- 
Kenza: -what to do about her, hmm?- 
Sheyreen: -it’s, it’s the new generation and 
now, normally, everyone shou-speaks other 
languages... Not them! They continue... like 
that: they speak Arabic, they don’t know how 
to speak French, they don’t know how to 
speak English. They don’t know... I dunno! I 
mean, everyone makes an eﬀort- 
Kenza: -English- 
Sheyreen: -But not them. They’re just there, 
staying dumb. Uh, I dunno.  
Kenza: There she goes! She’s oﬀ on a rant. 
((to Sheyreen)) Come on! Calm down! 
Sheyreen: No, but it bothers me! It bothers 
me. In France we all try. We make an eﬀort to 
learn English to speak to the whole world. 
But not them. They stay in their corner, in 
their bubble.  
Siwar: They only know Arabic, and they lie- 
Cécile: -But, they speak French well, no? 
Kenza: Yes, in my-honestly- 
Sheyreen: -No, it depends 
 This video dates from 6.12.13.8
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When Sheyreen says “we’re in 2013,” and also “it’s the new generation,” she 
appears to be taking on the persona of the organizers of Marseille-European 
Capital of Culture-2013. Kenza’s scoﬀ at this impersonation discloses her 
negative stance towards that kind of top-down talk about 2013 and what it 
promises to bring. Interestingly, however, Sheyreen is not completely on the 
same page with people like Madame Durel. For one, she cites English as the 
language one must work to learn in order to “speak to the whole world.” Arabic 
of any sort, she implies, is backwards by contrast and is associated with people 
who lack international flair. She too, like Fouhda in the previous transcript, 
craves an international lifestyle. To prove it, she is willing to make the eﬀort to 
learn languages like English and French. MSA is, tellingly, absent from her list of 
international languages that befit the people of 2013. In sum, Sheyreen appears 
to harbor dreams about 2013 and beyond that do not fall too far from the mark 
of the Municipality’s vision, namely, of a forward-looking, cosmopolitan 
Marseille. She finds her place within this Marseille, however, not via MSA but 
through English and other languages she recognizes to be international. 
Speaking MSA or regional varieties of Arabic, as she quips, indicates people who 
wish to “stay in their corner, in their bubble.”  
 Teachers, too, challenged the State construction of MSA as a professional 
instrument with few cultural links to the Arab world or Islamdom (Hodgson, 
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1974). One teacher named Sara commented that the instructions she received, 
not to speak in Moroccan, her home variety, or broach religious topics, made her 
feel like “we [MSA teachers] are teaching a fabricated language” (on enseigne une 
fausse langue). While on the bus one day, she expressed her hope to me that the 
Ministry would soon find her some “language assistants” from the Arabic-
speaking world. In some classes, MSA teachers are coupled with language 
assistants from Arab countries whose job it is to assist with fostering dialectal 
Arabic skills in students. Sara as such, who is the teacher for the six students 
who appear in the transcripts above, often leaned on Moroccan as a way of 
modeling for students the linguistic reality of dialectal varieties as compared to 
the type of “fabricated” MSA she was expected to teach. Sometimes, she would 
switch to Moroccan to get students to comply with her wishes. For instance, 
most days of the week Sara would seat a student named Ayman at the front right 
of class so she could keep an eye on him as he did his work. Without fail, he 
would push his desk backwards away from the front of class at the beginning of 
the period. Sara disputed this, gesturing and saying “Zidi! Zidi!” (more! more!) 
to make him move his desk forward again. At other times, she would depend on 
her students’ home experience with regional varieties of Arabic to help them 
understand how MSA functions. For example, on a day she was introducing a 
new lesson and the unknown vocabulary words zawjah (wife) and zawj 
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(husband), she asked in French “what do these words remind you of?” She put 
up two fingers, the students paused to think, and then many of them shouted 
“zuj!,” the word for two, or a pair, in Algerian. Sara also conducted impromptu 
class discussions on such unsanctioned topics as the diﬀerence between Arabs 
and Muslims and on whether she and the students should or should not miss 
school on Muslim holidays, given the school’s secular (laïcque) status (all, 
including Sara, agreed not to attend on Eid Friday).  
 Another teacher, named Norah, was one of the MSA teachers named to 
implement the “Classical Languages Workshop” at the high school where she 
had taught MSA for many years. Norah ultimately enjoyed the outcome of the 
workshop, though she explains that her enjoyment derived mainly from the fact 
that she became friendly with the Greek and Latin teachers, whom she had only 
seen in passing before. She also, however, admits to being somewhat perplexed 
at what was expected of her and finding it diﬃcult to really deepen students’ 
knowledge of MSA within such a framework: 
“I didn’t know what I was going to do. Uh, Greek...MSA, really for me it meant nothing. 
Then we get together the three of us---it was funny because people called us the 
‘infernal trio.’ You know, we were three and together all the time... So we would say 
‘Okay, what are we going to do today?’ It was good because, as long as we made a 
connection between Greek and MSA, we were left the freedom to choose our lesson 
plans. (...) It was like a workshop, if you will. They weren’t my students all year long. 
(...) For example, at the beginning of the year my colleague did his piece, then the 
second colleague did hers, then the third month was mine. Because we said that it made 
more sense to have continuity. I wasn’t going to start the [Arabic] alphabet one week 
because the class was only once a week. I wasn’t going to start and then leave oﬀ and 
then my colleague comes and talks with them about something else. (…) So I started 
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with the alphabet, then when I finished the alphabet we did the civilization part. This 
meant they had to see the link between Greek philosophy and Arab philosophy: how the 
Arabs transmitted, translated, and explained Greek philosophy, and then passed it along. 
All of that part was in French. (...) Then we talked about Averroës [Ibn Rushd]. We talked 
about him. Umm, my Greek colleagues talked about Aristotle. Because, precisely, it was 
Averroës who translated and commented on Aristotle. So they dealt with that piece. 
Then they saw films about, I believe Alexander [the Great]. They saw Alexander [the 
Great], they saw Cleopatra and Antony, things like that. And we mostly talked about 
Alexandria because it was a link between the Arab world and Greece.”   9
When I followed up on this, wondering if the students learned to read or speak 
any MSA, Norah said that no, due to the few hours allotted to her, they mainly 
learned to recognize letters. She and the other two teachers also brought the 
class to the J1 Hangar exhibit (“Mediterraneans: From the Grand City-States of 
Yesterday to the People of Today”) mentioned in Section II. “It was 
complementary and the students went to see the exhibit, of course. Oh yes, yes, 
yes, they went to see it,” she assured me.  
 “Moi je savais pas ce que j'allais faire. Euh grecque, arabe pour moi ça voulait rien dire. Et 9
après on s'est réuni tout les trois. C’était marrant parce que on nous appelé le trio infernal. Tu 
sais on était que trois, tout le temps ensemble et on disait "bon, qu'est-ce qu'on va faire.” (…) 
C’était bien parce que on nous a laissé la liberté de choisir le programme qu'on veut, du moment 
où on fait un lien entre le grecque et l’arabe, euh, on nous a donné la liberté du contenu. (…) 
C’est comme un atelier. Si tu veux. C'est pas mes élèves de toute l'année. (…) Par exemple, on a 
fait au début de l'année mon collègue il a fait un mois avec eux tout seul, après l'autre collègue il 
a intervenu, et moi j'ai fait le troisième mois. Parce que on a dit que c'est plus logique qu'il y a 
une suite. Je vais pas commencer l'alphabet par exemple une semaine (parce que c'est une fois 
par semaine seulement, une seule fois), je vais pas commencer et en suite on arrête et l'autre 
collègue vient pour parler d’autre chose. (…) Donc j’ai commencé avec l’alphabet. J’ai terminé 
l’alphabet. Après on a fait la partie civilizationnelle. Ça veut dire il fallait qu’ils voient le rapport 
entre la philosophie arabe. Comment les arabes ils ont, euh, transmis la philosophie grecque et 
comment ils ont traduit la philosophie grecque, et comment ils l'ont expliqué, et fait passé en 
suite. Donc on en a énormement parlé. Tout ca c’était en français. Alors on a parlé de Averroes. 
On a parlé de lui. Euhm mes collègues de grecque ils ont parlé d’Aristote, parce que justement 
Averroes il a traduit Aristote et il l’a commenté. Donc eux ils s’occupaient de cette partie. Ils ont 
vu des films concernant-alors c’était Alexandre. Ils ont vu Alexandre. Ils ont vu Cléopâtre et 
Antonio, des choses comme ça. Et on a parlé surtout sur la thématique d’Alexandrie parce que 
c’était un lien entre le monde arabe et grecque.” (Norah, 3.28.13). 
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 The examples reviewed here precipitate a handful of observations about 
Madame Durel’s preference—instilled in MSA classes over the 2012-2013 school 
year—for an MSA with professional and international utility over an MSA 
symbolically tied to Islamic history. As apparent from students’ comments, they 
continued to view MSA in a way that had symbolic as well as instrumental 
facets. For students, MSA remained a language tied to Islam and hence to their 
parents’ countries. It was not, as such, simply a language relating to their 
personal identities (“identitaire” in Madame Durel’s words). Rather, youth 
thought they might use MSA to read Koran, perhaps garner recognition in 
religious settings, and please their extended families. MSA was recognized to 
have an international dimension, not because it would lead to jobs around the 
globe, but because youth knew this language was admired in Muslim 
communities everywhere. As Moore (2011) notes with respect to European 
Union language policy more generally, there is a mistaken tendency to push 
languages either to the side of the “private person, possessing particular 
determinations of an ‘identity’” (p. 17), or to the side of the universalist “public 
citizen.” MSA as understood by youth who participate in public school classes 
continues, however, to be a language that is neither just private nor insular 
insofar as it is tied symbolically to Islam. As students’ parents perhaps reasoned 
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in urging their children into MSA classes, MSA has the potential to help youth 
maintain ties to the Muslim community within and beyond Marseille.  
 Just as symbolically laden languages may prove instrumental for those 
who ascribe to those symbolic values, so may languages thought only to be 
instrumental also be shown to have significant symbolic dimensions. Underlying 
Madame Durel’s vision of a practical, communicative MSA was, in eﬀect, more 
than just a pitch for youth’s socioeconomic mobility. As aﬃrmed by Moore 
(2011), “mere eﬃciency and symbolic value will always contradict each other, 
until we realize that eﬃciency is a symbolic value” (p. 21). Within the context of 
Marseille-European Capital of Culture-2013, the State’s move to instruct 
Muslim youth in a secular, professional register of MSA belies the city’s fear of 
Marseille falling backwards into social strife, poverty, and Islamic stringency. 
MSA’s eﬃciency, as such, lay in its presumed ability to maneuver Marseille’s 
diasporic youth population towards a more Classical, secular Mediterranean 
identity. In other words, although MSA was marketed in utilitarian terms to 
youth, along with it came a bundle of values endorsed by the local government. I 
have argued here that these values were packaged by the Municipality in the 
form of a recognizable cultural chronotope: an invitation to believe in a 
Mediterranean heritage for Marseille that dates to Antiquity. Insofar as MSA 
policy illustrates that swapping religious symbolism for economic utility 
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involves more, culturally, than just instrumentality, Minna Sif seems to have 
hewed very close to reality when she wrote that, in 2013, Marseille intended to 
become “capital of another culture” than its own. Nevertheless, the examples in 
this section show that Marseillais youth from Muslim familial backgrounds did 
not assume footings, or the stances and dreams, aligned with Durel’s MSA and 
were not, as such, interpellated as secular, Mediterranean subjects.  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 The premise explored in this chapter is that people may engage in 
recollections of the past that remain both perspectival and largely hypothetical. 
What is the significance of the French State recollecting a past that maybe never 
was, or belonged to someone else, as if it was their own? Can nostalgia be felt 
for an unlived past, and when it is, what might that indicate about the present? 
Jameson (1994), for instance, describes the blind nostalgia felt by the Russian 
characters in Andrei Platonov’s novel Chevengur, who wake in the middle of the 
night and search unknowingly for what might be signs of a socialist utopia. This 
“nostalgia mode” (Jameson, 1984, p. 66), which Jameson finds equally in the 
modernist literature of the former Soviet Union and U.S. films from the post-
modernist 1980s, is characterized primarily by “the desperate attempt to 
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appropriate a missing past” (ibid.) for the purposes of the present. What role 
might signs circulated by the French State in Marseille, like bits of MSA or 
contemporary images of Antiquity, play in their nostalgic attempts to bring the 
past forward?  
 This chapter focused, in particular, on how the French State in Marseille 
created “imaginary complicities” (Foucault, 1972, p. 4) between discontinuous 
nodes in time and space through such means as cultural programming and new 
MSA educational policies. Marseille’s Municipality turned to the Mediterranean 
of the past, chronotopically hypothesized to have united the Arabs and the 
French in a shared Greek and Roman heritage, to sketch a Marseille for the 
present, where the city’s diasporic and French-origin people come to share in 
one Mediterranean culture. The political and economic backdrop for the 
nostalgic reconfiguration of Marseille in these terms is, as described, the context 
of Marseille’s ongoing gentrification, its period in the public eye during MP2013, 
and its desire to reshape its reputation: from a city associated perhaps more 
closely with crime, poverty, and its Algerian population (e.g., Margérie) than with 
being a highbrow “cultural” destination.   10
 In a reference to Marseille’s numerous Algerians and Algerian descendants, youth sometimes 10
blend Marseille and Algérie, which yields Margérie. 
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 As apparent from the discrepancies in the importance youth versus the 
Municipality ascribed to Marseille’s status as European Capital of Culture, the 
city’s residents were engaged during 2012 and 2013 in a protracted negotiation 
over the definition of “culture.” Commentators like Minna Sif wondered in what 
sense Marseille was to be cosmopolitan, for instance. Why did city oﬃcials not 
consider diasporic youth to be representative of Marseille’s desired international 
identity? The material analyzed in this chapter prompts a series of related 
questions, in turn. Why are the youth socialized into an Islamic milieu not 
viewed as cultural contributors to the city, to the extent that their culture must 
be swapped out for a secular Mediterranean one? Is the move to push 
Marseille’s Muslim youth to identify with a visual appearance and an MSA 
defined in relation to a Classical Mediterranean in fact a restorative, historically 
accurate one? Does this move restore MSA and, through it, the diasporic youth 
who participate in MSA classes, to a long-lost pedigree? And, perhaps most 
importantly, did the Municipality’s project to “classicize” the infamous Arab and 
African crossroads, through cultural programming and MSA instruction, 
successfully entail Mediterranean citizens?  
 Viewed from a distance, the local Ministry of Education’s elaboration of 
MSA as a professional, communicative language in many respects resembles the 
language standardization projects that yielded European standard languages like 
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French, Spanish, or German (Gal, 2008). Only, interestingly, it is a minority 
language in this case, MSA, that is being groomed to linguistically represent 
French culture in Marseille. Likewise, the targets of the standardization project 
are French Muslims rather than the whole French nation. Madame Durel’s 
initiatives can be reframed, thus, as attempts to address a specific crisis, among 
diasporic socioeconomically marginalized youth, at a critical time, during 
Marseille’s year as Capital, with tools and concepts borrowed from Europe’s 
long experience with creating national subjects through language 
standardization.  
 The Municipality’s eﬀorts notwithstanding, conversations with youth 
who partake of MSA classes evinced, not only their uncertainty about MSA’s 
utility for their careers and their preference for English, French, or Spanish, but 
also a perduring understanding of MSA as a religious language. In sum, then, 
the invitation Marseille extended to professedly Muslim youth, asking them to 
claim Frenchness by aligning themselves with the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 
appears to have been rescinded by youth themselves. As presented in Chapters 
Three, Four, and Five, youth articulated their cultural belonging to Marseille and 
the Mediterranean in ways that diﬀered substantially from the kind of 
Mediterranean identity described in this chapter. Specifically, how youth 
positioned themselves culturally with respect to their hometown, their parents’ 
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Mediterranean countries of origin, and the Muslim World more broadly, 
depended upon their conception of themselves as either highly pious Muslims or 
else working-class diasporic youth.   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Transcript 6.1. French Original 
CE: Comment on les appelle ces classes là? 
LD: On les appelle "filières Méditerranéennes de langues et cultures Méditerranéennes" 
CE: Voilà. Et comment ça marche exactement? 
LD: En vérité c'est un travail conjoint entre les professeurs de langues d’antiquité, grecque et latin, et 
langue arabe. Mais dans le projet peuvent s’adjoindre d'autres professeurs. Un professeur d’histoire...(C: 
Oui) ou autre. Moi, dans le projet que j'ai à Cezanne un professeur de Provençal veut s’adjoindre. Moi je 
suis sur qu’on pourrait faire des choses intéressants, sur la musique, sur la poésie d’amour, choses comme 
ça.  
CE: C’est super comme idée. C’est récent donc? 
LD: Ouais, ouais. 
CE: Et d'où s'est venue ce- 
LD: -C’est venue d'une réflexion commune entre des gens de bonne volonté ((laughs/scoﬀs)) qui pensent 
que, euh, les langues anciennes chez nous sont en danger et l'arabe est en danger, et qu’il faut unir ces 
forces. (C: Oui) Donc c'est une perspective comme ça, de Méditerranée. C’est à dire en vérité c'est toute 
cette réflexion sur la Méditerranée, vous savez Braudel eh mais même l'Union hein, pour la Méditerranée, 
etc. (C: Oui). Tout ça c’est une réflexion de-nous ancrons, nous ancrons la France dans un espace 
géographique européen mais il y a un autre espace qui a une vraie cohérence qui est la Méditerranée.  
CE: Où la France est présente depuis bien plus qu’un siècle. 
LD: Voilà. Oui, oui, donc la Méditerranée, fin, c’est une inspiration très braudelienne. C’est à dire qu’il y a 
une culture Méditerranéene. Il y a eu des échanges. C’est un espace de vie très ancien, un espace de 
partage, de combats et de (liens?)- 
C: -Politiques aussi, justement- 
LD: -Et que tout ça ça crée une culture commune qu’on exploite pas suﬃsament. 
CE: Et les élèves comment ils répondent à ce-? 
LD: -Bah les quelques expériences qu'on a, très bien! Il n’y a pas de soucis. Ils sont contents. Par exemple, 
le projet qu’il y a sur Victor Hugo, auquel participent deux professeurs de lettres classiques et Norah, c’est 
chouette hein. Ols ont fait des trucs sur Aristote, sur Alexandrie, sur-ils sont allés à Paris pour voir les 
manuscrits là, de la Bibliothèque Nationale, c’est à dire les manuscrits grecques et latins qui sont passés 
par les arabes. Ils ont été apportés au monde occidental par les Arabes. (C: Jmm) On essaie d’apporter 
notre pierre à cela.  
CE: Je commençais à désespérer mais ça me semble une bonne stratégie, pour régler le statut de l’arabe.  
LD: En arabe il faut mieux ne pas désespérer. Il faut mieux très pugnace et être comme ça 
C: Oui, optimiste surtout ((long pause)). Et ça existe aussi cette idée de Méditerranée dans d’autres 
programmes d’arabe qui sont pas d’ici? 
LD: Non, non c’est national. C'est national. Mais en dehors de nous (la France), qui s’intéresse à 
l'enseignement de l'arabe? Personne! En termes scientifiques, personne! Dans le monde arabe il y a pas eu 
de développement de didactique de l’arabe, de science pedagogique de l’arabe. Les autres pays européens, 
non, non plus! Puisque ils n'ont pas-non que l'enseignement qui est universitaire. Nous avons une vraie 
spécificité française nous. (C: Mmm). De part l'ancienneté de l'enseignement de l’arabe en France. Ça 
remonte au 16ème siècle. De part euh l’histoire coloniale aussi. Il faut pas non plus l'omettre. C’est-à-dire 
nous avons eu une histoire coloniale dans le monde arabe, beaucoup au Maghreb, qui a fait que les études 
sur les arabes-sur la culture d'arabe se sont beaucoup développées. Et ça a créé une vraie réflexion. C’est 
comment on peut enseigner l’arabe en tant que langue vivante étrangère? Nous sommes les seules à 
réfléchir à ça.  
CE: En Europe vous voulez dire? 
LD: Ou même dans le monde arabe. Dans le monde arabe, qui réfléchit à ça? Personne! 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VII. Sexual Slurs: The Policing of Peers’ 
Language Use among Youth from 
Muslim Households in Marseille’s 
Projects 
I. Introduction 
 The idea for this chapter began with a curious incident early during my 
fieldwork. I was observing a group of twenty students learning MSA in their 
public school classroom in Northern Marseille’s 16th arrondissement, the same 
classroom, Class 3B, as appeared in Chapters Three and Four. The teacher, 
Madame Chérif, asked a student named Mohamed to write a particular sentence 
on the chalkboard about a hypothetical character named “Nabil.” Mohamed 
began writing out Nabil “ل - ي - ب - ن” (n-a-b-ī-l) beneath his classmates’ neatly 
written sentences, taking his time and exaggerating the tips on his letters. No 
sooner had he finished than Madame Chérif, looking displeased, took an eraser 
to his tall letters. “But my version is more swag!,” protested Mohamed at his 
typical high pitch. New to the term and skeptical of this new writing method, 
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Madame Chérif replied, “and what is swag?” Before he could answer, Maisara 
piped up “It’s homo!” from the back of the room.   11
 Among the students of Class 3B, being “swag” meant putting the kind of 
eﬀort into appearance, such as clothing, make-up, and accessories, that was 
associated with Western pop culture and the global music industry. This 
definition for the French label swag holds similarities to both its early 
etymological predecessors in England and its more contemporary use in the 
United States. First attested in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream at the 
turn of the 16th century—“What hempen homespuns have we swaggering here, 
so near the cradle of the fairy queen?” (Shakespeare, 1907, p. 35), the verb 
swagger pertained to a tremulous or swaying motion in one’s walk, “an aﬀected 
manner” (Wedgwood, 1865, p. 356). The meaning of aﬀectation appears to have 
accompanied “swagger” in its passage to the United States, where the verb 
underwent apocopation and conversion to the noun “swag.” The online freely 
editable Urban Dictionary features 535 entries for swag (2012). Entry two reads 
“‘the way someone presents themselves.’ Eg, whether someone looks 
cool” (2012). The association of swag with coolness is traceable to the early 
2000s, when hip-hop artists Jay-Z (“All I Need,” 2001), Soulja Boy (“Pretty Boy 
 Mohamed: “Mais ma version est plus swag!”/Madame Chérif: “C’est quoi swag?”/Maisara: 11
“C’est homo!” (12-12-12)
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Swag,” 2010), and Lil B (“Wonton Soup,” 2010), along with pop-music singer 
Justin Bieber (“Boyfriend,” 2012), put out songs lyrics with swag in the refrain. 
Swag’s connection to trends in the music industry explains why youth in Class 
3B considered pop singers like Rihanna and Justin Bieber, or media personalities 
like Kim Kardashian, to epitomize swag style.  
 What is, perhaps, unexpected is how, in this youthful context of Northern 
Marseille, men having a swag look were often tropically recast as “homo,” or 
gay.  Asked the meaning of swag, many of the students in Class 3B would 12
provide the folk etymology “S.W.A.G.—secretly we are gay” along with a 
definition focused on clothing. I argue that youth’s association of swag style with 
homosexuality is one that makes sense only in light of contrastive ideologies of 
personhood and language that youth have developed locally. On the one hand, 
they evaluated white, Western behaviors, like dressing swag and speaking 
Standard French, as indexing a “soft” (mou) disposition. To this persona, they 
counterposed their own image as tough, on the other hand. Among the 
behaviors thought to index this toughness were youth’s preferred tracksuits-
and-sneakers style and a linguistically syncretic register of French and Arabic, 
which they dubbed Castellanois after their project (c.f., Chapter Three). Given 
 Within the body of the text, I use quotes to indicate verbatim speech I recorded with youth 12
and English translations of what was said. Italics within the text indicate a language other than 
English. I provide the original text in footnotes.
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these contrastive ideological frames, when a male classmate deviated from his 
tough persona, peers understood such deviant behavior in terms of a softening 
of character. In Mohamed’s case, his claim to write Arabic in a swag style, 
together with his high-pitched voice, served to align him with the “softness” of 
white, Western culture and thus contributed to his construal by Maisara as a 
“fag.”  
 The primary concern of this chapter, as such, is to investigate the 
linguistic and behavioral crossing (Rampton, 1995) practices of diasporic youth 
from Marseille’s housing projects who have been socialized into Muslim 
traditions since childhood. The four questions orienting my inquiry are: to 
which language registers do youth hew as indexical of their various identities; 
what reasons might they have to cross out of these in-group registers; how are 
instances of crossing received by their peers; and what role does youth’s 
socialization into Islam play in these reactions? The data for this chapter were 
drawn from my fieldwork with three main peer groups: one, the MSA students 
in public school Class 3B; two, a friend-group of orthodox Muslim-identified 
female students at a local public university; and three, orthodox youth who 
either worked or attended the private Muslim secondary school in Marseille’s 
15th arrondissement.  
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 The anecdote with which I began this chapter introduced the tendency for 
youth from Northern Marseille to position as queer or sexually non-normative 
the behaviors they associated with other ethnic, class, and religious groups. To 
better understand this phenomenon, in Section II below I discuss a handful of 
analogous ethnographic examples from various minority contexts. These studies 
show that in contexts where several dimensions of social marginality overlap, 
where people are for example confronted to substandard living conditions and 
violence, or they experience economic or religious marginalization in addition to 
ethnic minority status, forms of group solidarity develop that make it socially 
delicate to behave in ways that transgress group boundaries. I discuss how the 
practice of linguistic “crossing” (Rampton, 1995) in particular, when one draws 
on linguistic resources associated with an (often ethnic) outsider to your social 
group, carries heavy—and often gendered—consequences for the individual who 
engages in it. The impression of crossing centrally depends on people 
distinguishing in their environment between at least two diﬀerent 
“registers” (Agha, 2007a), or two separate types of personhood understood to 
inhere in certain expressive behaviors, including language, clothing, and other 
signs. These images of personhood may, furthermore, be made of such 
aﬃliations as class, ethnoracial or religious group, gender, and age, among 
others. Viewing cultural identity within a semiotic framework of this sort allows 
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for a more technical discussion of what has previously been discussed in terms 
of the intersectionality of identity (Crenshaw, 1992). As such, the studies I 
review pay particular attention to how, in any event where someone deploys a 
linguistic or other sign token, “multiple social axes of identification coincide, 
emerge, or undergo ‘erasure’” (Alim & Reyes, 2011, p. 381), depending upon 
local conditions and sociocultural understandings.  
 Following this review of the literature, in Section III I compare two 
instances of youth from Class 3B crossing from Castellanois into Standard French, 
one by a young male resident of the project and another by a female student 
from Class 3B. I demonstrate that youth in this context deployed sexual slurs in 
reaction to linguistic crossing as a means of policing ethnoracial, class, and 
religious (or moral) boundaries that they wanted to keep intact. In addition, I 
oﬀer suggestions as to why instances of young men from La Castellane speaking 
a more standard form of French prompted readings of gayness, whereas young 
women from the community crossing in this way on occasion led them to be 
constructed as sexually easy or “slutty” (i.e., bandeuse, folle, bimbo, crasseuse, ham-
ham [ħɑmħɑm]). In Section IV, I present two transcripts from a slightly older 
peer group of female university students who, though also raised in Northern 
Marseille’s housing projects in North, West, and East African households, 
identified instead as orthodox Muslims (c.f., Chapter Five). In one, a Muslim 
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sister, or Islamically pious woman, exhorts other sisters to speak elegantly, in 
Standard French, as a means of enacting piety. In the other, a lunchtime 
interaction between several orthodox sisters unfolds in which one of them 
crosses into a “project French” not unlike Castellanois, an interactional move I 
analyze as the young woman’s desire to reveal her queerness to her closest 
friends. Taken as a whole, this chapter captures how youth from this milieu in 
Marseille, in creating certain ideological frameworks of ethnicity, class, and 
religion, at times eclipsed gender and sexuality altogether, and at other junctures 
rendered nothing but gender and sexuality visible.  
II. The Language Practices of Minority Groups in Mainstream Contexts: 
Intersectionality and the Penalties of Linguistic Crossing 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers in the social sciences fell 
into step with activists for minority rights in challenging assumptions about 
both the fixity and uniformity of identity. Gender and race, in particular, 
emerged from this pivotal period understood as societal achievements rather 
than innate personal qualities. Butler (1990) urged the view that gender, for 
instance, represented “a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of 
experience” (p. 23). As such, it lacked “ontological priority to the various roles 
and functions through which it assumes visibility and meaning” (ibid., p. 22). 
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The destabilization of identity categories instigated by postmodern 
anthropologists like Butler was pushed further by the arrival of third wave 
feminists, many of whom were women of color, to the Women’s Movement in 
the early 1990s. In 1992, Rebecca Walker, daughter of African American activist 
and novelist Alice Walker, wrote a magazine article in which she disputed 
“women” as a unified category. She envisioned that third wave feminism would 
be uniquely attentive to the ways in which female struggles were crosscut by 
women’s experiences with race, class, age, sexuality, religion, and so forth. 
Among the sources of inspiration for Walker’s work (1995), and for that of later 
third wave activists (e.g., Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Rehman & 
Hernández, 2006), were writings from the 1980s by second-wave feminists of 
color (Anzaldúa, 1987; Morraga, 1983; Lorde, 1984) in which they alluded to 
gaping diﬀerences between women’s lives depending upon their circumstances. 
The point that neither “womanhood” nor “blackness” were singular cultural 
categories was made especially clear, in the case of the United States, by 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1992) revelation of the way in which American blacks 
and whites reacted to attorney Anita Hill when she accused Clarence Thomas of 
sexual harassment on the eve of his Supreme Court nomination. Crenshaw 
argues that educated black women like Anita Hill tend to fall between the cracks 
of recognizable American stereotypes and face repudiation from all camps as a 
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result. Hill, shows Crenshaw, was unable to inhabit the figure of the violated 
white “Madonna” during her hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee (p. 
408), nor that of the black individual wronged at the hands of white society, 
often typified as a black male. She thus remained unaccounted for by the 
feminist movement, unvindicated by “dominant whites” (431), and vilified by 
“black people across a political and class spectrum” (p. 433). To summarize, the 
scholarly and community concern with the politics of minority representation in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s marked a turning point in how social scientists 
approached race and gender issues. Postmodernism in anthropology and its 
sister disciplines meant greater awareness of how people construct social 
categories in historically and culturally specific ways, many of which articulate 
and criss-cross dimensions of human identity (Hall, 1992).  
 Insights from researchers interested in language and discourse both fed 
into and deepened the postmodern—alias “linguistic”—turn (Canning, 1994). 
Indeed, nowhere were postmodern foci, like “indeterminacy, performativity, 
and…the unrepresentable” (Lucas, 2013, p. 640), more apparent than in the 
interplay between people’s language use and the identities they claimed. Among 
those whose linguistically oriented research informed postmodern thinking 
about identity  were cultural anthropologists examining fieldworkers’ 
positionality with respect to their informants (e.g., Briggs, 1986; Crapanzano, 
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1980; Dwyer, 1982; Rosaldo, 1986); social theorists who argued for discourse as 
the fundamental medium for the exercise of power in society (e.g., Bourdieu, 
1979; 1982; Foucault, 1971, 1972); and linguistic anthropologists and 
sociolinguists who theorized the sociocultural functions of language where 
gender was concerned (Gal, 1989; Lakoﬀ, 1975; M. Silverstein, 1985a), race and 
ethnicity (Baugh, 1983; Brice-Heath, 1983; Anzaldúa, 1987; Ervin-Tripp, 2001; 
Goodwin, 1982; Labov, 1972a; 1972b; Mitchell-Kernan, 1971; Rickford, 1991; 
Smitherman, 1977; Zentella, 1982), and class and status (Bourdieu, 1979; 
Honey, 1989; Irvine, 1974; Macauley, 1977). Four key theoretical tools these and 
other scholars leaned upon in documenting language’s social functions in the 
various communities in which they worked were indexicality (Silverstein, 1976), 
ideology (Silverstein, 1979), performance (Bauman & Briggs, 1990; M. 
Silverstein, 1985b), and register (Agha, 2007a).  
 The terms indexicality, ideology, performance, and register highlight 
language’s systematic reliance on cultural context for its meaning. Such terms 
mark an approach to language quite diﬀerent from that of Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1916), who attributed a mainly symbolic, decontextualized nature to language 
as a system. Indexicality, more specifically, refers to language’s ability to 
presuppose as well as enact social or pragmatic meanings, given specific 
contextual parameters and ideological set-ups, above and beyond its semantic or 
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referential meanings (M. Silverstein, 1976). Certain contextual aspects of a 
speech event can be brought into “sharp cognitive relief” (ibid., p. 34) when 
language is functioning indexically, at times strategically and other times 
through a mismatch of the ideologies at play and contextual factors. Ideologies 
are key to the ability of linguistic forms to index social meanings. Ideologies, or 
“native metapragmatic…rationalizations about the use of language” (M. 
Silverstein, 1979, p. 207), serve to specify the social tenor of linguistic forms, 
while grammatical rules lay the latticework for speech. Reflexive ideologies 
about language in eﬀect permit the “enregisterment” (Agha, 2005), or a 
measure of social concertation about, the social meanings indexed by a way of 
speaking. A performance and poetics approach (Bauman & Briggs, 1990; 
Jakobson, 1960; M. Silverstein, 1985b), in turn, looks to the poetic organization 
of a text (e.g., parallelism) in order to read the positions speakers presuppose or 
create in the elapse of an interaction. If ideologies about language tend to 
narrow the scope of social meanings available to speakers, then the notion of 
performance “involves an active process of negotiation [of such ideological 
meanings] in which participants reflexively examine the discourse as it is 
emerging, embedding assessments of its structure and significance in the speech 
itself” (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 69). The authors I cite below have drawn 
upon these theoretical refinements to illuminate how minority groups in a 
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variety of locations have created ways of speaking, or “registers” (Agha, 2007a), 
that index their group qualities.  
 A register, as per Agha (2007a), is “a reflexive model of behavior that 
evaluates a semiotic repertoire (or set of repertoires) as appropriate to specific 
types of conduct (such as the conduct of a given social practice), to 
classifications of persons whose conduct it is, and, hence, to performable roles 
(personae, identities) and relationships among them” (p. 147). Any register is 
organized in three dimensions: it has a “repertoire” of forms (its criterial signs, 
linguistic and otherwise); it has a “social range” of pragmatic values (the 
personae and relationships its forms can index) thanks to circulating ideologies; 
and it has a “social domain” (domains of people socialized to use or simply 
recognize the register; ibid., p. 169). The following ethnographic examples show 
how registers of language and conduct serve minority communities as 
touchstones for community members to communicate significant dimensions of 
their identities, but also, on occasion, a mooring from which it proves perilous 
for them to stray. The phenomenon of “crossing,” which Rampton (1995) 
elaborated in his study of the multilingual practices of English youth of Anglo, 
Pakistani, and Afro-Caribbean descent in a South Midlands school, is 
particularly useful in understanding the politics and motives involved when 
people from a particular ethnic background step out of their in-group register 
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and into a way of speaking stereotypically associated with another ethnoracial 
group.  
 Rampton subsumes three types of linguistic behaviors under the label 
“crossing.” In each case, crossing is at hand because youth are moving into the 
linguistic space of an ethnic other. Of the three behaviors, however, two are 
intended and received humorously, while one seems to be an earnest attempt to 
identify with members of another ethnic group. The humorous practices 
include, first, how youth of Anglo and Afro-Caribbean descent embed 
fragmentary Panjabi into their speech, and second, how youth of Anglo, Afro-
Caribbean, and South Asian descent stylize or exaggerate Indian English. The 
third kind of crossing is when youth of South Asian and Anglo descent adopted 
elements of a Creole register to index a “sense of multiracial working class 
identity” (p. 136). The youth who crossed in this way hailed from working-class 
families in Ashmead village and were closely tied into black peer groups. 
Rampton describes black and white Ashmead youth’s use of an English with 
Creole characteristics as indexing qualities like “assertiveness, verbal 
resourcefulness, and opposition to authority” (p. 53). It also operated to 
diﬀerentiate Ashmead youth from “posh Anglos” living in wealthier districts, 
whom were variously classified as “‘posh,’ ‘snobs,’ even ‘posh wimpies’” (p. 61) 
and were the least likely to attempt crossing. Rampton’s work draws attention 
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to a great number of phenomena germane to the data I analyze in this chapter, 
among them the observation that there are social barriers to linguistic crossing, 
that in-group and out-group uses of language help youth index certain qualities 
(e.g., Creole register indexing being anti-establishment), and that in this context 
Ashmead youth disparaged their aﬄuent white male peers in feminizing terms.  
 Whereas Rampton (1995) analyzed instances of mainly male youth from 
Anglo and other ethnic backgrounds crossing into varieties associated with 
minorities, like Jamaican Creole or Indian English, I am also keen to discern 
what is at stake when minority youth—male as well as female—cross instead 
into more standard language varieties. What are the stereotypical qualities, 
personal barriers, and social consequences involved for minority youth who 
venture into linguistic standards that in Western contexts have historically been 
the purview of a powerful, lighter-skinned majority? Undoubtedly the crossing 
dynamic of this sort that has been the most thoroughly documented is that of 
African Americans crossing into Standard English. Rickford’s (1985) research on 
the speech of black and white people from South Carolina’s Sea Islands provides 
useful inroads into this question. Rickford found that black Sea Islanders were 
much more likely to use black Vernacular English morphosyntax (alias, African 
American Vernacular English, or AAVE) and participate in certain speech genres 
(e.g., folk-praying on Sunday morning) than white Sea Islanders. Rickford saw 
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these speech behaviors as “acts of identity” (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller, 1985), 
meaning black speakers spoke in AAVE to index their ethnic identity in 
opposition to white people. He also noted that, in this context, “approximation 
to or adoption of the other [white] group’s linguistic norms may be negatively 
viewed as crossing-over…and regarded with suspicion or hostility” (p. 116). 
What, more specifically, are the stereotypical values that accrue to African 
Americans who cross into speech practices or behaviors thought to proceed from 
white American culture? 
 Mitchell-Kernan (1971), in her work on black speech genres like 
“signifying,” comments on how crossing is often perceived to be both about 
wanting to climb the class ladder and to be white. She relays a conversation in 
which a young black woman challenges another about “being one of those 
Negroes who don’t eat chit’lins.” The accused woman replies that “I ate enough 
black-eyed peas and neckbones during the Depression that I can’t get too excited 
over it. I eat prime rib and T-bone because I like to, not because I’m trying to be 
white” (pp. 95-96). Here, the charge of acting higher class is shot through with 
overtones of assimilating to whiteness. The accused woman feels pressed to 
justify her preference for costlier cuts of meat in order to prove that she is not, 
in fact, trying to act white. Relatedly, Rahman (2008) has examined the fraught 
position of middle-class blacks insofar as crossing is a frequent part of their daily 
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routines. She details how middle-class African Americans, who have access to 
standard and vernacular poles of AAVE and mainstream varieties of Standard 
English, may be accused of “talking white” if they unduly standardize their 
speech in casual community interactions (p. 142), and yet may be 
simultaneously criticized for using AAVE in corporate settings. In her work on 
black comedic performances, in turn, Rahman (2007) inspects comedians’ use of 
AAVE and Standard English for the black and white social personae they index, 
respectively. She shows how when black comedians speak in AAVE it is to 
perform values like “down-home common sense and resourcefulness,” 
“assertiveness and directness,” a “no-pretenses attitude,” “black coolness,” and 
“soul,” defined as the emotional depth one gains from having experienced 
suﬀering (p. 67, p. 80). When they imitate white people, by contrast, their 
characters show traits like blandness, “mechanicalness” (p. 80), and 
“ineﬀectualness, supposedly the result of a stereotyped life of privilege” (p. 68). 
This ideological contrast, between hardened and resourceful African Americans 
and soft and ineﬀectual whites, generates powerful tropes involving gender and 
sexuality when black men in particular engage in linguistic crossing. 
 Baugh (1987), for one, hints at unequal interpretations of crossing for 
black men than for black women. Telling of his own experience in Philadelphia, 
he writes "Most of my childhood black peers were openly hostile to standard 
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English, and boys who chose to speak the standard were usually called ‘sissies’ 
or worse" (p. 237). Similarly, Fordham and Ogbu (1986) and Ogbu (2004) 
describe how, in a Washington D.C. high school, black male students who 
“behaved and talked according to the white definition” (Ogbu, 2004, p. 8), 
getting good grades and taking Advanced Placement courses, feared being called 
“pervert brainiacs” and “homosexuals” by their peers (p. 194). Jackson (2005) 
elaborates further on this link between black success and perceived sexuality. In 
the context of Harlem’s gentrification, he relates how male “Harlemites” 
characterized new establishments catering to a clientele with disposable income 
as “feminized and homosexual” spaces (p. 53). One black male youth, for 
instance, spoke of the “faggoty” taint of a gourmet bakery in Lower Harlem that 
was frequented by white and black middle-class patrons (p. 53). Summarizing 
this man’s position, Jackson explains that “middle-class status is articulated 
through homosexuality—two equally soft versions of public life—in 
contradistinction to the more stereotypically hardened performances of lower-
class black masculinity” (p. 54). In sum, it appears that at least some African 
Americans ideologically link whiteness with aﬄuence and personal weakness 
thus that crossing into Standard English, the language of the mainstream 
establishment, can lead one to be tropically construed as “gay.” It also seems à 
propos here to remark upon the documented tendency for African American 
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communities to ridicule black gay men as individuals trying to mimic white 
culture (Johnson, 2003, 2004; Sears, 1991). Johnson (2004) writes, for instance, 
of how he witnessed a black gay man being called “Miss Ann” (p. 252). This 
man’s likening to a imperious white woman depends, again, on links held to 
obtain in black cultural circles between eﬀeminacy, an “uppity” class stance, and 
whiteness.  
 What is the function, more importantly, of the feminization (e.g., sissies, 
Miss Ann) or sexualization (e.g., faggoty, homosexual) of men of color’s 
crossing behavior? Might there be comparable phenomena among young female 
crossers that shed light on this question? In revealing work on Texan Chicanas, 
Gallindo (1992, 1993) contests the notion, widespread among Chicanos, that a 
slang register called Caló is spoken exclusively by Pachucos, male representatives 
of a Chicano subculture originating in El Paso, Texas. Gallindo unveils that 
Texan Chicanas of various ages and career ilk also spoke and identified with 
Caló. The female speakers she interviewed felt that when they crossed into Caló, 
an otherwise male-dominated register, they sought to inhabit the role of “any 
woman who is liberated and breaking away from her traditional role” (Gallindo, 
1992, p. 16). Given Caló’s radical indexicality, at least for women, it is perhaps 
not surprising that men in their social circles monitored women’s use of Caló by 
claiming that only “putas” (prostitutes), “cantineras” (barmaids), and 
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“pachucas” (gang women) were wont to use Caló (Gallindo, 1993, p. 27). In sum, 
by speaking Caló these Chicanas risked having their reputations sexualized by 
men in their communities. Relatedly, Billiez, Krief, and Lambert (2003) report 
on the case of suburban diasporic youth from Grenoble who, depending on their 
gender, speak varying degrees of a local “langage racaille” (lowlife language). 
When young women chose to dial up their use of this register, by swearing on a 
par with young men for example, they were singled out by young men and 
women as being tomboys (garçons manqués), dudes in-the-flesh (des vrais mecs), 
and unattractive to their male peers (p. 183). In this Chicana Texan and French 
cases, women who crossed into registers associated with the opposite sex were 
disciplined by men via assertions of their masculinization and their 
desexualization.  
 In all, the review in this section has aimed to diversify perspectives on 
crossing as a sociolinguistic practice by using theoretical tools from linguistic 
anthropology and examining cases with an intersectional yet semiotic lens. 
Crossing may involve, as in Rampton’s (1995) definition, moving partially or 
entirely into a register indexical of another ethnic group. This movement took 
place from a majority towards a minority ethnic group in Rampton’s case of 
Anglos embedding Creole features in their English, but took place in the 
opposite direction, from an ethnic minority towards a majority group, in the 
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African American examples. Obstacles presented themselves in both directions 
of crossing, though I focused particularly on the tools minority groups have 
developed to hinder people’s transgression of group etiquette and established 
social boundaries. Notable among these devices are moves to feminize, 
masculinize, sexualize, and desexualize crossers. In the ethnographic section 
that follows, I examine what local norms are for language use and behavior in La 
Castellane and La Bricarde projects and if they vary by gender. I also analyze 
instances in which male and female youth linguistically deviated from these 
norms and the diﬀerent social consequences they faced depending on their 
gender.  
III. Language and Gender among Youth from La Castellane and La 
Bricarde Projects 
 Writing in 1990, William Labov summarized a little over two decades 
worth of quantitative sociolinguistic studies that had examined the interaction 
between sex and language. He proposed two principles to capture what he saw 
as the significant tendencies: 1) “For stable sociolinguistic variables, men use a 
higher frequency of nonstandard forms than women” (p. 210); 2) “In change 
from below, women are most often the innovators” (p. 215). A corollary of the 
first principle was that “In change from above, women favor the incoming 
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prestige form more than men” (p. 213). This corollary meant that women 
employed more numerous standard language forms than men, but only when 
they were aware of the relative prestige of linguistic forms. Although this body 
of research used sex of speaker as a methodological tool (and not the speaker’s 
gender identity), Labov and others have furnished attempts at explaining these 
hypothesized tendencies that represent theorizations of gender. For instance, 
Labov (1990) suggests that women’s greater attraction to standard speech 
derives from their need to assert dominance symbolically—namely, through 
language—unable as they are to wield the same “material power” as men (p. 
214). In parallel with Labov, Trudgill (1983) contributes the line of reasoning 
that women are less drawn to the language forms of the working-class because 
of their characteristic toughness and the links society draws between being 
tough and being masculine. Much research has revealed, however, that 
toughness is not a quality to which only men aspire. Data from Trudgill’s (1972) 
own research in Norwich speak to the need to explore group-specific definitions 
of femininity. When the lower working-class women from Norwich in his study 
conversed casually with the interviewer, interestingly they tallied the same 
number of non-Received Pronunciation forms (i.e., [ən] as opposed to RP [ɪŋ]) 
as their lower working-class male counterparts. In another context where gender 
and class intersect, Mendoza-Dentón (1996, 2008) has written about how 
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Chicana homegirls from Northern California orient their speech and behavior to 
an ideal of acting macha, or tough and demanding of respect. These young 
women cite intimidating behaviors like “looking in” (looking down past an 
upthrust chin), wearing long eyeliner, and not smiling as semiotic devices they 
use to claim more egalitarian relationships with their partners and fend for their 
families (Mendoza-Dentón, 2008, p. 104). In yet another context, in schools 
around France, Baines (2007) administered a survey to 483 French youth and 
found that the quotient of insults reported by young men and women diﬀered 
little. If these studies are any indication, researchers have already begun 
reassessing the claim of a one-to-one relationship between male gender and 
non-standard speech. Though this section intends mainly to explain a particular 
ethnographic phenomenon, it is certainly the case as well that the findings I 
present sit at odds with the sociolinguistic “natures” of men and women 
generalized by Labov and Trudgill above. Further, that the explanations I have 
found to best account for these data necessarily invoke dynamics of religion, 
class, and ethnicity likewise reinforces Ochs’ (1983) insight that, insofar as 
several domains of social reality come together in constituting gender, gender 
must not be studied in isolation, as an independent variable.  
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Project-Specific Ideals of Youth Masculinity and Femininity  
 As described in Chapter Three, La Castellane and La Bricarde Projects 
perch upon a hillside in the 16th arrondissement of Marseille, overlooking the city 
from its northern reaches. Both projects are also adjacent to the public 
secondary school attended by the students of Class 3B. Here, I discuss 
femininity and masculinity as they were locally formulated by the students of 
Class 3B. Ochs (1983) writes of the relationship between language and gender 
that, although there are linguistic forms that directly index or presuppose 
speakers’ genders cross-linguistically, most typically gender is indexed indirectly, 
meaning people ideologically link language forms to certain stances or qualities 
and these in turn feed into images of male and female gender. Similarly, my 
exploration of the topic of gender in the setting of Class 3B began, not by posing 
questions about masculinity or femininity per se, but by asking the students to 
describe their style and dispositions to me. I was intrigued to observe that 
gender surfaced very little in students’ responses and that replies to my 
questions overlapped significantly between boys and girls.  
 Apparel was among the first subjects to arise, and both male and female 
students, with only a few exceptions, described their fashion norm as “survêtes-
baskets,” or tracksuits and sneakers. Asma explained this preference as one of 
choosing comfort over looks. She spoke of going to door-to-door in La Bricarde 
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with Kenza and Siwar, distributing maqrūt, North African date-filled cookies, to 
neighbors during Ramadan, and how even on those special occasions the girls 
avoided the discomfort and hassle of make-up, heels, and dresses (2.14.13). The 
girls’ emphasis on comfort and going plain by no means translated into less care 
in selecting clothes, however. Whether during the week or on the weekends, the 
girls paid careful attention to both their outfits and their hair. Kardiatou 
preferred Adidas-inspired tracksuits matched to Palladium high-tops (montantes), 
which she finished with Senegalese bangles and a snippy ponytail. Asma tended 
to go for sweatshirts over jeans and rip-oﬀ Nike shoes, avoiding jewelry 
altogether but straightening her long hair. Siwar wore loose-fitting tracksuits in 
varying colors, while Anisa loved to wear black and would top oﬀ her 
sophisticated look with a Burberry-inspired scarf and hoop earrings. The boys 
opted for blue and green tracksuits instead of the pink and purple ones enjoyed 
by the girls, but shared a liking for puﬀy vests, scarves, counterfeit-brand 
sneakers, and coiﬀed hair with the girls. On a typical day, Kader wore an Adidas-
striped tracksuit, razored slits in his eyebrows, and a gelled mohawk. Ayman 
opted for a modern-day James Dean look, wearing a black leather jacket over a t-
shirt, dark tight jeans tucked into high-tops, a scarf tightly wound around his 
neck, and his hair gelled into a devil-may-care wave. Mohamed summarized the 
local fashion norms thus:  
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“The fashion of the northern projects is tracksuits, caps… [soccer] club tracksuits and 
sneakers: Adidas, Manchester, Lacoste, Chelsea. Lacoste used to be mean-cool but now 
it’s burned out” (2.11.13).    13
The students were unanimous in opposing their “mean-cool” (méchant) 
tracksuit-and-sneakers norm to the style they called swag, and girls as well as 
boys had uproarious reactions when I asked them if they personally dressed 
swag:  
Cécile: And you guys, are you swag? 
All: Noooo! ((laughing loudly))  
Samia: No, no, no ((laughing)) 
Kardiatou: Tracksuits-and-sneakers 
Anisa: And yeah, like, sneakers 
Asma: The swag people are more those people who wear knit sweaters, big sunglasses, 
Jordans… 
Kardiatou: Like Americans! 
Asma: Yeah! Like Americans.  14
These girls, on a later occasion, let me into the negative perceptions they held of 
certain female students, from another class called Class 3A, whom they 
considered to be swag (2.10.13): 
 “La mode des Quartiers Nord c’est survêtes, casquettes… des survêtes de clubs [de fut] et des baskets: 13
Adidas, Manchester, Lacoste, Chelsea. Lacoste avant c’était méchant mais maintenant c’est devenu 
cramé” (Mohamed, 2.11.13). 
 Cécile: Et vous, vous etês swag? 14
All: Noooon! ((laughing loudly))  
Samia: Non, non, non ((laughing)) 
Kardiatou: Survêtes-baskets 
Anisa: Et ouais, genre, les baskets 
Asma: Les swag c’est plus eux qui mettent des tricots, les grosses lunettes, les Jordans… 
Kardiatou: Comme les americaines! 
Asma: Ouais! Comme les americaines.
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Kenza: Do you know, like, Juliette?  15
Anisa: Juliette and ((unclear)) 
Asma: They are always trying to act pretty! 
Cécile: In 3B? 
Kardiatou: No, no, no 
Kenza: In 3A 
Asma: Eeeeeh if they [the girls] did that in 3B… ((unclear)) [The girls in 3A] They have 
money to dress up and all, but they’re dumb in the head 
Cécile: How do they dress? 
Kardiatou: They wear foundation 
Kenza: How do we say... 
Cecile: Lots of make-up? 
Kardiatou: Because they’re all full of pimples! ((Kenza laughs)) 
Cécile: Are they Arab girls? 
Kardiatou: A Chinese girl, a Cambodian girl, another is an I-don’t-know-what 
Kenza: A gypsy 
Asma: A gypsy, an Arab 
Kardiatou: Another she’s a-a Madagascan  
Cécile: But do they dress tracksuits-and-sneakers? 
Kenza: Eeeehm no! They dress really swag. They wear skirts in winter 
Asma: Plus, they hang around more and all with the boys and all that 
  Kenza: Tu connais Juliette et tout? 15
Anisa: Juliette et ((unclear)) 
Asma: Elles font trop les belles! 
Cécile: Dans la 3B? 
Kardiatou: Non, non, non 
Kenza: Dans la 3A 
Asma: Eeeeeh dans la 3B ils font ça et... ((unclear)) [The girls in 3A] Elles ont des sous 
à sapper et tout, mais elles sont bêtes dans la tête 
Cécile: Elles s’habillent comment? 
Kardiatou: Elles mettent du font de teint 
Kenza: Comment on dit... 
Cecile: Beaucoup de maquillage? 
Kardiatou: Parce-qu'elles ont plein de boutons! ((Kenza laughs)) 
Cécile: C’est des filles arabes? 
Kardiatou: Une chinoise, cambodgienne, une autre c’est une chez-pas-quoi 
Kenza: Une gitane 
Asma: Une gitane, une arabe 
Kardiatou: Une autre c'est une-une malgache 
Cécile: Mais elles s’habillent survêtes-baskets? 
Kenza: Eeeehm non! Elles s’habillent bien swag, elles portent des jupes en hiver. 
Asma: En plus, elles trainent plus avec tout les garçons et tout ça 
Kardiatou: Ufhh 
Kenza: Ouais, elles font les populaires 
Kardiatou: Et elles vont fumer dans les toilettes avec eux 
Kenza: Mais dans le collège. ((pauses)) Notre class en fait on a un bon délire quoi 
Asma: Ouais, on n'est pas style trop habillé
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Kardiatou: Ufhh 
Kenza: Yeah, they act all popular 
Kardiatou: And they go smoke in the bathroom with them [the boys] 
Kenza: But at the secondary school. ((pauses)) Our class, we’ve got a good style going 
you know 
Asma: Yeah, we’re not too dressed up in our style 
In these transcripts, the students of Class 3B identify a specific “project” 
sartorial style, characterized by tracksuits and sneakers and “not being too 
dressed up” (pas style trop habillé) as the desirable norm for both girls and boys.  
 This kind of no-nonsense clothing style was indicative of a more general 
disposition held by youth in Class 3B, summed up by a student named Kader as 
the “mentality of the projects” (2.14.13).  This disposition was explained to me 16
as the need to show grit and act tough, whether one was male or female. 
Mohamed explained this mentality, more specifically, as a quality into which 
youth from the projects are socialized. When I asked him about where he 
planned to live in the future, he spoke of staying in La Castellane and teaching 
his future son about having backbone: 
“To stay in the projects that way my-that way my son he has a-he has the project 
upbringing, that way he has a project upbringing. He won’t let people mess with him… 
He’s tough, he’s not scared of anybody” (4.4.13).  17
This orientation to toughness manifested itself quite clearly in the classroom, 
where both male and female students were willing to face disciplinary action in 
 “J’ai la mentalité des quartiers” (Kader, 2.14.13). 16
 “Rester dans les quartiers comme ça mon-comme ça mon fils il a du-il a l’éducation quartiers, comme ça il a 17
une éducation quartiers. Il se laisse pas faire…Il est dur, c’est il a peur de personne” (Mohamed, 4.4.13).
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order to prevent a peer from insulting them or having their autonomy 
compromised. Ayman was notorious among his classmates for not allowing even 
the most minimal slight to his person. On a Friday in mid-March, 2013, Ayman 
was barred from class for refusing to follow the teacher’s directions. Ayman had 
gone to sit at the backmost desk of the classroom and, try as the teacher might 
to get him to sit in one of the seats closer to her, where she might keep a better 
eye on him, he would not budge. Ayman was not alone in his eﬀorts to prove he 
was proud and unafraid of people. In October earlier that year, Nacima received 
a detention for having yelled profanities at Kader during classtime. Kader and 
Nacima were in fact friendly more generally, but on this day Kader firmly crossed 
a line into racist territory when he called her “King Kong.” Nacima, whose 
parents are Comorian and Maorese, stood up and lunged for Kader, hurling 
insults in Comorian and French (to the eﬀect of “go get some balls”)  and 18
trying to scratch at his face. She had to be held back by two male students and 
the teacher, and Madame Chérif immediately meted out three hours of detention 
for Nacima and three days of expulsion for Kader. Once calm returned to the 
classroom, Madame Chérif walked by my desk and murmured, “I didn’t think a 
 Nacima began her sentence in French, “va chercher,” and then inserted the object in Comorian. 18
Another Comorian-speaking student glossed the object as a vulgar word for testicles, like couilles 
in French, but I was not able to write down the Comorian word (10.17.12).
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girl could talk like that” (10.17.12).  The teacher was not alone in her surprise 19
at these girls’ behavior being on a par with that of the boys. When I brought up 
the topic with a young woman named Gaëlle, who worked at a nearby 
community center with a similar demographic of youth, she aﬃrmed that “The 
girls are obliged to ‘masculinize’ themselves in order to exist” (1.23.13).  The 20
concept of girls acting like boys, oﬀered as an account by the teacher and this 
youth leader, turns on the assumption that boys are normatively exhorted to act 
toughly, whereas girls are not. I argue, contrastively, that in the particular 
cultural milieu of Marseille’s northern-most projects, youth enjoined toughness 
and inviolability upon their male as well as female peers. When the girls in 3B 
acted with brawn, they were simply acting like project girls.  
 An ancillary point to this argument is the observation that, if toughness 
was expected of both the boys and girls in Class 3B, the girls faced the additional 
expectation that they be modest in their clothing, behavior, and relationships 
with the opposite sex. Who enforced these rules? Girls themselves played a part, 
as shown by the transcript above in which the girls from Class 3B commented 
on the lapses of the girls in Class 3A. The latter, who forsook tracksuits and 
sneakers for swag style, were negatively judged as contravenors of project 
 "Je ne pensais pas qu'une fille pouvait parler comme ça” (Madame Chérif, 10.17.12). 19
 “Les filles sont obligées de se masculiniser pour exister” (Gaëlle, 1.23.13).20
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femininity: wearing heavy make-up and skirts showing their legs, smoking 
cigarettes with boys in the bathroom, and preening (“faire la belle”). The 
students’ Muslim parents also urged modesty upon their daughters, asking them 
not to spend time with boys outside of school or to stray too far from home. 
When for example the girls from Class 3B visited my apartment on the 
weekends, a parent with a car chaperoned them to and from my doorstep, rather 
than letting them take the bus and the Métro system. In the video excerpt below, 
Kader tells a similar story of how Sabrina’s mother restricts her movements. 
Though told in jest, Kader’s store is based on a premise rooted in a specific 
reality, namely, that of parents monitoring their teenage daughters’ relationships 
and movements around the projects in a way unthinkable for their teenage sons.    
Cécile: What’s your favorite neighborhood? 
Sabrina: None. 
Kader: It’s Carrefour Grand Littoral! ((Sabrina laughs loudly)) She’s not allowed to go 
past it. 
Sabrina: No… ((puts hand up in protest)) 
Kader: I swear to you, her mom made red lines. “Don’t pass these!” Tac, tac, tac 
((gesture as if putting down red tape)). “If you pass these, Sabrina…” 
Sabrina: No! What’s your problem? Hey Maisara! ((Looking to Maisara, across the table, 
for help)) 
Kader: Then the buzzer rings! Here comes the slap. 
Cécile: Is it like with Mohammed? 
Sabrina: It’s not true! 
Maisara: Ayaaaah! 
Sabrina: It’s not true. My mom lets me… but not too far away. She’s scared. Hey, my 
mom is scared, I’m a girl, hein! 
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Kader: Ah, here comes the slap!  21
Girls, in other words, acted tough, and yet they were protected by their parents 
as if harm could befall them at any turn. There were, I should note, 
circumstances that would give any parent cause to worry. Students came to 
school on at least two occasions over the course of the school year with reports 
of Kalashnikov shots fired between rival groups during drug skirmishes in La 
Castellane. On another occasion, the teenage daughter of the janitor at the local 
youth center was admitted to the hospital after sustaining injuries from a gang 
(une bande) of female teenagers armed with knives and a gun. To summarize this 
discussion of gender norms for young men and women from these projects, it 
 This excerpt is from a filmed interview with Kader, Sabrina, and Maisara dated 6.12.13. The 21
Carrefour Grand Littoral is the large mall located just above La Bricarde and La Castellane. The 
students and their families do their grocery and other shopping there, as it is only a walking 
distance away. When I ask if Sabrina’s situation is similar to that of Mohamed’s, I am referring 
to a previous conversation I had with a group of boys in which Kader teased Mohamed—who the 
boys often construct as being girly—of facing the same restrictions on his movements as his 
female peers.  
Cécile: C’est quoi ton quartier préféré? 
Sabrina: Rien. 
Kader: C’est Carrefour Grand Littoral! ((Sabrina laughs loudly)) Elle n’a pas le droit de 
le dépasser. 
Sabrina: Non… ((puts hand up in protest)) 
Kader: Je te jure, sa mère elle a fait des traits. “Tu depasses pas ça!” Tac, tac, tac 
((gesture as if putting down red tape)). “Tu dépasses ça, Sabrina…” 
Sabrina: Non! Ça va pas ou quoi? Eh Maisara! ((Looking to Maisara, across the table, for 
help)) 
Kader: Il y a la sonnette qui sonne! Alors voilà la claquette.  
Cécile: C’est comme Mohammed? 
Sabrina: C’est pas vrai! 
Maisara: Ayaaaah! 
Sabrina: C’est pas vrai. Ma mère elle me laisse… mais pas trop loin. Elle a peur. Oh, elle 
a peur ma mère, je suis une fille, hein!  
Kader: Ah, la voilà la claquette!
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can be said that both genders valued and oriented to toughness as a stance 
indexical of a project mentality or upbringing. Local images of male and female 
gender, as such, resembled one another insofar as they were grounded in 
working-class values like holding one’s head high, getting things done, and 
living a no-frills existence. Where they diverged, however, was in the accessory 
requirement that young women faced to be modest as well, a gendered notion of 
propriety based in Islamic values, like female modesty and pre-marital chastity, 
which youth presumably learned about from their parents.  
 Given these initial remarks on how youth masculinity and femininity took 
shape in these two projects, I now shift to examining the ways in which youth 
from Class 3B indexed these overlapping—class, ethnicity, religion, and gender-
based—identities in their speech, more specifically. I look, first, at how boys and 
girls indexed toughness linguistically; second, I consider youth’s relationship to 
Standard French; and third, I present two examples of a young man and then a 
young woman crossing into Standard French in anomalous ways, together with 
their peers’ reactions.  
Linguistic Repertoires of the Project Youth and the Paillot 
 The identification of a linguistic behavior as crossing requires that 
speakers distinguish between language varieties and their attendant social 
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personae. Said diﬀerently, at least two registers, in Agha’s (2007a) sense, must 
be afoot when crossing is attested. In the previous section, I introduced male 
and female youth’s adherence to a demeanor of toughness. Here, I consider how 
they indexed this tough disposition through the linguistic register of Castellanois 
(c.f., Chapter Three) and their relation to Standard French as though it indexed 
an opposing model of personhood. One of my initial observations in this regard 
was that the students, though I often heard them speaking more standardly in 
their French class with Madame Massi, consistently sought to mark their lack of 
ownership over Standard French. When for instance I asked them for their views 
on Standard French, they would respond that it was a kind of French spoken 
naturally by others than themselves, those whom they designated “paillots” (c.f., 
Chapter Four). In the excerpt below, taken from a conversation I had with 
Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda while sitting on the school steps, quite early into 
the school year and our acquaintance, Sabrina explains how the term paillot 
describes both a type of speaker and the type of speech associated with them.  
Sabrina: Paillot, that’s the Parisians when they talk. They talk well! 
Cecile: Are there students from Class 3B that speak paillot? 
Maisara and Sabrina: Degunnng!!! [dɛgəŋŋ] (‘not a soul’) 
Maisara: Madame no one speaks paillot here. It’s more Southern Marseille, over there. 
Maisara: ((singing an RnB song)) …et la melancolie fait partie de ma vie… 
Sabrina: But Madame if I find-if I could, I would speak like the paillots. But I can’t do it 
here. 
Cecile: You want to speak like that? 
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Sabrina: Yeah, but I can’t do it here, you see? It’s too many swear words and all [in 
Castellanois]. So I can’t keep [Standard French] going.   22
Sabrina identifies “les paillots” as people who live in the more aﬄuent southern 
parts of Marseille, or else in Paris. The paillots, says Sabrina, “speak well” (ils 
parlent bien), while she and her peers in Class 3B “speak badly” (on parle mal), a 
point she raised later in the same conversation.  In evaluating Standard French 23
versus Castellanois thus, Sabrina would seem to be voicing the French 
institutional perspective on the country’s linguistic landscape. This is an 
institutionalized discourse, purveyed by such regulating bodies as l’Académie 
Française and the Ministry of Education, according to which Standard French is 
the guarantor of, not merely educational and professional success, but also 
national unity. Analyzing the character of Standard French in comparison to 
other standard languages, Le Page (1989) writes that French can be said to be 
the “most reified, totemized, and institutionalized” language among them (p. 
12). In the same vein, Armstrong and Mackenzie (2013) advert that “the 
 Sabrina: Paillot, c’est les parisiens quand ils parlent. Ils parlent bien!  22
Cécile: Et il y a des élèves de la 3B qui parlent paillot? 
Sabrina: Degunnng!!! [dɛgəŋŋ] 
Maisara: Madame, personne parle paillot ici. C’est plus les Quartiers Sud là-bas. ((singing))…et 
la mélancolie fait partie de ma vie… 
Sabrina: Bon Madame si je trouve-si je pourrais, je parlerais comme les paillots mais j’arrive pas 
ici. 
Cécile: Tu veux parler comme ça? 
Sabrina: Oui! Mais j’arrive pas ici, vous voyez? C’est trop des gros mots et tout. Donc j'arrive pas 
a garder…  
(Sabrina, Maisara, 11.12.12). 
 Sabrina: Ils parlent bien, vous avez vu. Nous quand on parle, on parle trop mal. (11.12.12). 23
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association between writing and formal speaking is perhaps closer in French 
than in comparable languages” (p. 219).  Sabrina was continually exposed to 24
this discourse about French at school, and notably in French class. To illustrate, 
in one lesson the French teacher focused on helping the students distinguish 
between “le français familier” (colloquial forms of French, like Castellanois), “le 
français courant” (everyday educated French), and “le français soutenu” (elevated 
French). The first, she explained to the students, is proper to peer interactions; 
the second, to public settings and speaking and writing in her classroom; and 
the third, to formal writing and rhetoric (2.11.13). The teacher drew further 
links between Standard French and success when, after the class did poorly on a 
practice Baccalaureate exam (Bac Blanc), she emphasized that they must study 
the nuances between such Standard French verbs—featured in the exam 
instructions—as cite, identify, define, compare, classify, and enumerate.  To 25
return to my interaction with Sabrina, I believe it was my presence, as someone 
she had only seen observing her Arabic classroom and had not yet encountered 
outside of class, that led her in this interaction to articulate similar thoughts on 
language as those of her teachers.  
 My husband, for instance, who learned French at an early age in Senegal and later moved to 24
France, was often complimented by French friends who found that he spoke “like a book” (parler 
comme un livre). 
 Interview with Madame Massi (4.4.13). 25
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 Sabrina’s comments about paillot, or Standard French, also hint at a more 
complex set of calculations youth face in regards to this register. Put simply, 
why, if youth are familiar with an institutional arrangement wherein using 
Standard French confers social benefits upon the speaker, does Sabrina 
emphatically state that “not a soul” (degun) in Class 3B speaks paillot? Should 
Sabrina’s statement be read as evidence for these youth’s minimal exposure to 
Standard French and diﬃculty with its production, or might social calculations 
and an element of choice be involved when youth deal with this register? Two 
observations can be made in this respect. The youth in Class 3B did sometimes 
struggle to master Standard French. Madame Massi, the French teacher, traced 
this struggle to a relative lack of exposure to Standard French in the home 
compared to youth from other backgrounds. She remarked that her students had 
to work extra hard, compared to youth from other neighborhoods, to become 
fluent in the French misleadingly called “courant” (or commonplace) French. On 
a similar note, a particularly diligent student named Kenza admitted that, when 
she went to intern in a pharmacy for a week as part of a school requirement, she 
was insecure in her interactions with customers. She mentioned feeling as 
though she did not know how to greet clients when they walked in nor which 
formalities to use while taking their orders. A second observation is that, such 
diﬃculties notwithstanding, youth occasionally found it socially perilous to 
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speak Standard French, depending on their interlocutors and the speech event at 
hand. In her comments above, Sabrina implies that her location in the projects 
makes it socially unwise to speak paillot (“If I could, I would speak like the paillots. 
But I can’t do it here”). She adds that a personality contrast exists between 
Castellanois, which she links to vulgarity (“gros mots”), and the well-mannered 
French of the paillots. This contrast prevents her from keeping paillot going for 
very long (“je peux pas garder [l’accent paillot]”). Below, I argue that Sabrina 
describes her experience with Standard French as fleeting because she and her 
peers only borrowed its indexicality in moments of strategic need. 
 When I inquired with Sabrina whether any students in Class 3B spoke 
paillot, she replied that none did. It is thus necessary to distinguish between 
what Sabrina understood by speaking paillot, which she vowed “not a soul” in 
Class 3B did, and crossing into paillot, which every member of Class 3B did on 
occasion and with certain interlocutors. Speaking paillot was to consistently use 
the repertoire of Standard French because of an aﬃnity with the social persona 
of the paillot. The quality youth from Class 3B ascribed to this social persona 
was, in Mohamed’s words, being soft (“mou”), to which he contrasted the tough 
persona of youth raised in the projects (4.4.13).  Table 7.1 summarizes the 26
salient oppositions between the registers of the project youth and the paillot, 
 “Mohamed: L’éducation de quartiers c’est… il est dur, il a pas peur.” (4.2.13). 26
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with regards to speech, clothing, and the stereotypical qualities indexed through 
the use of these repertoires. Swag, as discussed in the initial anecdote, is one 
among several clothing styles youth associate with the persona of the paillot. 
Table 7.1. Two Registers in Northern Marseille 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Social Personae   Project Youth   Paillot 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Repertoire 
Clothes   Survêtes-Baskets   Swag 
Language   Castellanois   Le français paillot  
                                                                                                                           (Standard French) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stereotypic Quality  Toughness   Softness 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 If Sabrina refused the charge that she spoke paillot, in the sense of 
defaulting to Standard French and the indexicality that corresponded to it 
locally, the practice of episodically crossing into paillot was one at which she and 
her peers were quite adept. Mohamed, for example, commented that he crossed 
into forms approximating Standard French in order to show respect to authority 
figures around school: “As soon as I have to speak with the principal or vice 
principal, I talk well. I don’t talk like that [in Castellanois]” (4.2.13).  In her 27
 “Dès que je dois parler avec le principal ou la CPE je parle bien. Je parle pas comme ça” (Mohamed, 27
4.2.13). CPE is an acronym for Conseiller Principal de l’Éducation and is the person in French 
secondary schools who is in charge of discipline, absences, and student aﬀairs more generally. 
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study of tu and vous usage in France, Morford (1996) writes that her informants 
chose one or the other pronominal form as a means of strategically “defining the 
setting or the relationship between the speaker and addressee” (p. 24). In the 
case of Class 3B, similarly, the students turned to a paillot repertoire in order to 
index a soft disposition. Imbuing their demeanor with the quality of softness 
served, in particular, to express deference to people in their environment from 
whom they stood to gain or lose something, whether a school vice principal or a 
potential employer. In the following excerpt from a video interview (6.12.13), 
for instance, Kader demonstrates the extent to which his use of paillot French 
was goal oriented. He recounts the process of having to make phone calls to 
business owners in order to arrange a one-week internship. As one of their exit 
requirements for secondary school (collège), the students interned in local 
businesses of their choosing, including pharmacies, car shops, hair salons, and 
department and retail stores at the local mall (e.g., Darty). 
 Cecile: Do you guys speak kinda paillot sometimes? ((Sabrina shaking her head no)) 
 Kader: “Ummm, yes, ummmm” ((Sabrina laughs)) 
 Sabrina: No but sometimes to goof oﬀ, but- 
 Kader: -That’s all they say,  “Ummm, yes, ummmm”- 
 Sabrina: -almost never no, never!  
 Kader: But it’s true that I, to call the bosses I would do the paillot 
 Sabrina: Yeah, but that, I mean, but {like} 
 Kader: {“Oh hello}, are you (2nd person plural) planning on taking- 
 Sabrina: But when you’re {asking for internships too} 
 Kader: -{“an intern?”} They tell me non, then (akhé) I say, but at the hand ((hand  
 gesture)) “Well, go fuck yourself (2nd person singular)!”  
 Sabrina: ((laughing)) He speaks paillot and then he does that! No…. 
 Cecile: How would you speak to them? 
 Sabrina: To ask for internships 
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 Kader: First I ask. I ask. If he tells me “yes,” I say “Well, great, thanks and all.” Then  
 (akhé) if they tell me “no,” I say “go fuck yourself” (2nd person singular) or “go fuck  
 yourself” (2nd person singular) and I hang up! ((grinning))  28
The bolded text in this segment are Kader’s requests and replies to hypothetical 
business owners in paillot. His use of repetitive interjections of euh [œw] to 
show polite hesitation, the French uvular voiceless fricative /ʁ/ in bonjour and 
prenez, and cordial lexis (e.g., oui, allez bonjour, merci et tout alors) together serve to 
cordon oﬀ the voice of the paillot from his regular speech, in Castellanois.  29
Despite the comedic mood of his retelling, via this story Kader also reveals the 
strategic, façade-like rapport he maintains to Standard French. Strictly speaking, 
the paillot register is one he is willing to inhabit with a prospective employer but 
  Cecile: Vous parlez un peu paillot des fois? ((Sabrina shaking her head no)) 28
 Kader: “Euh, ouiiii euhhh” ((Sabrina laughs)) 
 Sabrina: Non mais, des fois pour faire des délires, mais- 
 Kader: -Ils font que “euuhh oui euhh”- 
 Sabrina: -presque jamais non, jamais!  
 Kader: Et moi c’est vrai, pour appeler les patrons je faisais le paillot.  
 Sabrina: Ouais après voilà mais {genre…} 
 Kader: {“Allez bonjour}, est-ce que vous prenez- 
 Sabrina: après quand {tu demandes} des stages aussi 
 Kader: -{“un apprenti?”} Ils me disent non, akhé je dis mais à la fin ((hand gesture)) 
 “Bah, vas te faire enculer!”  
 Sabrina: ((laughing)) Il parle paillot après il fait ça! Non.. 
 Cecile: Tu leur parlais comment? 
 Sabrina: Pour demander des stages. 
 Kader: D’abord je demande, je demande. S’il me dit “oui,” je dis “bah, ça va, merci et  
 tout alors.” Akhé [ɑχχɛ] si ils me disent non je dis “vas te faire foutre” ou “vas te faire  
 foutre” et je raccroche! ((grinning))
 The only notably Castellanois element in Kader’s paillot voice is his aﬀrication in apprenti 29
[apʁənʧi]. Despite this example to the contrary, youth from La Castellane generally showed 
themselves in our conversation to be acutely aware of this particularity in their speech. The 
ascension of aﬀrication to emblematic status in Marseille has previously been suggested by 
Gasquet-Cyrus (2004) and Vernet and Trimaille (2007), and they describe the feature as being 
increasingly associated by Marseille’s residents with youth from Northern Marseille. 
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only so long as they oﬀer him an internship. When in his hypothetical scenario 
the internship does not come through, Kader reverts to Castellanois and to tu (va 
te faire enculer). The insult he tacks on (“Bah, va te faire enculer!”) expresses his 
disgust at having played the paillot and yet come away empty-handed.  
 These examples illustrated how, when faced with high-stakes 
interactions, youth crossed into paillot to index deference and thereby produce 
certain results. The yield was nevertheless not always guaranteed, as in Kader’s 
story, and disillusionment or frustration could ensue. More intractable 
diﬃculties arose, however, in scenarios when youth crossed into Standard 
French without what peers perceived to be a clearly defined goal. Two case 
studies of this type of scenario are examined below. In sub-section 3 below, I 
analyze how a group of female students constructs a male peer when he 
transgresses the project’s linguistic norms. Then, in sub-section 4, I trace how 
male students from Class 3B participated in sexualizing a female peer who 
tended to speak Standard French.  
Qui Parle Tarplin Français?:  A Case Study of a Male Crosser into Paillot 30
 On Sunday afternoons, a group of six girls from Class 3B often came over 
to my apartment in La Joliette, at the northern edge of Central Marseille, to 
 This translates roughly to “who speaks so much (or such an intense degree of) [Standard] 30
French.”
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practice their English and chat with me. Of them, three—Asma, Kenza, and 
Sheyreen—were raised, or diapered (“couche-culotte”) as they liked to say, in La 
Bricarde project. The other three, Anisa, Kardiatou, and Siwar, were from La 
Castellane project. All but one of the girls was born locally, though their parents 
came from several countries: Asma’s parents were Tunisian and French (from 
the North); Kenza’s parents were both Algerian; Sheyreen’s mother was 
Algerian and her step-father Egyptian; Anisa’s parents were Algerian Kabyles; 
Kardiatou’s were Pulaar from Senegal; and Siwar’s parents were Algerian. 
Within this group of young women, Anisa, Asma, Siwar, and Kardiatou were the 
most admired speakers of Castellanois.  Asma saw Castellanois as her default 31
mode: “I always speak like this [in Castellanois], except when I speak with 
adults” (10.29.12).  The girls lauded Siwar’s gab in particular, holding her up as 32
the professor of project-language (“professeuse de la langue des quartiers,” 7.12.13), 
due to her ability to draw various languages into her speech and riﬀ on rap 
lyrics. Sheyreen and Kenza, by contrast, were generally recognized to be less 
project-like in their speech, a fact to which I will return below.  
 Asma and Anisa were also among the most high-achieving students in the Arabic class, often 31
called upon by Madame Chérif to explain diﬃcult points or leave class alone to fetch materials 
from the main oﬃce.
 “Je parle toujours comme ça [en Castellanois], à part quand je parle avec des adultes” (Asma, 10.29.12).32
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 In the following transcript, the girls were sitting around my kitchen table 
discussing their impending Arabic fieldtrip to Paris. Though none had ever been 
to Paris, they nevertheless had some intuitions, likely gleaned from the media, 
about how Paris would compare to Marseille, and Parisians to youth like them. 
In an echo of Sabrina’s comments on who speaks paillot, Sheyreen begins by 
announcing that Parisians speak “French, French, French.” Youth from La 
Castellane, she compares, “mix all languages, actually creating our own 
language.” Through spatial and personal deictics, Sheyreen establishes an initial 
map—or poetic structure (M. Silverstein, 1985b, p. 185)—where certain types of 
language are naturalized as belonging to particular people and places. Standard 
French is the domain of Parisians (“they”) and distant Paris, while Castellanois 
forms the base from which “we” maneuver “here” in Marseille. As Wortham 
(1996) has noted, the “minimal interactional framework” (p. 344) sketched by 
these deictics reveals little as to how these respective interactional camps are 
evaluated. Useful devices for understanding participants’ alignments are what 
Gumperz (1982) has called “contextualization cues” (p. 131), which are textual 
indications as to how speakers are interpreting an ongoing interaction. In the 
next sequence of the transcript, Asma interjects to tell the story of how she 
overheard a young man using Standard French to order bread in the boulangerie 
at the foot of La Castellane. Her excoriation of this young man’s behavior and 
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her girlfriends’ supportive reactions of her judgment act as contextualization 
cues exposing the group’s negative stance towards paillots more generally but 
also, quite tellingly, their disapproval of individuals from the projects who cross 
into Standard French, not to perform deference to others in a high-stakes 
situation, but to imbue themselves with the qualities of soft sophistication 
indexed by the paillot repertoire.   
Transcript 7.1.  “Bread Please” 33
French Original English Translation
Sheyreen: Non non, moi j'aime pas trop les 
parisiens parce que eux ils n'ont pas de culture, 
tu vois? Nous, ici à Marseille, on melange toutes 
les langues en fait et ça nous fait notre propre 
langage, alors que eux ils parlent français, 
français, français. Et nous on decou-des fois, on 
decouvre des nouveaux mots. Regarde, et {ceux 
qui comprennent pas l’arabe} 
Asma: {Ce que je crains le plus}- 
Kenza: C’est quoi? 
Asma: -C’est les garçons qui parlent tarplin 
français. Ah l’autre fois j‘étais à côté de - tu te 
rappeles - d’un mec. Akhaaa [ɑχɑ::]-t’as vu il 
était bien stylé et tout mais tu le vois arriver-  
Anisa: -les filles {ça va mieux mais les garçons} 
Asma: {“Bonjour} un pain [pε]̃ s’il-vous 
plaît”  
Sheyreen: Ah! {Une drôle de fille} 
Kardiatou: {On dirait une gadji}
Sheyreen: No no, I don’t really like Parisians 
because they don’t have any culture, you 
know? Us, here in Marseille, we mix all 
languages in fact and we come up with our 
own language, whereas they speak French, 
French, French. And we make-sometimes, 
we make up new words. Look, {and those 
that don’t understand dialectal Arabic} 
Asma: {What I really shudder at}- 
Kenza: Is what? 
Asma: -is boys that speak lots of French. Ah 
the other day I was next to-do you 
remember-a guy. Akhaaa [ɑχɑ::]-you know he 
was styled right and all but you hear him 
come with- 
Anisa: -girls {are alright but boys} 
Asma: {“Hello} bread please” 
Sheyreen: Ah! {A strange girl} 
Kardiatou: {Seems like a girl}
 This interview dates from 1.27.13. 33
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 When Asma begins recounting what happened, she assumes a project-
centric footing (Goﬀman, 1981) by speaking in Castellanois. She aﬀricates her 
stop consonants, uses a transformed version of the Marseillais vernacular adverb 
tarpin (>“tarplin”), employs project slang lexis like gadji [gaʤi] ‘girl’ and the 
neologism akha ([ɑχɑ]), roughly glossable as ’oh my gosh,’ and most 
importantly, renounces the paillot rendition of pain ‘bread’ (with a nasalized 
vowel: [pε]̃) in favor of the velar nasal in the Castellanois version of the word: 
[pɛŋ]. Asma introduces her story by stating that what she hates the most (ce que 
je crains le plus) are boys who speak French to the nth degree (qui parlent tarplin 
français). She then asks Kenza if she recalls how, while waiting in line at the local 
bakery, they had witnessed a boy ordering at the counter in Standard French. 
Anisa: {Les filles ça va mieux mais...} 
Asma: {Il parle trop...} 
Kenza: Les filles c’est vrai ça passe hein mais tu 
vois des garçons 
Asma: Ouais! 
Cécile: C’est qui? C’est quelqu’un que tu 
connais? Comme ça, {un mec?} 
Asma: {Non, non} c’était juste un mec qui était 
venu acheter et tout mais genre il a fait 
“Bonjour, euh, je voudrais alors un pain 
[pε]̃?” 
{C’est pas beau!} 
Anisa: {Oh ouais}. Moi j’etais partie en 
Normandie {ils disent “pain” [pε]̃} 
Cécile: Parce que ça fait pas comme vous quoi. 
C’est ça que tu veux dire? 
Asma: Ouais. Ça fait trooop tapette.  
Cécile: {Trop quo::::::i?} 
Anisa: {Pain, pain, pain [pε]̃}
Anisa: {With girls it’s alright but...} 
Asma: {He was talking too...} 
Kenza: It’s true with girls it goes over okay 
hein but you see some guys 
Asma: Yeah! 
Cécile: Who was he? Someone that you 
know? Just like that, {some guy?} 
Asma: {No, no} it was just a guy who came 
to buy and all but he went like “Hello, um, I 
would love a piece of bread?”  
{It’s so ugly!} 
Anisa: {Oh yeah}. I went to Normandy [they 
say “bread” [pε]̃] 
Cécile: Because it’s not the way you would 
do it, right. Is that what you mean? 
Asma: Yeah. It comes oﬀ as sooo gay.  
Cécile: {So wha::::::t?} 
Anisa: {Bread, bread, bread [[pε]̃]} 
((imitating how people in Normandy 
pronounce “pain”))
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She imitates his order twice, dwelling on paillot elements like the greeting 
bonjour, his  overly polite way of asking for bread (je voudrais alors un pain), his 
hesitating use of euh, and his nasalization of the final vowel in pain. The girls 
immediately flag the young man’s recourse to Standard French in this casual 
neighborhood setting as non-normative. All the more so because, as Asma 
indicates, the boy was likely a resident of La Castellane, judging by the 
conformity he showed to project fashion norms (il était bien stylé et tout). Their 
negative evaluation of his crossing takes the form of slurs focusing on the young 
man’s gender and sexuality. Sheyreen opens the commentary with “a strange 
girl” (une drole de fille), Kardiatou then calls him a slang word for “girl” (gadji), 
and Asma wraps up the story with the slur “fag” (tapette). The girls draw several 
important distinctions, both explicitly and implicitly, between types of crossing 
into paillot here. First, Anisa and Kenza oﬀer the point that crossing into paillot is 
more acceptable for girls: “It’s true with girls it goes over okay hein but you see 
some guys…” Second, and much more subtly, the girls draw a distinction 
between their own crossing practices and the crossing behavior of this young 
man. In the case of youth in Class 3B, as I have chronicled, youth crossed into 
the paillot register episodically, or when interacting with individuals towards 
whom indexing deference proved socially advantageous in some tangible way. 
Youth relied on the “soft” indexicality of Standard French in these contexts in 
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order to demonstrate their knowledge and respect of their interlocutors’ status. 
By contrast, the girls suspected that the young man in the bakery was regularly 
using paillot to self-formulate as being diﬀerent from other project-dwellers: 
perhaps more educated or sophisticated.  
 This example is interesting because it illustrates what takes place when a 
young man from the projects contravenes the normative persona of the tough 
project youth. In the cultural landscape of the 16th arrondissement, local youth are 
expected to speak in Castellanois (and its equivalents in other projects) as a 
means of indexing values like toughness, grit, and working-class and multi-
ethnic solidarity. Crossing into paillot, a register typically associated with more 
aﬄuent, ethnically French people from beyond the projects, is acceptable—even 
expected—given interactions involving outsiders to the projects. The anecdote 
related by Asma, however, involved a young man using paillot in a non-normative 
way, namely, with employees at his local breadshop. The result was for the 
young man’s linguistic non-normativity to be read as his own sociological 
deviance. Insofar as he failed to index the tough persona normatively enjoined 
upon him as a youth from the projects, the girls at my dining table were able to 
tropically construct him as “a fag” (une tapette). Given this example’s similarity 
with my introductory anecdote, in which Mohamed was called a “homo” for 
engaging in swag style, I argue that the construal as “fags” of male youth who 
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personally aﬃliate themselves with paillot behavior has become a “normalized 
trope” (Agha, 2007a, p. 356), or a trope that has gained wider recognizability 
within this youth population. Agha defines normalized tropes as “usages that 
are denotationally anomalous but interactionally felicitous under certain 
conditions of role inhabitance” (p. 367). In these cases, the denotational 
anomaly lies in these male youth not in fact being gay yet being felicitously 
construed as such due to their inhabitance of a persona, the paillot, at odds with 
project-specific formulations of masculinity. Beyond the mere regularization or 
dissemination of this trope on male sexuality, it is also worth pointing out that 
these youth turned to non-normative sexuality, in particular, as the means 
through which to monitor their peers’ social transgressions. Youth’s 
socialization into Islamic traditions, including ideas about defined gender roles 
and the abnormality of homosexuality, no doubt informed youth’s choice of 
tactics with which to police their male peers’ behavior. To illustrate this 
relevance of Islamic morality to the youth in Class 3B, the following anecdote 
further explores how Islamic ideas about female reserve surfaced in 3B 
classmates’ discourse. Specifically, I inquire into how these circulating ideas 
influenced the way youth read their female peers who, rather than act project-
like, used Standard French and dressed swag.  
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“Tche une bandeuse!”: The Sexualization of Female Crossing into Paillot and Swag 
 Leaning back in her chair during Arabic class, Sheyreen peered out the 
window at a boy named Idris in the recess yard. The teacher was spelling out 
why the students must learn to read words in MSA without their attendant 
vowel markings, but Sheyreen’s attention was drawn to a little ditty Idris was 
singing and which she could just barely make out through the window. “Ta mère 
fait du stop-euh sans sa culotte-euh…” (12-12-12).  Sheyreen absentmindedly 34
mimed Idris under her breath, “Your mother can get her ride on... without a 
stitch on…” Sitting near Sheyreen and Ayman, I then overheard Ayman mutter 
to her: “you’re a slut!” (t’es [ʧε] une bandeuse [bəŋdœzə]). Sheyreen’s explosive 
reaction, and Ayman’s part in provoking it, had them both excluded from classes 
for the next 24 hours. I analyze the sexual trope of which Sheyreen was a victim 
in this incident as yet another kind of social policing, only in this case one lead 
by young men interested in curtailing what they perceived to be overly paillot 
and swag behaviors among their female peers. Sheyreen was recognized among 
her peers as tending in her style towards paillot speech and swag clothes. This 
backdrop, together with the suggestive content of the song she sang in class, 
opened up her up to the normalized sexual trope of the “slut,” which youth in 
 This translates, literally, to “your mom hitchhikes without her underwear” (Ayman, 34
12-12-12). 
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Class 3B captured with various labels, among them bimbo, bandeuse, bimbo, ham-
ham ([ħɑmħɑm]), and crasseuse.  
 Sheyreen, as I mentioned in the last section, was raised in La Bricarde by 
an Algerian mother and an Egyptian step-father. She was also among the few 
students born outside of Marseille, in the northern département of Pas-de-Calais. 
Though she was raised locally and spoke ardently about the virtues of 
Marseille’s projects, Sheyreen also enjoyed the cachet of being able to claim the 
somewhat exotic identity of being born elsewhere with her friends. Sheyreen’s 
speech, too, reflected her attempt to cultivate this allure of being from 
elsewhere. In the quotes below, Sheyreen sets herself apart from the typical 
project youth as someone who tends to speak less Castellanois—and more paillot:  
 “They [the other students] pronounce everything with an Arabic accent, in   
 fact.” (10.29.12)  35
“Here [at school], to tell the truth, I’m not allowed to speak normally. If I speak 
normally, I know I am going to get whacked around. Because when we speak correctly, 
well then people make fun of you and it sounds like yeah, “you’re a paillote, yadda yadda 
yadda…” (7.12.13)   36
“When I go home [from school], I am a paillote. So when I go home, I speak French 
super well. Sometimes, I speak English to practice. And that’s it! And I speak Hindu 
[sic] too. In fact, I take words from [Bollywood] films and I try to 
understand.” (10.29.12)  37
 “Ils prononcent tout avec l’accent arabe, en fait” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12).35
 “Ici, en fait, j’ai pas le droit de parler normalement. Si je parle normalement, je sais que je vais me prendre 36
des claquets. Parce que quand on parle correctement, et ben ça se moque de toi et ça dit oui, “t’es un paillote, nia 
nia nia…” (Sheyreen, 7.12.13). 
 “Je rentre chez moi, je suis une paillote. Donc je rentre chez moi je parle très bien français. Je parle anglais 37
des fois pour m’entrainer. Et c’est tout! Et je parle Hindu [sic] aussi. Je reprends en fait des mots des films 
[Bollywood] et j’essaie de comprendre.” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12)
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Here, Sheyreen identifies speaking “French super well” as her normal or 
preferred mode. In front of two female peers and myself, Sheyreen seemed to 
have surprisingly few qualms about announcing her ease and pleasure in 
speaking paillot, particularly given her cognizance of her peers’ negative 
perceptions of the persona associated with this repertoire. Sheyreen flouted 
other norms as well, notably choosing clothing that was recognizably swag. She 
combined elements of the tracksuits-and-sneakers look, like loose-fitting jeans 
over sneakers and going make-up-less, with such swag elements as frilly 
scrunchies and tops trimmed with see-through lace that exposed her arms and 
shoulders. She took pains not to call herself swag, however. Indeed, youth in 
Class 3B had come to understand swag, not merely as a clothing repertoire 
begun by stars in the music and television industry, including Rihanna, Justin 
Bieber, and Kim Kardashian, but also, more significantly, as a Western lifestyle 
centered on free choices and boundless sexuality.  
 Class 3B youth’s more textured understanding of swag, namely, as a 
clothing style indicative of a free-wheeling, libertine lifestyle, was directly 
influenced by a particular reality television diva, Nabilla Benattia. Her show, Les 
anges de la télé-réalité, aired over the 2012-2013 school year on the public 
television channel NRJ-12, and the students watched and frequently discussed 
the show’s developments. Nabilla is an aspiring model who was born in 1992 in 
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a French town near Switzerland to an Italian mother and an Algerian father. The 
show follows, among other storylines, Nabilla’s eﬀorts to land modeling gigs 
with American agencies while living in a house in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In 
one episode, she did a scantily clad photoshoot with a magazine in Las Vegas. In 
another, she invited Kim Kardashian to her house as a consultant in how to 
become, in her words, further “swaguée.” Other episodes, meanwhile, featured 
her on-and-oﬀ relationships with the men who lived in her house. One student 
in Class 3B, Fouhda, was exceptional insofar as she dressed swag and identified 
Nabilla as her role model in doing so. Fouhda dressed noticeably diﬀerently than 
the other female students in Class 3B. She straightened her hair, got French 
manicures, and wore make-up and tight-fitting sweaters over holey jeans. One 
day I asked Fouhda what she thought of being labeled swag by her peers. Fouhda 
replied that she was proud of being swag, like Nabilla: “I’m like Nabilla because I 
wear what I want and I don't care if others like it or not” (11.3.12).  She 38
contrasted her own stance with that of another girl in her year, who after being 
called swag one day at school went home during lunch break to change out of 
her tunic and tights. For Fouhda, Nabilla represented the possibility of resisting 
social pressure to dress modestly. Nabilla also represented the stereotypical 
 “Fouhda: Je suis comme Nabilla parce que je m’habille comme je veux, ceux qui n’aiment 38
pas…!” (4.3.13).
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speaker of Standard French. Her performance of this register was made 
particularly clear to the students after a much-publicized monologue Nabilla 
Figure 7.1. Nabilla in Action 
gave in an episode that aired on March, 4th, 2013. Nabilla had given a short, but 
memorably vacuous diatribe on how two other women on the show were 
capable of traveling without their shampoo. While pretending to be on the 
phone with one hand, she exclaimed in a ditzy but Standard French: “Hello? 
Come on, hello! You’re a girl and you don’t have your shampoo?” (Allô? Non mais 
allô quoi! T’es une fille et t’as pas de shampoing?). Her line became famous thanks to 
repeated showings on television in the weeks following the episode and much 
commentary in social media. This and other behaviors of Nabilla’s were 
circulated and digested by the students of Class 3B, who came to consider her as 
the embodiment—and thus, the connection—between speaking paillot, dressing 
swag, and being sexually loose.  
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 For the students, Nabilla’s sexual behavior stood witness to the 
possibility that a second-generation female from an Arab and Muslim family 
background might lapse in her moral socialization. A couple weeks after 
Nabilla’s famed episode, for instance, I directed a study hall for five male 
students from Class 3B. With my appreciable encouragement, quiet work 
quickly devolved into an energetic exchange of tidbits about Nabilla. Amid a 
deafening chorus of Nabilla “shampoing” imitations, the following conversation 
took place: 
Cécile: Did you guys see the Nabilla thing with “hallo”? What is Nabilla about? ((Nabilla 
imitations in the background)) 
Mohamed: She’s a bimbo. She’s all touched up. Her dream is to be an it girl, a girl who 
gives her body. She’s totally plastified. ((more Nabilla imitations)) 
Cécile: And is she Arab? 
Mohamed: Well, Nabilla she’s not actually an Arab. She said she was an Arab but like 
she didn’t have an Arab education because her mother was Spanish and her dad, she 
never saw him 
Cécile: So she was never educated as a Muslim? 
Mohamed: She’s Muslim but she never- 
Elias: -but she’s with Thomas in the pool!!!  39
In this excerpt, Mohamed appears to struggle with the disjuncture between 
Nabilla being une arabe—the ethnic and religious category to which he connects 
 “Cécile: Vous avez vu le truc de Nabilla avec ‘hallo’? Nabilla, c’est qui en fait? 39
Mohamed: C’est une bimbo et elle est toute refaite. Son rêve c’est d’être une ‘hit girl.’ Elle est en 
plastique. 
Cécile: C’est une Arabe? 
Mohamed: Genre Nabilla en fait c’est pas une Arabe. Elle a dit c’est une Arabe mais, genre, elle a 
pas eu une éducation d’Arabe. Genre parce que sa mère c’était une espagnole et son père elle l’a 
jamais vu.   
Cécile: Donc elle n’a jamais été eduquée en tant que musulmane- 
Mohamed: -Elle est musulmane mais elle a jamais- 
Elias: -Elle est avec Thomas dans la piscine!” 
(4-4-13)
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himself—and Nabilla’s dreams of being an “it girl,” her plastic surgeries, and her 
sexual overtures to Thomas in the pool. He settles on Nabilla being Arab and 
Muslim but, given her Algerian father’s absence in her life, lacking the requisite 
socialization into Islamic morals. As shown by Mohamed’s uptake of Nabilla’s 
persona, whom throughout this conversation the boys called une bimbo, une folle, 
and une crasseuse, behaviors like speaking paillot and dressing swag were 
sometimes perceived in Class 3B as having a sexual patina.  40
 Returning to the incident with Sheyreen, then, it can be said that several 
factors came together to make Sheyreen the unwilling target of a sexual slur. On 
the one hand, Class 3B was at the time in the throes of a reality television show 
the heroine of which was a young woman born in Europe to a part-Muslim 
family and whom, notably, crystallized connections between swag style, paillot 
speech, and sexually loose behavior. On the other, Sheyreen herself engaged in 
some behaviors—such as paillot speech and swag style, but also singing a 
playfully “dirty” song in class—that led to her perception as indexing softness 
and immodesty rather than the toughness at the heart of the project youth’s 
self-image. This incident reveals youth’s local ideology of toughness to impose 
unequal or gendered requirements on young women as compared to young men. 
 Fouhda added to this list of slurs for females the term ham-ham [ħɑmħɑm], also meaning 40
“slut.” The term appears to be a neologism created with the Arabic phoneme /ħ/. 
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Whereas young men were simply required to act tough, young women were 
expected to act tough and modest. When young women failed to show bodily 
modesty and sexual reserve, two kinds of female etiquette drawn from Islamic 
moral discourses, this resulted in their policing through sexual slurs, which 
were levied at them by their male as well as female peers. Despite these youth’s 
ready admissions that they would not pray as required nor fast consistently 
during Ramadan, such instances are pointed illustrations of the continued 
relevance of certain Islamic norms among these Marseille-born youth. Although 
youth’s orientation to Islam influenced interactions in a more tacit way, it was 
also occasionally the case that youth flagged their aﬃliation to Islam in more 
tangible ways. In my fieldnotes from the day Ayman insulted Sheyreen, for 
instance, I wrote “Ayman has Allah written in Arabic on his right hand in 
purple” (12-12-12).  
 A last point in this regard pertains to the very real consequences for 
young women of such sexual name-calling. Towards the end of the school year, I 
conducted another interview with Fouhda in which we happened to discuss 
what we each thought of Facebook. Fouhda explained that, “Now that they have 
made a page for ‘The Sluts of Marseille,’ I’ve closed my account” (4.3.13).  She 41
filled me in on how some unknown Facebook users had created a page featuring 
  “Fouhda: Depuis qu’ils ont fait la ‘Page des Folles’ j’ai fermé mon Facebook.” (4.3.13)41
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local swag girls’ profile pictures and had tagged them with the label folle, or 
“slut.” Many of these photos were then insultingly commented upon (e.g., 
“you’re a crasseuse and all”), and some of the male commentators even feigned 
rendezvous with the depicted girls (e.g., “come at 4 p.m. to the Carrefour”). 
Fouhda, who earlier in the year had enjoyed penning the word love on her wrist 
and dressing how she wished, was now quite concerned about whether her 
previous labeling as swag would lead to the marring of her reputation, 
potentially changing it to bimbo. She approached her transition to high school 
the following year with no small degree of trepidation.  
Figure 7.2. (Left) Fouhda Writes “Love” on her Wrist Using Ayman’s Purple Marker (12-12-12) 
Figure 7.3. (Right) Phone Numbers for Made-Up “Folles” on a Chair at a Northern Marseille 
Tram Stop 
!347
IV. “Za’ama Je Crois à Notre Amour:” Standard French and Northern 
Marseille’s Youth Register as Resources for Performance among 
Orthodox Muslim Female Youth 
 In the ethnographic examples given above from La Castellane and La 
Bricarde housing projects, youth from Class 3B were shown to trope on 
ideological contrasts between local social types, positioning their peers in 
sexualized ways as a means of policing behaviors thought to be aberrant for the 
projects. In this section, I present how orthodox-identified individuals, likewise 
from Northern Marseille, diﬀerently orient to these same social types. A few of 
the examples I draw upon come from the time I spent teaching at a private 
Muslim school in Marseille 15th arrondissement. The majority, however, derive 
from my friendships with a group of female youth from Cité La Viste, another 
project in Northern Marseille. These young women, who were nineteen and 
twenty years-old when I met them in 2012 and 2013, attended the local public 
university and were studying to receive their Bachelor’s degree in Arabic 
language and literature. The majority of the women in this friend group lived 
with their families while attending the university, mainly in La Viste project, 
while a few of them also lived on campus. These young women identified as 
orthodox or Sunni Muslims in the sense I described in Chapter Five. They 
followed strict prayer schedules, went together to Friday prayer, dressed in 
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jilbābs, ‘abāyahs, and ḥijābs, and actively sought out Islamic knowledge. 
Throughout the year, I interacted with these young women at the university, 
attending classes and spending time studying with them, but also on the 
weekends. We traveled around Marseille to see visiting cheikhs speak on topics of 
interest, participated in tajwīd courses at a mosque in Central Marseille, went on 
hikes in Marseille’s calanque cliﬀ areas, and enjoyed women-only events like an 
Islamic fashion show and an all-girls pool day.  
 These young women were notable in a linguistic sense insofar as they 
were raised in the projects of Northern Marseille but chose to speak, not a youth 
register like Castellanois, nor even Marseille’s vernacular French, but a French 
closer in phonology, syntax, and lexis to Standard French. As argued in Chapter 
Five, for diasporic youth who claimed Islamic orthodoxy, a key behavior through 
which they indexed their piety was to speak in languages they considered 
cultivated, like Standard French and Modern Standard Arabic. Male and female 
orthodox youth drew iconic links between these institutionalized and 
historically valued varieties of French and Arabic, on the one hand, and an ethos 
of pious personhood based in such qualities as elegance, education, and 
cordiality, on the other hand.  
 An intriguing question in this regard is whether young orthodox men and 
women were equally impelled to follow this ideology of piety. In the transcripts 
!349
that follow, which are drawn from this female peer group and a handful of 
orthodox male acquaintances, I demonstrate how both young men and women 
try to uphold a measure of linguistic standardness in their speech, and yet 
community members often judge women who fail to speak thus by a diﬀerent 
standard. The examples I present reveal that members of the orthodox 
community in Marseille tend to read young females’ use of project-like behavior 
or linguistic features, like those of Castellanois, as not only impious but also 
abnormally masculine. Young men, too, are typically reminded to act more 
Muslim when they assume stances reminiscent of the projects, only such 
reproofs seem to have little bearing on how others interpret their gender or 
sexuality. In an interesting final twist, I discuss instances in which young women 
from this friend-group exploited the link between so-called project language and 
toughness in order to index such interactional stances as humor or even, in one 
young woman’s case, being gender-queer.  
 I turn now to discussing the relation between language, piety, and gender 
in Islam, as understood by a young woman named Amel, one of the young 
orthodox-identified women who took part in the above-mentioned friendship 
group at the public university. Amel was somewhat unusual in her peer group in 
that she was not from Northern Marseille’s projects but was born and raised in 
the working-class, diverse neighborhood of Aix-en-Provence called Encagnane 
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Corsy (alias “La Zup”). After turning sixteen, she and her family moved to 
Manosque, a large town about 90 kilometers northeast of Marseille, and it was 
from there that she commuted to the university for classes. Her father, who was 
born in France to an Algerian family, worked as a janitor, and her mother, who 
came from Algeria at age nineteen, was a personal aide to the elderly. Among 
the life experiences Amel did share with her female peers at the university, 
however, was an early socialization into Islamic traditions, along with a 
transition towards greater piety at the end of her teens:   
“Islam has always been present in my life. I have been immersed in it since very young. I 
began fasting, praying near six years of age. I had a period of distance with it, between 
sixteen and eighteen years, where I lived kind of like a youth, before returning to myself 
in full consciousness, maturity, around nineteen years old. Since that day, I do things 
and I understand why I do them, hamdulilah.”  (3.2.16).   42
Here, Amel plots a timeline in which the period of youth is accompanied by a 
distancing from Islam, and then entrance into maturity likewise entails a growth 
in Islamic consciousness. Insofar as she now observes Prophetic Sunnah, Amel 
feels that she acts knowingly, or with direction. In the following one-on-one 
conversation I held with Amel (4.3.13), she described what she understood to 
be Sunnah’s special requirements for women. Some of the requirements she 
mentions, like having a compassionate and calm demeanor, are recognizable 
 “L'Islam a toujours était présent chez moi. Depuis toute jeune je baigne dedans. J'ai commencé 42
à jeuner, prier vers l'âge de 6 ans. J'ai eu une période, entre 16 et 18 ans, d'éloignement où je 
vivais un peu comme une jeune pour eﬀectuer un retour de moi-même et en pleine conscience, 
maturité, vers 19 ans. Depuis ce jour, je fais les choses et comprends pourquoi 
hamdulilah.” (Amel, 3.2.16). 
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from Prophetic Ḥadith traditions. Meanwhile, others show locally formulated 
ideologies of what being a “sister” (sœur) demands, like for instance her point 
that Muslim women must avoid speaking in the youth registers characteristic of 
Marseille’s projects. 
Transcript 7.2  43
French Original English Translation
Amel: L’Islam il peut te-en tant que fe:mme, je 
veux dire, t’as pas envie de passer pour euh, je  
veux dire, tu dois être une femme tu dois être 
posée douce et tu dois, fin, posée, douce. C’est 
les trucs que, tu vois? Mais je veux dire, tu 
dois avoir une certaine conduite féminine 
quoi. Tu dois pas arriver devant quelqu’un et 
lui parler comme une sauvage. En fin c’est 
contraire à l’éthique et au comportement quoi. 
Donc après si tu veux suivre le comportement 
de:s-des Ṣaḥābāt [sɑħɑ:bɑ:t] comme on dit et 
des-voilà, après t’as un choix à faire quoi. Tu 
vois? Et là directemente tu te places plus ou 
moi::ns- 
Cécile: -Ṣaḥābah [saħɑ:bɑ] je connais. Ṣaḥābāt 
[saħɑ;bɑ:t] c’est nouveau pour moi. {C’est 
mignon j’aime bien} 
Amel: ((laughs)){ Ṣaḥābiyāt} et voilà quoi du 
coup euhm, tu vois, tu euh te places dans ce 
contexte la quoi il faut que…je pense que oui, 
de toute façon quand tu es musulmane tu fais 
un eﬀort mais l’eﬀort ne-il vient plus 
naturellement peut-être. Mais après tu vois 
des soeurs en jilbab. Elle arrive la soeur, “wesh 
wesh” [wεʃ wεʃ]. Euhhh c’est surprenant 
franchement, c’est surprenant, parce que tu ne 
t’y attends pas trop en fait 
Cécile: -tu t’y attends pas parce que il y a un 
modèle de fémininité dans l’Islam {qui qui 
euh}
Amel: Islam can make you-as a woman, I 
mean, you don’t want to seem like, uh, I mean 
you have to be a woman. You have to be calm, 
gentle, and you have to, well…calm, gentle. 
Those are the things that-you see? But, I 
mean, you have to have a kind of feminine 
behavior you know? You shouldn’t appear 
before someone and speak to them like a 
savage. I mean, it’s contrary to ethics, to 
behavior. So then if you want to follow the 
behavior of the Ṣaḥābāt [sɑħɑ:bɑ:t], as we say, 
and of-there! Then you have a choice to make. 
You see? And right away you position yourself 
more or less- 
Cecile: I knew about Ṣaḥābah [sɑħɑbɑ] (:male 
companions of the Prophet”) but Ṣaḥābāt 
[sɑħɑ:bɑ:t] is new to me. {It’s sweet. I like it} 
Amel: { Ṣaḥābiyāt [sɑħɑbijɑ:t].} And so in this 
way umm, you see? You put yourself in that 
particular frame of mind. You have to… (.08). 
I think that for sure if you’re a Muslim woman, 
then you have to make an eﬀort anyway. But 
the eﬀort doesn’t-comes more naturally 
maybe. But then you see Muslim sisters in 
jilbāb [jilba:b]… The sister arrives “wesh 
wesh” [wεʃ wεʃ] (“what’s up”). Uh, it’s truly 
surprising. It’s surprising because you really 
don’t expect it. You don’t expect it because- 
Cecile: You don’t expect it because there’s a 
model of femininity in Islam that that uh…
 This interview dates from 4.3.13.43
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 In this narrative, Amel explains that there are two types of young female 
Muslims in Marseille. The first is she who calls herself a Muslim and follows the 
behaviors expected of the Prophet Mohamed’s female companions, the Ṣaḥābiyāt. 
These, she notes, include being gentle (douce), calm or patient (posée), and 
having a certain feminine conduct (avoir une certaine conduite féminine). Amel 
identifies the second local type of female Muslim as the young woman who calls 
herself a Muslim but has not yet adopted the appropriate ethic. Such women, 
says Amel, are liable to wear the Islamically appropriate jilbāb and yet greet 
people with wesh wesh (“what’s up”) and “arrive before someone speaking like a 
savage.” This greeting, deriving from the Algerian interrogative word wesh [wɛʃ], 
Amel: -{c’est ÇA} qui est assez primordial 
parce que: la femme c’est la mère… C’est euh 
c’est la douceur. C’est l’aﬀection. D’ailleurs 
quand on la décrit dans le Qur’ān c’est 
souvent par ses qualités là tu vois donc c’est 
vrai que quand tu-c’est vrai que pour une 
musulmane quelqu’un qui rentre dans l’Islam 
et qui s’y intéresse et qui à la base a un accent 
très très prononcé à mon avis la soeu:r 
automatiquement elle va faire un eﬀort pour 
euh peut-être pas parce que changer un accent 
c’est dificile, hein, quand c’est quelque chose 
qui est depuis l’enfance 
Cécile: oh 
Amel: C’est c’est possible mais c’est peut-être 
un peu plus dur mais je pense qu’à partir de là 
du moment où elle fait l’eﬀort elle se dit “il y a 
certains mots que je banis” comme il y a 
certains mots c’est ni du français, c’est du-du 
truc du quartier, là tu vois donc ceux-là tu le:s 
tu les dis plus et après… 
Amel: That’s it. That is pretty primordial 
because the woman is the mother: she’s 
sweetness, she’s aﬀection. And by the way, 
when we describe her in the Koran it’s often 
by those exact characteristics. You see? So it’s 
true that when you… It’s true that for a 
Muslim girl, someone who enters into Islam 
and interests themselves and who has a very 
very pronounced accent from the get-go, in my 
opinion the sister will automatically make an 
eﬀort to, euh, maybe not because changing an 
accent is diﬃcult. Yeah, especially when it’s 
something that dates from childhood.  
Cecile: Oh 
Amel: It’s, it’s possible but maybe a little 
more diﬃcult. But I think as long as she makes 
the eﬀort to say to herself “there are certain 
words I banish,” since there are certain words 
that are not even French. It’s the-the stuﬀ of 
the projects, there, you know? So those things 
you stop saying them then and there…
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meaning “what,” is one typical of interactions between youth from Marseille’s 
projects, and from other suburban locations in France as well (Caubet, 2007). 
Towards the end of the transcript, Amel clarifies that wesh wesh belongs to 
project ways of speaking, which she does not consider part of the French 
language (ce ni du français, c’est du-du truc du quartier, là). She states that young 
women who have a “very pronounced accent” of this sort must work hard to 
banish such ways of speaking from their repertoire, should they wish to enter 
full-heartedly into Islam. She herself delivers her comments in a French 
phonologically recognizable as standard, without the aﬀrication of stops, 
devoicing of uvulars, velar nasals, and word-final schwas that I have discussed as 
marking Northern Marseille’s youth registers (and Marseille’s historical 
vernacular, to a certain extent). In sum, in her remarks Amel diagrams two 
linguistic poles and their corresponding social indexicalities. Speaking softly, and 
in “French,” indexes the female Muslim persona of the ṣaḥābiyah, understood to 
be sweet, aﬀectionate, and maternal. Project speech like wesh wesh, in contrast, 
indexes the speaker’s aﬃnity with the subculture of the projects (quartiers). 
According to Amel, this rough-hewn or “savage” persona is antithetical to the 
ideals of Islamic femininity, if not those of Islam more generally.  
 Indeed, both the young orthodox women and men I interviewed tended 
to place project-aﬃliated behaviors on the opposite side of the spectrum from an 
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Islamic disposition, regardless of their gender identity. Amina, one of Amel’s 
orthodox girlfriends, deliberately eschewed “accents” from the projects, though 
she did not necessarily tie her aversion to gender. She explained her linguistic 
aspirations principally in terms of a desire to speak in an elegant and educated 
way: “I don’t like accents. I like all sorts of sophisticated language, so that is 
how I endeavor to speak” (10-29-12).  Amina in fact so exuded gentility that 44
her female friends at the university were moved to nickname her “paradisiacal 
Amina” (Amina Paradis). This pet name was a nod to Amina’s courteous 
treatment of others around her but also to her use of a whispery, almost dreamy 
voice that was often so quiet it prompted people to ask her to repeat herself. The 
image of sweetness Amina projected stood out to others as well, such as a 
female employee at the university cafeteria who would greet Amina in particular 
with “how are you, my little sweetie?” (ça va, ma choupette? [literally, my little 
female cabbage]). Another friend from this group, Karima, found it particularly 
oﬀensive when young women engaged in so-called project behavior while 
wearing jilbāb. She considered it less an aﬀront to Islamic femininity per se than 
a stain on Islam’s reputation, however: “They laugh loudly, they talk loudly, they 
insult people, they don’t pay their Métro ticket” (10-29-12).  The girls agreed 45
 “J’aime pas les accents. J'aime tout ce qui est langue soutenue donc c’est comme ça que je 44
m'eﬀorce de parler” (Amina, 10-29-12). 
 “Ça rit fort, ça parle fort, ça insulte, ça paie pas son ticket de Métro” (Karima, 10-29-12). 45
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that professing Islam meant they could no longer, if they ever did, behave like 
the stereotypical project resident. Amina thus reminded her friends of their duty
—not as Muslim women, but as Muslims tout court—namely, to behave well as a 
means of both upholding their own piety and of educating the wider public 
about true Islamic values: 
“Before putting on the ḥijāb, we weren’t necessarily like this. But now there’s a job to be 
done, an image to give. We have the impression that we’re ambassadors for 
Islam” (10-29-12).  46
These examples have served to show that many of the qualities Amel imputed to 
the ṣaḥābiyah, while seemingly gendered, were often also invoked as virtues to 
which all Muslims in Marseille should aspire, irrespective of gender.  
 Indeed, young orthodox men echoed many of these thoughts on what was 
considered appropriate demeanor and speech. Ramin was a seventeen-year old 
male high school student whose Algerian mother I had befriended. Though all 
five children in the family prayed regularly, Ramin, who was the eldest, had 
become particularly assiduous in his pursuit of Islamic knowledge.  In 2012, he 
had taken to wearing Islamic men’s wear, like short-cropped pants and a cap, 
and to visiting a nearby prayer room at prayer times and for tajwīd recitation 
 “Avant de mettre le ḥijāb on était pas forcément comme ça. Mais maintenant il y a un travail à 46
faire, une image à donner… On a l'impression d’être des ambassatrices de l’Islam” (Amina, 
10-29-12).  
!356
classes. In a boulangerie with me one afternoon, Ramin reflected over a 
raspberry tartelette on his linguistic behavior as a Muslim:  
Cécile: Do you keep an eye on your language or not so much? 
Ramin: Yes, a lot! Because God, he already asks that of us: “believe in Allah and utter 
words that are sadidah,” the opposite of vulgar. I’m at high school and they teach us to 
speak well, for interviews. So we pay attention to what comes out of our mouths. (…) 
[Modern Standard] Arabic is the most beautiful. Darijahs (“colloquial Arabics”) are 
shot. Moroccans, they say “antshi” [antʃi]. They transform the “ta” to be “ch.” like 
people from Marseille. Literary Arabic is better than darijah. At the mosque, they teach 
us the value of literary Arabic.  47
Here, Ramin retraces ideological linkages parallel to those drawn by Amel above. 
He aligns himself with well-spoken French and Modern Standard Arabic. These 
are linguistically correct (sadidah) languages, he states, taught by French schools 
and mosques, respectively. As such, they are among the forms of speech God has 
ordained. Algerian darijah and Marseille’s accent, by contrast, he evaluates as 
“shot” (flingué). He mentions that darijah speakers, for example, realize “t” as 
[tʃ], as in [antʃi] instead of [anti] (‘you’). He then adds that this error is 
characteristic of how people from Marseille speak French as well.  
 With this ideological backdrop in mind, I now move to examining cases 
where orthodox youth crossed into conduct associated with the projects, 
whether speech or behavior, and the ensuing reactions. Given that I personally 
 “Cécile: Tu veilles un peu sur ton langage ou pas trop? 47
Ramin: Oui beaucoup! Parce que dejà Dieu nous l’ordonne: creignez Allah et dites des mots 
‘sadidah’ (contraire de vulgaire)... Je suis au lycée ils nous entrainent a bien parler, pour les 
entretiens, on fait attention à ce qui sort de notre bouche… l'arabe c'est plus beau les darija c'est 
flingué, les marocains ils disent antshi - le ta ils le transforment en tch (comme les marseillais)... 
littéraire soutenu c'est meilleur que darija... a la mosque ils nous ont donne la valeur de l'arabe 
littéraire... avant non” (Ramin, 6.15.13)
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witnessed more instances of young women adopting project-identified behaviors 
than young men, I oﬀer one male example and then focus mainly on young 
women crossing and the scope of reactions by orthodox-identified community 
members. I find that, when a young woman’s crossing represented an isolated 
occurrence, community members often found it amusing or humorous. In some 
cases, such rebelliousness even inspired a measure of admiration among 
onlookers. In others, however, and particularly when the young woman took a 
project-like stance on a regular basis, community members’ remarks evince a 
tendency to position such women as overly masculine or lacking in piety.   
 Perhaps due to the nature of my interactions with the young orthodox men 
I knew, I was privy to fewer situations in which this type of crossing behavior 
might have been a possibility. One occasion stands out in my fieldnotes, 
however, and pertains to the private Muslim secondary school where I taught 
English during the 2012-2013 school year. In April of 2013, I accompanied 
several teachers and a group of thirty students from this school on a one-week 
fieldtrip to London. While visiting the city on the first day of our trip, we 
decided to stop in Regent’s Park for a picnic lunch. The teachers and I sat at the 
edge of a grassy area with our sandwiches and watched as some of the male 
students played soccer on the lawn. Rida, one of these fourteen year old boys, 
got excited and began shouting out plays in a hoarse voice that carried easily to 
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where the principal’s wife was sitting. She shot to her feet and scolded Rida at 
close range: 
“Stop acting like a North African from the 15th [arrondissement]! Be a good Muslim! Don’t 
attract attention!”  48
In her remarks to Rida, Hanan sets up a contrast between North Africans from 
the 15th arrondissement and good Muslims from the 15th arrondissement, where the 
school is located and where most of the students live. She signals that Rida’s 
loud voice and rowdy behavior is representative of the former demographic, 
while she expects him to act as though he belongs to the latter group. The fact 
that Rida comes from a Muslim, Algerian family is not enough, she says; Rida 
must act like a Muslim, speaking quietly so as to perform reserve and respect of 
others. In this example, therefore, Hanan is able to curtail Rida’s raucous 
behavior by relating it to a type of impious project person whom he, as a student 
in an orthodox Muslim school, would be ashamed to resemble.  
 If Rida met with the threat of impiety for acting in line with supposed 
project norms on a certain occasion, the cases of two young women from his 8th 
grade class (3ième) illustrate other possible kinds of reactions to such behavior. 
Rania was a young woman in Rida’s grade whom the adults at school considered 
a notorious trouble-maker and who was also among the lowest grade-earning 
 “Arrête de faire ton maghrébin du 15ième! Sois un bon musulman! Ne te fais pas 48
remarquer!" (Hanan, 4-15-13).
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students in the school. In my own classroom, I noticed that Rania enjoyed 
making cynical remarks and entertaining side conversations with the male 
students. Rania was likewise an exception to linguistic trends at the school, 
preferring to speak in the project or quartiers register. I learned about others’ 
perceptions of Rania and her speech in the following conversation with Fawzi, a 
man in his early twenties who was the school recess monitor:  
Cécile: Generally, I find that students here don’t speak like that. 
Fawzi: It’s true that it’s rare here. But there is the student Rania, or Rani as we call her. 
Rania speaks kind of like this, okay “Stop dəħing! Come on, move it! You’ve pissed me 
oﬀ!” (Arrête de dəħ! Vas-y bouge! Tu m'as soulé! [aχεtə də dəħ vɑzi bu:ʒə ʧu mɑ su:lε]). 
Halima [the school accountant], who is uh very feminine, especially compared to Rania, 
was shocked when she heard her say that. She told her “Wait, you’re a guy (mec). It’s 
just not possible. I’m going to call you Rani.” One time, Rania even came to see me and 
said, “Fawzi, it’s fine. Don’t call me Rania anymore. Now my name is Karim” (Fawzi c’est 
bon! Tu [ʧu] m’appelles plus Rania. Maintenant je m’appelle Karim [kaχim]). “Euh, okay, if you 
like! How’s it going, Karim?” ‘“Yeah, yeah, it’s all good (We, we, ça va [wε wε sɑ vɑ]).” 
Okaaaay… ((shrugs his shoulders)) 
Fawzi imitates Rania using many of the devices I have shown to be typical of the 
project register, including Arabic phonology-influenced neologisms ([dəħ] “mess 
around”), stop aﬀrication, and devoicing of French uvulars. In these comments, 
both Fawzi and Halima, the school accountant, position Rania as her 
hypothetical male counterpart, Rani, due to her project-like speech.  As in 49
Amel’s comment about orthodox women who greet with wesh wesh, whom she 
found “truly surprising,” here Fawzi cues various forms of disbelief. He reports 
Halima being “shocked” and saying that “it’s just not possible.” Then he himself 
 Many Arabic names for females end in “a,” making the absence of this suﬃx recognizably 49
male by contrast (e.g., Rashida/Rashid, Karima, Karim). 
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indexes reluctance after Rania asks him to call her “Karim,” marking his 
hesitation with “euh” and two instances of “okay,” which he produces with rising 
intonation and a shoulder shrug.  
 I argue that Rania’s anomalous linguistic behavior was easily tolerated 
because the school staﬀ who were familiar with her believed that her parents 
lacked the schooling to instruct her otherwise. There was relatively less 
tolerance though for Rania’s knack at creating friendships with boys, a behavior 
for which adults at school held her personally responsible and for which she was 
frequently dismissed from class.  In other words, when orthodox girls spoke in 50
project-like French it was often not analyzed as crossing at all but instead as a 
way of speaking to which they were continually exposed, living in Northern 
Marseille. This account dovetails with Amel’s comment that one must be 
understanding of young women who speak thus because “it’s something that 
dates from childhood” and hence requires much eﬀort to change. The case of 
another girl in this class named Zineb provides further evidence to this eﬀect. 
Zineb was a vivacious, stubby girl who was among the few female students at 
the private Muslim school who, during non-prayer hours, opted not to wear the 
ḥijāb. During an informal conversation while on the London Tube, vice-principal 
 On our fieldtrip, for instance, Rania was placed in the room furthest from the boys’ room and 50
in which two teachers were sleeping. 
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Hanan singled out Zineb as a young woman who speaks with “gouaille.” Not 
knowing this French word, I asked Hanan to explain further. “Gouaille means she 
is expressive and has a popular sense of humor. She gets it from her Egyptian 
side,” elaborated Hanan (4-16-13).  Other meanings given for gouaille place it in 51
the semantic vicinity of words like cockiness, cheek, and gall, all stereotypically 
related to masculinity. Here, again, a young woman’s “popular” speech is 
interpreted as a masculine form of behavior. Although Hanan does not fault 
Zineb for her speech, seeing its origins in the fourteen-year-old’s familial milieu, 
her designation of “popular” speech as manly and humorous serves nonetheless 
as an implicit reminder of the more graceful aﬀect typifying pious Muslims in 
Marseille, and, with it, diﬀerences between social groups.  
 In the accounts of Rania and Zineb’s behavior above, others rationalized 
their project-like behavior as traits traceable to their environments and were 
thus able to find it humorous, if understandable. Below, I introduce two further 
examples that capacitate another version of events. My main point will be that, 
on occasion, young orthodox women strategically turn to the linguistic and 
behavioral repertoire of the project register to index certain qualities, such as 
 “Gouaille ça veut dire qu’elle est expressive est qu’elle a de l’humour populaire. Elle tire ça de 51
son côté Egyptien.” (Hanan, 4-16-13). 
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rebelliousness, bravado, or even queerness, in their interactions with other 
orthodox female peers.  
 A first anecdote relates to a conversation I held with Amina and Miriam, 
the two female university students, as we were walking towards the Aix-en-
Provence train station where we would catch the train back to Marseille. We 
were discussing my impending wedding, and in particular which shoes I might 
wear, when the following interaction took place (3-27-13). 
Cécile: Yeah, I’m going to wear low heels. Not too high. 
Amina: Me, on the day of my wedding, I’m going to wear sneakers! 
Cécile: Ahahaah 
Amina: Big fat sneakers! I’ve always dreamed of doing that. It’s…to mess around. I’ve 
always… 
Cécile: But why not go barefoot if you want to have a laugh? 
Amina: To grind my feet into the ground? 
Cécile: ((laughing)) Sneakers… 
Miriam: I had a girlfriend who did that. A converted girl, too. She had a wedding dre… 
Well, her feet weren’t visible. 
Cécile: That’s it! No one ever sees your shoes. 
Miriam: When she came down the stairs, I saw her TNs! I swear, I was so shocked. It 
didn’t seem very… 
Cécile: Where was that? 
Miriam: It was here, in Marseille. I swear that, from the bottom of the stairs, it was 
super shocking. You know? 
Cécile: Were people laughing? 
Miriam: It was just me and my sister. But she [the bride] didn’t give a dam. She owned 
it! She said it would never work with heels on... 
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Amina: I think it’s too hard too. I would like some pretty ballerina flats for girls, like 
when we were little, the little black shoes that sparkled with the little laces…   52
Above, Miriam regales Amina and me with a story of how a converted Muslim 
“sister” came down a staircase in a wedding dress only to lift her train and 
expose a pair of Nike TN sneakers, a favorite brand of sneakers in the housing 
projects. The contrast upon which Miriam and Amina alight in this story is one 
between an image of the Muslim woman as modestly feminine and one of the 
project girl as headstrong and unfeminine. Both young women seem to mark 
their greater identification with the normative image of Muslim femininity. First, 
Miriam tells the story quickly and excitedly, as if it were a tale of epic 
proportions, and thus signals the unusualness of a Muslim person embracing 
project behavior. She also expresses hesitation at certain points in the transcript, 
 Cécile: Ouais, je mets des petits talons. Pas trop grand. 52
Amina: Moi, le jour de mon mariage je vais mettre des baskets! 
Cécile: Ahahaah 
Amina: Des grosses baskets [sic]! J'ai toujours revé de faire ça. C’est...pour rigoler. Toujours 
j’ai… 
Cécile: Mais pourquoi ne pas être pieds nud si tu veux rigoler? 
Amina: Pour m’écraser les pioles dans le sol? 
Cécile: ((laughing)) Des baskets… 
Miriam: J'ai une copine qui avait fait ça. Une convertie, en plus. Elle avait une robe de m-en fait, 
on voyait pas ses pieds.  
Cécile: C’est ça! On voit jamais les chaussures. 
Miriam: Quand elle a descendu les escaliers, j'ai vu des TNs! Je te jure, ca m'a trop choqué. Mais 
ça faisait pas..  
Cécile: C’était ou ça? 
Miriam: C’était ici, à Marseille. Je te jure qu’en bas des escaliers c’était hyper choquant. Tu vois?  
Cécile: Les gens rigolaient? 
Miriam: Il y avait que moi et ma sœur. Mais elle [the bride] s'en foutait. Elle assumait! Elle disait 
ça va jamais marcher avec des talons… 
Amina: Moi aussi je trouve que c’est trop dur. Moi j’aimerais bien les belles ballerines pour filles, 
comme quand on était petites, les petites chaussures noires qui brillaient avec les petits lacets… 
(3-27-13).
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swearing upon her dismay (“I was so shocked”) and hinting at the deviance of 
the bride’s shoe choice (“It doesn’t seem very…”). Amina, likewise, wound up 
our exploration of this particular theme stating that she would prefer to wear 
“pretty little ballerina flats for girls.” Noteworthy in this interaction as well, 
however, are certain indications that Amina and Miriam find this transgressive 
behavior appealing. Amina, for instance, discloses initially that she has always 
dreamed of wearing “big fat sneakers” on her wedding day (though she later 
recants). Miriam, too, evaluates the bride in ways bespeaking admiration of her 
choice to wear sneakers, remarking with uncharacteristic profanity and 
considerable enthusiasm that the bride “owned” her decision and “didn’t give a 
damn.” Beyond her own use of profanity, Miriam’s shift to a project register 
footing in this part of the transcript is further supported by her aﬀrication of the 
t’s in convertie and tu. In short, this transcript depicts how, for young orthodox 
women, crossing into behaviors enregistered as “project-like” represented an 
opportunity for them to index qualities like self-will and defiance.  
 The second anecdote I use to illustrate these young women’s tactical 
recourse to the project register concerns a female student at the university 
named Safia. Arriving at the start of university from her native Toulouse, Safia 
quickly integrated herself into the circle of orthodox Muslim female students I 
have been discussing, in which Amel, Miriam, Amina, and others participated. 
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Like them, she was studying to receive a bachelor’s degree in Arabic language 
and literature. Where Safia parted ways with her female friends was in her 
clothing tastes. Safia swore oﬀ the long skirts worn by her friends—“I will never 
wear a skirt” —and opted for monochromatic “joggings” (or sweatsuits) instead. 53
She did not cover her hair either, which she wore parted down the middle and 
gathered in a low ponytail. When I asked Safia about her religious practice, she 
described it as a more recent development in her life. She grew up in a 
household where Islam was present “but really forgotten,”  and it was only 54
once at the university that she settled into a semblance of an Islamic routine, 
praying more consistently and cutting down on cigarettes, with notable help and 
motivation from her newfound orthodox girlfriends.  
Safia: It’s true that here [at the university] I’m more surrounded by Muslim women. 
Cécile: Here? And why? Do you also have French or non-Muslim friends or not really? 
Safia: In Toulouse, lots! 
Cécile: But not too many here? 
Safia: Not here. 
Cécile: And why? 
Safia: Dunno, I wanted to settle down ((Safia laughing)) 
Cécile: To settle down? Were you less relaxed before? 
Safia: Yeah! That’s it! That’s it! I actually like the fact they they [her girlfriends at the 
university] keep an eye on me, that they remind me of things. Do you know what I 
 “Je mettrais jamais des jupes” (Safia, 12.4.12). 53
 “J’ai grandi dans l’Islam mais c’était vachement oublié quoi. Mon père il m’en parlait pas tout 54
les jours. La prière on l’a appris toutes seules. Fin, de mon grandpère” (Safia, 12.4.12). 
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mean? “Stop smoking!” “Pray!” Because it’s true that sometimes I neglect my prayers. 
So, for lots of reasons.   55
Safia was aware, and even seemed to enjoy the fact, that her friends considered 
her an unusual addition to their friend group. She played up her atypical 
clothing choices, oﬀering for instance to “walk” (défiler) in an all-female Islamic 
fashion show that was being organized in Northern Marseille. Somewhat 
consternated by Safia’s suggestion, her friends played along so as not to oﬀend 
her. When however Safia finally revealed her planned outfit to be a “tracksuit-
and-sneakers” (survêts-baskets), all lapsed into relieved giggles and there was no 
further serious talk of her participation.  
 Quite interestingly, Safia was unconventional in her speech as well. 
Although Safia had only spent two years in Marseille, she reported that many of 
her acquaintances found her speech to resemble that of a person from 
Marseille’s projects. 
Cécile: And in terms of accents, do you think you have a Marseillais accent or not? I’m 
just asking, I don’t know. 
Safia: I don’t know. No. Well people tell me that, but I don’t have that impression. 
Cécile: Everyone tells you that you have a Marseillais accent? 
 Safia: C’est vrai qu’ici je suis plus entourée de musulmanes.  55
Cécile: Ici? Et pourquoi? T’as aussi des amis français ou non-musulmans ou pas trop? 
Safia: À Toulouse, énormement! 
Cécile: Mais pas trop ici? 
Safia: Non ici. 
Cécile: Et pourquoi? 
Safia: Ch’ais pas, j’avais envie de me poser ((Safia laughing)) 
Cécile: De te poser? T’étais moins tranquille avant? 
Safia: Ouais! C’est ça! C’est ça! J’aime bien le fait qu’elles me surveillent, qu’elles me fassent des 
rappels, en fait. Tu vois ce que je veux dire? “Fume pas! Prie!” Parce que c’est vrai que ça 
m’arrive de la délaisser. Fin, plein de choses. (12-4-12).
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Safia: Eeeeeveryone! 
Cécile: How can that be? You told me that it’s been, what, two years since you got here? 
Safia: Dunno. 
Cécile: What do they tell you?  
Safia: You seem like a girl from Marseille.  
Cécile: And what do you think of the accent here? 
Safia: Horrible ((Cécile laughing)). Vile. Listening to that accent is not pleasant in any 
way. It shatters your ears.  56
Above, Safia’s negatively characterizes the accent of Northern Marseille, 
assuming a similar ideological position as her orthodox friends, and yet she 
admits to others’ perception of her as having just such an accent. Tellingly in 
this regard, there were several occasions on which I observed Safia deploying 
linguistic features associated with the register of Marseille’s Northern projects, 
seemingly to point to her non-normative gender and sexual identity.  In the 57
following conversation, for instance, Safia uses the quartiers register to index 
bravado and, seemingly, to suggest her queerness to her closest girlfriends.  
 Cécile: Et niveau accent, tu trouves que t’as un accent marseillais ou pas? je te demande, je 56
sais pas 
Safia: Je sais pas. Non. Mais on me le dit mais j’ai pas l’impression 
Cécile: Tout le monde te dit que t’as un accent marseillais? 
Safia: Touuut le monde! 
Cécile: Comment ça se fait? Tu m’as dit que ca fait, quoi, deux ans que t’es là? 
Safia: Ch’ais pas 
Cécile: Ils te disent quoi? 
Safia: On dirait une fille de Marseille 
Cécile: Et comment tu trouves l’accent ici? 
Safia: Horrible ((Cécile laughing)). Immonde. Il y a aucun plaisir à entendre cet accent. Ça ruine 
les oreilles.
 Although Safia was not “out” to any of her friends, based on her comments and my ongoing 57
interactions with her, I have reason to believe she identifies as queer, if not gay. Given the 
stigmatization of such an orientation in the Muslim milieu of Marseille, Safia had good reason to 
be circumspect. 
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 The conversation transcribed below took place while Safia, five of her 
orthodox friends, and I sat around a circular table outside the university 
cafeteria having lunch. In the interest of clarity, the sequence of conversational 
moves is the following. After a long silence, Safia declares that a friend of hers, 
Miriam, who is eating lunch at the table next to her, is “hers.” Safia then takes 
back her declaration of love to Miriam and pledges herself to Bushrah instead. 
This reminds Bushrah of a recent conversation she had with Safia. Safia had 
asked Bushrah whether she would understand her were she a man. Safia denies 
instigating that conversation, retorting that Bushrah was the first to raise the 
idea of Safia being the perfect mate for her, if only Safia had been a man. Safia 
then pulls out a cigarette and is rebuﬀed by Bushrah for smoking against her 
orders. I intervene and jokingly turn the conversation to a hypothetical scenario 
where Safia brings her future bride, played by Bushrah, home to meet her 
parents.  
Transcript 7.3. “Miriam, You Are Mine” 
                        (French Original) (English Translation)
Safia: ((general lunch noises)) Miriam, tu [ʧu] 
es à moi.                                                 
Miriam: ((giggling softly)) Je t’ai dit qu’elle  
me draguait tout à l’heure.
Safia: ((general lunch noises))  Miriam, you 
are mine.  
Miriam: ((giggling softly)) I told you that she 
was hitting on me earlier
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Safia: Mais TOUT le temps [təŋ] je la drague  
[dʁagə], °tout le temps [təŋ].° Za’ama  
[zaʕma], j’ai des chances [ʃəŋs], tu sais?  
Za’ama [zaʕma]… ((laughs)) J’y crois [kχɑ],  
tu [tu] vois? Je crois [kχɑ] à °notre amour.°  
NON [nɑŋ], je suis avec Bushrah  
Nour: Ah ((laughing)) T’as [ta] vu ce qu’elle 
raconte?                            
Bushrah: {Hier elle me disait} 
Nour: {Non je ne sais pas} 
Bushrah: Ouais, hier elle me disait, “Oui, si  
j’étais un homme est-ce que tu me  
comprendrais et tout?” Je pense à ça  
maintenant. 
Safia: Attends [atəŋ], attends [atəŋ], attends  
[atəŋ], attends [atəŋ]!      
Bushrah: {Faut pas faire hypocrite quand je  
suis pas là-en  face de moi.} 
Safia: {Non, puisque…} ((laughing)) Non, 
non, mais écoute! 
Cécile: Elle a pas honte. ((laughing)) 
Safia: Moi et elle, un jour on était dans le caf  
et, je sais pas pourquoi,  elle me fait “Si  
t’étais, si t’avais été un homme, za’ama [zaʕma]  
je l’aurais été parfait.” Tu vois? Eh ben du coup  
je lui ai reposé la question, za’ama [zaʕma],  
pour voir si c’est resté ce sentiment… 
Bushrah: ((harrumphs)) Mmmm… 
Safia: Qu’elle a dit si j’avais été un homme est-
ce que-tu comprends [cõpʁəŋ]? ((Safia raises a 
cigarette to  her lips))  
Bushrah: ((chuckling)) Mais je t’ai toujours 
interdit ça. 
Safia: Mais tu te rappelles, Cécile, tu [ʧu] 
m’as—                                                     
Bushrah: ((to Safia)) Mais je t’interdis ça. 
C’est bon! 
Safia: Ah oui, il fallait-il faut que j’arrête de  
fumer. Mai::s dans tous les ca::s, j’ai pas de  
zizi, donc je peux continuer à fumer. 
Cécile: ((unclear)) Et la dote c’est combien? 
Bushrah: “Dans tout les cas je suis pas un  
homme donc je  peux continuer à FUMER.”  
Hhhhh! 
Miriam: Bushrah, c’est quoi la dote? 
Cécile: °Ouais,° c’est quoi la dote? 
Safia: AH t-alors là, Cécile tu m’as manqué.  
((laughing)) Je suis dans une cité et tu dis ça à  
ton père. Tu dis que, “je”…Tu dis, t’es une fille,
Safia: But ALL the time I hit on her, °all the  
time.° Za’ama, (“like” in Algerian) I’ve got a  
chance, you know? Za’ama ((laughs),) I believe  
it, you see? I believe in °our love.° NO, I’m  
with Bushrah. 
Nour: Ah ((laughing)), can you believe what 
she’s on about? 
Bushrah: {Yesterday she was saying to me} 
Nour: {No I don’t know} 
Bushrah: Yeah, yesterday she was saying to  
me, “Yes if I were a man would you  
understand me and all?” Now I’m thinking  
about that. 
Safia: Wait, wait, wait, wait!   
Bushrah: {You can’t act like a hypocrite when 
I’m not here to my face.} 
Safia: {No, since…} ((laughing)). No, no, but 
listen!                       
Cécile: She’s not embarrassed. ((laughing)) 
Safia: Me and her one day we were in the caf  
and, I dunno why, she goes to me, “If you  
were-if you had been a man, za’ama, I would  
have been perfect.” You know? So then I just  
returned the question, za’ama, to see if the  
sentiment had stayed… 
Bushrah: ((harrumphs)) Mmmm… 
Safia: What she said about had I been a man 
would-you see? ((Safia raises a cigarette to her 
lips)) 
Bushrah: ((chuckling)) But I’ve told you not 
to do that ((unclear)) 
Safia: But you remember Cécile you had—                                                 
Bushrah: ((to Safia)) But I don’t want you  
doing that. Enough! 
Safia: Ah yes I was supposed to-I’m  
supposed to stop smoking. But I don’t have a  
dick in any case, so I can keep smoking. 
Cécile: ((unclear)) And how much is the 
bride price? 
Bushrah: “I’m not a man in any case, so I can  
keep on SMOKING.” Hhhh! 
Miriam: Bushrah, what’s the bride price? 
Cécile: °Yeah,° what’s the bride price? 
Safia: AH y, well now, Cécile I missed you 
((laughing)). I’m in a housing project and you  
say that to your dad. You say that “I”… You  
say, you’re a girl, and you say. “I’ve  
((unclear)), I’m Moroccan” ((conversation  
continues about how Safia will run away))
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 There are, in a sense, two texts coming together in this transcript. One is 
a denotational text in which Safia and her friends speak in hypothetical or joking 
terms about love between Safia and her girlfriends. The second is an 
interactional text where Safia, by crossing into the speech register associated 
with the toughness of Marseille’s projects, is able to take on a masculine or 
“husbandly” gender role. As flagged in the bolded IPA renditions in the 
transcript, Safia uses several features and elements of project speech throughout 
this conversation. She aﬀricates her ‘t’s’ and ‘d’s,’ makes liberal use of the velar 
nasal, and devoices the French uvular fricative /ʁ/. Significant, too, are her uses 
of the Algerian discourse marker “za’ama” [zaʕma], the legendary Marseillais 
tu dis, “J’ai ((unclear)), je suis 
marocaine” ((conversation continues about  
how Safia will run away)) 
Safia: Ah putain [putεŋ]! Mais je vois trop  
arriver mon père “Papa, je vais me marier” et  
tout. “Ah OUI, lala, (“miss” in  Moroccan), en  
fin.” ((all laughing)) Imagine, mais imagine,  
imagine! Mais j’ouvre ((unclear)). Je vais me la  
faire celle-là, à mon avis celle-là…. “Bah  
attends. Reste ici.” 
Nour: “Papa, j’ai trouvé quelqu’un de très  
bien. C’est… Croit en dieu…. 
Cécile: C’est une gadji [gaʤi]             
Safia: Je rammène Bushrah! 
Miriam: Ah, il faudra filmer cette scène-là. 
Cécile: [Ah ouais] 
Miriam: [Faut faire un film] 
Safia: Non, mais il y aura pas temps de  
filmer. Ma daronne elle va juste VOIR ÇA LÀ,  
elle va même pas poser les yeux voilà— 
Nour: “Ah, les cheveux longs” ((Safia  
laughing)) “elle est voilée, Safia!” 
Safia: Ah fuck! But I can really see it now,  
my dad arriving, “Dad, I’m getting married”  
and  all. “Oh yes, lala! (‘miss’ in Moroccan)  
finally.” ((all laughing)) Imagine, just imagine,  
imagine! I just open ((unclear)). I’m gonna get  
her for myself, that gal… “Well, wait here.  
Stay here.” 
Nour: “Dad, I found someone really great.  
They’re…God fearing…” 
Cécile: They’re a girl!                                              
Safia: I bring Bushrah in! 
Miriam: Ah that scene’s got to be filmed. 
Cécile: [Oh yeah] 
Miriam: [Have to make a movie] 
Safia: No, but there won’t be time to film.  
My daronne (Fr. ‘mother’), she’s just gonna  
SEE THAT THERE, she’s not even going to let  
her eyes rest 
Nour: “Ah, what long hair” ((Safia  
laughing)) “And she wears a veil, this Safia!” 
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curse word “putain” [putεŋ] (or “fuck”), and language considered blasphemous 
(zizi/“dick,” je vais me la faire celle-là/I’m going to get her, that gal). Her language 
in this segment is noticeably diﬀerent from that of her friends. Nour uses the 
uncontracted, academic form “je ne sais pas” (I do not know). Bushrah translates 
Safia’s comment about not having “a dick” (un zizi) by euphemistically stating 
that Safia is “not a man” (pas un homme). Safia’s friends, in turn, speak French 
more standardly, without stop aﬀrication, nasal velarization, or uvular devoicing. 
This contrast in register between Safia and her lunchmates parallels an 
opposition in social indexicality as well. Whereas Safia asserts herself as 
masculine by using a project register stereotypically indexical of brawn, her 
friends assume a footing of Islamic propriety according to an ideology linking 
standard speech and practicing Muslims. Safia’s assertion of masculinity is 
reinforced, too, by a role playing sequence in which she engages with Bushrah. 
After some back-and-forth with her friends, Safia pulls out a smoke, as if to take 
a break from all the tiresome arguing. Bushrah promptly reminds Safia of their 
agreement that Safia should not smoke. Safia concedes Bushrah’s point, but then 
recants and vows to continue smoking. Here, Bushrah and Safia fall easily into 
the roles of the nagging wife and the ornery husband. Even after Safia suddenly 
awakens to the husbandly role she has been playing, and moves to reject her 
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duties (to stop smoking) by claiming to lack male genitalia, she continues to 
enact the husband-and-wife script by ultimately rejecting Bushrah’s advice.  
 This example with Safia showed how, despite not being from Marseille, 
she was able to draw upon her knowledge of the way in which her orthodox 
female friends normatively mapped gender to the language options present in 
Marseille in order to create a gendered trope of queerness. As a member of this 
friend group, Safia was aware that when Muslim females crossed into project-
aﬃliated apparel and speech, this was interpreted as masculine or impious 
behavior. She nevertheless consistently crossed into behavior connected to 
Marseille’s projects, a tendency that I have argued served to position her as 
gender-queer. Due to the close connection between gender and sexuality for 
those socialized in an Islamic cultural milieu, it may be that it was enough for 
Safia to create a disjuncture between her sex and her gender image in order to 
convey information about her sexuality as well. In Salima Amari’s (2013) 
groundbreaking study with Franco-Maghrebi lesbians living in Paris, she notes 
that the Maghrebi relatives of these young women infer their sexuality from 
gender roles the women do or do not uphold. When women do not hold to 
certain Arabo-Islamic ideals of femininity, refusing to marry or wear their hair 
long, for example, the tie that scripture has naturalized between gender and 
sexuality is sundered. In other words, her lesbian interlocutors’ silence on the 
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gendered tasks they are expected to perform as women marks a tacit “coming 
out” to their families and friends. In sum,  through various ethnographic 
examples this section has captured how orthodox Muslim youth both reinforce 
and trope upon ideologies marrying options on Marseille’s linguistic palette to 
gradations of piety and gender. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has examined, in a first instance, the ideologies that 
variously positioned youth from Muslim households in Northern Marseille have 
created about languages in their environment, whether standard languages or 
project youth registers like Castellanois. My objective, in a second instance, has 
been to scrutinize why, when youth crossed into the registers thought to be 
typical of other social groups, peers often foregrounded these speakers’ gender 
or sexuality as non-normative.  
 In the first series of ethnographic examples, I discussed how fourteen-
year-old adolescents from two northern projects, who were students in an 
Arabic class in a public secondary school, negotiated their identities by claiming 
particular speech and clothing styles. In their talk about themselves and others, 
the students from Class 3B drew dividing lines between an in-group 
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“project” (quartiers) register and an out-group register, paillot, which they 
associated with ethnically French, aﬄuent individuals from outside the projects. 
Youth pitted their own register, indexed through Castellanois speech and 
tracksuits-and-sneakers clothing style, to that of the paillots, indexed in turn 
through Standard French and clothing styles such as swag. Interestingly, when 
describing what it meant to be from the projects the young men and women in 
Class 3B did not flag gender as something needing to be especially addressed. 
Both male and female youth saw toughness as their disposition and sought 
equally to maintain it through the aforementioned behaviors. Thus, it can be 
said that, in ideologizing their own project mentality, youth erased gender 
diﬀerences within their ranks. Gal and Irvine (2000) define erasure as when 
“facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or 
get explained away” (p. 38).  
 Significantly, It was when individuals from Class 3B contravened the 
norms of project behavior, that diﬀerences in how young women and young men 
were expected to act returned with the most clarity. One of these salient norms 
with respect to language was that it was acceptable for youth from the projects 
to cross into Standard French when an important gain or loss might be made in 
doing so. Hence, I reported on how, when youth were faced with authority 
figures at school or potential employers, they relied on the softness 
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stereotypically associated with Standard French to index deference to such 
people. Another norm held that defaulting to Standard French, without regards 
to context and interlocutor, was anomalous behavior. Thus, peers negatively 
judged the young man in the bakery who addressed others from La Castellane in 
paillot, as well as Sheyreen and Fouhda’s ongoing exploration of paillot speech 
and swag apparel. Transgressions in project norms of this sort consistently led to 
young men being called “fags” and young women “sluts,” a fact warranting my 
argument that sexual tropes have come to represent normalized ways for youth 
to construe such behavior. I contend, further, that if youth have normalized such 
tropes—involving the sexualization of their peers’ anomalous use of semiotic 
resources, and with consequences diﬀering by gender—this is because these 
slurs serve as an eﬀective means of policing boundaries between social groups. 
When youth deploy such labels as “fag” or “slut,” they appeal to cultural 
coordinates with which youth are familiar due to their socialization into Islamic 
values. Hence these slurs act as potent warning signs, eﬀectively likening 
youth’s anomalous behavior to culturally unacceptable sexual modes of 
existence. Moreover, that youth react in such trenchant ways to their peers’ 
displays of earnest aﬃliation with other social groups would appear to indicate 
the importance, in this milieu of economic duress, of showing solidarity to one 
another through semiotically tangible means. 
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 A similar dynamic, of the ideological erasure but interactional 
foregrounding of gender and sexuality, was also evident among youth from 
Northern Marseille’s projects that identified as orthodox or practicing Muslims. 
Attributing qualities like elegance and piety to the use of Standard French and 
MSA, Muslims in Marseille encouraged young women as well as men to embody 
these qualities through this kind of speech. For youth who grew up in the 
projects to the north of the city, this often meant working to actively rid their 
speech of phonological and lexical indicators of having been socialized in the 
projects. I compared instances where young men and young women exhibited 
project-like behavior and demonstrated that, whereas young men were rebuked 
for lacking in piety, young women were typically positioned as overly masculine, 
in addition to lacking in piety. Although within the orthodox community such 
female behaviors were rationalized as deriving from these young women’s 
surroundings, and hence humorously tolerated, I also oﬀered a diﬀerent account 
whereby this behavior might be considered purposeful crossing. Leaning on the 
case of Safia, I proposed that occasionally young women crossed into project-like 
speech and apparel in order to index, not only the masculinity stereotypically 
attributed to this register, but also stances of audacity or, possibly, queerness.  
 When the case of youth from Northern Marseille is compared to the 
ethnographic cases I reviewed initially, one question that arises is whether 
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suﬃcient evidence exists to support the generalization that, in minority 
contexts, in-group languages tend to carry a stereotypic indexicality of 
toughness and masculinity, while standard languages are routinely evaluated as 
soft and feminine. Although such a hypothesis may hold true for certain 
contexts, it remains important to dwell on the specificities of local categories 
and how they are invoked in interaction. For one, the orthodox youth I described 
in my latter examples represent a clear illustration of minority youth negatively 
evaluating what some might imagine was their in-group register and positively 
regarding national standard languages. Specifically, in an instance of register 
reanalysis (Agha, 2007a), they reframed the stereotypical values that Standard 
French is widely recognized to have, like softness or educational sophistication, 
as the hallmarks of Islamic piety. It follows that labels like “in-group” and “out-
group” must be used in a highly emic way if they are to be useful. A second 
observation is that labels for behavior may resemble one another across 
ethnographic contexts and yet comport with diﬀering socioindexical values. In 
Denmark, for instance, Madsen (2013, 2015) describes a “street” register used 
among youth of diverse linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, as well as their 
identification of an “integrated” Standard Danish register. The street register 
was similar in some respects to Castellanois, such as in its devoicing of Danish’s 
uvular “r” (/ʁ/) and in its ability to index youthful toughness and “panethnic 
!378
minority street culture” (Madsen, 2013, p. 133). In other respects, the 
Copenhagen street register diﬀered notably from project culture in Marseille. 
Madsen (2015) describes heavy make-up and large jewelry, for instance, as part 
of the Copenhagen street register, both behaviors which young women from 
Class 3B would have labeled paillot and looked down upon as being linked to the 
sexual easiness of the mainstream French population. Likewise, at the level of 
indexicality, Copenhagen street register is associated with masculinity and lack 
of academic skills. Marseille’s project register, by contrast, was a resource to 
which young men and young women alike turned to index toughness. By the 
same token, the youth in Class 3B ascribed values like smarts, creativity, and 
resourcefulness to being from the quartiers; it was being paillot and dressing swag 
that indexed vacuousness.  
 Broader implications of these findings for sociolinguistics are that, as 
mentioned previously in regards to Ochs’ (1983) work, language does not 
necessarily index gender in a one-to-one manner. Images of male and female 
gender are tied up with other axes of belonging, like ethnoracial group, religion, 
and class, inter alia, and complex semiotic processes may result in either the 
erasure or the highlighting of sex and gender, depending on the ideologies 
people hold and the resources upon which they draw. As for the concept of 
intersectional identities (Crenshaw, 1992), the evidence adduced in this chapter 
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helped illustrate how people are not simply situated, in a passive sense, at the 
crossroads of multiple hierarchies: economic, racial, class, and gender 
marginalities. Rather, with the aid of theoretical tools like register, ideology, 
performance, and indexicality, inroads may be made towards understanding 
people’s responsibility in creating ideologies. The youth in this chapter at times 
aligned with ideological figures, other times found themselves at their mercy, 
and in yet other instances were able to trope upon them, generating unexpected 
permutations. It is within such a space of indeterminacy that we can imagine 
young men and women from Northern Marseille tinkering with the social 
meanings of labels like quartiers, paillots, swag, and ṣaḥābiyah, and opening up 
novel ways for youth from the projects to exist.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 This dissertation demonstrates that diasporic youth from Marseille are, 
culturally speaking, not beyond the pale of the French Republic. Due to 
prevailing social dynamics, however, youth from Muslim households, and 
particularly youth who practice Islamic orthodoxy in Marseille, appear not to 
garner the wider public’s recognition as cultural citizens of France. Will youth 
have to take it upon themselves, either to change or to employ diﬀerent 
strategies to increase their national legibility? Or must the French mainstream 
find ways to be more attentive to the historically contingent and emic ways in 
which such diasporic youth perform variations on Frenchness? Only French 
society can determine the answers to these questions.  
 In the meanwhile, this dissertation has challenged the notion, which I 
recently read in the news was the basis for many Western countries’ counter-
terrorism and surveillance eﬀorts (Malik, 3.30.16), that to qualify as a “pre-
radical” Muslim one need simply belong to a Muslim community. Being Muslim, 
as an examination of fewer than a hundred youth from Muslim households in 
Marseille has clarified, takes countless guises, many of which recontextualize 
what are often thought of as more orthodox Islamic traditions. Certainly all of 
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these behavioral takes on the so-called Muslim category, when considered 
together, defy attempts at homogenization.  
 The findings presented here also point to further directions for possible 
research. I plan, in the future, to travel to locations like Algiers and Doha, where 
some of my female orthodox research participants have resettled, in order to 
investigate the challenges posed by their relocation. Foreseeable among these 
challenges, for example, is the mismatch between their French version of Islamic 
piety and the host country’s practice of Islam, something these young women 
have already indicated in their more recent conversations with me. How do 
these young women’s life paths unfold as time moves on: what careers do they 
pursue, what links do they maintain with France, and how do their convictions 
potentially change as they build families? These are some of the questions I plan 
to raise in the near future.  
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